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Notes and explanation of symbols 
The following symbols have been used in the tables in this Survey: 
Three dots (...) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. 
A dash (-) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible. 
A blank space in a table means that the item in question is not applicable. 
A minus sign (-) indicates a deficit or decrease, unless otherwise indicated. 
A full stop (.) is used to indicate decimals. 
A slash (/) indicates a crop year or fiscal year, e.g., 1969/1979. 
Use of a hyphen (-) between years, e.g., 1960-1970, signifies an annual average for the calendí r years involved, 
including the beginning and the end years. 
References to "tons" mean metric tons, and to "dollars" United States dollars, unless otherwise slated. 
Unless otherwise stated, references to annual growth rates of variation mean cumulative annual r ites. 
Figures and percentages in tables may not neccessarily add up to the corresponding totals, because of rounding. 
FOREWORD 
This issue of the Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 
differs in some important respects from previous years. In addition to a 
detailed analysis of the trends in the region's economies in 1994, it also 
covers economic developments in the early months of 1995. The aim was 
to provide continuity by following economic events up to the moment of 
writing in so far as information was available. 
- The Survey is appearing in a single volume comprising both a regi inal 
analysis and reports on each country. In the new format the Survey is 
shorter, since some of the country-specific information formerly 
included in the regional chapters is now given only in the country 
reports. 
- The regional section has been restructured. The chapter on economic 
policy also covers public finances and monetary and foreign exchange 
policy and includes two new sections on structural reform and the 
integration process. 
- The format of the country reports remains the same; they discuss 
economic policy in greater detail and outline the results achieved. The 
statistical information accompanying each report is limited to two 
tables and one figure summarizing trends in the main variables. 
- More detailed statistical information on each country from 1987 to the 
present will be presented in an annex, available on diskette, to be 
distributed separately. 
Further improvements will be made in the Survey next year. It is 
anticipated, for example, that the base year for figures at constant prices will 
be changed to 1990. 
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I. MAES TRENDS 
During most of 1994, there were further signs of 
consolidation of a more dynamic economic 
picture in Latin America and the Caribbean, with 
faster growth and a substantial reduction in the 
rate of inflation. With the explosion of the foreign 
exchange crisis on 20 December in Mexico 
-where pressure had gradually been building 
since the early months of the year due to a 
combination of serious political factors and the 
accentuation of imbalances already manifest in 
previous years- the region once again braced for 
turbulence, and fears were rife that the crisis 
would spread throughout the region in a repeat of 
the 1982 crisis. 
The impact of the Mexican crisis was, in fact, 
felt immediately in other countries of the region 
and reflected in a significant decline in 
international reserves, falling prices on the stock 
Overall, in 1994, the economies of Latin America 
and the Caribbean turned in a stronger 
performance than in previous years. The growth 
rate of gross domestic product for the region 
progressed from an annual average of 3.3% for 
the three-year period 1991-1993 to 4.5% in 
1994, the highest figure since 1980; per capita 
GDP rose 2.7% as a result. Average inflation 
(excluding Brazil) dropped to 16%, its lowest 
point in several decades. The countries of the 
region continued to attract large amounts of 
foreign capital, some US$ 43.5 billion in 1994, 
which helped to finance the growing current 
account deficit. Flows were lower than in the 
two previous years, however, because of 
problems in some countries in the region, 
which experienced a significant drop in capital 
inflows. Venezuela in particular posted a 
negative balance on its capital account after three 
exchanges and liquidity problem:; in the banking 
systems. In Argentina, in particular, fears revived 
that the currency would have to be devalued and 
that the stabilization process initiated in 1991 
would be cut short, while in Brazil the impact 
threw new obstacles in the way of the 
stabilization programme that had just got under 
way. In other countries, the impact was less 
dramatic, but their Governments were forced to 
tread warily in the new situation. 
The crisis deepened during the first quarter of 
1995, but later eased off in response to the 
adjustment measures adopted b) the countries 
most heavily affected, strong support from the 
developed countries and international 
organizations and the recovery in the economies 
of the industrialized countries, which was 
reflected in higher prices for basic products. 
years of positive balances. Mexico also 
experienced a major reduction in c apitai inflows, 
perceptible even in the early months of 1994, 
accentuated towards the end of the year and 
culminating in a sharp devaluation of the 
currency. 
In spite of the climate of uncertainty in a 
number of countries due to the ele :toral process, 
the improvement in the region's economic 
performance was facilitated by su: tained growth 
in internal investment and adherence to the 
policies of stabilization and structural reform 
adopted in earlier years. These measures were 
responsible for a gradual improvement in the 
underlying structure of the economies, despite 
their negative effects on some sectors over the 
short term. Economic performaice was also 
heavily influenced by the upturn in the world 
economy, particularly during the second half 
1. The economy of Latin America and the 
Caribbean in 1994 
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Table I-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATO RS 
Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
Gross national income 
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Urban unemployment rate0 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Per capita gross national income 
Consumer prices 
Current value of exports 
of goods and services 
Current value of imports 
of goods and services 
Terms of trade 
(goods and services) 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods 
and services) 
Net payments of profits and interest 
Balance on current account 
Balance on capital account 
Balance-of-payments position 
Total disbursed external debt 
Ratios (percentages) 
5.7 5.8 5.4 5.8 
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427.7 419.7 424.9 442.7 457.5 474.8 506.7 533.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* The figures given for the gross domestic product and the population correspond to the countries appearing in table 1-2 (except 
Cuba), while those given for consumer prices refer to the countries listed in table 1-4. The data concerning gi oss national income 
and the external sector (except for the figures on external debt) correspond to the countries shown in table IV-20. The figures 
for external debt refer to the countries listed in table IV-10. 
population of 17 countries in Latin America. d December-tc-December variation. 
Preliminary figures. Weighted annual rate for the 
of the year, a recovery that produced significant 
growth in international demand and an increase 
in prices of basic products after several years of 
declining trends. The impact of the recovery 
was countered to some extent by higher 
international interest rates, although their effect 
on the region was limited, since, before the 
increase, interest rates had been at the lowest 
levels in over 30 years. A further impetus was 
provided by renewed regional integration 
efforts. 
Notwithstanding the improvement in the 
economy, job creation continued to be 
inadequate in much of the region, as the work 
force grew at a faster pace, driven by higher 
rates of participation. In some countries, 
economic restructuring and efforts to improve 
competitiveness had negative short-term 
effects on labour demand. As a result, 
unemployment and underemployment did not 
decline in step with the increase in growth 
rates, and in some countries they actually 
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increased despite the stimulus of expanded 
output. 
In general, it was evident that in Latin 
America and the Caribbean growth rates of 
around 4% were not enough to allow for major 
progress in the fight against poverty or to prevent 
unemployment and underemployment from 
reaching unacceptable levels. Furthermore, 
capital inflows, while welcome for their 
contribution to growth and investment, reflected 
the inadequacy of internal saving and might 
undermine efforts to expand exports. There 
remained much to be done, therefore, in order to 
increase international competitiveness while at 
the same time improving social equity in years to 
come. 
Price stability remained a high priority in 
economic policy, and there was further progress 
in this area. Most of the countries had inflation 
rates of under 25% in 1994. Only Brazil, 
Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Uruguay and 
Venezuela exceeded that level. Seven countries 
-Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Panama and Trinidad and Tobago- actually 
achieved single-digit inflation, while Barbados 
registered a slight decrease in the price index. 
The most spectacular instance of stabilization in 
1994 was that of Brazil, where the Real Plan 
reduced the monthly rate of inflation from nearly 
50% to around 3%. Major progress was also 
made in Peru, where rates declined from over 
7,500% in 1990 to 15% in 1994. Argentina 
achieved a similar success, reducing inflation 
from 4,900% in 1989 to only 3.7% in 1994. A 
number of countries, however, experienced 
setbacks in this area in 1994, notably Costa Rica, 
Honduras, the Dominican Republic and 
Venezuela, which had much higher inflation 
rates than in 1993. 
In previous years, progress or setback in the 
fight against inflation had depended in large 
measure on the fiscal situation, which in most of 
the countries of the region was kept under control 
or financed with external resources. In 1994, 
however, it was observable that the adjustments 
were far more precarious, so that a number of 
countries were forced to tighten their fiscal 
austerity policies even further; this was the case 
with Costa Rica, Honduras, the Dominican 
Republic and Venezuela. As the year progressed, 
more countries, including Argenti na, Mexico and 
Uruguay, began to develop imbilances in their 
public sector accounts, and Brazi I was unable to 
achieve a sustainable fiscal adjustment. 
Appreciation of local currencies and greater 
real demand for money were major factors in 
consolidating price stability in some countries. In 
others, entrenched indexation mechanisms acted 
as a drag on anti-inflationary monetary measures. 
Against this background, fixed capital 
investment continued to expand jit the fast pace 
observable over the past three years. The 
expansion of investment caused imports of 
capital goods to grow with particular rapidity in 
Peru, Argentina and Brazil and to maintain their 
strong rate of growth in Colombia and Mexico. 
This was a significant indicator oí the efforts the 
countries in the region were making to modernize 
their production structures. 
The recovery of the industrialized economies 
and the resulting expansion of inte mational trade 
combined with the dynamism ol' intraregional 
trade created a favourable clirrate for Latin 
American and Caribbean exports The region's 
exports in 1994 totalled US$ L54.8 billion, 
representing an increase ol over 15%, 
considerably higher than the 5% increases posted 
in the two previous years. The acceleration was 
attributable to a shift in the trend o "export prices 
combined with continued momentum in the 
volume of sales. The trend shift was chiefly due 
to the behaviour of prices of basic products, 
which, excluding fuel prices, rose for the first 
time since 1989. The value of exports registered 
a particularly large increase in Bolivia (39%), 
Peru (30%), Nicaragua (29%), Chile (25%), the 
Dominican Republic (25%) and Ecuador (21%). 
The region's imports in 1994 totalled US$ 
175.4 billion, 17% higher than the year before, 
when they rose 9%. The increase; would have 
been even larger had it not been for he sharp drop 
in Venezuelan imports due to recession and 
limits on the availability of foreign currency. The 
largest increases in the value of imports occurred 
in Peru (39%), Brazil (29%), Argentina (28%), 
Uruguay (22%) and Colombia (20%). These 
rates reflect a larger volume of purchases, since 
prices rose only moderately (4%). 
The widening deficit in the mere handise trade 
balance (from US$ 15.7 billion to US$ 20.5 
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Table 1-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROWTH OF 
TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates) 
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Mexico 1.2 3.3 4.4 3.6 2.8 0.6 3.5 17.9 10.9 















Trinidad and Tobago 















































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
* Preliminary estimates subject to revision. Excludes Cuba. c Refers to total social product. 
d OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States. Includes Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. e Refers to the period 1991-1993. 
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Table 1-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROWTH OF 
PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
* Preliminary estimates subject to revision. Excludes Cuba. cRefers to total social product. OE ̂ S = Organization 
of Eastern Caribbean States. Includes Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sail it Lucia and Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines. e Refers to the period 1991-1993. 
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billion) was a factor in perpetuating the tendency 
towards a growing current account deficit 
financed by massive capital inflows. The current 
account deficit rose from US$ 46 billion in 1993 
to US$ 49 billion in 1994. Mexico (US$ 29.2 
billion) and Argentina (US$ 10.1 billion) ran the 
largest deficits, in both cases higher than in 1993. 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru also posted 
significant deficit increases of between US$ 500 
and US$ 800 million. Other countries ran deficits 
fairly similar to those of the year before, two 
exceptions being Chile (where the deficit 
narrowed because of the strong performance of 
exports) and Venezuela (where the balance 
shifted from deficit to surplus thanks primarily to 
a marked drop in imports). 
Capital inflows to finance the current account 
deficit were again plentiful, totalling some US$ 
43.3 billion. While this amount was lower than 
the US$ 67 billion that came into the region the 
year before, capital flows remained strong 
despite potential disincentives such as the 
uncertainties created by a number of crucial 
electoral contests, the problems confronting the 
financial systems of some countries and the rise 
in interest rates in the United States. It should be 
added, moreover, that the only major episodes of 
capital flight occurred close to the end of 1994 in 
Mexico and Venezuela and did not have 
repercussions on other countries. Since net 
capital inflows for the region as a whole were less 
than the current account deficit, international 
reserves decreased by US$ 5.6 billion, compared 
with an average accumulation of over US$ 20 
billion per year during the three-year period 
1991-1993. 
The sharpest drop in capital flows was 
experienced in Mexico, where fears of political 
instability led investors to reduce their net 
investments of US$ 30.7 billion to US$ 10.3 
billion, still a fairly large amount, equal to nearly 
one fourth of net flows into the region as a whole. 
Since the sum was considerably lower than the 
Mexican current account deficit, international 
reserves declined US$ 18.9 billion to make up 
the difference. In Venezuela, a banking crisis 
resulted in a capital outflow of US$ 4.9 billion, 
in contrast to the inflow of US$ 2.2 billion in 
1993. Venezuela was then also forced to draw on 
US$ 800 millions its reserves, despite the 
significant turnaround in its curre at account from 
a serious deficit to a large surplus. A number of 
Central American and Caribbean countries 
(Costa Rica, Guatemala and most notably the 
Dominican Republic) also reteived far less 
foreign capital than the year befo re. On the other 
hand, 10 countries received larger capital flows, 
with Chile, Colombia and Peru posting 
substantial increases. For the region as a whole, 
net transfers of funds (net capital flows less 
interest and dividend payments) :ontinued to be 
positive for the fourth consecutivo year, although 
the figure declined from US$ 33.7 billion in 1993 
to US$ 9.2 billion in 1994. This was primarily 
due to the large negative net transfers from 
Venezuela and Mexico reflect: ng net capital 
outflows and to the regularizai ion of Brazil's 
debt service arrears, for which it drew on its 
international reserves. 
Capital flowed into Latin Anerica and the 
Caribbean in 1994 chiefly in the form of bonds, 
foreign direct investment and stock purchases 
through the region's stock exchanges or stock 
exchanges outside the region in the form of 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRS) in the 
United States market and Gloriai Depositary 
Receipts (GDRS) in the world market. Of the net 
capital influx of US$ 43.3 billion in 1994, some 
US$ 17 billion were attracted liy bond issues, 
even though bonds declined in relative 
importance compared to 1993. <\DRs and GDRs 
accounted for close to US$ 5 billion, while 
foreign direct investment brought in some 
US$ 18 billion. The remainder came from 
stock purchases through local stock exchanges, 
official loans and various short-term capital 
instruments. 
The region increased its indebl edness by 5.8% 
in 1994 to US$ 534 billion. The net increase of 
nearly US$ 30 billion was largely due to the bond 
issues mentioned above, togetier with loans 
from international and regional financial 
institutions and from Governments of 
industrialized countries. These increases in 
liabilities were partially offset by reductions in 
commercial debt in Brazil, Ecuador and the 
Dominican Republic, where Bridy plans were 
implemented. 
The combination of a moderate increase in 
debt and larger increases in exports brought 
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Table 1-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONSUMER PRICES 















































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a To May. 
about a reduction in the debt/export ratio for the 
region as a whole from 302% in 1993 to 280% in 
1994, its lowest level since the start of the debt 
crisis. All the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, except for Paraguay and Haiti, 
managed to improve their debt/export ratio, even 
though in some cases (notably Nicaragua and 
Haiti), the debt burden continued t< t be quite high 
and will have to be dealt with in the years to 
come. 
2. The crisis of late 1994 - early 1995 
The economic crisis that erupted in late 1994 
appeared to be similar to that of 1982 and difficult 
to limit to a single country. This was true, in 
particular, because it had begun in one of the 
largest economies in the region, which was also 
the main recipient of financial resources from 
abroad. However, some external and internal 
factors were different from those seen in the 1982 
crisis. Rows were not of the same type; in 1982, 
credit from international commercial banks had 
predominated, while in 1994 foreign direct 
investment or portfolio investment (bonds and 
shares) and repatriation of capital hi >ld sway, with 
a parallel decrease in the amounts < if commercial 
19 
bank loans. Moreover, international economic 
conditions were different; there was no strong 
dollar, as in 1982, and the economies of the 
developed countries were expanding, not in 
recession as they had been earlier. Accordingly, 
prices of basic products were high, and interest 
rates, while rising, were lower than in 1982. 
Meanwhile, the Latin American economies were 
in a far better position to cope with the crisis than 
they had been at the start of the 1980s, as there 
was greater awareness of the need to maintain 
macroeconomic equilibria. In addition, broad 
structural reforms had taken place, which 
improved the countries' linkages with the global 
economy. 
Thus, while the situation in the region has 
shown some difficulties in the first months of 
1995, under no circumstances has there been a 
widespread crisis. In addition, there are 
significant differences between countries. 
The Mexican crisis continued to deepen in the 
early months of 1995, forcing the authorities to 
implement a harsh fiscal adjustment plan aimed 
at achieving a substantial fiscal surplus; this 
enabled them to mobilize massive financial 
resources from abroad, thanks to the decisive 
support of the United States Government and 
international institutions. From April onward it 
was possible to stabilize the exchange rate, which 
had been floating since the end of December 
1994, at around 6 pesos to the dollar, after it had 
reached nearly 8 pesos. As a result of such 
measures and of the devaluation itself, the level 
of activity contracted, while the inflation rate 
rose to 33% in the first half of 1995 compared to 
only 7% during 1994. On the other hand, a very 
favourable trend was seen in the trade balance, 
which had a surplus of nearly US$ 1.2 billion in 
the first four months; this contrasts with the 
deficit of US$ 5.7 billion, equivalent to 6% of 
GDP, registered in the same quarter of 1994. 
In Argentina, the first months of 1995 brought 
a notable reduction in capital inflows, which 
caused strong pressure on the foreign exchange 
market and significant declines in international 
reserves. The financial system was also seriously 
affected by the growing fears that a number of 
banking institutions were in dire straits. 
Meanwhile, the fiscal problems were aggravated 
by the drop in tax revenue. In order to cope with 
the first-mentioned difficulties, tie Government 
reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining peso 
convertibility, for which it drew on a large 
build-up of reserves. 
Subsequently, a fiscal adjustment plan was 
adopted to increase fiscal revenue, especially by 
raising the value-added tax rati: by 3%, and 
reduce public expenditure, mainly through wage 
cuts, and thus achieve a significant surplus in 
public accounts, which would seive to establish 
an emergency fund to aid struggling banks. 
Support from international institutions and 
contributions from the domestic private sector 
and international commercial banks were also 
obtained for this fund. Inflation continued to be 
very low, while the level of activity showed signs 
of going into recession. Meanwhile, the trade 
balance was in surplus during the first five 
months of 1995, following the high deficit of 
1994. 
Brazil, too, was affected by the drop in capital 
inflows, just when it was on the way to 
consolidating its stabilization process. That was 
reflected by instability in the forïign-exchange 
and stock markets and declines in reserves, 
which, however, remained high. The strong 
appreciation of the real in the second half of 1994 
had undermined the trade balance, which from 
November onward registered deficits. Thus, the 
Government faced a dilenma in it's 
exchange-rate policy. On the on 5 hand, it was 
difficult to maintain the exchange rate "anchor", 
which had helped to reduce inflatk in; on the other 
hand, allowing the real to deprecate would help 
the trade problem, but would nake it more 
difficult to control inflation und eliminate 
indexation. 
This dilemma has been expressed in continual 
changes in exchange-rate policy which have 
increased economic instability. Added to this 
were the difficulties of fiscal adjustment and the 
severity of monetary policy, which had become 
the main instrument of stabilization. 
Furthermore, legislative approval of the 
structural reform process is progressing slowly, 
although it took important leaps in June. The 
level of activity remained high in lhe first quarter 
of 1995, but began to decline theieafter because 
of the restrictions imposed in ore er to limit the 
growth of consumption, especially extremely 
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high real interest rates. Meanwhile, in June 1995 
the annual inflation rate was around 34%, its 
lowest level since 1976. 
In Chile the Mexican crisis had a lesser 
impact; this was because the Chilean economy 
was well tuned, had a fiscal surplus and was 
registering domestic saving levels far above 
those of other countries in the region, and 
because it had a very dynamic export sector 
which was also favoured by high prices for the 
main export items. The impact of the crisis was 
felt, however fleetingly, on the stock exchange. 
Large capital inflows resumed, so that the 
Chilean currency was again overvalued. 
In the other countries in the rej;ion the effects 
of the crisis have generally teen of lesser 
magnitude. In any case, here, too, it was 
necessary to promote adjustmsnts of some 
significance. Moreover, the crises of some 
countries, such as Costa Rica, Honduras and 
Venezuela, began earlier and were due to specific 
causes in each case. In 1995 the indicators for 
these three countries have continued to show 
setbacks in the level of activity, n slowdown or 
drop in output, exacerbated inflationary 
tendencies and a deepening diseqt ilibrium in the 
balance of payments, along with losses in 
reserves and even delays in paying debt service. 
21 

II. ECONOMIC POLICY 
In 1994 the focus of economic policy in the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries continued to 
be on maintaining macroeconomic equilibria, 
since a recurrence of the serious situations 
encountered some years earlier remained a 
distinct possibility. In some countries, old 
problems did in fact recur or persist and required 
greater attention. At the same time, countries 
continued to place emphasis on structural reform 
Controlling inflation continued to be the prime 
goal of macroeconomic policy in most Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, which in 
general adhered in broad outline to the policies 
they had pursued in previous years. More 
thorough-going fiscal adjustment was one of 
the chief reasons for in the progress achieved 
in stabilization programmes, other contributing 
factors being prudent monetary policy and close 
monitoring of exchange rates to maintain 
levels compatible with anti-inflationary 
targets. These practices went hand in hand with 
further liberalization of the external sector, 
particularly through regional agreements 
aimed at eliminating tariffs between trading 
partners. 
Abundant external capital continued to flow 
into the region, helping to finance increased 
domestic demand but lowering real exchange 
rates. In an environment of primarily floating 
exchange rate systems, the capital influx 
generally tended to appreciate national 
currencies, although some countries set 
minimum rates to protect external 
competitiveness. Heavy flows of foreign capital 
also made it harder to manage monetary policy, 
leading some countries to adopt measures to 
restrict the entry of financial resources, 
particularly short-term capital. In this scenario of 
policies, in part to help achieve macroeconomic 
equilibria and in part to strengthen the new 
operating bases of their respective economies. 
The momentum of structural reform manifest in 
the early years of the 1990s did slow somewhat, 
however. Although major ac vanees were 
announced for 1995 and following years, in 
Brazil, for instance, the measures were still in the 
study phase or in debate in the legislature. 
abundant foreign resources, however, economic 
policy-makers often took advantage of the 
anti-inflationary effect of exchange rate 
appreciation. Programmes of tarif! reduction and 
foreign trade liberalization also helped to slow 
inflation by contributing to an expansion of 
aggregate supply through an increase in imports 
costing less than domestic produc s. 
In 1994, Brazil, with the region's largest 
economy, joined the ranks of countries with a 
stabilization programme by introducing a set 
of measures that drastically curtailed price 
increases. In Costa Rica, Honduras and 
Venezuela, in contrast, signifcant macro-
economic disequilibria developed ¡ ind fuelled the 
pace of inflation. Haiti's situetion became 
desperate, as the trade blockade and the 
suspension of international aid persisted nearly 
to the end of the year. The Mexican economy 
suffered a new wave of inflation following the 
devaluation at the end of Decern >er 1994; the 
jump in prices in the first half of 1995 was the 
highest since 1989. 
In 1994, the public sector in most countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean achieved 
something close to a balanced budget, 
consolidating the major strides made since 1991, 
and while the number of deteriorating 
government budgets increased, the sums 
A. MACROECONOMIC POLICY 
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involved remained within bounds. To a great 
extent, these results were the fruit of fiscal 
adjustment processes initiated in earlier years 
and the widespread adoption of budget control 
measures. 
Progress in fiscal reform, more realistic 
pricing policies adopted by public sector 
enterprises, perseverance in efforts to crack 
down on tax evasion and proceeds from 
privatization continued to boost real revenues. 
Expenditure, particularly capital expenditure, 
was held in check. These factors helped to keep 
fiscal results for most countries within acceptable 
By the beginning of 1994, most of the region's 
economies had already achieved significant 
reductions in the rate of inflation. Some of them 
(Argentina, Bolivia and Peru) once faced 
situations of near hyperinflation that forced them 
to undertake drastic stabilization plans; the 
plans have essentially run their course, since 
price increases have been very low in recent 
years. Nicaragua also succeeded in reducing 
inflation dramatically, but the country 
nonetheless remains deeply mired in crisis. 
Other countries experiencing high inflation 
rates, such as Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay, 
succeeded in bringing them down. In Mexico, 
the annual rate of inflation dropped into the 
single digits, until the foreign exchange crisis in 
December 1994 set off a new wave of prices 
increases. The most recent inflation-fighting 
effort was Brazil's new stabilization plan, so far 
a success, after five failed attempts over the last 
nine years. 
There were a few exceptions to this picture, 
one being Venezuela; in 1989 the country 
undertook a stringent adjustment and 
stabilization plan and succeeded in reducing 
inflation and balancing public sector accounts 
and its balance of payments, but later gradually 
Public finances in most Latin American countries 
in 1994 were more or less under control. In a few 
economies, however, the relatively sound footing 
limits in 1994, so that pressure on domestic credit 
was avoided. Exceptions to this rule were Costa 
Rica, Venezuela, Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, where growing fiscal deficits financed 
by monetary expansion fuelled higher inflation. 
Except in a few cases, then, rronetary policy 
was facilitated by fiscal managerient and by an 
increase in the demand for money in a climate of 
expectations of declining inflation. Hence, most 
of the challenges that arose in mai itaining a level 
of monetary expansion compatible with growth 
and inflation targets had to do with the influx of 
external capital. 
abandoned the measures and suffered a return to 
macroeconomic turbulence. CDsta Rica and 
Honduras also experienced a resurgence of 
inflation along with fiscal ard balance-of-
payments deficits. 
The stabilization plan institut ;d by Brazil in 
1994 was undoubtedly the most ambitious plan 
undertaken by a country in the region in recent 
years since the efforts by Argentina, Nicaragua 
and Peru in 1989-1991. It was implemented in 
three successive stages. In the first stage the aim 
was to achieve fiscal balance, the basic 
prerequisite for the plan. The second stage 
involved coordinating the price-setting process 
by creating a new indexing mechs nism with daily 
variations and making it mandai ory or strongly 
encouraging its use for all prices : n the economy. 
In the third stage, a new currency (the real) was 
introduced and went into circulation on 1 July, 
replacing all the old currency at i ts "URV" value 
(unit of real value) as of 30 June. The plan 
achieved promising results; the inflation rate 
dropped drastically from a rate o1'nearly 50% foi 
the month of June 1994 to a monthly average of 
a little over 2% in the following twelve months, 
thanks to the elimination of much of the inertial 
component of price increases in Brazil. 
of previous years was eroded, while in some 
others already posting heavy defi cits the situation 
remained critical or deteriorated even further. 
1. Stabilization plans 
2. Fiscal policy and public finances 
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The deep fiscal crisis experienced by most 
countries in the region in the 1980s obliged their 
governments to adopt drastic fiscal adjustment 
programmes closely tied to adjustments in 
external accounts. In the course of the decade, 
some countries began to show promising signs of 
improvement in their fiscal accounts, achieved, 
however, primarily through sharp cuts in 
spending, particularly on wages, capital 
investment and social programmes. Toward the 
end of the 1980s, more economies followed their 
example, so that between 1989 and 1991 fiscal 
adjustment became widespread in the region. A 
trend towards balanced public sector accounts set 
in and in most cases persisted into 1994. 
In the early months of 1995, however, there 
was an abrupt deterioration in public sector 
finances in some countries as a result of the crisis 
that hit the region in December 1994. The drastic 
reduction in capital flows from abroad not only 
put pressure on foreign exchange markets, but 
affected the level of economic activity and hence 
of tax revenues, and this in turn made a high level 
of public expenditure unsustainable. The 
situation forced severe new fiscal adjustments, 
which basically entailed increasing the tax 
burden and applying cost control measures. 
a) Trends in fiscal balances 
Trends in fiscal balances were not uniform 
across Latin America and the Caribbean; in this 
respect countries can be divided into five 
categories. The first category covers those who 
had their fiscal accounts relatively well 
adjusted by the end of the 1980s (Chile, 
Colombia and Paraguay) and were still in a 
comfortable position in 1994. In Chile, the 
non-financial public sector again posted a surplus 
of 2% of GDP, marking over ten years of 
balanced public finances; Colombia and 
Paraguay managed to increase their positive 
balances (see table II-l). 
In the countries that make up the second 
category, the process of fiscal adjustment 
intensified in 1994. In Peru, which began the 
decade mired in deep crisis, central government 
accounts moved from a deficit equal to 1.6% of 
Figured by excluding the inflation component of nominal i 
output in 1993 to a surplus of 2.1% in 1994, 
although part of this achievement was due to 
non-recurring income from srivatization. 
Ecuador also managed to reduce it s non-financial 
public sector deficit to just 0.2% of GDP. Brazil 
swung from a deficit of 1.3% of OP in operating 
terms to a surplus of 1.2%, a trend that 
accelerated in the second half of ] 994 due to the 
sharp drop in inflation. 
The third category comprises a number of 
countries that had made major progress in 
previous years in controlling public finances but 
suffered setbacks in 1994. Argentina, Mexico 
and the Dominican Republic, for example, 
recorded a modest deficit in 1994, whereas in 
1993 they had shown a surplus or a nearly 
balanced budget. Uruguay, which adjusted its 
public sector accounts in 1991, experienced a 
setback in 1993 and an even deeper deficit, equal 
to 3% of output, in 1994. The strious external 
account crises that developed in <\rgentina and 
Mexico towards the end of 1994 al so had a heavy 
impact on their fiscal situations aid obliged the 
governments of both countries tc adopt drastic 
adjustment measures in the early m onths of 1995. 
The government that took office in Uruguay in 
March 1995, fearing that the extern al capital flow 
crisis might accentuate the deficit, also 
implemented a new fiscal adjustment 
programme. 
The countries in the fourth category are 
those whose deficits were large but were 
financed with external resources granted on 
concessional terms; of this group i, Bolivia and 
El Salvador succeeded in reducing their 
deficits. Honduras and Nicaragua, in contrast, 
ran up substantial deficits of 5% and 10% of 
output, respectively, although ttey were still 
able to finance them completely with external 
capital, grants and "soft" loans. In Guatemala, 
finally, the central government deficit was held 
to 1.5% of GDP, despite a decline in current 
revenues, offset by an equivalent ci it in spending. 
To that figure should be added a quasi-fiscal 
deficit of 1%. 
The final category covers countries with a 
relatively complicated fiscal situation in which 
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Source: ECLAC, based on official figures. 
Key: CG = central government. NFPS = Non-financial public seaor. NNFPS = National non-financial public sector, excluding 
provinces and municipalities. CPS = Consolidated public sector. 
Calculated on the basis of figures in local currency at current prices. Preliminary figures. 
requirements of consolidated public sector. Excludes inflation component of interest rates. 
" Estima es based on finance 
e Does n ot include transfers. 
derived in whole or in part from monetary 
creation. In Costa Rica, the central government 
deficit expanded to 7% of GDP from a level of 
less than 2% the year before. Venezuela's fiscal 
deficit, already high, rose even higher, chiefly 
because of the banking crisis that forced the 
public sector to provide massive financial 
assistance to the banks. Haiti's public finances, 
already in a state of collapse during the previous 
two years, again shrank drastically, leaving the 
authorities no choice but to finance the huge 
fiscal deficit by issuing money ind postponing 
external debt service payments. 
b) Trends in fiscal income 
In 1994, as in the previous two years, fiscal 
income increased in most countries in the 
region with just six exceptions (Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Haiti and Honduras). In consequence, 
non-financial public sector income in a 
In some cases only information on central government income was available. 
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numberofeconomies reached levels higher than 
in 1990. Ten countries (Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay) achieved levels that exceeded those 
recorded at the start of the decade by 25% or 
more in real terms (see table II-2). In Brazil, 
general government income continued to climb 
back after contracting in 1991-1992. Where 
fiscal income increased, it was due to the 
expansion of both tax revenues and earnings of 
public sector enterprises; in some cases 
non-recurring income from privatization was 
also a factor. Declines in fiscal income were 
largely due to the problems that curtailed tax 
revenues in certain countries. 
i) Tax revenues 
One of the most significant developments in 
public finances in the region in 1994 was the fact 
that in six countries (Bolivia, Brazil, El Salvador, 
Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela) tax revenues 
increased by over 10% in real terms, in some of 
them for the second or third straight year. In 
Venezuela, non-petroleum tax revenues 
underwent a remarkable expansion (40%), nearly 
triple the figure for 1990. In contrast, 
petroleum-related tax revenues declined. Some 
other countries (Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Panama) also achieved 
increases ranging from 4% to 7%. In Chile, on 
the other hand, tax revenues increased very 
little because of tax cuts. In the other seven 
countries of the region, tax revenues declined 
(see table II-2). 
As in previous years, the increases in tax 
revenues in Latin America were due to a 
variety of factors, including expanded 
economic activity and imports, low and 
declining inflation rates, greater efficiency on 
the part of collecting agencies, and tax reform. 
Revived production activity expanded the 
tax base in most countries of the region, 
thereby contributing to the increase in tax 
revenues, generally with high elasticity in 
relation to output. Significantly greater 
imports, generally subject to high tax rates, 
also brought about a big increase in tax 
revenues. Import liberalization policies 
introduced in recent years also had a major 
impact, since the larger volume of imports 
more thancompensatedforthe re( luction in tariff 
rates. 
In nearly all countries in which tax revenues 
increased, economic activity ami imports also 
increased. In Venezuela, however, the expansion 
in non-petroleum tax revenues was due to new 
taxes, while older taxes brought in less because 
of rising inflation and slumping economic 
activity. In Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Guatemala and Uruguay tax revenues 
declined in real terms despite an increase in the 
level of economic activity; the decline was due 
to a combination of other factors, such as tax cuts 
and a drop in tax revenues deriving from 
petroleum. 
The fact that a number of countries that had 
suffered in the past from runaway inflation 
were able to bring their inflation rates firmly 
under control in 1994 also contributed 
significantly to higher tax revenues. Rising 
inflation had hurt revenues because of the 
widening gap between the valuss of the tax 
liability when generated and when actually 
collected by the State. The sow-down in 
inflation beginning in 1991 produced the 
opposite effect. The increase in revenues from 
this cause was especially noticeable in 1994 in 
Brazil and Peru, as it had bei;n earlier in 
Argentina. 
Major improvements in the efficiency of the 
collecting agencies were also obüervable, and 
the effect was reflected in the high elasticity of 
tax revenues in relation to output Tax evasion 
nevertheless continued to be extensive, as 
more efficient collection methods were 
countered by the growing inform! il component 
in the economy. The phenomenon was 
particularly noticeable in Peru, vhere the tax 
ratio, although up significantly in 1994 to 
10.5%, still remained far below the levels 
recorded prior to 1987. In Brazil, despite 
improvements in the two previous years, the 
tax ratio was just 22%, nearly four per cent 
lower than the rates recorded for some years in 
the previous decade. 
Tax reforms introduced in 1994, combined 
with reforms still in effect from earlier years, 
undoubtedly contributed to the increase in 
fiscal income in a number of countries. The 
chief purpose of the reforms was to correct the 
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Figure II-l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CURRENT INCOME OF 
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Table II-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PUBLIC SECTOR INCOME 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, based on official figures. 
Key: CG = Central government. GG = General government. PEMEX = Petróleos de Mexico. PDVSA = Petróleos de 
Venezuela. CPS = Consolidated public sector. NFPS = Non-financial public sector. NNIPS = National 
non-financial public sector, excluding provinces and municipalities. 
a Calculated on the basis of figures in 1980 dollars. b Calculated on the basis of figures in local currency at current prices. 
c Preliminary figures. Includes income from sales by public sector enterprises and autonomous agencie s. e Includes 
Treasury, taxes on the circulation of merchandise and services, and social security contributions. 
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imbalance in public finances, and to achieve that 
aim tax rates were raised, new taxes created and 
exemptions eliminated orreduced." 
ii) Other public sector income 
Other important sources of public sector 
income were income from public sector 
enterprises and non-recurring income from sales 
of State assets. 
There were divergent trends in public 
enterprise income in 1994. In the countries in 
which such fiscal income derived largely from 
State-owned oil-exporting enterprises, the 
figures declined. In countries where metal 
exports predominated, on the other hand, income 
rose significantly, reflecting higher international 
prices. With regard to income from domestic 
sales of goods and services, revenues of public 
sector enterprises held their own or increased in 
some countries thanks to rate adjustments that 
enabled them to catch up with the general 
increases in prices. In some economies, such 
income was affected by the privatization of 
public sector enterprises. 
In Mexico, petroleum revenues declined 17%, 
while in Venezuela, where lower prices were 
offset by growth in gas and oil exports, they 
increased 7%. In Ecuador, the surplus posted by 
public sector enterprises was lowered by a 
combination of lower prices for crude and a lag 
in some rates (electricity, communications). A 
similar situation was observable in Bolivia, 
where income from sales by pubic enterprises 
declined 1.5% in real terms, primarily as a result 
of the drop in the price of natural gas sold to 
Argentina. 
In Chile, on the other hand, the surplus 
realized by the Corporación Nacional del 
Cobre (CODELCO), after declining sharply the 
year before, rebounded thanks to the rise in the 
price of copper, so that the enterprise was able 
to increase its transfers to the central 
government. Other Chilean public sector 
enterprises duplicated the results of the 
previous year. In Colombia, the net operating 
income of public sector enterprises went up 
13% in real terms, bolstered by the surpluses of 
the electric power sector and the State-owned oil 
company. 
In Paraguay, public sector enterprises again 
generated surpluses, thanks in large measure to 
adjustments in the prices of the goods and 
services they provided. In addition, there was a 
big jump in royalty income ¡elated to the 
operation of the Itaipú hydroelectric dam. In 
Peru, operating results of public sector 
enterprises improved as a result of increases in 
prices and rates, particularly for electricity and 
telephone services. In Uruguay, public sector 
enterprises once again posted a profit thanks to 
price and rate adjustments, enabling them to 
transfer large sums to the central government. In 
El Salvador, public sector enter] >rises posted a 
significant operating surplus, du; in part to an 
increase in rates. 
In Argentina, in contrast, savings of public 
sector enterprises once again declined, largely 
because the enterprises remaining after 
privatization were limited in scope. In Brazil, on 
the other hand, public sector enterprises were 
able to raise their rates in the first half of 1994, 
and although rates were later frozen, the 
companies were able to make up a small 
operating deficit. 
In a few countries, finally, public sector 
enterprises posted negative results. In Costa 
Rica, for example, in a change from previous 
years when their surpluses helped to offset the 
central government deficit, the em erprises had no 
contribution to make to the public coffers, chiefly 
because of investments in telephone equipment 
and to a lesser extent in electric power plants. In 
Honduras, public sector enterprises posted a 
large deficit due to spending on an emergency 
programme to alleviate the electric power crisis. 
In the Dominican Republic, public sector 
enterprises and autonomous agencies performed 
less well in 1994, which translated into a 
significant deficit for the non-financial public 
sector as a whole. 
Non-tax income collected by the various 
4 
levels of government , a category covering a 
fairly heterogeneous group of it ;ms, increased 
3 Tax reforms in recent years are discussed later in this chapter under the heading of "Structural reforms". 
4 Normally, social security contributions would be included under this category, but were excluded because 1994 information 
was not available. 
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Figure II-2 
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in 9 of the 15 countries for which information 
was available. Notable among them were 
Uruguay, Paraguay and Colombia, which 
achieved increasesofoveronepercentofoutput; 
Chile and Peru also made gains, to a lesser 
degree. 
In addition, in 1994 some countries of the 
region again realized proceeds from the sale of 
public sector enterprises and other assets; Peru 
and Colombia were outstanding examples. In 
Argentina and Mexico, on the other hand, where 
income from such sources had increased 
markedly in previous years, the sums realized in 
1994 declined. Privatization continued in Brazil, 
but proceeded at the halting pace characteristic 
of previous fiscal years. In the other countries of 
the region, income generated from the sale of 
public assets was minimal. 
c) Trends in public expenditure 
In 1994, public sector expenditure increased 
in real terms in most of the region. In 14 of the 
countries for which information was available 
expenditure increased, although the percentage 
increase and the reasons for it differed widely. 
Expenditure declined in only five countries, 
compared with eight the year before. The biggest 
jumps in total expenditure were in Costa Rica, 
Peru and Venezuela, where central government 
spending rose by percentages ranging from 19% 
to 31%. In Venezuela, non-financial public 
sector expenditure increased 50% because of the 
financial assistance that had to be given to the 
banking system when it faced massive 
withdrawals by depositors. There were also 
significant increases in Colombia, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay (between 9% 
and 15%), while in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, the 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama 
expenditures grew at a moderate pace (between 
2% and 5%). 
In Brazil, on the other hand, expenditure 
dropped slightly, and in Ecuador and Guatemala 
it declined significantly (between 6% and 10%). 
In Honduras total central government spending 
was cut heavily (-17%) as an adjustment 
measure, after increasing an average of 20% a 
year over the two-year period 1992-1993. In 
Haiti, finally, spending declined drastically for 
the fourth consecutive year (see table II-3). 
In most countries of the region public sector 
expenditure dropped sharply -in real terms-
during the 1980s as a result of ttie adjustments 
undertaken in the wake of the external debt crisis. 
In the current decade, however, th ; pendulum has 
begun to swing back in some countries, as can be 
seen from the fact that in 1994 the level of 
spending reached historical lighs in nine 
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Venezuela), while Honduras 
reached a high in 1993. In Brazil, on the other 
hand, total expenditure increased in the previous 
decade, reaching a peak in 1987, and thereafter 
declined steadily except for 199ÍL In most other 
countries of the region, despits a significant 
rebound in recent years, spending in 1994 
still remained below the levels of the early 
1980s. Haiti and Nicaragua, in contrast, spent 
in 1994 only one fourth and one half, 
respectively, of the amounts the y spent in 1987 
(see table II-3). 
With regard to the separate components of 
expenditure, trends were mixed; although in 
most countries both current and capital 
expenditure increased, there were some countries 
in which these two components siowed opposite 
tendencies. In 10 of the countries in which total 
spending rose in real terms (Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) both 
current and capital expenditure hcreased. Three 
other countries (Argentina, El Salvador and 
Venezuela) increased only their current 
expenditure, while reducing capital expenditure. 
In the Dominican Republic, on the other hand, 
capital expenditure accounted for the entire 
increase in total spending, while current 
expenditure declined slightly. All countries that 
reduced total spending made significant cuts in 
both current and capital expenditure. 
In a number of the 19 countries for which up-to-date information on public finances was available, the < lata on expenditures 
referred only to the central government only (and generally included transfers to local governments, but not their expenditures). 
Information on the total expenditure of the non-financial public sector was available only for a subset of cou itries. 
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Interest payments on both external and 
domestic debt were lower in seven countries of 
the region, but higher, in some cases appreciably 
higher, in another eight. One reason for the 
decline was a reduction in external debt as a result 
of agreements signed in the framework of the 
Brady Plan. In some countries, interest payments 
on domestic debt were lower because of a drop 
in nominal interest rates, linked, for the most part, 
to the slowing rate of inflation, although the 
decline in real terms was considerably less. In 
Brazil, in particular, real interest payments 
declined for the second year following a sharp 
increase in 1992. The decline was due to lower 
real domestic interest rates, which no longer 
had to be used intensively as monetary 
instruments to control runaway inflation and to 
counteract the rapid expansion of the money 
supply caused by a large increase in 
international reserves. In the second half of 1994 
the trend began to shift, and real interest rates 
were again raised considerably to help control 
inflation, when difficulties arose with the use of 
fiscal instruments. 
i) Spending policy 
In contrast to previous years, for a variety of 
reasons countries departed from the strict 
policies of austerity in public sector spending 
introduced at the end of the previous or beginning 
of the current decade. Fiscal adjustment policies 
ran into serious difficulties because of the 
inflexible structure of public expenditure; new 
needs arose that could not be postponed, or it was 
found that expenditure could not be indefinitely 
compressed. 
Seven countries (Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru 
and Uruguay) adopted expansive fiscal policies. 
In Costa Rica, the decision was reflected in 
increased consumption outlays and interest 
payments. The heavy increase in expenditure, 
however, was caused by other factors over which 
the Government had very little control, such as 
the above-mentioned transfers to the financial 
system. Mexico pursued an obviously expansive 
policy aimed at supporting the sectors where 
government participation was socially most 
productive, promoting economic recovery and 
enhancing the social component of spending. All 
these aims resulted in an increase in real current 
expenditure (10%), in a context of steadily 
declining interest rates (-1:1%). Capital 
expenditure expanded 25% in real terms, most of 
it spent as part of the National Solidarity 
Programme and in the areas of communications 
and transportation. 
In Peru, both current and capiial expenditure 
expanded explosively. The expansion was made 
possible by an impressive improvi ment in public 
sector finances due to an increase in income that 
was quite remarkable, even setting aside the large 
sums generated by privatization. Public sector 
investment increased 65% in reil terms, since 
external financing was also available. Uruguay 
increased its expenditures considerably, 
primarily through social security transfers over 
which the Government had no control and 
through a 31% real increase in capital 
expenditure as a result of the expansive policy 
adopted by the authorities in th s area. There 
was also a rapid rise in wage payments, while 
interest payments on the public debt continued 
to decline. 
The Dominican Republic pursued an 
expansive policy on capital expenditure, 
increasing it nearly 8%, while current outlays 
declined 4%, reflecting a decliie in interest 
payments. In Nicaragua an expans: ve investment 
policy was pursued in an attempt to make up for 
enormous deficiencies in infrastructure, the 
legacy of years of crisis and aimed conflict. 
Increased expenditure in Paraguay, particularly 
capital investment, was covered by a comfortable 
surplus in public finances resulting from the tax 
reform introduced in 1992. 
Most Latin America countries faced the 
problem of in inflexibility in the public budget 
due to the large number of people employed in 
the public sector and large inteiest payments 
equalling as much as 3% of oitput. In nine 
countries, moreover, the trerd in public 
expenditure was due to factors beyond the 
control of the authorities. In Colombia, which 
up to two years ago had been able to adhere to 
a policy of moderate growth in public sector 
spending, outlays began to mounl substantially 
starting in 1993, essentially becau se of massive 
transfers from the central Government to the 
regional and local governments. Tie increase in 
transfers was based on coistitutional 
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Figure II-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
OF NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC SECTORa 
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a For Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay, the total expenditure shown pertains to the central government only; for 
Brazil and Chile it pertains to general government. 
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Table II-3 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, based on official figures. 
Key: CG = Central government. GG = General government. NFPS : 
public sector, excluding provinces and municipalities. 
* Calculated on the basis of figures in constant 1980 dollars. 
prices. c Preliminary figures. 
= Non-financial public sector. NNFPS = N¡ tional non-financial 
Calculated on the basis of figures in local currency at current 
amendments allotting subnational governments 
a share in the tax revenues collected by the 
central Government. In Argentina, Costa Rica 
and Uruguay, greater expenditure was the 
result of a large increase in disbursements 
under the social security system. In the case of 
Costa Rica, additional factors were the 
considerable cost of export incentives and 
transfers related to the bankruptcy of Banco 
Anglo-Costarricense. 
The Government of El Salvador was obliged 
to allocate large sums to defray the costs of the 
peace process, including grants to demobilized 
combatants and the creation of new institutions. 
In Honduras, adjustments in public sector 
expenditure were delayed by the need to make 
heavy investments in the electric power system 
to avoid a breakdown in the power supply. 
Nicaragua maintained a high level of expenditure 
because the public sector remained large despite 
gradual reductions, especially in the military. 
Bolivia incurred considerable expense to pay 
compensation to 3,000 workers who took early 
retirement from the State-owned enterprise, 
Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL). In 
Venezuela, finally, already struggling with a 
heavy fiscal deficit, a widespread banking crisis 
developed that forced financial institutions to 
turn for help to the Deposit Guaranty and Bank 
Protection Fund (FOGADE). 
Despite the above-mentioned inflexibility in 
the budget, most countries did attempt to control 
spending. In five (Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Honduras) measures were 
implemented to make a signifie! int reduction in 
total expenditures or at least in so me of the major 
expense items. In Brazil, he economic 
authorities adhered to the view that balanced 
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public sector accounts were basic to the 
success of the stabilization plan. In a major 
development, a constitutional amendment was 
introduced to reduce mandatory allocations of 
taxes and social security contributions, making 
it easier to achieve a cash management 
balance. The high cost of the public debt, 
however, continued to make it difficult to 
control expenditure. 
In Ecuador, the public sector imposed strict 
fiscal discipline, reducing both current and 
capital expenditures in real terms. In El Salvador, 
the goal of fiscal policy was to trim expenditure, 
and the country succeeded in keeping current 
outlays within pre-set limits, despite pay 
increases and the expenses connected with the 
peace accords. Capital expenditures were 
20% below target for lack of execution 
capacity. In Guatemala, public sector 
expenditure was subject to severe constraints 
in 1994 because of the reduction in the tax 
ratio for the second consecutive year. Public 
investment fell even below the extremely 
modest levels achieved in 1993. The tax 
reform in Honduras did not have a significant 
impact in 1994, but an improve ment in State 
finances was achieved by lowerin g public sector 
expenditure, which had risen disp roportionately 
the year before. The need to disburse funds to 
alleviate the electric utility crisis, however, 
prevented any very signif cant cut in 
spending. 
Chile, finally, again posted a moderate 
increase in public sector expendit are that was in 
line with the growth in activity and with 
macroeconomic conditions, and this allowed it to 
maintain a good surplus in its public sector 
accounts. 
As a result of the crisis at the end of 1994, 
a number of countries in the region were 
obliged to make drastic fiscal adjustments in 
the early months of 1995, involving not only 
tax increases but also spending cuts. The most 
striking examples were provided by Argentina 
and Mexico. The measures adopted in 
Argentina included a cut in wages and 
postponement of their paymenl. In Mexico, 
wage increases did not keep pace with 
inflation, which meant that wiges declined 
significantly in real terms. 
3. Foreign exchange policy 
Foreign exchange policy continued to be a key 
tool in combatting inflation, a method 
increasingly adopted by countries in the region 
since the close of the 1980s. Specifically, many 
Governments used the exchange rate as an 
"anchor" in price formation, while others 
adopted flexible exchange rates, with greater or 
lesser intervention by the monetary authority, in 
the context of a more open foreign exchange 
market. The massive influx of external capital 
fostered exchange rate appreciation, but the 
corollary, increased international reserves, made 
monetary management and export promotion 
harder. 
Three countries (Brazil, Chile and Colombia) 
adopted measures intended to control short-term 
external capital flows by imposing restrictions or 
reserve requirements to discourage their influx. 
It was not clear, however, that the measures had 
any significant effect, since the currencies of 
these three countries appreciated considerably in 
1994. Most of the smaller economies did not 
restrict external capital flows, [n particular, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay an 1 Uruguay did 
not impose restrictions despite he< vy inflows of 
foreign currency. Nor did Argentina, which 
preferred to maintain the completely open 
system it had maintained since the start of the 
decade. 
The real effective exchange rati s for exports 
-calculated on the basis of a baskel of currencies 
of the country's main trading partr ers- declined 
in 1994 in eight countries of the region (Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, III Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru) ii comparison 
with the average level the year befe re. In another 
three (Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay), the 
real exchange rate declined in relation to the 
' For the method of calculating real exchange rates, see note a/ in table II-4. 
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dollar but rose or remained stable in relation to a 
basket of currencies. Another six countries 
(Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Mexico and Venezuela) recorded 
increases in 1994 in the real exchange rate, 
including the rate in relation to the dollar (see 
table II-4). 
In six countries (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Nicaragua and Peru) the real 
appreciation of the currency coincided with a 
slow-down in inflation, while another five 
(Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Paraguay and 
Uruguay) experienced declining inflation 
accompanied by real stability or depreciation of 
the national currency. In Costa Rica, Honduras 
and Venezuela, real depreciation coincided with 
a resurgence of inflation, while the Dominican 
Republic also experienced a surge of inflation 
despite a stable real exchange rate. 
a) Real appreciation in most countries 
The countries whose real exchange rates went 
down against a basket of currencies or the dollar 
received a heavy influx of capital from abroad, 
enabling them not only to cover easily the 
demand for foreign exchange but also to 
increase substantially their international 
reserves. There were marked differences, 
however, in the relative size of the flows. In 
some countries, notably Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Peru, external capital flows were 
so heavy that they made it very difficult for the 
countries to meet to their exchange rate and 
monetary targets. Argentina experienced 
considerable flows, but international reserves 
increased only moderately because of the large 
current account deficit. 
The countries in this category had diverse 
exchange rate systems, including a fixed 
exchange rate system, systems with various 
degrees of central bank intervention, and a 
floating exchange rate system -the latter applied 
only for relatively short periods, however. 
Argentina pursued a fixed exchange rate policy 
in accordance with the Convertibility Act, which 
provided that the central bank must maintain 
reserves equal to the monetary base. At the other 
extreme, Ecuador had allowed the sucre to float 
beginning in 1993, and this had the effect of 
accentuating appreciation. In 19i»5, therefore, it 
established an exchange rate bani. 
Most of the countries in ;his category, 
however, followed a policy o:: central bank 
intervention in the foreign exchange market to 
achieve a rate of exchange that vould stimulate 
exports. Some countries also set exchange rate 
bands within which the currency was allowed to 
float more or less freely, with intei vention to firm 
prices when the rate reached the limits of the 
band. In some cases the bands could be shifted in 
accordance with stipulated criteria, such as 
trends in domestic and internal ional inflation 
rates. Results varied widely; some countries 
managed to approximate the targets set by the 
monetary authorities, while others remained 
fairly far off target. 
Brazil made major changes in its foreign 
exchange policy. To June 1994, it had an 
intervention system like that desci ibed above; the 
exchange rate was adjusted daily on the basis of 
domestic inflation, with central bank 
intervention when necessary. With the 
introduction of the new currency, the country 
switched to a floating exchange rate system. It 
had previously been established that one real (the 
new unit of currency) would equal one dollar. 
However, when the central bank, in a change 
from its normal practice, withdrew from the 
foreign exchange market as of 1 July, the result 
was a strong appreciation ol the nominal 
exchange rate. In 1995, the system was again 
changed because of a deteriorating trade balance 
and a drastic drop in net capital in! lows. Rotation 
bands were established and restrictions were 
placed on imports of some products, particularly 
consumer durables. 
In Chile, the gradual, persistent appreciation 
of the peso dominated the monetary and 
exchange picture from the start if 1994. While 
the expansion of the money supply accelerated, 
primarily because of foreign exch ange purchases 
by the central bank to support the flotation band, 
the real exchange rate continued to fall. In order 
to offset the monetary impact of the increase in 
reserves, the central bank resorted to very costly 
open market operations. At the end of November 
1994, as the situation was beconing untenable, 
the issuing authority changed its foreign 
exchange policy and shifted the flotation band 
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Table II-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL EFFECTIVE 
EXCHANGE RATES FOR EXPORTS a 



























































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
a Corresponds to the average of the indexes of the (main official) real exchange rates between each country's 
currencies of its main trading partners, weighted by the share of that country's total exports represented by e 
the trading partners. The weightings are averages for the period 1989-1992. For further information on the 
sources used, see ECLAC, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1981 (E/CEPAL/G.1248), Santiago, Chile, 198: 
publication, Sales No. E.83.II.G.2. Preliminary figures. c From 1987 on the commercial exchan; 
The exchange rates used were the following: To July 1982, the mean of the average buying and selling rates 
Bank of Mexico by the main commercial banks; August to November 1982, the preferential rate for essent 
November 1982, the mean of the buying and selling rates on the regulated market. e The unregulated or j. 
rate was used. 
currency and the 
uports to each of 
nethodology and 
. United Nations 
;e rate was used. 
is reported to the 
al imports; after 
arallel exchange 
downward by 10%, causing a nominal 
appreciation. 
Colombia introduced an exchange rate band 
system in January 1994, but the tendency towards 
real appreciation persisted throughout the year, 
as in 1992 and 1993, due to heavy foreign capital 
flows. Despite restrictions on entering capital, 
the foreign currency supply remained high. 
Because of the difficulties encountered in 
maintaining the exchange rate and the high cost 
of sterilization, the exchange rate band was 
shifted downward, and the result was significant 
real appreciation. 
Peru maintained its floating exchange rate 
system, but a strong influx of foreign currency 
obliged the central reserve bank to tuy up a great 
deal of it. By this means it succeeded in 
stabilizing the real effective rate of exchange 
over the course of 1994, althougi the annual 
average was lower than in 19')3. Bolivia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay and 
Uruguay also had intervention systems, but some 
of these countries failed to meet the targets set by 
the authorities. 
b) Depreciation in a smaller number of 
countries 
In the six countries with a rising r ;al exchange 
rate, the process varied a great deal, depending 
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Figure II-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEXES 
(Percentages variation in 1994 with respect to average for 1980-1990) 
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Source: ECLAC, based on figures from the International Monetary Fund. 
a Indexes of the real effective exchange rate for exports. 
b The consumer price index was used for all countries. 
on the factors responsible for the depreciation of 
their respective currencies. Haiti, Honduras and 
Venezuela had been encountering 
balance-of-payments problems for two years or 
more, while in Costa Rica, Mexico and the 
Dominican Republic the imbalances had 
developed more recently. In general, these 
countries adopted adjustment me isures to correct 
the imbalance in their external accounts and 
fiscal position, so far with scant success. 
All the countries in this jroup suffered 
heavy losses of international re serves because 
of their large current account deficits; 
Venezuela and the Dominican Republic also 
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experienced a net outflow of capital. The case of 
Mexico was unusual; financial flows from 
abroad were extremely high throughout most of 
1994, but dried up after the crisis in December, 
so that the country wound up the year with a 
significant net outflow. In Costa Rica, capital 
continued to flow into the country, but in 
declining amounts. The situation in Honduras 
was unique in thatbothreservesandcapitalflows 
increased, but the reason for it was the delay in 
external debt service payments. 
Moreover, the exchange policies of the 
countries in question changed during 1994. 
The most striking example was afforded by 
Mexico, which had been pursuing a fixed-rate 
policy with a band of 10% and radically 
changed its system towards the end of 1994, so 
that the Bank of Mexico withdrew from the 
foreign exchange market. The exchange rate 
thereupon rose rapidly to nearly eight new 
pesos in a highly volatile market. It later 
declined and levelled off at six pesos to the 
dollar, with some fluctuation. 
In Venezuela, foreign exchange policy 
underwent major changes in this as in previous 
years. The political and economic instability 
experienced in 1992 was followed by an acute 
banking crisis, which generated serious 
imbalances in the money and foreign exchange 
markets. The central bank maintained its 
The countries of the region in 1994 in general 
continued to follow the prudent monetary 
policies initiated in previous years. Room for 
manoeuvre became narrower due to a 
combination of internal and external factors. Real 
domestic interest rates in the local currency 
remained very high in most countries and in some 
rose higher (see table II-5). 
A number of countries experienced 
increasing difficulty in controlling the 
expansion of aggregate demand, primarily as a 
result of plentiful flows of external capital, 
particular short-term capital. This situation 
was conducive to a substantial increase in the 
money supply resulting from a heavy build-up 
of reserves. Various measures were taken to 
deal with the problem, including regulations 
policy of mini-devaluations, but was unable by 
that approach to avoid a loss of international 
reserves, so that it was forced tc devalue more 
drastically. As this measure ilso failed to 
calm the markets, the currency suffered an 
abrupt depreciation at the end o f the first half, 
which induced the Government to adopt a 
system of exchange controls. 
In the other countries in ihis category, 
changes in exchange policy were minor. 
Costa Rica continued its managed float of the 
colón and by postponing a more drastic 
devaluation brought about some 
overvaluation of the national currency, and 
this in turn led to a substantial loss of 
international reserves. In Honduras, in an 
attempt to slow the climb of the exchange rate, 
the central bank at mid-year unified the 
interbank market and instituted a 
foreign-exchange auction systsm, with the 
result that the real exchange rate for 1994 was 
higher than the year before. In tie Dominican 
Republic, the rate of exchange remained 
fixed during the first eight months of 1994; this 
situation seriously eroded international 
reserves, created expectations of a devaluation 
and led to capital flight. Early in September 
the monetary authorities ordered a 5% 
devaluation as part of a package of adjustment 
measures. 
restricting the influx of short-tern capital and 
operations to sterilize excess liquidity. 
Other countries, meanwhile, were confronted 
with reduced external capital flows, large fiscal 
deficits and serious banking crises. Faced with 
these situations, a number of the m resorted to 
monetary creation to meet their more pressing 
needs. This seriously reduced the s :ope of action 
of monetary policy, especially since these 
countries experienced a significant contraction in 
the demand for money as a result of economic 
crisis and an acceleration of inflation. 
Some parts of the region exhibited more 
positive trends, such as the increased demand for 
money in countries that succeeded in 
consolidating their stabilization programmes, 
following periods of capital flight. The increase 
4. Monetary policy 
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in the demand for money made monetary 
management easier by reducing the need to 
absorb excess liquidity, thereby forcing interest 
rates up. The new state of affairs allowed for 
greater collection of seigniorage and an increase 
in revenues derived from the inflation tax. A few 
years back this was an important phenomenon in 
Bolivia and later in Argentina. In 1994, Brazil 
and Peru achieved significant remonetization of 
their economies through progress in their 
respective stabilization programmes. 
Latin American countries can be classified 
into three categories based on the orientation of 
their monetary policy in 1994. The first category 
comprises eight countries that followed a passive 
monetary policy; the second consists of four 
that adopted a restrictive policy; the third 
covers seven countries that pursued monetary 
policies with an expansive tendency. The 
countries in each categories are not alike in all 
respects, and in some cases it is debatable 
whether a country should be put into one 
category or another; a given country, for 
example, may have followed a basically passive 
monetary policy, but nevertheless applied some 
restrictive measures. 
a) Passive monetary policies 
A characteristic common to all the countries 
in this category is that they pursued a managed 
exchange rate policy. Some maintained a fixed 
exchange rate, while others allowed the rate to 
crawl according to certain criteria. The group 
includes some countries that adopted exchange 
rate bands, but since during 1994 their exchange 
rates stayed at the bottom of the band, in effect 
what they was had a fixed-rate regime. In 
general, this group of countries had a sound fiscal 
position, although in a number of cases a deficit 
was financed with external resources. Despite 
these basic similarities, their policies differed in 
detail. 
At one extreme are the countries that pursued 
a completely passive monetary policy. One 
example is Argentina, whose policy is dictated 
by its convertibility system. There were no 
drastic swings in 1994, and the expansion in the 
money supply was relatively modest, reflecting 
the moderate increase in international reserves. 
Because of the crisis at the end of 1994, the 
financial situation became shîky, primarily 
because of solvency and liquidity problems in the 
banking system. The country had to resort to a 
credit package put together by international 
financial organizations and priva :e domestic and 
foreign banks in order to create a fund 
guaranteeing the deposits of troubled banks. 
Despite these measures, monetary policy 
remained clearly passive. Bank interest rates 
rose, through relatively little hroughout the 
course of the year until the crisis riit at the end of 
December. Thereafter, they rose rapidly and also 
displayed great volatility. 
In Nicaragua, the stock of noney was an 
endogenous variable; contributing factors were 
the financing of the fiscal defic: t with external 
resources and the elimination c f assistance to 
State-owned banks. Open market operations 
were minimal, and the legal reserve proved a 
relatively ineffective tool, since the 
commercial banking system had a high level of 
liquidity and maintained deposits with the 
central bank that exceeded the legal minimum. 
In Panama the national currency is tightly 
pegged to the dollar, leaving no scope for 
monetary policy. 
Five other countries (Bolivii, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Paraguay and Uruguay) also had 
passive monetary policies, because their scope of 
action was severely limited bj the extensive 
dollarization of their respective economies. 
Moreover, they experienced a significant influx 
of capital from abroad. Reserve requirements and 
open market operations were used as tools to 
control the expansion of liquidity but not to great 
effect. In Uruguay, time deposits in foreign 
currency increased to the equivalent of nearly 
40% of GDP. Most of such deposi ;s, however, are 
rechannelled abroad as a result of the off-shore 
banking strategy under which the Uruguayan 
financial system operates. In Bolivia, monetary 
policy was severely disrupted in November 
1994 by the liquidation of two private banks, 
and in consequence the ironey supply 
increased by over US$ 200 ml lion, or 4% of 
GDP, in just two months. From that point on, 
Bolivia's situation more closely resembled that 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Nominal rates deflated by the change in the consumer price index over the relevant period. ' Average valui : for the year. 
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In Ecuador, nominal interest rates rose in 
the second half of 1994, which meant that real 
rates increased considerably, given the rapid 
decline in inflation. As a result of armed 
conflict, interest rates rose abruptly in early 
1995 to extremely high levels and thereafter 
declined slowly. In Bolivia and Paraguay, 
interest rates remained high, but were 
somewhat lower in El Salvador. In Uruguay, 
real interest rates on deposits were negative, 
because of the broad spread between the 
domestic inflation rate and the considerably 
lower pace of devaluation. Interest rates on 
loans, however, remained very high. 
b) Restrictive monetary policies 
Four countries followed a restrictive 
monetary policy, made more difficult by a 
heavy influx of capital. The authorities 
attempted through a variety of measures, 
primarily open market operations and 
increases in the reserve requirement, to 
moderate the expansion of domestic demand. 
The restraining actions did not have the desired 
effect, however; domestic demand continued to 
expand in these countries, Chile excepted, and 
the exchange rate appreciated. During the course 
of the year, some countries in this group made 
their monetary policy more flexible, which 
tended to push them into the expansive policy 
category. 
Brazil received heavy flows of external 
capital in the first half of 1994, but their impact 
on liquidity was cushioned by a strict monetary 
policy. Interest rates rose considerably, partially 
in response to the greater volatility induced by 
the already rapid pace of inflation associated with 
a generalized system of indexation. As a result, 
real interest rates remained, on average, around 
4% per month. Another factor that helped to 
reduce the impact of external flows was the 
improved fiscal performance, reflected in a 
larger primary surplus and a lower the operating 
deficit. With the introduction of the new currency 
in July, a monetary anchor was established and 
upper limits were set for money creation to 
March 1995. Those limits were quickly 
exceeded, however, in part because of the 
remonetization of the economy made possible by 
declining inflation and because rf the liquidity 
problems encountered in some sectors of 
economic activity. 
Colombia, whose economy went through a 
process of adjustment some yesrs earlier, also 
had to struggle with the complex problems 
generated by an abundant flow of external 
capital. In order to cushion the impact, 
restrictions were imposed on the entry of 
short-term capital. Despite the extra cost these 
measures implied, however, capial continued to 
flow in. Sterilization measures were then 
undertaken, but failed to stem the flow, and the 
chief effect of the attempt was to make the cost 
of financing very expensive. The se problems led 
to a revaluation of the currency. Moreover, 
interest rates rose considerably as a result of the 
open market operations undertaken to control 
liquidity. 
In Chile, monetary policy had a greater 
restraining effect than in the two previous cases. 
In 1994, strenuous adjustment efforts continued 
to be directed towards reducing the rate of 
inflation and slowing the grow h of spending, 
aims that were facilitated by the public sector 
accounting surplus. The adjustment measures 
had been introduced in November 1992, when 
the central bank increased the rea I interest rate on 
its floating rate notes to 6.5%. In z ddition, reserve 
requirements had been set for short-term capital 
flows and external financing. These measures 
succeeded in reducing the growth in domestic 
demand, enabling Chile to achiev e its goals more 
effectively than other Latin American countries. 
A contributing factor may have been the high 
level of indebtedness of the public sector, which 
made it very sensitive to the increase in interest 
rates. 
In November, since inflation was on the 
decline, spending had been curbed and the 
prospects in the external sector were good, the 
adjustment measures were lifted, as reflected by 
a reduction in the short-term interest rate on 
central bank floating rate notes. Ity the end of the 
month, however, the pressure exerted by the 
strong increase in international reserves, 
resulting in a significant expansian in the money 
supply, forced a downward shift in the exchange 
rate band. Through this exchange rate 
adjustment, the central bank gave itself greater 
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room for manoeuvre in its efforts to control 
monetary aggregates. 
Peru applied a restrictive monetary policy 
during the first half of 1994, but shifted to a more 
expansive policy in the second half. Until 
mid-year, the monetary impact of the heavy 
influx of capital from abroad was sterilized 
through deposits by the public sector and the 
Banco de la Nación with the central bank; 
thanks to these measures, the money supply 
expanded only moderately in real terms. In the 
second half, the impetus of domestic demand 
and a marked slow-down in prices created 
positive expectations and enhanced the 
public's willingness to hold real money 
balances. The monetary authority opted for a 
more flexible policy, particularly in relation to 
public sector deposits, and the result was an 
acceleration in the pace of monetary 
expansion. This process of remonetization -the 
demand for money had fallen to extremely low 
levels as a result of the runaway inflation of 
earlier years- allowed the stock of money to 
keep pace with the considerable increase in 
transactions without affecting domestic prices. 
Interest rates in national currency fell as 
inflation declined but remained quite high in 
real terms. 
c) Expansive monetary policies 
Expansive monetary policy in some countries 
was the outgrowth of a political situation of some 
complexity; this was particularly the case in 
Mexico and to a lesser extent in Guatemala and 
the Dominican Republic. Brazil also could be put 
into this category; its monetary policy, though 
restrictive during the first half of the year, turned 
clearly expansive in the second half. The 
expansive category also includes countries with 
large fiscal deficits, and some in the latter group 
also had to allocate substantial sums for financial 
assistance to counter banking crises. Moreover, 
these additional needs could not be financed with 
external resources, because the countries in 
question were experiencing a sharp contraction 
in external capital flows. Under these 
circumstances, the authorities chose to meet the 
demand chiefly through money creation, since 
conditions made it extremely difficult to 
implement an adjustment plan. Real and in some 
cases even nominal interest rates declined. In 
consequence, inflation accelerated and 
currencies depreciated. 
In Mexico, the thrust of monetary policy 
changed radically. During 1994, a number of 
factors impeded the conduct of monetary and 
credit policy and contributed toward the high 
volatility of the local financial markets. 
Following the drop in internatioral reserves in 
the second quarter, the Bank of Mexico, acting 
on the assumption that the situation was 
temporary, adopted an expansive monetary 
policy in order to prevent an excessive rise in 
interest rates and to stimulate econc mic recovery. 
As a result, the monetary base expanded 13% in 
real terms, despite a considerable decline in 
international reserves. The strong < xpansion was 
unsustainable under a fixed exchange rate 
regime. These factors triggered a foreign 
exchange crisis towards the end of December. In 
the face of this situation, the Government 
adopted a drastic adjustment programme, 
involving a return to a strict monetary policy 
(high interest rates and limits on th< expansion of 
credit), accompanied by fiscal adjustment; these 
measures were supported by heavj international 
financial assistance. Real interest rates declined 
in the second half of 1994, after reaching their 
highest level since 1990 in the second quarter. 
Impelled by fears of devaluation generated by the 
outbreak of political crisis, interest rates began to 
shoot up in April, in a reversal of tie downward 
trend recorded since the end of 195 2. Moreover, 
the authorities were promoting th<¡ purchase of 
Tesobonos, bonds indexed to the e «change rate, 
which to a great extent displaced peso-
denominated government securities. However, 
with the crisis that hit at the end of ] 994, nominal 
interest rates in pesos began to mo int rapidly to 
extremely high levels, far outstripping the 
stepped-up pace of inflation. 
In Guatemala, monetary policy was also 
expansive; reserve requirements were reduced 
and open market operations suspended with the 
aim of lowering interest rates. In the Dominican 
Republic, in contrast to previous years, monetary 
policy was shaped by the financing required to 
cover the fiscal deficit and to meet the needs of 
the private sector, and this orientation resulted in 
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new inflationary pressures and a loss of 
confidence in the national currency. From 
September on, however, monetary policy 
became contractionary once again, particularly 
through the mechanism of the sale of central bank 
securities. 
In Brazil, beginning in July monetary policy 
shifted from the restrictive course it had followed 
during the first half of 1994. The change was 
chiefly due to the problems faced by the official 
banking system. Most of the public sector banks 
were have problems adapting to the economy's 
new mode of operation based on much lower 
inflation rates. In the second half, the central 
bank allocated an amount equivalent to over 
2% of output in financial assistance to 
government banks. The impact of this outlay 
was offset by the increased demand for money. 
Another factor that helped to restrain the 
expansion of the monetary base was the sharp 
drop in the flows of external capital that had 
complicated the conduct of monetary policy in 
the first half. Moreover, strict measures were 
adopted to control the strong growth in the 
monetary aggregates and in domestic demand, 
much of which was directed towards imports. 
The authorities pushed real interest rates up, 
imposed restrictions on credit and raised reserve 
requirements. These measures were tightened 
further in 1995 in response to the deficit that 
began to develop in the trade balance beginning 
in November 1994. 
In Venezuela, the actions of the central bank 
were determined by the overriding need to deal 
with the financial crisis by providing aid to banks 
in difficulty; this entailed tolerating a 
considerable expansion of the monetary base and 
easing up on reserve requirements. As a result, 
despite the drop in international reserves and 
Structural reforms were undertaken in most Latin 
American and Caribbean countries in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Their most important 
aspects were economic liberalization in terms of 
both trade and financial regulation and 
privatization of public sector enterprises. These 
reforms went hand in hand with an effort to 
redefine the role of the State, which was also 
recourse to open market operations in an attempt 
to drain off excess liquidity, the money supply 
increased by over 25% in real terms. In the 
widespread banking crisis, the trend of interest 
rates became less importanl as financial 
transactions drastically declined. Most notably, 
net lending to the private sector declined as the 
economy experienced the recessive effects of the 
situation just described, and this in turn resulted 
in a steady decline in nominal inte rest rates in the 
second half. 
In Costa Rica the economy became further 
dollarized, and long-term deposits were 
increasingly converted into demand deposits, 
while the monetary base expanded over 10% in 
real terms despite a drop in international reserves. 
The expansion was further augmented by the 
currency that went into circulation as a result of 
the failure of the Banco Anglo-Csstarricense. In 
order to control monetary expans ion, the sale of 
stabilization bonds was stepped up and the 
reserve requirement ratio was raised. Despite the 
sale of bonds and the implementation of 
measures to absorb excess liquidity, the nominal 
interest rate did not increase, <nd this, given 
accelerated inflation, meant that real interest 
rates declined. Interest rates on deposits were 
actually negative. 
In Honduras, the money supply expanded 
12% in real terms to meet the needs associated 
with the energy crisis and the losses of the central 
bank. The reserve requirement was raised in 
order to moderate the increase in liquidity. As 
inflation picked up, real interest rates declined 
and were ultimately negative. Haiti again had to 
resort to money creation to cover its public sector 
deficit, since the international embargo 
continued to keep it from obtaining outside 
financing until nearly the end of 1994. 
reflected in moves to deregulate markets, 
changes in economic policy aimed at greater 
neutrality of policy instruments and fewer 
sectoral and regional incentives, and 
maintenance of basic macroeconomic 
equilibria. 
In pursuit of macroeconomic equilibria, 
reforms were introduced in the sirea of taxes in 
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order to increase fiscal revenues and put them on 
a sounder footing; in the area of administration 
and spending in order to reduce costs, streamline 
government administration and make it more 
efficient; and in the area of public sector 
enterprises, in order to make profit maximization 
part of management strategy and thus achieve 
positive balances. 
Although the reforms instituted by the various 
countries were similar in many respects, the 
Major progress was made in the first half of the 
1990s in the direction of trade liberalization. 
Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru accelerated the process by 
eliminating bans, quotas and advance permits on 
imports. There were also sharp cuts in tariff rates 
and reductions in the rate spread. In some 
countries -Peru recently and Bolivia some years 
earlier- short-term targets were set for arriving at 
a single, uniform tariff. This will bring them to 
the stage reached by Chile in the second half of 
the 1970s. 
Since the timetables established in previous 
years for reducing import tariffs were generally 
adhered to, 1994 saw only minor adjustments 
relating to specific activities. Tariffs protecting 
sectors badly hit by external competition, for 
example, were raised. This was the case in 
Mexico, where restrictions were placed on 
imports entering under unfair trade terms and 
hurting the shoe, garment and tool industries and 
producers of some intermediate chemical 
products. 
In other countries, tariffs were reduced even 
sooner than the timetable called for on products 
selling for high prices domestically because of a 
lack of competition. This occurred in Brazil, but 
the measure was short-lived; tariffs were raised 
again as the trade balance deteriorated in 1995. 
Costa Rica and El Salvador, on the other hand, 
lowered tariffs in 1994 in order to bring 
Starting early in the 1990s, some countries that 
had held back in the previous decade began the 
process was not uniform throughout the region. 
There were some significant differences in terms 
of the contexts in which the refor ns took place, 
the ideologies guiding governments and 
politicians, the thoroughness w th which the 
reforms were implemented, and the progress, 
setbacks and interruptions experienced. In one 
way or another, however, by the mid-1990s 
almost all the countries of the regi MI were in the 
process of reform. 
themselves into line with the Central American 
common external tariff. The situation in 
Venezuela ran counter to the rend, as the 
financial crisis that arose in 19Í6 led to the 
establishment of a system of exchange controls 
in mid 1994 that in effect negated the trade 
liberalization measures introduced during 
1989-1990. 
The more liberal trade policy of the 1990s 
was also reflected in the elimination of tax and 
credit incentives and other types of subsidies 
for exports. This was the case in Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and 
Peru, all countries that had pursued sectoral 
export promotion policies during the previous 
decade. 
Some actions, however, even if limited, were 
taken in 1994 to mitigate the impact of the 
decline in the real exchange rate on the profits of 
the export sector. In Argentina, for example, the 
authorities decided to reduce employer 
contributions to the social security system and to 
lower or eliminate a number of minor taxes in 
order to reduce the cost of activities exposed to 
foreign competition. Nicaragua was able to take 
advantage of a climate of monetary and foreign 
exchange stability to make progress in promoting 
exports through a campaign to encourage greater 
use of the Caribbean Basin Initia :ive and the 
European Union's generalized system of 
preferences. 
process of deregulating their banking systems 
and liberalizing their capital maikets. These 
1. Trade reform 
2. Financial reform and the capital market 
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reforms at first were accompanied by a strong 
influx of external capital, but flows dropped off 
sharply in 1994. 
The measures adopted included deregulating 
of capital markets and bank credit, liberalizing 
interest rates and foreign exchange markets, and 
eliminating obstacles to foreign investment. 
Some countries, notably Argentina, Mexico and 
Peru, implemented this set of measures 
practically in full. Colombia and Costa Rica, on 
the other hand, maintained some restrictions on 
foreign exchange and on deposits in foreign 
Public sector reforms have been in progress since 
the middle of the past decade, but have gained 
momentum in the 1990s. The changes have 
involved primarily tax reform, privatization of 
public sector enterprises and restructuring of 
social security systems. 
a) Tax reforms 
Initially, tax reforms involved simplifying 
the tax structure, applying value-added tax 
across the board and expanding the tax base. 
More recently they have focused on enhancing 
the institutional capacity of both the tax 
collection and customs offices. Policies have 
aimed at streamlining and decentralizing 
organizational structure, training personnel 
and clamping down on tax evasion by 
developing computerized data systems. 
In nine countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela) a number of tax 
reform measures passed in 1993 or 1994 went 
into effect, in some cases as a supplement to 
previous reforms. In nearly all these countries the 
reforms were intended to correct the imbalance 
in public finances, although in some cases there 
was also an emphasis on simplifying the tax 
system. Countries resorted to a variety of 
measures; they raised tax rates (value-added tax, 
or VAT, sales tax, fuel taxes, taxes on financial 
transactions), created new taxes, broadened the 
tax base, withheld taxes on income generated by 
certain activities and eliminated or reduced 
exemptions. 
currency at banks, or continued to reinforce the 
official banking system. All these countries also 
tightened the regulations on their financial 
systems in order to avoid another crisis like the 
one in the early 1980s. 
While Chile eliminated som<; restrictions on 
external capital flows, unlike Peru, Mexico and 
Argentina it adhered to a policy of intervening in 
the foreign exchange market and sterilizing 
effects on the money supply in order to avoid the 
sharp drop in the real rate of exchange 
experienced in other countries. 
The most sweeping reforms were those 
introduced by Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras and 
Venezuela. Brazil approved i constitutional 
amendment that cut back on mandatory 
appropriations of taxes and social security 
contributions. In addition, on 1 January 1994 a 
tax on debit balances on curr;nt accounts at 
banks went into effect for one year only. 
Moreover, the volume of social security 
contributions (CONFINS) recovered from the 
depressed levels in previous years due to 
court litigation. After Congress rejected a 
proposal to raise the VAT rate (from 10% to 
18%), Ecuador opted for a sharp increase in fuel 
taxes, so that final domestic pri :es of fuel were 
higher than international prices for the first 
time since the country became an oil exporter. 
In Honduras, tax reform involved higher rates 
for some taxes, creation of new taxes and 
expansion of the tax base; among other things, 
a 1% tax on net assets of companies was 
introduced, and the sales tax base was 
broadened. In Venezuela, tie income tax 
system was revised; VAT, introduced the 
previous year but only on the wholesale level, 
was replaced by a tax on luxuries and 
wholesale sales; finally, a new tax was created 
on bank debit balances. 
Along with reforms aimed at raising revenue, 
five countries (Argentina, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay) introduced other 
measures essentially involving tax reductions 
(lowering rates, eliminating taxes or allowing 
exemptions) with the aim ol improving the 
allocation of resources, encouraging certain 
3. Public sector reforms 
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kinds of activities or simply alleviating the tax 
burden on specific sectors. 
Tax reforms in Chile entailed both increasing 
revenues and reducing taxes. The tax reforms of 
1990, originally due to expire in December 1993, 
were extended, but at the same time personal 
income tax was reduced. In the same vein, tax 
policy was made more flexible by empowering 
the Administration to move the VAT rate one per 
cent up or down depending on macroeconomic 
conditions. 
Finally, equalization funds for major export 
products, such as copper in Chile and coffee in 
Colombia, benefited from improved prices on the 
world market. In other coffee-exporting 
countries, efforts to create equalization funds or 
special assessments on external sales of coffee 
beans encountered mixed success. El Salvador, 
for example, introduced advance withholding of 
a portion of the assessment on income generated 
by coffee sales, and Honduras established 
various mechanisms to set aside some of the 
excess profits. In Costa Rica, on the other hand, 
the attempt failed, because coffee exporters 
sought and obtained an injunction suspending 
collection of the tax that was to be levied when 
the price of coffee exceeded 80 centavos per 
pound. 
In terms of administrative reforms, there has 
been some progress in recent years in 
decentralizing management by strengthening 
regional and local bodies. Except in the case of 
Brazil, however, the costs and the responsibility 
for providing services and performing functions 
have been transferred without the corresponding 
revenues. The process is therefore still 
incomplete. 
b) Privatization 
One of the major trends of the 1990s has been 
a strong move in the direction of privatizing 
public enterprises. In the previous decade, only 
Chile undertook substantial privatization, but in 
the 1990s Argentina, Mexico and Peru have also 
made great strides in this direction. The process 
has entailed the sale of a significant portion of 
public sector assets, including, in the above 
countries, activities traditionally considered 
strategic (petroleum and natural gas deposits); 
utilities (telecommunications, ransportation, 
railroads, ports and airports); activities related to 
the exploitation of natural resourc ;s (transport of 
petroleum and natural gas); and i ocial services. 
At the end of 1994, Peru introduced the system 
of "citizen participation" whereby Peruvians 
were offered the opportunity to buy stock in 
State-owned enterprises, similar to the system of 
"popular capitalism" instituted in Chile in the 
1980s. 
In Nicaragua, the programme c f privatization 
moved ahead rapidly as part of the structural 
reform process initiated in 1990, Privatization 
did not bring in revenue for the government, 
however, since the assets were coiveyed free of 
charge. The People's National Corporations 
(CORNAP), the agency in charge of administering 
and privatizing 351 public sector enterprises, 
pursued and came close to completing its work 
in 1994. 
In other countries, such as B alivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Uruguay and Venezuela, the process was slow, 
generally because of a lack of polit ícal consensus 
about privatization or a lack of agreement about 
a programme of reforms. In Bolivia, the 
legislature made progress, albeit ¡lowly, on the 
capitalization programme, which was to take 
effect in mid-1995 with the sale of Empresa 
Nacional de Electricidad (ENDE), divided into 
four separate entities. The programme is also 
supposed to cover the whole of the State-owned 
petroleum enterprise. In Brazil, privatizations in 
1994 were chiefly in the petrocherr ical sector. In 
Colombia, Banco de Colombia wis sold to the 
private sector, and concessions for cellular 
telephone business were awarded In Ecuador, 
the law on privatization and delivery of public 
services by the private sector went into effect in 
1994; it excluded petroleum-relaied activities, 
electric power and telecommunications. 
El Salvador continued its jirivatization 
process by finalizing the sale of some of the 
facilities in the San Bartolo free zone and some 
of the assets of the Salvadoran Ccffee Institute 
(INCAFE). In addition, the Salvadoras Institute for 
Agrarian Change (ISTA) divested i self of some 
assets as a one-time contribution to the land 
transfer programme under the peace accords. 
Moreover, a law was passed on pr vatization of 
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sugar mills and alcohol plants. Costa Rica sold 
the State-owned enterprise Cementos del 
Pacífico. In Honduras, as part of the economic 
stabilization plan, the legislature is working on a 
programme of reforms that include privatization 
of the Empresa Hondurena de Telecomu-
nicaciones (HONDUTEL). 
In Panama, the State-owned tele-
communications enterprise was converted to a 
mixed-ownership enterprise in 1994 because 
government resources were insufficient to 
finance the cost of modernizing it. The new 
Government has proposed privatizing the rest of 
the enterprise and part of what is now the 
Hydraulic Resources and Energy Institute (IRHE). 
Uruguay and Venezuela, meanwhile, have 
suspended all or most privatization initiatives. 
The concession system is still not widespread 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, but it is 
making headway in some countries, particularly 
with respect to the establishment of a legal 
framework within which the system can operate 
effectively. The issue is closely connected with 
programmes for privatizing public utilities 
supplying electricity, telecommunications, 
drinking water and sewer systems. The 
concession system has been applied primarily in 
the areas of road construction, cellular 
telephones, cable television, port services, 
airports and railroads. 
c) Social security reforms 
There have been major advances in the past 
few years in social security reform, involving in 
particular the creation of employee contribution 
capitalization systems to replace the distribution 
systems currently prevailing in nearly every 
country in the region. Chile is the exception, 
since it undertook a thorough reform early in the 
1980s. As the oldest such system, it is also the 
only one so far to show good results, with the 
In 1994 the movement toward multilateral 
integration maintained the momentum it had 
shown since 1990. In addition, new trade 
agreements concluded between Latin American 
additional advantage that it his been able to 
generate long-term resources to lie intermediated 
by the financial system. 
Recently Argentina, Colombia and Peru have 
made some progress in social security reform. 
After lengthy debate, Argentina adopted a new 
retirement pension system in V)94. Under this 
system, workers still actively employed could 
elect either to enrol in the new capitalization 
system and channel their personal contributions 
into the newly created private pension funds or 
to remain in the public distribut on system. The 
number of individuals who chose the 
capitalization system grew steadily (after a 
relatively low initial response) to some 3.5 
million by the end of the year. The above pension 
reform (which took effect in the second half of 
the year) and reductions in employer 
contributions led to a decline ir social security 
funds, which was offset in pert by revenues 
derived from the system of debt payment 
facilities for overdue social security 
contributions. 
In Colombia, the social security reforms 
introduced in 1993 translated into higher social 
security revenues and helped bring about a 
surplus in the accounts. In 1994 a new system 
went into effect whereby workers under 40 years 
of age could elect to enrol in private pension 
funds, which competed with the government 
Social Security Institute. 
In Peru, the process of social security reform, 
initiated in 1993, ran into difficulties because of 
big losses reported by some fund managers. The 
situation was due in part to the fact that the 
number of enrollees had not reached the levels 
hoped for -because of the high amount of 
contribution required- and in part to the 
government's delay in honouring 
acknowledgement certificates, other factors 
were the paucity of investment nstruments and 
the lack of an adequate regulatoiy framework. 
countries with the aim of liberalizing and 
fostering mutual interchange lielped to bring 
about a significant expansion of reciprocal trade 
and demonstrated the advisability of 
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coordinating macroeconomic policies in order to 
facilitate closer trade ties. 
Progress in the area of economic integration 
agreements was considerable and contributed to 
the significant liberalization of reciprocal trade. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) between Canada, the United States and 
Mexico, took effect. The Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR), composed of Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, also began 
operating. The countries of the Andean Group 
made progress in integration, including 
agreement on a common external tariff, and the 
Central American Common Market became 
more tightly knit, again thanks to the adoption of 
a common external tariff. 
At the end of 1994 the MERCOSUR countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) 
completed their programme of full tariff 
elimination. During the year they reached 
agreement on common external tariff levels and 
arranged for a customs union to take effect on the 
first day of 1995. The countries presented lists of 
exclusions, however, some quite extensive, to be 
phased out over the next five years. This means 
that beginning 1 January 2001 the customs union 
should take full effect; there will be no duties 
between member countries, and uniform tariffs, 
ranging from 2% to 20% of the import value, will 
apply to products purchased from outside the 
union. 
Except for the list of products subject to 
special treatment during a transition period (of 
four years for Argentina and Brazil and five for 
Paraguay and Uruguay), tariffs were eliminated 
on trade within the group. In addition, the 
structure of a common external tariff (averaging 
14%) was defined; with respect to capital goods, 
the area of greatest debate, the members agreed 
on linear convergence towards a common tariff 
within 6 years on conventional machinery and 11 
years for computer and telecommunications 
products. 
Because of the many exceptions, the customs 
union created is imperfect. Moreover, there are 
other aspects of the integration process that still 
need to be dealt with, such as coordination of 
macroeconomic policies between member 
countries and some issues concerning the ties 
members have with other countries or trade zones 
and the incorporation of new members into the 
agreement. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement 
between Mexico, Canada anil the United 
States, for which the ratification i process had 
been completed in the three countries by the 
end of 1993, went into effect on 1 January 
1994. This forced Mexico to continue its 
efforts to adapt its institutions to accord better 
with the agreement. Membership in NAFTA thus 
entailed tariff reductions and changes in a 
number of regulatory agencies as part of the 
process of modernizing the legal framework 
governing relations between economic agents 
and their external contacts. Major steps taken by 
the country included amending the Customs Act, 
changing the foreign trade regula ions, creating 
an Advisory Council on International Trade 
Practices, adopting new provisions regarding 
rules of origin, becoming party to the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, creating th; Institute of 
Measures and Standards, enacting the Public 
Investments Act and establishing the Mexican 
Industrial Property Institute. 
The Andean Group also nude progress 
towards integration through agretments signed 
by all or some of the members. On 31 January 
1995, for example, Colombia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela agreed on a common external tariff 
with four tariff levels (5%, 10%, 15% and 20%, 
except for motor vehicles, which a:e subject to a 
rate of 40%). The common exterial tariff will 
take full effect on 31 December :.995, and the 
exclusions stipulated by the member countries 
will be eliminated over the course of four years. 
Peru and Venezuela agreed to extend their 
preferential tariff arrangement und< r the bilateral 
trade agreement signed by the two countries in 
1992 to an additional 198 Venez jelan and 89 
Peruvian products. Some 60% of the tariff 
preferences reciprocal and relate primarily to 
textiles and agricultural products. Finally, 
multilateral negotiations are progressing 
between the Andean Group and MLRCOSUR. 
Apart from the institutionalize! integration 
processes described above, in recent years there 
has been a proliferation of bilateral or 
multilateral agreements between La tin American 
countries, generally involving tariff reductions in 
order to promote reciprocal trade. There has also 
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been greater interest shown in international trade 
and cooperation agreements, as demonstrated by 
accession to GATT and ratification of the act 
establishing the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). 
Ecuador took the steps preliminary to joining 
GATT/WTO in 1995 and undertook bilateral 
negotiations aimed at strengthening trade ties 
with Chile, Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic, among other countries. Towards the 
end of 1994 Ecuador signed a free trade 
agreement with Chile providing for a gradual 
elimination of tariffs. 
El Salvador made similar efforts to establish 
integration agreements with other countries in 
Latin America (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, 
the Dominican Republic and Mexico). It has also 
been seeking an alignment with NAFTA through 
negotiations together with other Central 
American countries. Under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), El 
Salvador acted expeditiously against practices 
prejudicial to its trade. In late September, the 
Textiles Surveillance Body issued a ruling 
favourable to the country in its appeal against a 
quota imposed by the United States that would 
limit Salvadoran exports of shirts made of cotton 
and synthetic fibres. 
Mexico became a member of f. le Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in May. It also completed negotiations on 
trade agreements with Costa Rica, Colombia and 
Venezuela. 
Nicaragua initiated talks on free trade 
agreements with Mexico, Colombia and 
Venezuela. In Panama, the new Government 
stepped up the pace of talks on membership in 
GATT, which at this stage were focused on 
revisions in trade liberalizado i measures in 
certain sectors, and this made it difficult to agree 
on specific limits. In 1994, the Dominican 
Republic joined the Association of Caribbean 
States and signed the act establishing the World 
Trade Organization, although it s renegotiating 
the status of various agricultural products 
because of the potential damage 1 he sector might 
suffer if quantitative restrictions were 
eliminated. The Government also managed to get 
for the Dominican Republic the same free zone 
benefits that Mexico obtained from the United 
States under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). 
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III. LEVEL OF ACTIVITY, INFLATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
1. Growth of GDP 
The gross domestic product (GDP) of Latin 
America and the Caribbean grew by 4.5% in 
1994, thereby accelerating the moderate 
recovery which had begun in 1991. Per capita 
GDP therefore increased again, this time by 2.6%. 
However, since the regional GDP for 1994 was 
only 30% higher than the pre-crisis 1980 
figure, per capita GDP was still 2% below its 
1980 level. The expansion of GDP was fairly 
widespread; only four countries registered 
setbacks in the level of activity. There was also 
greater consistency in the various countries' 
growth rates than in previous years. The vast 
majority of the region's economies marked up 
growth rates close to the average rate for the 
region as a whole, while the largest increases 
were achieved in countries whose levels of 
activity were recovering from the prolonged 
recession of the 1980s. The growth registered 
in 1994 was based mainly on the expansion of 
external demand, as well as on the buoyancy of 
investment, which once again was encouraged 
by a copious inflow of external financing (see 
table 1-2). 
In three countries GDP rose by more than 6%. 
Peru exhibited the highest growth rate in the 
region (12.7%), even higher than its 1993 rate 
(6.5%), and was thus largely able to recover from 
the recession which it had suffered in the period 
1988-1992. Guyana maintained its high rate of 
the preceding year (8%), thereby carrying 
forward its recovery for the fourth year running. 
Argentina again showed substantial growth 
(7%), thereby rounding out four years of 
notable expansion and posting a cumulative 
increase of 34%. Moreover, in 12 countries 
-Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Uruguay- GDP expanded by between 4% and 
and national income 
6%. Chile maintained its steady pace of 
expansion for the eleventh year in a row, 
although its growth rates dipped below the 
average of 7% for the previous three years. 
Meanwhile, Colombia, which for many years 
had shown positive, if occasionally modest 
growth rates, managed to speed ip the pace of 
its expansion in the most rece it three-year 
period. Brazil, which had turned in a poor 
performance between 1988 and 1992, pushed 
ahead, in an environment of ins [ability, with 
the recovery that had begun in li'93, but even 
so was unable to regain the levels reached in 
the mid-1980s. 
Five other countries (Belije, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua and Paraguay] experienced 
moderate growth of between 2% am 13%. Mexico 
was thus able to rebound fron the virtual 
standstill it had reached in 1993, with a growth 
rate similar to the average rate for the period 
1989-1992. Paraguay, meanwhile, registered a 
growth rate which, if slightly lower than that of 
the preceding year, enabled it to continue 
expanding for the eighth year runnir g. Nicaragua 
raised its level of activity by 3.2%, following 
a decade of declines; however, GDP was only 
two thirds of what it had been in thî three years 
immediately preceding the crisis (1976-1978). 
In Belize the growth rate was the lowest in 
recent years, while Jamaica shoved modest 
growth, similar to that of the previous three 
years. 
In contrast, the level of activity fell in four 
countries. In Haiti, the setback reflected the 
prolonged impact of the recession that had 
afflicted the country since the outsreak of the 
political crisis. In Venezuela, meanwhile, the 
recession that had emerged the year before 
deepened, following three years of tiigh growth 
rates. In Honduras GDP contracted, following 
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two years of strong expansion, and in Suriname 
itdeclinedoncemore.EconomicactivityinCuba 
continued to be mired in the deep crisis that the 
country had been experiencing for some years, 
owing to the collapse of its relations with the now 
disbanded socialist system; accordingly, GDP 
was only slightly more than half of what it had 
been in 1989. 
Lastly, while the small countries of the 
Organization of Western Caribbean States 
(OWCS) grew moderately (2.9%), by slightly 
more than the year before, there were wide 
differences among the members of the group: 
Antigua and Barbuda had the highest expansion 
rate (over 5%) and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines the lowest (only 0.4%). 
Thanks to the higher pace of growth in 1994, 
14 countries, not counting those of owes, had 
a better showing than in 1993, while another 
seven countries maintained their growth, 
although for two of them the rates were 
somewhat lower than in the previous year; 
furthermore, only three countries registered a 
marked deterioration in the level of activity. 
This stands out in sharp contrast to the 
preceding year, in which only seven countries 
had improved their performance in relation to 
1992 (see table 1-2). 
Even though population growth rates 
remained fairly high in many countries of the 
region, the figures for per capita GDP were 
positive for the most part. In four countries 
-Argentina, Guyana, Peru and Uruguay- this 
indicator of well-being climbed by 4% or 
more, while in another nine -Barbados, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama and Trinidad 
and Tobago- it showed an improvement of 
between 2% and just under 4%. In three 
economies -those of Bolivia, Costa Rica and 
Mexico- per capita GDP rose only slightly, by 
between 1% and 2%, while in Guatemala, 
Jamaica and Paraguay the increase was under 
1%. In the remaining six countries per capita GDP 
decreased. 
Given the poor performance of the region's 
economies during the past decade, per capita 
GDP in 1994 was higher than in 1980 in only 
10 countries: Chile (37%), Jamaica (35%), 
Belize (31%), Colombia (29%), Uruguay 
(16%), the Dominican Republic (8%), Panama 
(5%), Costa Rica (4%) and Argentina (1%), 
while in Barbados, Ecuador, Mexico and 
Paraguay, this indicator declined slightly, by 
around 1 %. At the opposite extrer le, the sharpest 
downturns in per capita GDP vere in Haiti 
(-48%), Nicaragua (-41%), Trinidad and 
Tobago (-32%), Peru (-21%), Venezuela 
(-17%), Guatemala (-15%) Bolivia (-13%), 
Suriname (-8%), El Salvador and Honduras 
(-7%), Guyana (-4%) and Brazil (-3%) (see 
table 1-3). 
In 1994 all sectors showed g eat buoyancy, 
especially the service sector, which 
contributed half the GDP growth of the region 
as a whole, and manufacturing, which 
contributed a fourth. Furthermore, in 11 of the 
21 countries for which information is 
available, the increase in the level of activity 
was due mainly to the service sector, while in 
seven others the largest impetus came from 
goods-producing sectors. In he remaining 
three countries, GDP contracted, mainly as a 
result of a poor performance i i goods trade, 
although the service sector also had 
unfavourable results (see table II-l). 
The growth in services was more uniform 
than in manufacturing and especially 
construction. The largest growth in services 
occurred in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala and Peiu, with growth 
rates of between 5% and 9%, while drops 
occurred only in Haiti, Honduras and 
Venezuela, the only countries in the region 
whose total GDP declined. In manufacturing, 
Peru stood out with an increase of 18%, but 
there were also significant expansions (of 8% 
and more) in three other countries -Brazil, 
Ecuador and El Salvador- whil<; declines were 
seen in the same three recession-stricken 
countries, as well as in Jamaica, which showed 
a slight deterioration. In the construction sector 
the differences were even mon! marked; Peru 
achieved a notable increase of 35%, and four 
other countries (Argentina, Colombia, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua) made gains of over 
10%. On the other hand, thsre were also 
significant contractions, of bet ween 17% and 
50%, but only in the countries undergoing 
recession. Agriculture registered a significant 
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Table III-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 
BY BRANCHES OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT MARKET PRICES 
(Annual growth rates) 
Latin America 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
a Preliminary figures. Excludes Cuba. c Includes mining and quarrying. 
increase in Peru and decreases in the other three 
countries mentioned, as well as in El Salvador 
and the Dominican Republic. Lastly, mining 
achieved satisfactory results in most of the 
countries in which it plays an important role. It 
expanded even in Venezuela, in contrast to the 
country'sothereconomicactivities. 
Net factor payments to the rest of the world 
diminished slightly, indicating a return to the 
downward trend seen in the period 1990-1992. 
As a result of this and of the region's slightly 
more favourable terms of trade, g :oss national 
income in 1994 increased more rapidly (5.2%) 
than gross domestic product, and, in per capita 
terms, the increase was consider ible (3.3%), 
higher than in the preceding years. í fone the less, 
per capita national income was 7% ower than in 
1980 (see table III-2). 
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2. Supply and demand 
In 1994 the upturn in the level of activity of the 
Latin American and Caribbean economies as a 
group was reflected also in an increase in the total 
supply and the domestic supply of goods and 
services. This came in response to a notable 
reactivation of investment, a sustained expansion 
of exports and, to a lesser extent, an increase in 
consumption. 
Total supply again expanded significantly 
at a rate of 5.6%. This rate, the highest since 
1981, outstripped the rapid pace of growth of 
the preceding three years (4.8% on average) 
and strengthened the recovery hat had begun 
in 1991 (see table III-2). The volume of the 
region's imports swelled by nearly 12%, a rate 
higher than in 1993, but significantly lower 
Table III-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL SUPPLY, 
DOMESTIC DEMAND AND GROSS NATIONAL INCOME" 
(Indexes and growth rates) 
Indexes (1980 = 100) Growth rates 
Cumulative 
variation 
1992 1993 1994b 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994b j ^ ¿ " j ^ ¿ 
1. Total supply (2+3) 
2. Gross domestic product 
at market prices 
3. Imports of 
goods and services 
4. Exports of 
goods and services 
5. Domestic availability 
of goods and services 
(2 + 3 - 4) = domestic 
demand (6 + 7) 
121.6 126.7 133.8 1.2 5.0 5.2 4.1 5.6 10.1 21.5 
120.3 124.2 129.9 0.3 3.6 3.1 3.3 4.5 12.7 15.3 
130.1 142.2 158.8 8.2 15.3 20.0 9.3 11.7 -6.0 68.9 
184.7 197.6 213.7 5.1 4.5 6.6 7.0 8.1 65.8 28.9 
112.9 116.9 122.8 0.3 5.1 4.9 3.5 Í.0 2.4 19.9 
6. Final consumption 
expenditure c 
7. Gross fixed capital 
formation 
120.1 123.4 128.2 0.9 4.7 3.9 2.7 4.0 10.4 16.2 
89.2 95.3 104.6 -2.5 6.8 9.9 6.9 S .7 -24.0 37.5 
8. Net factor payments 
to rest of world 145.8 155.5 154.5 -13.9 -5.7 -3.9 6.6 -V.6 60.9 -4.0 
9. Real gross national 
income (2 - 8) 113.7 116.5 122.6 0.9 3.5 3.3 2.5 Í.2 6.2 15.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPONENTS OF TOTAL DEMAND 











































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
a Preliminary figures. b Nineteen countries; figures on private consumption and investment include estimates ir the case of some 
countries for which data were lacking.c Includes variation in stocks. Government consumption is included under private 
consumption. e Does not include variation in stocks. 
thanin 1992. This trend was largely attributable 
to the notable expansion in the volume of 
imports made by Peru (30%), Brazil (23%), 
Argentina (20%), Colombia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay (all between 
14% and 18%) and, to a lesser extent, Chile, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Panama and Paraguay (between 
4% and 9%), while in Nicaragua the increase 
was slight. The volume of imports decreased in 
only four countries; the most significant drops 
were in Haiti (-37%), Venezuela (-29%) and 
Honduras (-8%), while in Bolivia there was a 
slight decrease. The increase in tie volume of 
merchandise imports nearly matched the rise in 
their value, since unit values did not change 
significantly. Sharp increases were seen in 
imports of consumer goods, intermsdiate goods 
and capital goods, while fuel purcha ses declined, 
owing to the drop in petroleum prices. The 
increase in imports of intermediate goods 
represented just over 50% of the exp ansion in the 
region's total imports, while capital goods 
imports accounted for somewhat 1 JSS than one 
third and consumer goods purchase s one fifth of 
the total increase. 
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The volume of exports grew by 8%, which 
was higher than the mean annual rate for the 
period 1981-1993, as well as the 1993 figure. In 
Argentina, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador and Peru, the volume of exports showed 
significant increases of between 11% and 20%, 
while in Chile, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, the increases ranged from 7% to 
10%. In Brazil there was a moderate expansion 
of somewhat below 6%. In contrast, a sharp 
contraction was seen in Haiti (-37%) and a slight 
decrease (-1%) in Honduras. 
Because the real growth rate for exports was 
lower than the rate for imports, the domestic 
supply of goods expanded (5.2%) somewhat 
more rapidly than GDP. As a result, supply 
exceeded the 1990 level by 20%, and, in per 
capita terms, was 11% above that year's figure 
(see table III-2). 
The expansion of domestic demand stemmed 
from a sharp rise in gross capital formation and, 
to a lesser extent, in consumption. Fixed 
investment climbed by 9.5%, thereby continuing 
the upward trend that had begun in 1991. 
However, regional investment represented only 
18% of GDP, while in the period 1979-1981 this 
ratio had been somewhat higher than 23%. 
Consumption rose more quickly than the year 
before, since it grew by 4% as compared with 
slightly less than 3% in 1993. Thus, final 
consumption expenditure was 16% greater than 
in 1990 in real terms, thereby exceeding the 
region's population growth rate for the same 
period. 
The growth of the region's GDP in 1994 was 
solely the result of the buoyancy of domestic 
demand. Once again there was an outward shift 
in domestic demand, which, if greater than in the 
previous year, was smaller than the shifts seen in 
1991 and 1992. The volume of exports expanded 
considerably and thereby contributed to 
generating an increase in total demand 
equivalent to 1.8% of GDP, a higher increase than 
in preceding years. Be that as it may, this effect 
was more than offset by the channelling of a 
portion of demand, amounting to 2.1% of 
regional GDP, to increased impo: is. 
Meanwhile, the growth of consumption 
-especially in the private sector- made a 
contribution equivalent to over 3 points of GDP 
to the increase in total demand (somewhat more 
than in the preceding two years). Despite this 
improvement, per capita consumption in 1994 
was still 1% below its 1980 level as a result of 
its earlier declines, mainly during the first half 
of the 1980s. Meanwhile, fixed investment 
again made a significant posit ve contribution 
(equivalent to nearly 2% of GDI'), in contrast to 
its results in the 1980s, when its contribution had 
clearly been negative in character (see tables 
III-3 and III-4). 
With regard to total demard, the regional 
trend of rapidly rising investmînt and exports 
and a slower expansion of private consumption 
was shared by a good number of individual 
countries, although the size of t tie contributions 
made by the various components of demand 
varied from one country to the next. In fact, 
domestic demand climbed in 15 of the 19 
countries for which information was available, 
and in seven of them (Argîntina, Brazil, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay), the increases were qui te large, ranging 
from around 7 to 15 points of GDP. Domestic 
demand also swelled in Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Parama (where it 
increased by between 4% and 5% of GDP) and in 
Chile, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua 
(around 3 points). In Bolivia and Honduras, 
meanwhile, domestic demand fell by between 3 
and 4 points of GDP, and in Hail i and Venezuela 
it shrank outright (by over 10%] i. 
In nine of the 15 countries in which domestic 
demand grew, fixed investment increased faster 
than private consumption, while in the other six 
the opposite was true. However, the size of the 
contribution made by fixed investment to GDP 
growth was comparable to that of private 
consumption, as that variable's more moderate 
growth was offset by its sigrificantly higher 
1 This figure includes variations in stocks. 
2 It should be noted this analysis of the contributions made by the different components of demand to chi nges in GDP does not 
incorporate the impact of variations in the terms of trade, since it is based on accounts reflecting real flows. By the same token, 
the discussion of variations in each of the components of domestic demand does not reflect the real impact < f changes in relative 
prices, which have come to be of considerable importance in the countries' recent adjustment processes. 
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Table III-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1994 
















































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
share of total demand. Thus, in 10 of the 
countries, far more than half the increase in 
domestic demand came from private 
consumption; in Argentina and Peru, the two 
components' contributions were similar, and in 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Panama, 
most of the increase was generated by 
investment. 
Because of the net effect of an increase in 
imports and a somewhat more moderate rise in 
exports, in some countries a portion of the growth 
in domestic demand was diverted to the external 
market, and the expansion of GDP was therefore 
less marked than it would otherwise have been. 
Even so, in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Panama, Peru and Uruguay the 
momentum generated by domestic demand was 
reflected in high growth rates. In Guatemala, 
Mexico and Paraguay, the CDnsiderable 
deterioration in these countries' external trade 
position resulted in very little GDP gowth. On the 
other hand, the increase in Chile's rade balance 
and the reduction of deficits in thî Dominican 
Republic and Nicaragua made it possible for 
these countries' GDP growth to outdistance the 
expansion of domestic demand. 
Despite the above, in some countries exports 
continued to make an important contribution to 
the rise in the level of activity. In Bolivia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Panama and Peru, the 
expansion of exports contributed between 3 and 
6 points of GDP, while in Argentina, ] îrazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and Uruguay, their contribution 
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amounted to between 1 and 3 points; in the case 
of Venezuela, this contribution amounted to over 
3 points, which helped to offset a large share 
of the downturn in domestic demand (see 
table III-4). 
Domestic demand shrank only in Haiti (-14 
points of GDP), Venezuela (-12 points), 
Honduras (-4 points) and Bolivia (-3 points). 
While in all these countries private 
consumption declined, and this accounts for 
the bulk of the downturn in domestic demand, 
in Haiti and Venezuela the drop-off in 
investment was an equally influential factor. 
The contraction of domestic demand was 
counteracted in Haiti and Honduras by the 
reduction of the trade deficit and, in 
Venezuela, by the growth of the trade surplus, 
which helped to mitigate the drop in GDP. In 
Bolivia, the growth of the trade surplus 
comfortably offset the downturn in domestic 
demand, making a positive contribution to 
growth of GDP. 
In 1994 per capita private consumption in 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay swelled by between 3% and 9%, while 
in another three countries (Chile, Mexico and 
Panama), the increase was slight. In two 
countries (the Dominican Republic and 
Nicaragua) per capita private consumption was 
relatively stable. In Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras and 
The region's supply and demand structure 
underwent significant changes during the first 
half of the 1990s, sparked by adjustment 
processes, a real appreciation in local currencies 
and economic reactivation. The export share of 
total demand increased by just over 1%, while 
the contribution made by gross capital formation 
to domestic demand rose slightly and the 
contribution made by consumption decreased. 
The variations in total supply were more 
sizeable, due to the headlong growth of imports, 
whose share of total supply increased by 4% 
during the same period. 
In the current decade, the coefficient for 
exports of goods and services climbed 
Venezuela, on the other hand, the slide was a 
steep one (between 5% and 14%). Thus, per 
capita private consumption declined in less than 
one fourth of the countries of the region, which 
is an improvement over the situât ion in the 1980s, 
when reductions in this indicate r of well-being 
were widespread. 
In general, levels of per capita private 
consumption continued to bo significantly 
lower than at the start of the previous decade, 
since the upswing seen between 1991 and 1994 
constituted no more than a vîry incomplete 
recovery from the downturn,in this variable 
that occurred between 1981 ami 1990. Indeed, 
per capita private consumption was higher in 
1994 than it had been at the stjirt of the 1980s 
in only five of the 19 countries for which 
information was available. In four of those five 
(Chile, Colombia, Paraguay ami Uruguay), the 
cumulative rise ranged from 11% to 31%, 
while in El Salvador it was 6%. The largest 
cumulative decreases in per capita private 
consumption were in Haiti (-50%), Nicaragua 
(-45%), Bolivia, Peru and Vem zuela (between 
-14% and -25%). In Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala and Honduras, 
the decreases ranged between 6% and 9%, 
while in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and 
Panama, this indicator of veil-being still 
stands at between 2% and 4% below its 1980 
levels (see figure III-l). 
significantly, by 3.5 points of GDP, thereby 
continuing the rising trend seer in the previous 
decade and strengthening still further the process 
of developing the region's exporting capacity, a 
process which had begun in the nidst of the debt 
crisis at the start of the 1980s. TI le increase in the 
coefficient for exports was "widespread, 
inasmuch as between 1990-1994 it spread to 14 
of the 19 countries for which information was 
available. Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and 
Paraguay marked up the largest increases 
(between 7 and 11 points of GEP), while Brazil, 
Chile and El Salvador boosted heir coefficients 
by around 4 points. In Colombia, the Dominican 
Republic, Mexico, Paraguay, ] Nicaragua, Peru, 
3. Liberalization and changes in the supply 
and demand structure 
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Figure III-l 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Uruguay and Venezuela the rise ranged from 1 
to 3 points of GDP. In Guatemala, however, the 
indicator edged downward; in Argentina and 
Honduras it fell by around 3 points of GDP, and 
in Haiti it dropped by 9 points. 
The coefficient for imports of goods and 
services as a percentage of GDP rose notably 
between 1990-1994, following the decline of the 
1980s; it reached 6 points of GDP, which helped 
it to exceed its 1980 levels. The 1994 import 
coefficients were higher than their 1990 levels in 
16 of the 19 countries of the region for which 
information was available. The sharpest 
increases were in Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Paraguay and Uruguay, where they 
ranged between 10 and 20 points of GDP. 
Significant increases of over i i points also 
occurred in Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, 
Mexico and Peru. 
In nearly all the countries mentioned, import 
coefficients had declined at the start of the 
previous decade, the period in whi< h the external 
debt crisis erupted. This was followed by a 
gradual upswing, a trend which intensified in the 
current decade, owing to the trade liberalization 
policy, the overvaluation of exchange rates and 
abundant inflows of foreign capital. 
Variations in exports and imports were 
reflected in substantial changes in the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries' trade 
balances. The region as a whole hid marked up 
a significant surplus by the end of 1 he 1980s and 
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Table III-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RELATIVE SHARES OF 
COMPONENTS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND GROSS 
NATIONAL INCOME, AT MARKET PRICES a 














































































































ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 



























































the start of the 1990s; however, this surplus 
then declined steeply, so that by 1994 it had 
dropped by nearly 4 points of GDP, as compared 
with the 1990 trade balance.3 Be that as it may, 
the dwindling of the trade surplus allowed for 
an equivalent growth of domestic demand, 
which was channelled ma nly towards 
increased investment. The coefficient for 
investment as a percentage of GDP rose by 3 
points, while the total consumption ratio rose 
by only slightly more than one half point (see 
table III-5). 
4. Investment and its financing 
The upturn in investment that had begun in 1991 
strengthened in 1994, as shown by the increase 
in the regional coefficient of gross capital 
formation to 18% of GDP. The 1994 investment 
coefficient, for its part, was higher than the 1993 
ratio in most countries of the region, with 
particularly notable increases being registered in 
Peru (from 19% to 22.9%), Argentina (from 
19.9% to 21.9%), Brazil (from 14.1% to 15.8%), 
El Salvador (from 19.7% to 21.2%), Honduras 
(from 23.5% to 24.9%) and Mexi co (from 20.7% 
to 21.7%). Increases also occurred in Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, Panama and Paraguay, 
amounting to less than 1% of GDP , In another four 
3 In accordance with the national accounts statistics prepared by ECLAC, the trade surplus, in constant 191 ¡0 prices, was 7.5% 
of GDP in 1990 and 3.9% in 1994. However, preliminary estimates indicate that if a new base year was used, for example, 1990, 
the 1990 surplus would have been only 2.6% of GDP, while for 1994 it would show a deficit of 1%. The difl erence made by the 
change in the base year is attributable mainly to the high prices which regional export products fetched in l'>80, but which then 
declined considerably. In the statistics using 1980 as the base year, this was reflected in very large coefficients for exports as a 
percentage of GDP, as well as in a terms-of-trade effect with a minus sign for all the years in the series. 
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countries (Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and 
Uruguay) the coefficient was relatively 
constant. In Bolivia, Guatemala and Nicaragua 
it edged downward, while in Venezuela it fell 
by nearly 5 points. Haiti had the lowest 
coefficient for gross capital formation, which 
declined again in 1994, this time by 5 points of 
GDP (see table III-6). 
Despite the increases in gross capital 
formation in recent years, the regional coefficient 
of gross fixed investment for the period 
1992-1994 was only slightly more than 18%, 
which is considerably less than the 23% figure 
registered for the period 1979-1981. This decline 
was widespread, although its characteristics were 
not the same in all the countries of the region. 
During the most recent three-year period, most 
of the countries recorded significantly lower 
average coefficients than they had prior to the 
crisis of the early 1980s. Thus, between the above 
two periods the investment coefficient slipped by 
between 8 and 11 points of GDP in Brazil, 
Ecuador, Haiti, Uruguay and Venezuela and by 
between 2 and 6 points in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. In 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic and 
Nicaragua, the level was similar in both periods. 
The only countries that managed to improve their 
investment coefficients were Chile, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Honduras and Paraguay (see 
figure III-2). 
The recent increases in gross capital formation 
were reflected in a significant expansion in 
imports of capital goods, whose regional value 
increased by 23% with higher rates in Argentina 
and Peru (50%), Brazil (46%), Ecuador (45%), 
Paraguay (39%) and Colombia (32%), and 
moderate ones in El Salvador, Mexico and 
Panama (between 13% and 20%). In contrast, 
Haiti's and Venezuela's imports of capital goods 
fell by between 28% and 33% as a result of 
sluggish investment and the recession affecting 
these countries. In Bolivia, whre the country 
maintained its moderate pace sf expansion, 
imports of capital goods declined by 13% as a 
result of the downturn in investnw nt. 
In 1994 investment financing was much the 
same as it had been in the precedin g year. During 
the most recent four-year period, d< >mestic saving 
remained constant at around 2!.5% of GDP, 
which was slightly lower than the 1990 level 
(23.2%). National saving increased slightly, to 
hold steady at nearly 15% of regional GDP, 
which was due to the fact that the terms of trade 
improved in 1994 while net factor payments 
abroad diminished somewhat. Nevertheless, 
outbound flows of profits and interest still took 
up nearly 14% of gross domestic savings. 
External saving, which had been up during the 
preceding three years, remained constant at 
around 4% of GDP, in contrast to ils scanty 1990 
level of 0.5%. Influencing this trend was the 
headlong growth of capital flows since 1991, 
which meant that in the most recent two-year 
period, the contribution of extc rnal savings 
(which include net capital income from the 
build-up of international reserves) reached its 
highest levels since 1983. Thus, exiernal savings 
contributed nearly one fourth of investment 
financing (see table III-7). 
5. Inflation 
In 1994 inflation rates continued to decline 
in the vast majority of countries in the region; 
of the 22 countries considered, only five 
showed a clearly unfavourable pattern. In 
the remaining 17 countries, inflation either 
fell or continued to climb very slowly. 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Honduras and Venezuela registere d significant 
rises in inflation rates, which,however,did 
not reach the extreme levels of tie 1980s and 
the early years of the current decade (see 
tableI-4). 
4 It may be supposed that the volume of capital goods imports tended to grow at much the same pace as their value, since the 
unit prices of imports of manufactures increased only slightly in 1994. 
The explanation of this wide gap between domestic and national saving lies in the base year used for calcul ating the series. 
For example, if 1990 were selected as the base year, the gap would be substantially smaller, since the terms of trad : would register 
only a small decline in 1994 as compared with 1990. 
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Table III-6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INVESTMENT RATIOS 
(Gross fixed investment as a percentage ofGDP) 
Latin America 






















































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
a Preliminary figures. 
During the early months of 1995, that trend 
has generally continued, except in the case of 
Mexico. In some countries inflation rates 
continued to fall and in others only slight 
increases were noted. In Mexico inflation surged 
heavily in 1995, which brought the 12-month rate 
to 38% in June, after it had been only 7% in 1994. 
Brazil's anti-inflation efforts had notable 
results, since thanks to its stabilization plan, 
which had begun in 1993, the pace of price 
increases, then 2,500%, fell to 930% in 1994 and 
to only 34% during the 12 months ending in June 
1995. (In the first half of 1994 the 12-month 
inflation rate had reached 5,000%). This put an 
end to the last of the virtually hyperinflationary 
situations that had prevailed in the region during 
the preceding 15 years. Bolivia's inflation rates 
have been moderate since 1986 and were less 
than 10% in 1993 and 1994. Since 1992, 
Argentina has also managed to control its 
inflation rate, which was under 4% in 1994 and 
has remained low in 1995. In Peru the pace of 
price increases dropped from 40% in 1993 to 
15% in 1994; this falling trend continued into the 
first half of 1995 and helped to strengthen control 
of inflation, after the excessively high rates 
registered between 1988 and 1990. In Nicaragua, 
the annual price increase has ranged between 4% 
and 20% since 1992, in clear contrast to the 
previous years' levels, which reached a high 
point of 34,000% in 1988 (see table 1-4). 
Other countries whose inflation rates, while 
high, are still substantially lower than those 
mentioned earlier also managec to lower them; 
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Figure m-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL INVEST MENT 
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Percentages 
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Source: EC LAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Countries are listed in the order of their investment ratios for the period 1979-1981 
thus, Ecuador's index fell to 25% in 1994, while 
Uruguay's decreased, but remained above 40%. 
In contrast, Jamaica's inflation, which has been 
somewhat high since 1990, increased slightly in 
1994, which brought the rate to 33%. In the case 
of Colombia, the situation remained stable, with 
annual increases of nearly 23%; the same was 
true for Paraguay, where the increases have been 
somewhat less than 20%. In Guatemala inflation 
has hovered at slightly over 10% in recent years. 
Chile, El Salvador and Trinidad and Tobago, 
whose inflation rates had been relai ively low for 
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Table m-7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FINANCING 
OF GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION a 
1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 19<>2 1993 1994b 
Percentages of gross domestic product 
23.0 24.3 22.7 23.7 24.2 23.7 23.2 22.7 22,4 22.5 22.7 
2.6 4.9 4.5 3.9 4.1 4.3 3.7 3.4 3,1 3.2 3.1 
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 09 0.7 0.9 
0.0 -3.0 -4.1 -4.2 -4.4 -4.7 -5.0 -5.5 -5,6 -6.0 -5.7 
20.5 16.8 14.5 16.0 16.1 15.1 15.2 14.6 14,6 14.0 14.8 
4.1 0.5 2.4 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.5 1.8 3,3 4.1 4.0 
24.7 17.3 16.8 17.3 17.4 16.1 15.7 16.4 17,9 18.1 18.8 
Other percentages 
93.1 140.7 134.9 136.8 139.0 147.0 148.1 138.0 125,4 123.9 120.6 
0.0 -12.2 -18.1 -17.6 -18.2 -19.9 -21.4 -24.2 -24,8 -26.5 -25.0 
-11.2 -20.1 -19.8 -16.6 -17.1 -18.1-15.8 -14.8 -13,9 -14.4 -13.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
a Nineteen countries. Preliminary figures. 
1. Gross domestic saving 
2. Net factor payments 
abroad 





5. Gross national saving 
( 1 + 2 + 3 + 4) 
6. External saving 
7. Gross capital 





Net factor payments 
abroad/domestic 
saving 
several years, were able to consolidate this trend 
in 1994 by reducing annual price increases to 
single-digit rates. Lastly, in Barbados and 
Panama, countries in which inflation has always 
been low, that situation continued into 1994, with 
Barbados even having a negative rate and 
Panama an increase of barely 1%. 
Of the five countries in which inflation rates 
flared significantly, the Dominican Republic 
went from only 3% in 1993 to 12% in 1994 and 
Costa Rica from 9% to 20%, while Honduras's 
inflation rate rose somewhat more, from 13% to 
29%. In contrast, Haiti's annual inflation rate 
continued to spiral upward until it exceeded 50%, 
fuelled by the serious political crisis, which, in 
turn, was sparked by an economic blockade in 
place during nearly the whole of : L994 and a fiscal 
deficit financed solely through increased money 
issues. Venezuela registered the largest jump in 
inflation, from 46% to 71%, as a result of the 
serious fiscal and exchange-rate crisis affecting 
the country. In the early months of 1995, its 
annual rate remained constant at around 70%. 
Brazil's rate during the sam< period amply 
exceeded that level, becoming the highest in the 
region. However, these inflation rates, despite 
the increases, are well below those which 
prevailed in Latin America in the recent past. 
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The decline in regional inflation rates was 
partly due to the fact that in 1994 the Brazilian 
economy, the region's largest, joined in the 
stabilization programmes already under way. 
Brazil instituted an innovative plan aimed at 
drastically reducing inflation, which was very 
high due to its inertial aspects, these, in turn, 
being the result of a highly indexed economy. 
The plan had notable effects, since the monthly 
rate of price increases, which had been nearly 
50% in June 1994, fell to around 2% on average 
over the following 12 months. 
The favourable results obtained in other 
countries are attributable to the carrying forward 
of the macroeconomic policies adopted in 
previous years, whose main objective continued 
to be to quell inflation. The strategies 
implemented carried forward the establishment 
of fiscal austerity and prudent monetary policies, 
as well as the extension of trade liberalization, 
especially through regional agreements to 
eliminate tariffs between trading partners. 
Exchange rates, meanwhile, played an 
important role in the evolution of consumer 
prices in most countries of the region, either by 
supporting anti-inflationary efforts in 
situations characterized by an abundant supply 
of foreign exchange, or by contributing to price 
increases in situations where external weakness 
made it necessary to expedite the pace of 
devaluation. 
In nearly all countries in the region, fiscal 
policy has succeeded in balancing public 
accounts. Progress in fiscal reform, the 
application by public enterprises of more realistic 
pricing policies, the persistent effort to control 
tax evasion and the resources stemming from 
privatization have continued to increase real 
income. Meanwhile, the volume of expenditure 
has remained smaller, especially as regards 
Following the gradual improvement in the urban 
open unemployment rate of the Latin American 
and Caribbean economies during the second half 
of the 1980s, this trend slowed in the early 1990s, 
and unemployment even increased again 
slightly. In addition, the upturn in economic 
activity in 1994 was not reflected in lower 
investment; while this has promoted fiscal 
equilibrium, it also entails some degree of 
uncertainty as to the long-term viability of such 
policies. 
During 1994 a group of counties succeeded 
in keeping fiscal balances within acceptable 
limits so that no pressure on domestic lending 
was generated. The expansion of tlie fiscal deficit 
and its financing through growth in the money 
supply played a decisive role in increasing 
inflation only in Costa Rica, tlie Dominican 
Republic, Haiti and Venezuela. Tie failure of a 
State bank in the first case, and widespread bank 
failures in the second, gave rise to massive 
parafiscal deficits which had a sigrificant impact 
on the money supply, especially in Venezuela, 
while in Haiti the serious situation in the public 
sector meant that the bulk of the fiscal deficit had 
to be financed through money creiition. 
Thus, except in a few cases, monetary policy 
has been facilitated by fiscal management, as 
well as by an upturn in the demanc for money in 
an environment of declining expectations of 
inflation. This means that the challenges posed 
by ensuring that growth in the noney supply 
remains consistent with the goals of economic 
growth and low inflation have renamed linked 
to external capital flows. Thus, donestic interest 
rates have had to grapple with the conflict 
between increasing compïtitiveness, 
anti-inflationary targets and the financing of the 
external current-account deficit. However, in 
most countries, as in previous year», priority has 
been given to the goal of stabilizing prices, as a 
result of which real interest rates have remained 
very high and, in some cases have even 
increased. In several countries local currencies 
appreciated again, while tlie cost of 
implementing policies to sterilize tlie excess cash 
was high. 
unemployment levels. In fact, witl the increase 
in the urban open unemployment rate for the 
region as a whole from 6.2% in 19! »3 to 6.4% in 
1994, this indicator returned to levels not 
registered since 1985 (see table III-8). 
Several of the largest countries in the region 
contributed to this adverse result. Thus, in 
6. Employment 
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Argentina, the average annual rate of urban open 
unemployment rose from 9.6% in 1993 to 11.5% 
in 1994, with the situation worsening in the 
second half of the year, added to which was an 
increase in the underemployment rate. In Chile 
the level of unemployment grew from 4.1% to 
6.3% in the Metropolitan Region and from 4.7% 
to 6% nationwide. In Colombia the average 
annual rate climbed from 8.6% in 1993 to 8.9% 
in 1994; however, towards the end of the year, an 
improvement in the situation meant that by 
December the rate was the same as it had been in 
December of the preceding year. In Mexico 
urban unemployment increased slightly from 
3.4% to 3.7%. In Venezuela the nationwide open 
unemployment rate increased from 6.6% to 
8.7%. Increases in the unemployment rate were 
registered also in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Panama and Uruguay. In Cuba, while the levels 
could not be quantified, the critical economic 
situation was expressed in very high 
underemployment rates. 
In other countries, however, the 
unemployment rate fell. In Brazil, after 
fluctuating throughout 1994, urban 
unemployment dropped drastically at the end of 
the year, owing to the economic expansion 
generated by the Real Plan. Because of this plan, 
the unemployment index for 1994 as a whole was 
favourable. Underemployment followed a 
similar path, with rates higher than the 1993 
levels in the first half of the year and declining 
ones in the second half. Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru also 
registered drops in the open unemployment rate, 
attributable mainly to their high economic 
growth rates. However, in all these countries, 
underemployment levels continued to be 
significant. 
In contrast to the expansion of unemployment 
in the region as a whole during the early years of 
the 1980s -which was also much more marked-
the increase in unemployment in the current 
decade is not based on a widespread slowdown 
in economic activity, but on other factors. Only 
in the cases of Honduras and Venezuela was a 
drop in GDP the main cause of the worsening of 
unemployment. 
Some of the other factors which contributed 
to raising the level of unemployment included 
stabilization and adjustment policies. Thus, in 
Argentina, sharp cutbacks in the public sector, 
partly in the context of privatization policies, 
entailed the dismissal of a large number of 
public-sector workers, many of whom have had 
serious difficulties in findiig alternative 
employment. In Chile, the stabilization policy 
has limited domestic demand and job creation in 
the non-tradable goods sectors, especially 
construction. 
In other countries the increase in 
unemployment had its or gin in trade 
liberalization, which has affectée employment in 
industries facing increased foreign competition. 
Thus, in such countries as Argent ina, Mexico and 
Uruguay, massive job losses wire registered in 
certain industrial branches whici have not been 
offset by job creation in expanding activities. In 
other countries, such as Brazil, his process has 
not yet developed to the sane extent, and 
liberalization has affected only certain low 
labour-intensive industries. 
In the same context, and also in order to cope 
with the consequences of trado liberalization, 
changes in the factor mix wer; introduced in 
many industrial sectors which ¡generated sharp 
increases in labour productivity That was seen 
especially in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, where smaller 
numbers of workers were ne;ded. Thus, in 
Argentina, while industrial outout climbed by 
nearly 4%, the index of new hring in Buenos 
Aires fell by nearly 50% as conpared with the 
previous year. 
In other countries, meanwhile, the rise in 
unemployment was due to increased 
participation in the labour market, as a result of 
which the growth in the labour supply exceeded 
the rate of job creation, which, ir turn, was fairly 
low. Increased participation can reflect 
long-term structural trends, sucl as the growing 
integration of women into the labour market. 
Thus, in Costa Rica, Uruguay and Venezuela, 
women represented a larger share of the labour 
market in 1994 than did men. Tie opposite was 
true in Argentina and Colombia, where the rate 
of participation fell, cushioning the rise in 
unemployment levels. 
Another factor which migtt have had an 
impact on the tendency fcr the rate of 
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Table III-8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN OPEN UNEMPLOYMENT 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
0 Preliminary figures. Nationwide urban rate, May-October average. c Up to 1988, official estimates; fi om 1989 onward, 
capital cities of departments and the city of El Alto. Metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Bel< i Horizonte, Porto 
Alegre, Salvador and Recife: 12-month average. e Santiago Metropolitan Region, 12-month aveage. Seven 
metropolitan areas, average for March, June, September and December. 8 Nationwide urban rate, up to July. In 1987, 
Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca; from 1988 onward, nationwide urban rate. Includes hidden unemployment. 
1 Nationwide urban rate. J Nationwide total; official estimates. In 1987, Central District, San Pedro Si la and five cities; 
from 1988 onward, nationwide urban rate. ' Encompasses a growing number of urban areas, which reacl led 39 in October 
1994. m Metropolitan area. " Metropolitan Asunción. ° Metropolitan Lima. p Montevideo, 12-month average. 
q Four-quarter average; in 1994, nationwide total. 
participation to grow is wage-earners' response 
to short-term economic trends. Thus, the 
economic difficulties affecting many households 
in Venezuela meant that a larger number of 
members had to join the work force in the hope 
of gaining additional sources of family income, 
which translated into a sharp increase in 
participation for both women and men. 
In 1994, as has been seen for many years, 
unemployment was concentrated in specific 
groups within the work force. Thus, it reached 
high levels among youth, women and people with 
low levels of education and job training. 
Recently, however, in some countries it has also 
affected groups that have traditionally enjoyed 
relatively stable employment. In Argentina, 
unemployment in the higher age bracket 
registered a sharp increase, owing to the 
restructuring of the public sector. This problem 
was worsened by the fact that the characteristics 
of the training received by many of those affected 
make it difficult for them to find new jobs. In 
addition, the critical situation in some industrial 
activities and restructuring processes in others 
have generated levels of industrial 
unemployment above the urban average in such 
countries as Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Uruguay. 
There also continued to be major differences 
in unemployment levels between the various 
urban centres within a single cour try (see table 
III-9). Thus, in Argentina, while lhe decline in 
employment was widespread in all metropolitan 
areas, the discrepancies between more severely 
affected cities and those with higher levels of 
economic activity increased. It is also worth 
mentioning that in Greater Buenos Aires, where 
unemployment rates have generally been below 
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Figure III-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES) : 
URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
(Average annual rates) 
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the urban average, this situation has changed 
since 1993. The main reason for this is the mixed 
performance of the participation rate, which in 
Greater Buenos Aires grew steadily in recent 
years, until 1993, while in all other urban areas it 
remained practically constant. In contrast to 
Argentina's experience, Colombia witnessed a 
process of homogenization of unemployment 
rates, since they increased in the metropolitan 
areas that had lower levels of unemployment and 
fell in Medellin, where this indicator had 
previously been higher. 
In Brazil's greater metropolitan areas, the 
improvement in employment registered in 1994 
primarily benefited São Paulo and Recife, while 
in other urban centres the unemployment level 
remained unchanged, and in Salvador de Bahía 
it actually increased. The north-eastern cities 
continued to display high rates of unemployment 
as compared with the national average. Be that 
as it may, the index improved at the end of the 
year in all metropolitan areas. In Mexico, 
unemployment trends in the major metropolitan 
areas were uniform, so that the previous 
inconsistencies remained, while in Ecuador, a 
sharp drop in unemployment in Quito contrasted 
with a slight increase in Guayaquil. 
In some cases, internal migration promoted 
processes of homogenization of unemployment 
levels, while in others vast discrepancies 
persisted or even increased. It must be assumed 
that, among other factors, qualitative differences 
in the supply of and demand for labour impeded 
the development of uniform conditions in the 
region's labour markets. 
Lastly, it should be recalled that the open 
unemployment figures reveal only part of the 
total picture of employment problems. A fuller 
analysis would have to take into account the 
situation of discouraged job-seekers who have 
stopped actively looking for work, as well as the 
underemployment of many other persons 
registered as employed. However, not all 
countries in the region have generated the 
relevant data. 
The structure of employment has also 
changed significantly in recent years. In many 
countries, industrial restructuring resulting from 
the elimination of certain activities, as well as the 
diminished use of labour made possible by 
modern technology, has led to a iecrease in the 
relative strength of the manufacturing sector 
within the occupational structure, or even to an 
absolute decline in industrial employment. Thus, 
in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru and Unguay, modern 
industrial employment decreased in absolute 
terms, despite the substantial growth of sectoral 
output in some cases (see table III 10). In Brazil, 
employment in formal industry remained stable 
nationwide, but shrank in metropolitan areas. 
Moreover, in the Dominican Republic, 
Mexico and some Central American countries, 
the inbond assembly (maquilac ora) industry 
constituted an important employment-generating 
industrial activity, although the Central 
American countries have witnessed the first 
displacement effects of the North t American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The automotive 
sector was also a significant source of job 
creation in such countries as Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico. 
Meanwhile, the increase in construction 
activity once again significantly spurred the 
demand for labour in Costa Rica, Ecuador and 
Mexico. On the other hand, in si ch countries 
as Chile, Guatemala, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, the slower growth of construction 
contributed to worsening the situation in the 
labour market. 
In general, the countries for which 
information is available continued to witness a 
long-term declining trend in the strength of 
agriculture within the occupational structure. In 
some countries, such as Chile anc Costa Rica, 
agricultural employment actually decreased in 
absolute terms. In Guatemala and Mexico formal 
employment in agriculture aluo receded. 
Venezuela constituted an important exception in 
this regard, since employment in this sector grew 
in 1994 despite shrinking agricultiral output, a 
phenomenon which reflects th; nature of 
subsistence agriculture as a last resort in times of 
crisis. 
In contrast to what occurred in primary and 
secondary activities, employment in the tertiary 
sector expanded again, which indicates that the 
trend towards tertiarization of the labour market 
is continuing. Specifically, employment in some 
services (communication, transport, finance and 
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Table III-9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OPEN 














































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC and International Labour Organization (ILO), on the basis of official figures. For Greater San iago: Department of 
Economics, University of Chile. 
a The period covered by the rates corresponds to the original for each country. Preliminary figures. c In 1992, the annual 
figures are for 10 months, and the figures for the second and third quarters do not include June and July, n ¡spectively. 
community, social and personal services) was 
stimulated by economic policy reforms. In 
particular, significant growth was seen in formal 
employment in such activities in Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador and Peru. 
In many countries public-sector employment 
continued to fall in relative and even absolute 
terms. The available statistics for 1994 showed 
setbacks in relation to the previous year in 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, 
Panama and Venezuela. 
Thus, the economic restructuring now under 
way within the modern sector led to a revival of 
manufacturing; however, to the extent that it 
contributed to increased labour productivity, it 
also led to job losses in many cases, at least in 
the short term. The public sector, for its part, lost 
its employment-generating function, while a 
larger number of jobs are apparently being 
generated in modern tertiary activities linked to 
the processes of liberalization and 
modernization. Another indicator of the effects 
of modernization on the labour market was the 
increase seen, primarily in Argentina and Chile, 
in the proportion of professionals and technicians 
in the work force. 
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Table III-10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDICATORS 
OF INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT 





































































































































































































































































































































an 1 medium-scale 
enterprises, while those referring to total industrial employment include small-scale and micro-enterprii es, as well as 
own-account work. c Persons employed in industry, excluding coffee-threshing; in 1994, January-November average. 
1 Persons employed in industrial enterprises with 10 or more workers. e Refers to the number of persons payin, 5 into the social 
security system. Includes mining 
include the maquiladora industry. 
Total formal industrial employment. 8 Persons employed in manufac uring: does not 
1 Persons employed in the maquiladora industry. ' Industrial employme: it in enterprises 
with 100 or more workers in metropolitan Lima. J The figure that appears in the 1980 column refers to 198:'.. Persons 
employed in enterprises with five or more workers. Up to 1990, includes persons employed in manufacturing; from 1991 
onward, all persons employed in manufacturing in Greater Buenos Aires. m Persons employed in manufacturing in the 
Metropolitan Region. ° The figure that appears in the 1980 column refers to 1982. The figure for 1990 is an estimate. 
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However, the tendency for most employment 
to be generated in activities that are not part of 
the modern sector continued. While there is 
limited information in this respect, such 
countries as Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and 
Venezuela saw an increase in 1994 in the 
proportion of smaller-scale enterprises and 
In contrast to the worsening employment 
situation in most Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, there was a widespread improvement 
in 1994 in formal-sector compensation (see table 
III-ll). Thus, the recovery process continued for 
real wages, which had suffered a sharp 
deterioration during the 1980s. This tendency has 
been fairly widespread and persistent since the 
start of the 1990s. In most countries in the region, 
wages in the formal sector again reached or 
exceeded their 1980 levels. However, in some 
countries, especially Argentina, Nicaragua, Peru 
and Venezuela, a considerable backlog persisted 
in this regard. Wage increases in the formal 
sector varied in size according to country, but 
were concentrated in a range of between 1% and 
4%. The largest increase was in Peru, where, after 
accumulating heavy losses, especially up to 
1990, wages and salaries in the formal sector rose 
by an average of over 15%. 
In Brazil, high inflation in the first half of the 
year led to wide variations in the real wages 
received by workers with social security 
protection. With the drop in inflation, their 
compensation stabilized at a real level somewhat 
lower than the average for the first six months. 
Nevertheless, average annual wages for 1994 
posted an increase in absolute terms as compared 
with 1993. In Argentina and Uruguay, too, wages 
fell between the first half of 1994 and the second 
half, when they were about at the level reached 
towards the end of 1993. 
It should be recalled that the wage increases 
were not absolutely uniform. For example, at the 
end of 1994, all wage-earners in Brazil who were 
enrolled in the social security system received 
real wages that were lower, on average, than 
those which they had received during the same 
period in the previous year, while at the same 
time, industrial compensation in the state of São 
informal activities in the labour market. In 
other countries, such as Guatemala, Mexico 
and Peru, the limited buoyancy of job creation 
in the modern sector, combined with an 
ongoing expansion of the work force, led to an 
increase in the proportion of less productive 
employment. 
Paulo increased by over 8% in eal terms. Also 
in Brazil, after several years of deterioration, the 
incomes of own-account workers improved in 
1994 as compared with those cf wage-earners, 
especially in the formal sector. Ii Chile, the real 
hourly compensation of administrative and 
professional staff increased by tetween 6% and 
8%, while that of retail workers lose by only 1%. 
The improvement of compensation in a 
context of erosion of employment appears to 
reflect a gradually widening gap between highly 
productive and profitable activities and those of 
lesser buoyancy in both respects. The first group 
of activities is capable of generar ng rising earned 
incomes for an ever smaller segrient of the work 
force, while for the second grou;) the opposite is 
true, since such activities are pocrly remunerated 
and absorb an ever increasing proportion of the 
population. This polarization of the labour 
market is leading to growing heterogeneity as a 
result of increased differentiation in the supply 
of and demand for labour. In this context, in 1994 
several countries, in some casts with external 
financing, expanded programmes for the 
promotion of micro-enterprises ¡ind continued to 
carry out measures designed to modernize and 
enhance the efficiency of job training 
programmes, with a view to raising the 
productivity and earned income s of the sectors 
lagging behind. 
At the start of the 1980s real minimum wages 
suffered a substantial decline in nearly all 
countries of the region as a result of high inflation 
rates and stabilization policies. In some countries 
a process of recovery had alreai ly begun during 
the past decade, while in others real wages 
continued to fall, a difference which partially 
reflects a varying interpretation of the role of the 
minimum wage as an instrument of economic 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL AVERAGE WAGES 





























































































































































































































































































: Wages of private-sector wa kers in La Paz. 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
4 Preliminary figures. b Average total monthly wages in manufacturing. 
d Wages of workers protected by social and labour legislation. e Up to april 1993, average compensation of i rage-earners in 
non-agricultural sectors. From May 1993 onward, general index of hourly compensation. f Wages of marual workers in 
manufacturing. 8 Average compensation reported by persons enrolled in the social security systen. Average 
compensation of persons employed in enterprises with 10 workers or more, in mines, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade 
and services; in 1985, September-December average. ' Average wages in manufacturing. J Average wjiges, excluding 
compensation in kind and other benefits. k Industrial wages in Panama City; from 1990 onward, estinated figures. 
1 Average wages in Asunción. ""Wages of private-sector manual workers in Metropolitan Lima. ° Average wages. 
0 Average income per urban worker. 
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establishment of- a minimum wage was seen, in 
particular, as part of an anti-inflation strategy, 
while in others emphasis was given to its function 
as a tool of an incomes policy to benefit 
lower-income wage-earners. 
At the start of the 1990s, too, and specifically 
in 1994, there were vast differences among the 
countries of the region from the standpoint of 
the behaviour of real minimum wages (see 
table III-12). Thus, three groups of countries 
could be distinguished in 1994. In the first 
group a significant increase was registered in 
average annual real minimum wages as 
compared with the previous year. This group 
includes Argentina (although in that country the 
sharpest increase in the minimum wage had 
already occurred in the second half of 1993), 
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. However, in all 
these countries real minimum wages had 
previously nosedived and are still well below 
their 1980 levels. 
In the second group of countries, the aim of 
minimum wage policies was to keep pace with 
price increases, sometimes also taking into 
account increases in productivity. Thus, real 
minimum wages rose slightly in Chile, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Mexico and Paraguay, and fell 
slightly in Colombia. In all the countries in this 
group, with the exception of HI Salvador and 
Mexico, the minimum wage has exceeded its 
1980 level. In Mexico the minimum wage was 
revised within the framewort of a broader 
tripartite agreement, the Pact for Stability, 
Competitiveness and Employrrent, which was 
carried forward in September 1994 as the Pact 
for Well-being, Stability and Ecanomic Growth. 
In Colombia a similar instrument, the Social 
Pact, was applied, which in addil ion to raising the 
minimum wage includes conimitments with 
regard to increased productivity, job training and 
price controls. 
In a third group of countries, real minimum 
wages fell significantly, either because their 
nominal values did not increase (as in Honduras) 
or because they failed to keep pace with inflation 
(as in Brazil and Uruguay). In all these countries 
minimum wage levels were lower than they had 
been in 1980. 
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Table III-12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. b Minimum overall living wage with supplementary benefits. c Minimum wage in Mexico City, 
deflated by the consumer price index. d Minimum wage in Asunción. e Minimum wage in Metro] olitan Lima for 
non-agricultural activities. f National minimum wage for non-agricultural activities. 
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IV. THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
1. The inter 
The international economy expanded in 1994, 
owing to the impressive recovery of growth rates 
in the industrialized countries following four 
years of slow growth, and to control of inflation, 
with the lowest rates seen in the past three 
decades. World trade expanded notably after the 
previous year's modest showing, while 
commodity prices rose significantly, in contrast 
to the declining trend of preceding years. This 
favoured Latin American exports, which consist 
largely of raw materials. These trends have 
generally continued in 1995, although the rate of 
growth is tending to slow. 
In addition, the United States dollar fell 
significantly, relative to the Japanese yen and 
the German deutsche mark, so that the market 
values of those currencies reached 
unprecedented levels in the early months of 
1995. The dollar's weakness against the yen and 
the deutsche mark was partially offset by its rise 
in value relative to the Canadian dollar and the 
currencies of several European and developing 
countries, especially the Mexican peso. 
Meanwhile, international interest rates rose, 
mainly because of the policy followed by the 
United States Federal Reserve Bank, although 
not to the levels of the previous decade. That had 
an adverse impact on the Latin American 
countries, since external debt-service payments 
increased. Nevertheless, as interest rates in the 
international financial markets continued to be 
low, especially as compared with those available 
in the Latin American and Caribbean region, 
investors in the developed countries continued 
to purchase significant amounts of Latin 
American currencies. Towards the end of 1994, 
however, financial flows to the developing 
countries contracted as a result of the problems 
that had arisen in Mexico and other emerging 
markets. 
Mial context 
The world output of goods grew at a 
satisfactory pace (2.6%), primarily because of 
the recovery in the industrialised countries 
and the continuing expansion in tie developing 
countries, GDP growth in the industrialized 
countries was 3%, significantly higher than 
the 1993 figure of 1%. Me< nwhile, the 
developing countries again grew by more than 
5% in 1994, mainly because of the headlong 
expansion in Asia (see table IV-1). The 
economies in transition contracted for the fifth 
year running, this time by 10%. While Eastern 
Europe is tending to stabilize and even grew 
by nearly 3%, the outlook for the ibrmer Soviet 
Union remained critical; its GDP dropped 15% in 
1994. 
The highest world-wide growth took place 
against a backdrop of lower inflation, since idle 
capacity in the developed countries had not yet 
been exhausted by their emerging recovery. 
Inflation for these countries as a whole fell from 
2.9% in 1993 to 2.5% in 1994. Ii the United 
States inflation dropped below 3%, while in 
Germany it receded from 4.7% in 1993 to 3% in 
1994, and in Japan it was less than 1% in 1994. 
In the European countries which devalued their 
currencies, the adverse impact on price levels 
was cushioned by the drop in labour costs (see 
table IV-2). 
In the United States GDP grew at i robust pace, 
reaching 4.1% in 1994, its best performance 
since 1984. In the last quarter GEP grew at a 
seasonally adjusted annualized rate of 5.1%, 
thereby completing 12 quarter:; of steady 
expansion. 
In 1995, however, this momentum has 
slowed, as the first quarter increase was only 
2.7%. The strong expansion in 19)4 stemmed 
from the soaring growth of consumption, as 
well as increased investment. Another 
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Table IV-1 
GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP), BY REGION 
World 




Economies in transition 
Eastern Europe 
USSR and its successor States 
Developing countries 
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Source: United Nations, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. 
a Preliminary figures. b Predictions based partly on the LINK project. c After 1991, the former German E temocratic Republic 
is included in Germany and, accordingly, in the European Union. Covers 93 countries which togethet account for 99% of 
the population of all developing countries. e Net material product to 1988. 
contributing factor was relatively low interest 
rates, which between July 1992 and February 
1994 were at their lowest level since 1963, 
although they rose in 1994. This improved the 
net asset position of households and enterprises, 
thereby enabling the debt burden to be reduced 
sufficiently and generating a major increase in 
total spending. 
The marked buoyancy of the economy in 
1994 evoked certain fears of a resurgence of 
inflationary pressures. The current 
Administration's austere fiscal policy achieved 
excellent results in reducing the budget deficit 
from 4% of GDP in 1992 to 3.4% in 1993 and 2% 
in 1994. In any event, the Federal Reserve Bank 
foresaw difficulties in maintaining a low 
inflation rate, and therefore gradually raised 
short-term interest rates from February 1994 
onward. This, however, did not immediately 
affect the economic expansion, which remained 
very strong for the remainder of the year. Thus, 
interest rates rose again in February 1995, 
and fell thereafter, in view ol the economic 
slow-down that was already evident at mid-
year. 
The European Union expanded by 2.8%, thus 
recovering from its slump of the preceding year, 
although with continuing high levels of 
unemployment, approaching 11% of the labour 
force. Unemployment has therefore become a 
major source of political, economic and social 
concern. 
In Germany, the difficulties ir volved in union 
with the former German Demccratic Republic 
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Table IV-2 
MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN THE SEVEN LARGEST 
INDUSTRIALIZED ECONOMIES, 1993-1994 








































































































































































































































Source: United Nations, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, based on data provided by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), OECD and national authorities. 
Note: Total growth rate is weighted average with weightings being gross domestic product, consumption and industrial output, as 
appropriate. 
* Percentage change in seasonally adjusted data from preceding quarter, expressed as annual rates. In this able "Germany" 
means only the former Federal Republic of Germany prior to 1991. c Percentage of total labour force; seasonally adjusted 
data as standardized by OECD. Percentage change in average consumer price index in quarter relative tc same quarter of 
preceding year, expressed as annual rates. 
continued to weigh on the economy, which led 
to a very awkward fiscal situation, due largely to 
massive transfers of resources to the new eastern 
states. This made fiscal austerity measures 
necessary and forced the Deutsche Bundensbank 
to adapt a cautious attitude towards the relaxation 
of monetary controls. However, in order to 
cushion the impact of the recession, short-term 
interest rates were gradually lowered during 
1993 and the first half of 1994. After registering 
strong growth between 1988 and 1992, GDP 
slowed, and even fell by 1.7% in 1993. Be that 
as it may, a solid recovery process was seen 
during 1994. Spearheaded initially ¡>y the export 
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sector, it spread gradually to the rest of the 
economy, achieving unexpectedly strong growth 
in the second half of the year, which facilitated 
the recovery in the rest of Europe. 
France's economy grew by 2.5%, in contrast 
to the 1993 drop in GDP. However, the 
unemployment rate remained very high, at more 
than 12% of the labour force. The United 
Kingdom's GDP expanded by 3.8%, 
strengthening the recovery that had begun in the 
previous year, although more recently a certain 
slow-down has been seen, as well as the 
emergence of inflationary pressures. 
Japan, meanwhile, has had greater difficulty 
in conquering the recession, as its growth 
continued to be slow in 1994 (0.6%), with a drop 
of 3.4% in the last quarter. This poor 
performance continued to be influenced by the 
adjustment process initiated in previous years 
as a result of falling stock prices and high 
levels of debt, while the rapidly appreciating 
yen has weakened the manufacturing sector. 
Despite the loosening of monetary controls and 
the set of economic measures adopted by the 
Government since the onset of the recession, 
private-sector spending has continued to contract 
markedly. 
The volume of world trade expanded by 
9.4% in 1994 -its highest increase in two 
decades and double that of the previous year. 
In addition, dollar prices rose by slightly more 
than 2%, so that the value of trade expanded by 
nearly 12%, thereby reaching the 
unprecedented figure of US$ 4 billion. The 
world output of goods rose by 2.6%, which was 
also much higher than the 1993 figure. This 
sizeable gap in growth between international 
trade and output reflects the continual 
integration of national economies through 
trade (see table IV-3). 
The volume of exports increased by 8.4% in 
the industrialized countries and 11.8% in the 
developing countries. Once again, the largest 
increase was seen in Asia, while Latin America 
took second place. Meanwhile, Eastern 
European economies enabled this region's trade 
to expand after contracting in 1993. Due to the 
growth of GDP in the industrialized countries, 
their import volumes increased significantly, but 
the largest expansion in the global demand for 
imports originated in the As an developing 
countries. 
The unit value of basic commodities, 
excluding oil, rose by somewhat more than 12% 
after five years of contraction. The unit value of 
manufactures grew by 2.8%, thereby recovering 
from the previous year's slumt> of nearly 6%. 
Thus, the terms of trade of the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries again roie slightly, this 
time by 0.7%, so that they continued to recover 
from the low levels of preceding years. 
The pace of growth of th; international 
financial markets slowed in 1994, after the robust 
expansion of capital flows tha: had begun in 
1991. These flows increased by 16% in 1994, 
whereas in 1993 they had increiised by 34%, to 
reach nearly US$ 820 billion. After a period of 
relative growth during 1990-199!!, the proportion 
of international capital flowing to the developing 
countries has stabilized and ever decreased; this 
is especially visible in the stock investments 
made by mutual funds and other investors. Bond 
issues by developing countries a Iso decreased in 
the first nine months of 1994. 
The slower growth of international capital 
flows in 1994 was due mainly to j ;reater volatility 
on the world financial markets, especially in the 
second quarter. This was reflected in smaller 
bond issues by both developed and developing 
countries, although bonds continued to represent 
a significant portion of total borrowing. Bond 
sales dropped 11% world-wide, while falling by 
only around 7% in the devele ping countries. 
Bond issues in the Latin American countries 
contracted to a far greater exten : (-32%), owing 
to the abrupt suspension of sales in Venezuela 
and a sharp decrease in Mexico. As a result, Latin 
American bond sales as a percentage of total 
capital flows to the developing countries fell 
from 45% to 33% in 1994. 
While stock issues for new cipital formation 
continued to expand, they repressed only 5.5% 
of total capital flows in 1994. Stock issues by the 
developing countries were up 50%, from US$ 12 
billion in 1993 to US$ 18 billion in 1994. 
However, primary stock issues in the Latin 
American countries fell from U;>$ 5.7 billion in 
1993 to US$ 4.7 billion in 1994. This was due 
chiefly to a sharp fall-off in issues of American 
Depository Receipts (ADRS) in Argentina and 
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Table IV-3 
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Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics (various issues), and estimates prepared by the 
United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. 
' Preliminary estimates. Estimate. c After 1991, the former German Democratic Republic is included in Germany and, 
accordingly, in the European Union. 
Mexico, which were only partially offset by a 
significant increase in Chile. 
Mention should also be made of the growing 
importance of syndicated loans, which continued 
to expand in 1994 (by more than 10%). Likewise, 
non-underwritten facilities, primarily 
Eurocommercial paper and other medium-term 
commercial paper, grew vigorously. Brazil is 
among the Latin American countries that have 
resorted most extensively to this type of 
financing. 
The smaller capital flows in 1994 were 
influenced not only by these problems in the 
developing countries, but also by higher interest 
rates in the United States. The Federal Reserve 
Bank's discount rate was raised six times in 1994, 
reaching 4.8% in December 1994 and 5.25% in 
February 1995, whereas it had been only 3% in 
1993. In other developed countries, however, 
interest rates generally declined. In Germany the 
discount rate fell from 5.8% in 19i>3 to 4.5% in 
mid-1994; in March 1995 the Bundesbank 
lowered the rate again, to 4%. In the United 
Kingdom short-term financial market rates fell 
during the first half of 1994, but rose again 
towards the end of the year. In France the decline 
in short-term financial market rates that had 
begun in the previous year continued, bringing 
these rates to around half their 1!»92 level. In 
Japan short-term rates dropped by 1 % in 1994, to 
hold steady at slightly more than 2%, their lowest 
level in many years. The rediscount rate, which 
had been around 1.75% since September 1993, 
was brought down to only 1% in Ar. ril 1995 (see 
table IV-13). 
Meanwhile, in the developed countries, 
higher inflationary expectations caused 
long-term interest rates to rise, especially in the 
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United States, where they were up by more than 
two percentage points during 1994. In Germany 
long-term rates mounted again, after falling 
during the first quarter of 1994, a trend also seen 
in France, the United Kingdom and Japan. 
The liberalization of world markets continued 
to make steady gains. The new General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
signed in January 1994, following protracted 
The region's external sector expanded again to 
some extent and thus did not constitute a 
constraint on the growth of most Latin American 
and Caribbean economies. Deficits were seen 
again in both merchandise trade and the current 
account, although these could be financed 
relatively easily owing to the continuation of 
abundant capital flows from abroad. Export 
growth in 1994, while significant, was not 
sufficient to offset a new and accelerated growth 
of imports. Thus, the merchandise trade deficit 
of the Latin American countries expanded by 
US$ 4.5 billion. Be that as it may, at only slightly 
more than 1% of regional GDP, the merchandise 
trade deficit remained low. 
Meanwhile, the current-account deficit also 
continued to expand, representing around 3% of 
GDP for the region as a whole. Contributing to 
this outcome, in addition to the increase in the 
merchandise trade deficit, was the US$ 1.2 
billion growth in net payments of interest and 
profits. 
One significant change in Latin American and 
Caribbean foreign trade in recent years has been 
the growing importance of intraregional trade. 
Since 1990, intraregional flows have expanded 
notably, increasing from 13% to 22% of total 
regional trade during that period. The bulk of 
intraregional trade flows were between Southern 
Common Market (MERCOSUR) countries and 
between these countries and Chile. 
In 1994 trade between the MERCOSUR 
countries continued to expand rapidly (19%), 
although less so than in the previous three years. 
The factors that especially influenced this growth 
included the deregulation of their economies, 
liberalization of their trade relations and a higher 
demand for imports in all of the countries that are 
bilateral negotiations between the United 
States and the European countiies; as a result, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the new 
institution which replaced GAIT, segan operating 
in 1995. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force at the 
beginning of 1994 and could soon be expanded 
to include Chile; the negotiation s for this began 
in 1995. 
parties to the subregional agreement, as well as 
major increases in the domestic availability of 
goods. In particular, the remarkable growth of 
demand in Brazil, whose MERCOS UR imports rose 
by 40%, made a significant contribution. While 
this had a widespread impact, its chief 
beneficiaries were non-traditional exports. The 
buoyancy of Brazilian demand continued into the 
early months of 1995. 
Bilateral automotive-sector agreements 
between MERCOSUR partners were also 
influential. Thus, Argentina's automobile sales 
to Brazil increased significantly, while two thirds 
of the total increase in Uruguay's exports were 
due chiefly to higher motor vehi cle sales within 
the framework of such bilateral agreements. 
Trade between the MERCOSUR countries as a 
percentage of their trade win all countries 
increased only slightly, given the dramatic 
increase -linked primarily to high capital flows-
in these countries' imports from the rest of the 
world. That percentage remained very high in 
Paraguay and Uruguay (42% and 48%, 
respectively), while in Brazil it was only 14%, 
despite having risen substantially in recent years, 
and in Argentina, it was 27%. 
Chile's exports to Latin America and the 
Caribbean, which were dominate :d by sales to the 
MERCOSUR countries, rose by over 30%. Exports 
to Asia also expanded by 30%, while those to 
North America grew by 21%, and to the 
European Union, by only 12%. If copper is 
excluded, the growth in Chilean sales to the 
region amply exceeded its sales to other 
geographical areas. 
Intraregional trade flows hav; been important 
for the Andean Group countries also. For 
instance, Venezuela continues t) be Colombia's 
2. Foreign trade 
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Table IV-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATIONS 




































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
" Excludes the maquiladora industry in Mexico. b Covers 17 Spanish-speaking countries, plus Brazil and Hait. c Average. 
d Preliminary figures. e Includes Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. Includes Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicara gua and Panama. 
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most important export trade market. Ecuador's 
exports to the Andean Group countries, 
especially Colombia, registered high growth 
rates; the same was true of its sales to other Latin 
American countries, particularly Chile and 
Mexico. Meanwhile, the bulk of the increase in 
Ecuadorian imports stemmed from Andean 
Group countries, as well as from Brazil and 
Mexico. 
Trade between the Central American 
countries has recovered significantly in recent 
years, following the sharp contraction seen 
during the 1980s. Thus, Guatemala's sales to 
Central America expanded (13%), while Costa 
Rica's manufacturing industry has benefited 
from the recovery of demand in the subregion. 
In Honduras, trade with other Central 
American countries has intensified since a free 
trade zone was established in April 1993; 
exports rose 25%, which was similar to the 
previous year's rate. In El Salvador, however, 
in contrast to 1993, exports of non-traditional 
products to Central America grew more slowly 
than trade with the rest of the world, which 
increased its deficit with the Central American 
Common Market (CAO*!); likewise, El 
Salvador's trade surplus with Honduras and 
Nicaragua decreased, while its traditional deficit 
with Guatemala and Costa Rica deepened in 
1994. 
The first year of operation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was 
characterized by a significant expansion in 
Mexico's merchandise trade with other NAFTA 
members; its overall trade with the United States 
grew 22%, and with Canada, 14%. 
Several countries saw major increases in 
income from the maquiladora (in-bond 
assembly) industry or free-zone activities. In 
Mexico the added value generated by maquilas 
grew by more than 9% in real terms, but was 
lower than the preceding year's 15%. Central 
America and Cuba again had sizeable income 
from this source. In El Salvador, the maquiladora 
industry continued to exhibit great dynamism, 
which helped to maintain the rate of growth of 
manufacturing output. Maquila exports reached 
US$ 430 million in absolute terms (US$ 140 
million more than in 1993), while imports of 
spare parts and components rose from US$ 203 
million to US$ 298 million in 1994. Guatemala's 
sales of maquiladora textiles and nothing to the 
United States climbed from US$ 118 million to 
US$ 131 million. 
In Honduras the maquiladon industry has 
grown rapidly since 1991, neaily tripling its 
added value in current terms. However, in 1994 
its growth rate decreased beca ase of labour 
problems. In Nicaragua, too, it giew at a robust 
pace. The gross value of exports from the 
Mercedes Industrial Free Zone 'vas US$ 37.3 
million, easily triple the level achieved in 1993. 
In Costa Rica, however, the maquiladora 
industry stagnated to some exten as a result of 
the transfer of some enterprises to other Latin 
American countries with lower labour costs. In 
Bolivia, the outstanding growtr of jewellery 
exports was associated with maquiladora 
enterprises. In Panama, re-exparts from the 
Colón Free Zone (which are counted as exports) 
expanded by 11%, which meant total sales of 
over US$ 5 billion, stimulated by the opening of 
Latin American and Caribbean markets. In 1994 
new markets in Brazil and Ecuador played a 
leading role. 
a) Merchandise exports 
The value of the region's merchandise 
exports was up by 16% in 1994, to US$ 181 
billion, which denoted an accelerated 
expansion after the moderate increase of the 
previous three-year period. The increase was 
attributable to the expansion of the volume of 
exports and, to a lesser extent, of unit values 
(see table IV-5). 
Export trends in the region were also quite 
uniform, since nearly all counxies achieved 
substantial growth. Seven countr.es (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, the Dominic in Republic, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua and Peru) expanded by 20% 
or more, but there were difference s in the relative 
contributions of volumes and prices. In the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Peru, the 
higher export values were due 1o increases in 
both prices and volumes. Peru's e sports grew by 
30%, while Ecuador's exports recovered 
impressively from the previous ye ir's slump, and 
the value of the Dominican Republic's 
merchandise exports rose 25%. Meanwhile, in 
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Chile and Nicaragua, the increase stemmed 
mainly from prices, although volumes also 
increased significantly. In Chile, the value of 
exports expanded by 25%, after contracting in 
the previous year. There was thus a return to 
the expansionary course of recent years, with 
an average annual rate of 12% between 1985 
and 1992. Nicaragua pursued the robust 
recovery that had begun in the previous year, 
after the slump that had lingered since the start 
of the 1980s. Meanwhile, in Bolivia, whose 
exports exceeded US$ 1 billion for the first time, 
the opposite occurred, since volumes grew more 
than prices, notwithstanding significant price 
growth (13%). In Argentina, however, unit 
values increased by only 2%; therefore, the 
expansion was due almost entirely to the 
spectacular growth in volumes, which denoted a 
recovery from the modest results of preceding 
years. 
Another nine countries increased their exports 
by between 10% and 19%. In Brazil and 
Uruguay, the increases in unit values and 
volumes were roughly the same. In another four 
countries -Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador 
and Guatemala- the substantial rise in unit values 
was the main determinant; indeed, for several of 
these countries, it was the only one, since their 
volumes contracted or barely grew. The rise in 
unit values was due chiefly to the steep climb in 
international coffee prices. In Colombia and 
Guatemala, export trends improved as compared 
with the previous year, while Costa Rica's 
growth rate remained the same. In El Salvador, 
export growth, while high, was lower than in the 
preceding year (see table IV-5). 
In the remaining three countries, Mexico, 
Panama and Venezuela, the increase in volume 
was the decisive factor in export growth; in 
Mexico and Venezuela, unit values were affected 
by the downward trend in oil prices. In Mexico, 
the value of exports rebounded significantly, 
growing by 17%, whereas in the previous year it 
had increased by 12%, and in 1992, by 8%. 
Exports of Panamanian products continued to 
increase slowly, while re-exports climbed more 
rapidly, thanks to the Colón Free Zone's trade 
boom. Venezuela's non-oil exports expanded by 
10%, as a result of favourable external demand 
and depressed domestic demand, while oil 
exports expanded because of higher volumes of 
sales abroad. 
In Honduras and Paraguay, exports grew 
moderately, since the contraction in volumes 
counteracted the favourable effsct of the rise 
in prices. Honduras's merchandise exports 
increased by 3%, owing to an f % increase in 
prices, since their volume fell by 5%. 
Paraguay's exports grew by i'<%, owing to 
better prices, which amply offsît the drop in 
shipped volumes. Lastly, Haiti was the only 
country in which the value of exports declined, 
falling by over 40% as a result of the 
continuation of the trade embargo during 
nearly all of 1994. Thus, Haiti's foreign sales 
declined to only one quarter of th ;ir value three 
years earlier. 
The expansion of Latin American exports in 
1994 was driven both by primary products and 
by manufactures and non-traditional products, 
although with different characteiistics in each 
country. This was facilitated by higher demand 
in the international and regional markets, as well 
as by major increases in the domes ic availability 
of goods. On the other hand, the ev olution of real 
exchange rates had a contrary eïect, slowing 
export growth. As noted in chapte :: II, several of 
the region's countries had shown significant 
declines in real exchange rates in recent years, 
which undoubtedly affected the competitiveness 
of their exports. In 1994 this factor had more of 
an impact on non-traditional products, since for 
primary products, the effect of falling exchange 
rates was partially or wholly offset by the 
widespread rise in international commodity 
prices. 
The expansion of commodity exports was due 
especially to the rise in the prices of major 
products. Thus, higher coffee prioes benefited 
Brazil, Colombia and the Cential American 
countries. The rise in metals prices helped to 
expand Chilean and Peruvian exports, while the 
increases in cellulose and wool prices were 
important for Chile and Uruguiy. In some 
countries, commodity export valûmes also 
increased, although not as much a¡; prices. This 
was true for Argentina, where only volumes 
increased, while in Bolivia, Chile and Peru, the 
volume increases came in addition to steep rises 
in metals prices. 
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Table rV-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS OF GOODS FOB l 
(Indexes: 1980 = 100 and growth rates) 



























































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMP) and national sources. 
a Excludes the maquiladora industry in Mexico. b Preliminary figures. 
In several countries there was a sizeable 
increase in exports of manufactured and 
non-traditional products. In Mexico, in 
particular, high-technology industries, and, to a 
lesser extent, certain producers of intermediate 
inputs and traditional end-user industries, fared 
remarkably. Argentina saw a continuation of 
the sharp upward trend in manufacturing 
exports, especially vehicles, propelled by the 
special regime in the automotive sector, while 
the growing demand from Brazil stimulated 
foreign sales of various products. 
Non-traditional exports from Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru increased at a robust pace 
(between 13% and 28%), despite the real 
appreciation in their respective currencies. 
Uruguay's non-traditional expor:s expanded by 
11%, due also to increased purchases by Brazil 
in the wake of the Real Plan. Likewise, Bolivia's 
non-traditional exports, especially jewellery 
articles, expanded considerably, thereby 
exceeding traditional exports ind displacing 
mining products. Venezuela's non-traditional 
exports grew by 33%, stimulates by the drop in 
domestic demand. 
In El Salvador, non-traditional exports were 
up 14%, led by increased sales of footwear, 
processed food products and detergents to the 
Central American countries, and of bed linens, 
tableware and kitchenware outside the region. 
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Such exports also rose satisfactorily in 
Guatemala (10%) and Nicaragua, where they 
already constituted one third of total merchandise 
sales. In Panama, where non-traditional 
exports already accounted for 40% of the total, 
they rose 12%, owing to increased sales of 
medicines, banana pulp, cowhides and 
processed shellfish. 
In Brazil, on the other hand, exports of 
manufactures performed differently than in the 
rest of the region, sales of such products 
increased only moderately, owing to the 
expansion of the domestic market and the strong 
overvaluation of local currency. Nevertheless, 
exports of semimanufactures increased by 26% 
as a result of price increases. In Costa Rica, too, 
non-traditional exports performed poorly, in 
contrast to the vigorous expansion seen in 
previous years; they were held in check during 
most of the year, especially by a somewhat 
overvalued exchange rate. 
While oil-exporting countries were affected 
by the unfavourable trend in international crude 
oil prices, they all managed to offset this situation 
easily through higher sales of other products, 
either because of better prices or growth in the 
volume of exports. In addition, Venezuela 
managed to expand its exports by increasing 
shipped volumes (from 1.5 million to 1.7 million 
barrels per day), so that the value of oil exports 
increased by 6% as compared with the previous 
year. 
Colombia's oil exports fell 11% as a result 
of the drop in both volume and prices. Pending 
the expansion of shipped volumes of crude 
from the Cuisiana oil fields, petroleum slipped 
below coffee as the leading export product in 
1994. In Ecuador, low oil prices were offset by 
an increase in shipped volumes, so that the total 
value of oil exports rose slightly. Mexico's oil 
exports fell 1% as a result of poor prices and the 
stagnation in shipped volumes of crude. In 
Argentina, however, they grew notably, thereby 
accounting for a significant share of its total 
foreign sales. 
b) Merchandise imports 
The value of Latin American and Caribbean 
merchandise imports increased again for the fifth 
consecutive year; this time it grew by almost 
18%, to reach US$ 196 billion, with an increase 
of 12% in volume and nearly 4% in unit value 
(see table IV-6). In most countries the expansion 
was facilitated and even stimulated by abundant 
capital flows. In all countries, unit values 
exhibited similar growth, of bei ween 3% and 
4.5%. Moreover, the only major îegional import 
which declined was petroleum ind petroleum 
products. 
The largest import growth was seen in 
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, with 
increases of between 18% and 39% as compared 
with 1993. In all these countries import growth 
accelerated in 1994; in several of them, it did so 
remarkably, except in Colombia, where it 
slowed, following a sharp rise during the 
previous two-year period. Around 90% of the 
total regional increase was due to liigher imports 
in three countries: Mexico (USB 10 billion); 
Brazil (US$ 7.5 billion); and Argentina (US$ 4.3 
billion). 
Imports also expanded by between 7% and 
11% in Chile, Costa Rica, tin; Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and 
Paraguay. Imports by Guatemala and the 
Dominican Republic increased more rapidly than 
in 1993, while the remaining five countries saw 
a clear deceleration in imports, having registered 
spectacular growth rates in the preceding years. 
In Bolivia imports were virtu illy stagnant, 
which was attributable to decreases in volume, 
since unit values climbed moderately. 
Meanwhile, in Haiti, Honduras and Venezuela, 
imports contracted as a result of balance-
of-payments problems and ai economic 
recession. Venezuela's imports slumped, 
decreasing by US$ 3.4 billion, or more than 
double the contraction seen in 1993. This was 
attributable to the institution of foreign exchange 
controls, in addition to the recessfoi. and an acute 
banking crisis (see table IV-6). 
In Honduras, the current valu; of imports 
decreased 4%, owing to the continui ng recession. 
Lastly, in Haiti, imports slumped again due to the 
political crisis, after recovering partially in the 
previous year, so that imports amounted to less 
than half the 1990 figure. The lifting of the 
embargo in November 1994 made it possible to 
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Table IV-6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPORTS OF GOODS FOI Ja 
(Indexes: 1980 = 100 and growth rates) 



























































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Excludes the maquiladora industry in Mexico. Preliminary figures. c Problems with coverage am 1 time of registration 
mean that the unit values for 1993 and 1994 are not comparable to those arrived at in previous years or to th< »se of other countries 
in the region, ECLAC estimates indicate that the unit value growth rates for 1993 and 1994 are -1.3 and 4.0, 
reverse that trend, especially because 
international assistance resumed. 
Almost all major import categories 
participated in the regional boom, except fuels, 
which declined as a result of falling oil prices. 
Capital goods imports showed great 
dynamism, driven by the sharp upturn in 
investment in several of the region's countries. 
Argentine, Brazilian and Peruvian imports 
played a leading role, increasing by around 
50%, as did those of Colombia, El Salvador 
and Mexico, which increased by between 18% 
and 30%. Ecuadorian and Uruguayan imports 
also expanded, although at a slower pace than 
total imports. In Honduras, 
imports grew 7% because o 
electricity-generating plants, i 
with the emergency that th 
facing. In Bolivia, Guati 
Nicaragua and Venezuela, ho 
contracted. In Haiti and Venezi 
were attributable to the gem 
affecting imports. 
Foreign purchases of c 
intermediate goods also expanc 
and declined only in countri 
imports fell. In some countries, 
particular, were imported in hig 
capital goods 
f purchases of 
i order to cope 
î country was 
:mala, Haiti, 
wever, imports 








The strong growth of imports in 1994 can be 
explained chiefly by a combination of three 
factors: the sharp increase in the level of 
activity and investment, the real appreciation 
in local currencies and the liberalization of 
imports. An additional factor would have to be 
foreign capital flows, although their impact is 
also reflected in the evolution of real exchange 
rates. 
All countries whose level of activity and 
capital formation expanded also showed an 
increase in imports. The converse was seen in the 
countries in recession, where imports also 
contracted. Bolivia was a special case, since 
despite satisfactory growth, investment declined, 
so that imports fell. 
Falling real exchange rates undoubtedly had a 
marked influence on the sizeable expansion of 
imports in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El 
After declining for four years in a row, the dollar 
prices of most of the region's main export 
commodities rose in 1994. However, despite this 
recovery, the real prices of all products except 
bananas were substantially lower than in 1975 
and 1976, which are regarded as relatively 
normal years, in that they preceded the huge 
fluctuations which began at the end of the 
1970s. 
The prices of primary products had 
deteriorated considerably during the early 
years of the 1980s, at a time when the world 
economy was passing through a recessionary 
phase. Subsequent recoveries took place, 
although in general only partial ones, at times 
when the dollar lost value, especially during 
1987-1989. During the world economy's 
most recent recessionary phase, between 
1990 and 1993, such prices again fared 
unfavourably. With the recent revitalization 
of the world economy, the prices of primary 
products, with few exceptions, increased 
significantly. 
An outstanding example in 1994 was the rise 
in coffee prices, whose average annual value 
easily doubled as compared with 1993. The 
prices of lead, cotton, wool, cocoa, copper and 
Salvador and Peru. Meanwhile, ii; another three 
countries -Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay- low 
real exchange rates also helped to stimulate 
imports, even though the rates remained stable or 
increased. In four countries -Chile, the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala and 
Nicaragua- exchange rates also appreciated, but 
imports increased more moderately, although 
with an elasticity relative to CIDP that was 
substantially higher than 1. 
The liberalization of impor s proceeded 
largely through integration agreements, 
especially in the MERCOSUR countries, and 
through NAFTA in Mexico. In Brazil, the 
deregulation of trade carried out in previous 
years and the tariff reductions instituted to 
check inflation as part of the stabi lization plan, 
also contributed to the sharp increases in 
imports. 
sugar also rose significantly. However, those of 
meat, iron ore, oil and, to a lesser extent, soya, 
decreased. 
The notable increase in coffee prices in 1994 
was due mainly to the decreased international 
supply because of frosts in Brazil. Prices reached 
their highest level in October, to fall sharply 
thereafter, but in any event, their a\erage annual 
value was very high. Nevertheless, as a result of 
the price drop, the main producer countries (the 
Central American countries, Colombia and 
Brazil) agreed on a coordinated coff se marketing 
plan. 
The rise in sugar prices that ha i begun two 
years earlier continued, while cctton, cocoa, 
cellulose and wool showed sizeable increases. 
Metals prices also rose, particularly for copper, 
which recovered significantly after the previous 
year's drop, driven by the replenishment of 
stocks, and lead, which also increased sharply 
following a significant déclins in 1993. 
Smaller increases were seen in the prices of 
other metals, notably tin and zinc, Lastly, oil 
prices fell again. 
Trends in real commodity pricîs -i.e., the 
ratio of their nominal prices to those of 
manufactured products- have been distinctly 
3. Export prices and the terms 
of trade 
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unfavourable in the past 20 years. This was partly 
because the unit value of exports of manufactures 
from the industrialized countries more than 
doubled between 1975 and 1994. The rise in 
commodity prices in 1994 was substantially 
higher, in general, than for manufactures, but this 
barely affected the unfavourable trends for the 
region in the long term (see table IV-7 and 
figure IV-1). 
Accordingly, the real prices of almost all 
primary products were lower in 1994 than in 
1975-1976. The most unfavourable prices were 
those of sugar, cocoa, tin, maize, soya and wheat, 
which were between 50% and 70% lower than in 
the earlier two-year period. A considerable 
deterioration of between 25% and 50% was also 
seen in the prices of cotton, coffee, meat, copper, 
wool, lead and zinc. The same was true of oil 
prices, which, however, followed a different 
path. Between 1979 and 1985, oil prices had 
been much higher than in 1975-1976, but from 
1986 onward they clearly showed a declining 
trend. 
The region's terms of trade increased by 2.4% 
in 1994, due to the 6.5% increase in the unit value 
of exports, which exceeded that of imports 
(3.9%). These terms, however, were 9% lower 
than in 1990 and 30% lower than in 1980 (see 
table IV-8). The terms of trade increased in 1994 
in most of the region's economies, decreasing 
only in Argentina, Ecuador and Panama. 
The largest increase in the terms of trade was 
seen in Colombia, because of the substantial rise 
in coffee prices, despite the effect of low 
hydrocarbons prices on these terms. Meanwhile, 
the rise in metals prices made possible a 
significant improvement in the terms of trade 
for Bolivia, Chile and Peru. The Central 
American countries also benefited from the 
steep rise in coffee prices, as well as the drop 
in international oil prices, since all these 
countries are highly dependent on 
hydrocarbons imports. 
The deficit in the merchandise trade balance 
widened by 43% in 1994 to reach US$ 14.7 
billion, thus capping three years of deterioration, 
Brazil's terms of trade improved as a result of 
the rise in coffee prices and :hose of other 
primary or semi-industrialized pioducts, such as 
orange juice and cocoa, while at the same time, 
as a net importer, the country jenefited from 
falling fuel prices. Uruguay showed major gains, 
mainly because of the recovery if wool prices. 
In Mexico and Venezuela, however, less 
favourable trends were seen, given the scant 
increase in the unit values of exports, which was 
attributable chiefly to low international oil 
prices. 
The purchasing power of the region's 
merchandise exports (defined as the volume of 
exports adjusted for the terms of trade, which is 
the same as the value of exports deflated by the 
unit value of imports) increases 12%, slightly 
more than the growth in volume, given the 
moderate recovery in the average regional terms 
of trade (see table IV-9). 
The expansion in the purchasing power of 
exports was widespread, occurring in 17 of the 
19 countries analysed (purchasing power fell 
only in Haiti and remained stable in Honduras) 
and increasing significantly in most of them. 
There were, however, differences as to the 
determining factor in the expansion. In six 
countries (Argentina, Ecuaior, Mexico, 
Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela), the 
increase was almost wholly attributable to 
growth in the physical volume of exports. In 
Bolivia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Peru 
and Uruguay, the expansion stemmed chiefly 
from higher volumes, although the terms of 
trade also increased significan ly. In another 
four countries (Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala 
and Nicaragua), it was due to a significant 
recovery in the terms of trade. Ir Colombia and 
El Salvador, the expansion in [he purchasing 
power of exports was attributable to the 
dramatic rise in coffee prices, while the volume 
of exports contracted. 
from a US$ 13 billion surplus in 1991 to a 
US$ 5.6 billion deficit in 1992 and a US$ 10.3 
billion deficit in 1993. The 1994 deficit would 
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Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Monthly Commodity Price Bull'tin. Supplement 
1970-1989 (TD/B/C.l/CPB/L.101/Add.l), Geneva, November 1989; and Monthly Commodit] Price Bulletin 
(TD/B/CN.1/CPB/L.22), vol. XV, No. 1, Geneva, January 1995. 
Note: Unrefined sugar, FOB, Caribbean ports, for export to the open market. Central American Bananas, CIF North Sea ports. 
Cocoa beans, average of daily prices (futures), New York/London. Coffee, mild arabica, ex-dockNev/ \ ork. Beef, frozen 
and de-boned, all sosurces, United States ports. Fish meal, all sources, 64%-65% protein, CIF Hamburg. R laize, Argentina, 
ClF North Sea ports. Soybeans, United States, No. 2, yello, in bulk, CIF Rotterdam. Wheat, FOB Unil ïd States, No. 2, 
Hard Red Winter. Cotton, United States M 1-3/32", CIF Northern Europe. Wool, clean, combed, 48" ¡ quality, United 
Kingdom. Copper, tin, lead and zinc, spot prices on the London Metal Exchange. Iro ore, Brazil to I urope, C. 64.5% 
Fe, FOB. Oil, IMF average, average of spot prices for Dubai, Brent (United Kingdom) and Alaskan North Slope oil, which 
reflects a fairly balanced mix of medium, light and heavy crude worldwide. 
a Preliminary figures. b US cents per pound. c Dollars per metric ton. Dollars per pound. 'Dollarsper carrel. 
have been drastically larger had it not been for 
the sharp contraction of imports in Venezuela, 
which was experiencing a severe banking and 
foreign-exchange crisis. If Venezuela is 
excluded, the region's merchandise trade deficit 
shows a much larger increase -from US$ 13.2 
billion in 1993 to US$ 22.7 billion in 1994. The 
1994 trade gap resulted mainly from higher 
deficits in Argentina, Mexico and Peru, and from 
the notable decrease in Brazil's trade surplus. 
These setbacks were partially offset by better 
results in Chile, which turned its trade deficit into 
a surplus, and by the strong expansion in 
Venezuela's surplus, resulting from the decrease 
in its imports (see table IV-10). 
The trade balance for services evolved 
somewhat more favourably than for goods, since 
the deficit in non-factor services fell 6%. This 
decrease is attributable chiefly to higher net 
incomes in Colombia and Uruguay, which 
climbed to US$ 400 million and US$ 150 
million, respectively, and to the reduction in 
Venezuela's deficit (US$ -1 billion). However, it 
was partially counteracted by higher net outlays 
in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The increase in 
Colombia was due to higher earnings from 
various services, while in Uruguny, the main 
factor was travel and tourism. Both the decrease 
in Venezuela and the increases i:i Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico reflected the peiormance of 
transport services, which are closdy linked to 
merchandise imports; in Venezuela, these 
services slumped, while in the other three 
countries they expanded notably (see table 
IV-10). 
After decreasing in 1991 and 19Ç2, the deficit 
in Latin American and Caribbean profits and 
interest increased by US$ 31 billion, to US$ 33 
93 
Figure rV-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL EXPORT PRICES ' 
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S o u r c e : ECLAC, on the bas is o f f igures f rom the Uni ted Nat ions C o n e rence 
on T rade a n d Deve lopmen t (UNCTAD). 
a Nomina l pr ices def la ted by the unit va lues of expor ts of manu fac tu ras by 
d e v e l o p e d marke t econom ies . 
billion in 1993 and US$ 34.2 billion in 1994. The 
main differences as compared with the previous 
year were increases in net outlays for factor 
payments of US$ 1.2 billion in Mexico, almost 
US$ 700 million in Argentina, US$ 270 million 
in Chile and around US$ 200 million in 
Colombia. Brazil, however, reduced its deficit by 
US$ 1.5 billion (see table IV-11). 
The higher regional deficit due to factor 
service payments reflects the net effect of interest 
payments and steady profit remittances. The 
interest due on the external debt increased, in 
part, because of the rise in international interest 
94 
rates in dollars. While this has not yet had a 
sizeable impact, it will be fully felt next year, 
since the rates have been rising steadily, and 
recently, at the end of the year, began to climb 
more rapidly. Added to this is :he discrepancy 
between the increase in interest rates and in the 
amount of interest due. Profits remittances on 
foreign direct investment also increased, as a 
result of falling real exchange rates and the 
greater weight of such investmer t in the region's 
economies. 
The balance-of-payments deficit on the Latin 
American current account inci eased in 1994, 
Table IV-8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE IN GOODS EOB/CIF 
(Indexes: 1980 = 100) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994a 





















































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Preliminary figures. 
Table IV-9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PURCHASING POWER OF EXPORTS OF GOODS 
(Indexes: 1980 = 100) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994' 





















































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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ON Table IV-10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TRADE BALANCE 

































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Excluding net payments of profits and interest. Exports and imports of goods include the maquiladora industry. 
although to a smaller extent than in the previous 
year. The deficit has widened drastically in 1991, 
to US$ 19 billion; this figure shot up to US$ 37 
billion in 1992 and US$ 46 billion in 1993. In 
1994, the deficit's steep rise slowed, so that it 
reached US$ 49 billion. This deterioration 
reflects both the trend in the trade balance and 
the increase in the profits and interest deficit. 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico accounted for 
nearly all of the deterioration in the 
current-account balance; it was partially offset by 
Chile's lower deficit and Venezuela's change in 
a positive direction. Mexico had the most notable 
deficit increase -from US$ 23.5 billion in 1993 
For the fourth year in a row, the region received 
a significant inflow of capital, totalling US$ 43 
billion, although that represented a US$ 23 
billion decrease as compared with 1993 (see table 
IV-11). This sharp setback was due mainly to a 
fairly steep drop in bond issues, which was very 
evident during the second quarter of 1994, and to 
a notable decrease in stock investments in 
Mexico. It should be noted that there was also a 
sharp decrease in bond issues world-wide during 
the second quarter of 1994, caused mainly by the 
rise in United States interest rates. Other types of 
capital flows, including direct investment, 
Eurocommercial paper and supplier credits, 
increased during 1994. 
Despite the turbulence in the international 
financial markets, especially in the second 
quarter of 1994, as well as the political and 
economic problems that prevailed in some 
countries during the year, capital flows to most 
of the region's countries remained at essentially 
the same levels. A further factor was that in 1994 
investors had discriminated among the region's 
countries on the basis of their economic and 
political trends, so that the drops in capital 
inflows were limited to specific countries, rather 
than being widespread. Thus, during 1994 such 
reductions were mainly concentrated in two 
countries, Mexico and Venezuela. 
Mexico registered a net inflow of more than 
US$ 10 billion in 1994, which, however, was 
only a third of the previous year's figure, and far 
to US$ 29.2 billion in 1994. In Argentina and 
Brazil the deficit also expanded considerably, by 
US$ 2.7 billion and US$ ¡500 million, 
respectively. The change in Vetezuela's trade 
balance meant a shift from a deficit of US$ 2.2 
billion to an abundant surplus of US$ 4.1 billion. 
Meanwhile, Chile significantly reduced its 
current-account deficit, from USJ: 2.4 billion in 
1993 to US$ 1 billion in 1994. Asa group, the 
Central American and Caribbean countries 
showed 1994 current-account results similar to 
those of the previous year, with deficit reductions 
in Costa Rica, Haiti and Panama and increases in 
the Dominican Republic and Guatemala. 
below the amount required to finance the huge 
current-account deficit. This drastic reduction 
was triggered mainly by domestic political 
instability, the rise in United States interest rates 
and uncertainty in the financial markets. All of 
this was reflected in a sharp reduction in portfolio 
investment and other long-term capital 
investment, since direct investmen) grew rapidly. 
Net flows on the stock marke: climbed to 
US$ 7.6 billion, a figure that coitrasts greatly 
with the US$ 28 billion worth of inflows in the 
previous year. 
Direct investment, on the other hand, 
increased remarkably (63%), from almost US$ 5 
billion in 1993 to US$ 8 billion in 1994. As a 
result of the reduced flows, Mexico attracted only 
23% of the external resources earmarked for the 
region in 1994, or well below the 50% it achieved 
during the previous four-year period. 
Venezuela saw a net outflow of capital 
estimated at nearly US$ 5 billion, chiefly 
because of its economic instability, which, in 
turn, was rooted in the serious difficulties 
afflicting its banking system and the subsequent 
economic policy changes. The only funds which 
the country received were in the form of direct 
investment totalling US$ 140 millic n. It is worth 
mentioning that the institution of 
foreign-exchange controls in the th: rd quarter of 
1994 reversed the trend towards ca jital-account 
deficits through the mandatory deferral of 
principal and interest payments, while rules were 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
Excluding labour and ownership. ' Including net unrequited private transfers. Including long- and short-term capital, unrequited official transfers, and errors and omissions. 
Equal to variation in international reserves (of opposite sign), plus counterpart items. 
Figure IV-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTERNATIONAL INTEREST RATES 
(Percentages) 
r-t Six-month LIBOR 
EH N o m i n a l rate H Rea l rata a 
.1.1 iJjJJJJlJJjJll-. «J 
' I I I I 









— Six-month L IBOR "*~ Pr ime rate b 
r ^ A ~ \ ^ 
V- , / 
\ y ^ 
5 8 
1 9 9 0 I 
5 8 
1 8 8 2 I 
5 8 
1 9 9 3 
5 8 
1 8 9 4 
1 
Il 8 8 5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from IMF. 
a Nominal rate deflated by the consumer price Index for Industrialized countr ies. 
b The prime rate is the preferential rate offered by United States banks to their best cuslomers. 
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established for the allocation of foreign 
exchange. 
In contrast, several countries saw an increase 
in capital inflows during 1994. This was 
particularly notable in Peru, where net capital 
inflows nearly reached the record figure of 
US$ 6 billion, equivalent to 11% of GDP. Some 
40% of these resources were in the form of 
direct investment, and of these, two thirds 
came from the privatization of the Peruvian 
National Telecommunications and Telephone 
Company. In Chile, net capital inflows were up 
sharply, from US$ 2.85 billion in 1993 to 
US$ 4.25 billion in 1994, despite the existence 
of rules to discourage short-term capital inflows. 
Some 25% of this amount consisted of portfolio 
investment and 21% of direct investment, which 
was heavily concentrated in the mining industry, 
while the remainder consisted mainly of 
short-term capital. 
Colombia also saw an abundant and 
unprecedented net inflow of capital, amounting 
to US$ 3 billion, of which 40% was in the form 
of direct investment, despite the introduction of 
measures to discourage short-term flows. As in 
the previous year, Argentina managed to attract 
external resources worth US$ 10.5 billion. 
Paraguay and Uruguay also received more 
external resources in 1994 than in the preceding 
year. Uruguay increased its resources by more 
than US$ 100 million, and Paraguay registered 
a sharp increase, although a high proportion of 
these funds were from unidentified sources 
(i.e., were registered under "errors and 
omissions"). 
Brazil had smaller net capital inflows in 1994 
than in 1993, reaching only US$ 8 billion. 
Nevertheless, long-term net flows rose to almost 
US$ 13 billion, including around US$ 2 billion 
in direct investment and US$ 6 billion in 
portfolio investment. Short-term net capital 
outlays, however, amounted to more than 
US$ 4 billion, especially because of the 
payment of cumulative arrears incurred in 
previous years. 
The Central American and Caribbean 
countries as a group saw a slight decrease 
(US$ 100 million) in external resource flows in 
1994 due to competing trends. Thus, the 
Dominican Republic witnessed a turnaround in 
its 1993 capital flows, which became a net 
outflow of US$ 180 million in 1994, while in 
Costa Rica, the net capital received in the 
previous year decreased by nearly US$ 200 
million, and in Guatemala, Haiti and Panama, 
such flows decreased to a lesser extent. El 
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua were the only 
countries in this group whose n ît capital flows 
increased. 
During 1994 total Latin American bond issues 
amounted to nearly US$ 20 billicn, which meant 
a contraction of 30% as compared with the 1993 
sales of US$ 29.5 billion (see tibies IV-14 and 
IV-15 and figure IV-3). Thi¡ amount was 
substantially lower than the 1993 sales figure, but 
much higher than the one for 19 ?2. It should be 
noted that the drop in bond issues was 
concentrated in the second quar er of 1994, but 
that bonds began to recover in the third quarter, 
gaining momentum in the last on:. This suggests 
that towards the end of 1994 the bond market was 
gradually recovering from the d image inflicted 
on it by the initial rise in United States interest 
rates. However, following the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso on 20 December, bond sales 
contracted wildly and rose to barely US$ 1 
billion during the first four manths of 1995. 
Thirteen Latin American countiies participated 
in the bond market in 1994. Bond sales were 
heavily concentrated in three co íntries: Mexico 
(40%), Argentina (27%) and Bnzil (20%). The 
rest were sold in Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, 
Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Uruguay, as well as in Barbados, Bolivia and 
Costa Rica, countries which had ecently entered 
this market. 
Shorter maturity periods wen; seen for Latin 
American bonds in 1994, especially during the 
second quarter, when the av;rage regional 
period fell to slightly more than 3 years. This 
trend was reversed during thî second half, 
when average maturity periods rose to 4 years, 
i.e., levels approaching the average for 
1991-1993. A higher proportion of bonds were 
issued with variable interest ratos, owing to the 
trend towards increases in such rates and to 
volatility in the markets. An increase was also 
seen in premiums over the referei ice interest rates 
on bonds, which meant higher costs for 
borrowers. Lastly, the proportion of 
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Table IV-12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: RATIO OF THE 
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DEFICIT ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 














































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a Negative figures indicate a surplus on the balance-of-payments current account. Preliminary figures. 
private-sector bond issues fell during the first six 
months, but this trend was reversed during the 
remainder of the year. 
Since 1991, portfolio stock investments, on 
both local and foreign stock exchanges (mainly 
in the United States) have constituted a new 
source of foreign finance capital. The profits 
from such investments, expressed in dollars, 
which had been very sizeable in 1993, fell 
sharply, and some countries registered major 
losses. Stock prices at the end of 1994, as 
compared with those at the end of 1993, fell in 
Mexico (-41%), Venezuela >27%) and 
Argentina (-25%), while rising in 3razil (68%), 
Peru (52%) and Chile (41%). Towa rds the end of 
1994, the average weighted price per share in 
Latin America decreased by 2e/o (see table 
IV-16). 
A large number of Latin Ameria in enterprises 
continued to trade in American Depository 
Receipts (ADRS), and, to a lesser ertent, Global 
Depository Receipts (GDRs). In 1994 
international sales of Latin Amer can primary 
stocks (fresh capital) verged on US$ 4.7 billion, 
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Table IV-13 

















































































































































































































































Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics, Washington, D.C. (various issi íes). 
which meant a drop of 17% as compared with 
1993. Of this amount, 35% went to Mexico, and 
the remainder to Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, 
Colombian and Peruvian companies. It is worth 
noting that US$ 1.03 billion flowed to Brazil, 
US$ 735 million to Argentina and US$ 600 
million to Chile. Meanwhile, Peru, which 
attracted US$ 130 million in 1994, is eliciting 
growing interest among investors (see table 
IV-17). 
Institutional investors have begun to pay 
greater attention to company reputations and 
liquidity positions. Towards the end of 1994, a 
number of Latin American enterprises which 
issued ADRS saw significant discounts in the price 
of their stocks, a trend that was heightened during 
the early months of 1995. 
At the end of 1994, net loans f o the region by 
international commercial banks showed a slight 
surplus, reaching US$ 3.2 billioi, according to 
data provided by the Bank for International 
Settlements. This amount results from two 
competing trends. On the one hand, Brazil's 
commercial debt, which had reached US$ 62.2 
billion at the end of 1993, dropped by US$ 5.9 
billion at the end of 1994, owing to the 
finalization of the Brady Plan debt reduction 
scheme; furthermore, in th< light of the 
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Figure IV-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SOURCES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING 
(Percentages) 
I Direct investment S Bonds a D ADR b ED Commercial banks 
B i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s 
35 i 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 b 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of f igures f rom the International Monetary Fund, the 
International Sett lements and the World Bank. 
a Gross values. b Primary issues. 
difficulties affecting Venezuela's domestic 
banking system, net bank loans to that country 
fell by US$ 3.9 billion during 1994. On the other 
hand, the level of net loans to Mexico (US$ 5.4 
billion), Argentina (US$ 3.15 billion), Chile 
(US$ 2.25 billion), Colombia (US$ 650 million) 
and Peru (US$ 300 million) increased during 
1994. It should be noted that these amounts 
103 
include the increased borrowing R suiting from 
the adjustment of debts incurred in currencies 
other than United States dollars so as to 
compensate for the dollar's depreciation relative 
to the yen and European currencies. 1 furthermore, 
since the third quarter of 1994, the Latin 
American countries have had easier access to 
syndicated loans. 
Table IV-14 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SOME SOURCES 
OF EXTERNAL FINANCING 

























































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from official sources, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Worlc Bank and the Bank 
for International Settlements. 
a Preliminary estimates. Gross value. c Net, short- and medium-term. Includes reinvestment o; profits. 
e ADR = American Depository Receipts; GDR = Global Depository Receipts. f Close-ended funds; initial capital. g First six 
months. 
Table IV-15 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTERNATIONAL BOND ISS UESa 
(Millions of dollars) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
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Peru 































































Source: 1990-1991: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Private market financing for developing countrie i, Washington, D.C, 
December 1993; 1992-1994: IMF, estimates based on various sources. 
a Gross financing. 
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Table IV-16 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DOLLAR 















































































Source : ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Finance Corporation and Latin A merica Weekly Repo rt, several issues. 
Year-end. Mexico devalued the peso on 20 December 1994. 
Table IV-17 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: 
INTERNATIONAL STOCK ISSUES a 
(Millions of dollars) 














































, December 1993 Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Private market financing for developing countries, Was i , 
(data to 1992) and figures provided directly (1993 and 1994). 
a Corresponds to American Depository Receipts (ADRS) and Global Depository Receipts (GDRs)for widening of new :apital (primary 
issues). 
6. External resource transfers 
The net transfer of financial resources to Latin 
America and the Caribbean was positive for the 
fourth year in a row, but was notably smaller, 
representing less than a third of the 1993 amounts 
(see table IV-18). This transfer reached only 
US$ 9.1 billion in 1994, as compared with 
US$ 33.5 billion one year earlier. Tl lis result was 
due in large part to competing trends in five of 
the region's countries. Thus, the sharp decrease 
in transfers to Mexico and Venezuela was offset 
by increases in transfers to Peru, Chile and 
Colombia. The most spectacular turnaround 
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Table IV-18 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET CAPITAL 
INFLOW AND RESOURCE TRANSFERS a 






































































































































































































Source: 1980-1991: ECLAC on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF); 
1992-1994: ECLAC on the basis of figures from IMF and national sources. 
a Covers 16 Spanish-speaking countries (Cuba and Panama are not included), plus Brazil and Haiti. ' Equal to net inflow 
of capital minus unregistered transactions. c Corresponds to the errors and omissions entry on the I lalance of payments. 
Preliminary estimates. 
occurred in Mexico, where an inflow of nearly 
US$ 20 billion in 1993 became an outflow of 
US$ 2.1 billion in 1994. Other salient examples 
were Venezuela's and the Dominican Republic's 
exceedingly negative net transfers (US$ 6.6 
billion and US$ 540 million respectively). 
Another five countries decreased net resource 
transfers, including Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Haiti and Guatemala. Argentina, however, 
maintained a broad surplus (US$ 7 billion); 
Peru nearly tripled its 1993 transfer (US$ 4.8 
billion), Chile almost doubled its figure (US$ 2.5 
billion), and Colombia achieved the highest 
positive transfer of the most r;cent five-year 
period (US$ 1.3 billion). Hcnduras's 1993 
negative net transfer became a positive one in 
1994 (US$ 80 million), but this was wholly 
attributable to overdue debt-seivice payments, 
which were counted as capital income. Other 
countries which increased their net resource 
transfers were Ecuador, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. 
7. The external debt 
a) Main trends 
The Latin American and Caribbean region's 
external debt rose by nearly US$ 26 billion in 
1994, totalling US$ 533 billion by the end of the 
year (see table IV-20). This represents an 
increase of 5.3%, a slightly higher growth rate 
than in the preceding three-year period (4.6%). 
The expansion of the debt was due chiefly to 
bond sales totalling US$ 20 billion. These sales 
played an important role n the largest 
economies; in 1994 the bo ids issued by 
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Figure IV-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET CAPITAL INFLOW 
AND RESOURCE TRANSFERS 
Net balance 
¡Capital inflow D Profits and interest I Resource transfers 
Billions of dollars 
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary 
Fund. 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico represented more 
than 85% of all bonds sold by the Latin American 
countries. Other factors contributing to the 
growth of the debt were Eurocommercial paper 
and medium-term commercial paper, syndicated 
loans, supplier credits and variations in exchange 
rates due to the depreciation of the dollar, 
especially relative to the deutsche mark and the 
yen. In other countries, especially those with 
smaller economies, loans from multilateral 
institutions and bilateral sources contributed to 
increased borrowing. On the othei side of the 
coin, Brazil, the Dominican R( public and 
Ecuador curbed or reduced their deb ; through the 
formalization of debt reduction schîmes within 
the Brady Plan framework. 
Most Latin American countries saw minor 





LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET RESOURCE TRANSFERS a 
Net resource transfers 
(millions of dollars) 
Ratio of net resource ñ 
transfers to exports of 
goods and services(%) 
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and omissions), minus net payments of profits 
and interest, which include both interest actually paid and interest due but not paid. In this table, negative figures indicate outward transfers of resources. D ] Preliminary figures. 
Table IV-20 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL DISB131SED EXTERNAL DEBT ' 
(MUMons of dollars and growth rates) 
















Central America and 
the Caribbean 
Costa Rica 

































































































































































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Includes debt owed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Preliminary figures. c Public debt. Total debt according to official figures and data from international financial 
agencies. e The public debt does not include investment by non-residents in govemament securities. The figures on private debt between 1991 and 1993 have been adjusted to account 
for the privatization process and the abolition of the system of foreign-exchange controls. 
However, the Dominican Republic reduced this 
amount significantly, by 14%, chiefly by 
restructuring its external commercial debt under 
the Brady Plan. Moreover, only four countries 
had fairly sizeable increases in their debt. In 
Colombia (16%) and Chile (11%), this was due 
to a sharp growth of private-sector debt, since in 
both countries the public-sector external debt 
decreased. On the other hand, in Bolivia (10%), 
the expansion was rooted mainly in the public 
sector. In Argentina the debt rose 10%, with 
public-sector debt apparently accounting for a 
higher proportion of the increase. In another six 
countries -Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago- the debt 
rose by between 4% and 7%, with the public 
sector having the largest share. The other Latin 
American countries showed minor changes. 
In 1994 the secondary debt market reacted 
unfavourably to the events in Mexico and 
Venezuela. Likewise, the price of debt 
instruments declined in Argentina, and, towards 
the end of the year, in Costa RÍCÍ , Ecuador and 
Panama. On the other hand, as a r< ¡flection of the 
continuing process of recovery from a decade of 
debt crisis, secondary debt-market prices 
remained stable during the year in Jamaica, 
Colombia and Chile (at 83%, 90% and 95%, 
respectively), and during the sîcond half in 
Brazil and Peru (42% and 55%, respectively) 
(see table IV-21). 
b) The debt burden 
The region's debt load continued to decline, 
as it had since 1987. The ratio of interest 
payments on the external debt, to lotal exports of 
goods and services was 18%; in .982-1983 this 
figure had approached 40%. In L994, only six 
Latin American countries (Chile, <Hosta Rica, the 
Table IV-21 
LATIN AMERICA: PRICES OF EXTERNAL DEBT PAPER 
ON THE SECONDARY MARKET 

















































































































































































































Source: United Nations, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, on the bisis of asked prices 
compiled by Salomon Brothers and by Merrill Lynch. 
* Weighted by the amount of bank debt. 
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Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala 
and Paraguay) showed interest/exports ratios of 
around 10% or less, a figure which most analysts 
consider acceptable. All the other countries still 
have ratios exceeding that figure, including four 
with ratios above 20%: Nicaragua (100%), 
Argentina and Mexico (24%) and Peru (21%) 
(see table IV-22). 
The decrease in the interest/exports ratio in 
1994 was the result of the robust expansion of 
exports of goods and services, which far 
outstripped the growth in interest payments. 
External sales1 rose from US$ 165 billion in 
1993 to US$ 190 billion in 1994, while net 
payments of interest and profits increased from 
US$ 33 billion to US$ 34.2 billion, partly 
because of the rise in international interest 
rates (UBOR applicable to variable-rate 
external debt increased from 3.5% in 1993 to 
3*9% in 1994). Other factors Contributing to 
this growth in net payments were the expansion 
of the external debt, higher profits remittances 
and, in the case of bond sales, increased 
brokerage costs. 
Owing to the moderate expansion of the 
external debt and the robust growth of exports, 
Latin America registered an improvement in its 
debt/exports ratio, to 276%, which was very 
similar to what the region's ratio had been prior 
to the debt crisis (see table IV-23). 
All of the region's countries except Haiti 
showed positive trends in this indicator in 1994. 
The figures for Nicaragua and Haiti are so 
extreme (2,600% and 1,200%, respectively) that 
they will undoubtedly require special measures, 
including forgiveness of significant 
external-debt amounts. The indicators for Peru 
(415%), Argentina (404%), Honduras (367%) 
and Bolivia (356%) were also very high. The 
Peruvian Government is negotiating for the 
restructuring of its commercial debt within the 
Brady Plan framework, which will probably take 
place in 1995. Argentina has gradually reduced 
this indicator since 1987, when it reached an 
unprecedented 717%. 
A group of countries, consisting of Brazil, 
Ecuador and Uruguay, had ratios of between 
310% and 260%; in recent years, all these 
'These figures include only net income from the maquiladi 
economies have consistently reduced this ratio. 
Mexico's ratio of 270% has tended to stabilize 
during the most recent five-year period. Lastly, 
the countries with more ample debt/exports 
ratios include Venezuela (223%), Colombia 
(179%) and, especially the Dominican Republic 
(155%), El Salvador (154%), Chile (152%), 
Costa Rica (126%), Guatema a (91%) and 
Paraguay (46%). 
The debt/GDP ratio continued to show a 
downward trend, reaching 32% in 1994, a level 
substantially lower than the 1986 figure (an 
unprecedented 57%), and close to the 1980 
figure (28%), which can be regarded as 
relatively normal. In 1994 this rat io increased in 
Bolivia (because of increased bon owing) and in 
Haiti, Honduras and Venezuela (bxause of their 
shaky economic performance). It was relatively 
stable in most countries in tho region, but 
declined significantly in Brazil and the 
Dominican Republic, because a p artion of their 
debt was written off, and in Argentina and 
Peru, because of robust economic growth (see 
table IV-24). 
The debt/GDP ratio remained ebove 50% in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, although most of these countries have 
seen significant declines from level 5 approaching 
100%. Extraordinarily high ratio! persisted in 
Honduras (125%), and especially Nicaragua, 
where the amount of the debt continued to be six 
times the value of GDP. 
c) Debt renegotiations 
In August 1994 the Govern nent of the 
Dominican Republic finalized the provisional 
agreement concluded in 1993 for the 
rescheduling of its debt to commïrcial banks. 
The agreement combines the usual Brady Plan 
terms with an additional option, which allows for 
greater debt reduction, and encompasses 
US$ 1.25 billion in principal and interest arrears. 
The list of principal options include;»: repurchase 
at 25% of face value; a discount bond with a 
30-year repayment period and 30 yîars'grace, a 
35% discount and an interest rate or 0.81% over 
UBOR; and an 18-year par bond with nine years' 
industry. 
I l l 
Table IV-22 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL INTEREST 




































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from national sources. 
a Includes interest payments actually made and interest due but not paid. Services do not include factor servic< s. 
figures. 
3 Preliminary 
grace and interest rates of 3% in the first two 
years, 3.5% in the third and fourth years, 4% 
in the fifth and sixth years, and 0.81% over 
LIBOR in the following years. The discount 
bonds are backed by a United States Treasury 
zero-coupon bond and a renewable interest 
guarantee; the par bonds are not guaranteed. 
With regard to the interest arrears, 12.5% must 
be paid in cash, and the rest converted into 
15-year bonds with an interest rate of 0.8125% 
over LIBOR. Upon the signing of the 
agreement with foreign private banks in 
August 1994, the debt balance was reduced 
from US$ 1.25 billion to US$ 520 million, of 
which US$ 329 million was automatically 
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redeemed through zero-coupon bonds. The only 
outstanding payment obligation to commercial 
banks amounts to US$ 191 million. Thus, the 
country obtained a debt reduction of US$ 1.058 
billion. 
In October 1994, Ecuaior signed a 
rescheduling agreement for its external 
commercial debt within th; Brady Plan 
framework which included US: 5 4.5 billion in 
principal, US$ 2.3 billion in inte rest arrears and 
US$ 800 million in overdue interest. The list of 
principal options included a discount bond with 
a 30-year repayment period and 30 years' grace, 
a 45% discount and an interest ra ;e of 0.81% over 
LIBOR, and a par bond with a 30 year repayment 
Table IV-23 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL DISBURSED EXTERNAL 
DEBT AS A PERCENTAGE OF EXPORTS Of GOODS AND SERVICES 
(Percentages) 
Latin America 

































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC. on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and from national sources. 
" Preliminary figures. 
period and 30 years' grace and gradually 
increasing interest rates of 3% to 5%. 
Approximately 58% of the country's creditors 
opted for the discount bonds, and 42% chose the 
par bonds. The bulk of the interest will be paid 
over a 20-year period, with 10 years' grace, at 
interest rates of 0.81% over UBOR. Overall 
commercial debt reduction is estimated at 31%. 
In order to finance the restructuring (purchase of 
United States Treasury zero-coupon bonds), the 
country received support from the International 
Monetary Fund, the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the World Bank, with 
which it signed a structural adjustment 
agreement. 
During the early months of 1!>95, Panama 
and Peru pursued negotiations for the 
restructuring of their debt to commercial banks 
within the Brady Plan frame work. The 
recognition by the Peruvian legislature of a 
debt to a United States bank and the 
announcement by creditor banks in 
mid-December that they were abandoning 
judicial proceedings instituted against the 
Government of Peru in 1990 constitute 
important steps towards an agreement.In 1994, 
only Ecuador and Guatemala restructured 
principal owed to the Paris Club, worth 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT 





































































































































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
a Estimates of gross domestic product in current dollars were arrived at on the basis of GDP data expressed in local currency and 
the exchange rate applying to exports of goods and services. 
percentage of gross domestic product. 
Preliminary estimates. Extenal public debt as a 
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V. ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE CARIBBEAN 
1. Main features of recent trends 
The pace of economic activity in the 
N English-speaking Caribbean subregion
1 picked 
up by 3.8%, after the sluggish performance of the 
previous three years. Per capita output expanded, 
in a change from the cumulative decline 
experienced since the early 1980s. The 
recovery was widespread, although it was more 
noticeable in some of the larger economies of 
the subregion (see table 1). Inflation trends, 
however, were mixed, slowing in some 
countries, notably Trinidad and Tobago, and 
accelerating in others, such as Guyana, 
Jamaica and above all Suriname, where it rose 
350%. Economies that had enjoyed relatively 
low rates of inflation were generally able to 
hold the line, although there were slight 
increases in some countries. 
The trade balance improved for the Caribbean 
countries as a whole, with exports expanding by 
8% and imports by a little under 4%. Since 
services, particularly income from tourism, also 
increased satisfactorily, the overall current 
account deficit declined by 23%. Net capital 
flows were generally positive, although in many 
cases lower then the year before. Private capital 
flows, attracted by exchange and interest rate 
liberalization measures adopted earlier, 
predominated in the larger countries. In other 
countries, however, notably Guyana and 
Suriname, the trend was unfavourable, 
characterized by a sharp drop in capital inflows 
in the first and a net outflow of capital in the 
second. None the less, the volume of 
international reserves increased for the subregion 
as a whole and for most countries individually. 
Public finances continued to be one of the major 
concerns of Caribbean Governments, despite the 
fact that some economies had to struggle with 
heavy debt service payments and high cost of 
controlling liquidity. 
In 1994, economic policy continued to be 
focused on stimulating the output of export 
products while providing support for the most 
vulnerable members of society, There was 
growing consensus among the Governments of 
the subregion on what the content of economic 
policy should be. Implementation ol'policy in the 
individual countries, however, was far from 
satisfactory, either because of the magnitude of 
the disequilibria they had experienced and the 
consequent adverse social effects, or because of 
a lack of speed and consistency in applying 
corrective measures. 
Initiatives to meet the above objectives were 
taken in three different arenas. The first was 
domestic macroeconomic policy, where the 
focus was on providing a framework within 
which the private sector could become more 
competitive. Attention remained centred on 
fiscal and monetary policy and the real exchange 
rate, although there were setbacks in some 
instances when political considerations 
outweighed economic objectives. Trade policy 
was another area of concern, with att< ntion aimed 
at eliminating anti-export biases and promoting 
efficient use of domestic resources; however, 
actions on the national level often had to be 
coordinated with subregional agreements. 
1 The expression "English-speaking Caribbean" is a succinct way of referring to the following countries and ti :rritories in the 
Caribbean subregion for which data were available: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands, 
Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and 
Trinidad and Tobago. The Dutch-speaking countries of Aruba, Netherlands Antilles and Suriname are also included. Countries 
for Which sufficient information was not available have been excluded. 
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Measures were also gradually taken to liberalize 
foreign exchange regimes, encourage the 
repatriation of flight capital, attract flows of 
private external capital and facilitate transactions 
between Caribbean countries. 
The second arena of action was on the 
regional level, where initiatives were taken to 
consolidate markets within the framework of the 
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS)2, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)3 
and the wider Association of Caribbean States 
(ACS)4. Over the longer term, the Caribbean 
countries also considered integration into a 
broader hemispheric market within the 
framework of the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas. Among the anticipated benefits to be 
derived from market consolidation were the 
gradual exposure of local agents to external 
competition, the development of economies of 
scale wherever feasible and the identification of 
complementarities within the wider market. 
Progress toward market consolidation at all 
levels was slow, however, since many feared that 
Caribbean firms would be unable to compete in 
wider regional or global markets, while the 
beneficiaries of protection sought to retain it. 
Moreover, there was apprehension that greater 
specialization by each of the small Caribbean 
islands would increase the risk entailed in 
concentrating on the production of just a few 
products. 
Finally, the third arena of action was related 
to concern over growing disparities between 
citizens as a result of the recent recession and 
economic restructuring. Efforts were therefore 
made to obtain better statistics on poverty and to 
strengthen social policies in sustainable ways, 
especially in the areas of health and education, in 
order to achieve the twin goals of greater equity 
and human productivity. 
The growth in output experienced by nearly 
all the countries was due primarily to consistent 
macroeconomic policies and a relatively 
favourable external environment. A notable 
acceleration of the economic pace was 
observable in Aruba, Barbados, Guyana 
-continuing its strong performance of the 
previous three years- and Trinidad and Tobago. 
The OECS countries as a group experienced 
moderate growth; in Anguila, Antigua and 
Barbuda and Grenada there was significant 
growth, while the pace of expansion slowed in 
the other countries. Belize and Jamaica also had 
lower rates of growth. Suriname, finally, suffered 
severe economic disequilibrium and struggled to 
find the appropriate instruments to contain 
runaway inflation. 
Aruba resumed vigorous growth after a 
modest performance in 1993, when it had 
adopted a restrictive policy in an effort to reduce 
inflation. In 1994 its economy was enlivened by 
dynamic construction activity in the tourist and 
petrochemical sectors and in infrastructure. The 
number of tourists again rose, by 3.6% this time, 
but the free zone turned in a poor performance. 
The current account surplus nevertheless 
increased, thanks to the contribution of the 
petroleum sector, although the total 
balance-of-payments surplus contracted because 
of increased profit remittances. The prime 
objective of curtailing inflation vas achieved in 
part, since inflation fell from 6.5% to 4% in 1994. 
Concerns remained, however, because Aruba's 
inflation rate, stemming mainly from a tight 
labour market and excess domestic demand, 
exceeded that of its main trading partners. 
Unemployment had dropped from under 1.5% in 
1989 to 0.5% or less in 1991 and maintained that 
level thereafter. Macroecononic policy was 
therefore directed at impioving labour 
productivity in all sectors and particularly in the 
public sector. 
After three consecutive year» of decline, the 
economy of Barbados revived in 1994 following 
a hesitant start in 1993. Unemployment declined 
from 24.7% to 21%. The incnased tempo of 
The OECS is made up of Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Mons< rrat, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. For the purposes of this study, the totals given fir OECS also include 
Anguila, which, while not a part of the OECS, is a member of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. 
The members of CARICOM are the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobaj o, and the countries 
belonging to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). 
4 The ACS is composed of the member States of CARICOM plus the Central American countries, Cuba, 1 [aiti, the Dominican 
Republic, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. 
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Table V-1 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual percentage change) a 
Total subregion 
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SÒurCe: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures converted into dollars at constant 1980 prices. 
a Calculated on the basis of figures in dollars at constant 1980 prices. Preliminary figures. 
activity was due primarily to the expanding sugar 
sector (6%), manufacturing (7%) and tourism 
(9%). These activities also contributed to 
increased export earnings, which, together with 
greater foreign direct investment and external 
borrowing by the Government, helped to rebuild 
international reserves. Monetary policy focused 
on containing rising demand, and prices 
remained stable. Fiscal policy was weaker, 
however, and the deficit was larger than those 
recorded In the previous two years. 
Guyana experienced expanded output of 
8.5%* « repeating its excellent performance in 
1993l©rowth was notable in agriculture (12%), 
industry (9%), with a 6% increase in 
manufacturing)andservices (nearly 6%). Export 
earnings were also up, thanks to increased 
foreip sales of bauxite, rice, shrimp and gold, 
while sugar exports levelled off. The resulting 
influx of foreign currency fuelled a number of 
domestic activities, particularly among the 
service industries. At the same time, the fiscal 
situation improved and the pace of monetary 
expansion slowed. The national debt continued 
to be a serious obstacle to the country's 
development by making it hard to obtain 
financing to expand infrastructure and 
production capacity. 
In Trinidad and Tobago the economy grew 
by a little over 4% after a long period of decline; 
between 1983 and 1993 GDP grew only in 1990 
and 1991. The recovery was led by the petroleum 
and petrochemical sector, which expanded by 
over 8%. Other sectors, notably sugar and 
construction, experienced more modest growth. 
The economic upturn improved the balance of 
payments and increased fiscal revenues, so that 
more could be spent on alleviating some of the 
most painful effects of the recent adjustment 
programme. Economic recover) also had a 
positive impact on the labour market, so that 
unemployment declined. The hflation rate 
slowed from a annual average of i:.% in 1993 to 
9% in 1994. 
Jamaica experienced modest giowth in 1994 
(2.5%), thanks to an expansion in mining and 
agriculture, although growth in th<: latter sector 
was not as strong as the yi;ar before. 
Manufacturing and construction contracted as a 
result of work stoppages, a slow-do^ vn in tourism 
and high interest rates that discouraged 
investment. Merchandise trade performance 
improved, but earnings from tourism declined. 
High interest rates attracted a grei ter influx of 
capital, and reserves increased significantly. 
Monetary policy was orientdd towards 
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controlling inflation, and tight money led to high 
interest rates, which in turn put a strain on the 
fiscal budget, in addition to their 
above-mentioned impact on the external 
accounts. Fiscal management remained 
problematic and was further complicated by the 
need to handle the debt and to cover losses by the 
central bank. Although the annual average rate 
of inflation was higher than for the previous year, 
the monthly rate dropped progressively during 
the last five months of 1994 in response to a 
consistent monetary policy and exchange rate 
stability. 
Belize experienced a declining rate of 
economic growth for the second consecutive 
year, partly because of cuts in government 
spending and related construction activities in an 
effort to reestablish fiscal balance and partly 
because of the withdrawal of British troops, 
which had been contributing nearly 4% of output. 
On the other hand, agriculture and manufacturing 
expanded and the service sector also did well, 
particularly transport, communications and 
tourism. Overall, fiscal performance improved 
slightly, but at the cost of a severe cut in capital 
investment, while current expenditures 
continued to increase. The rate of expansion of 
domestic credit also slowed, though it remained 
predominantly directed to the public sector, and 
this may have dampened the demand for imports. 
Consequently, the balance of payments 
improved slightly, the main increases being in 
the merchandise account, so that the erosion of 
reserves was arrested. Inflation continued to be 
very low. 
The output of the OECS countries as a group 
increased at a rate of 2.8%, better than the figure 
of 2.2% for 1993, but well below the average of 
6.6% recorded for the period 1988-1990. Growth 
Fiscal and monetary policies remained the key 
instruments for short-term economic 
management. Most governments recognized the 
importance of adhering to conservative fiscal 
policies to enable their economies to increase the 
rate of investment in productive activities. The 
concept of shifting the main source of revenue 
away from taxes on income, profits and 
was driven by services, mainly tourism and 
construction, while agriculture and 
manufacturing did poorly. Within the group 
performance varied. The most rat id growth was 
observable in Antigua and Grenada, the latter 
rebounding from a recession year. Growth 
slowed in Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadine s, levelled off 
in Saint Lucia and was negative in Monserrat. 
The island of Anguila, not a pari of OECS but a 
member of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 
(ECCB), turned in a good perfor nance for the 
third consecutive year thanks to growth in 
tourism. 
The economic instability observable in 
Suriname in 1993 persisted in 1994. Output 
declined for the second year running, reflecting 
primarily a contraction in agriculture and 
government activities, while inflation and 
devaluation accelerated. The rats of monetary 
expansion jumped from 72% in 1993 to 167% in 
1994. Rapid money creation was due to fiscal 
deficits (including central bank losses incurred 
through a policy of multiple exchange rates) 
equal to 19% and 13% of output in 1993 and 
1994, respectively. Although the central 
government deficit remained roug hly the same in 
both years at 8% of output, central bank losses 
descended to 5% of output in 1994 from nearly 
12% in 1993, thanks to the unification of the 
exchange rate in June 1994. Ii the external 
accounts, the current account balance improved. 
Exports declined, but imports declined even 
faster as a result of the new exchange rate, and 
official and private unrequited transfers 
increased. Capital outflows ami debt service 
payments produced a small defic it in the overall 
balance of payments, which was financed by 
drawing down gross reserves. 
international trade to taxes on consumption 
gained new adherents, while efforts to reduce 
current spending continued, th; focus in the 
smaller countries being placed on controlling the 
persistent growth of wages. There was also 
growing consensus on the need to orient 
government spending to basic soc ial services and 
the rehabilitation of infrastructuR. This clarity of 
2. Fiscal policy 
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purpose; however, was complicated by the 
legacy of previous fiscal laxity in the form of 
heavy debt service and liquidity management 
costs. Concern continued to be expressed about 
the state of some key social services, especially 
health and education, and policy debate 
continued about the appropriate pace and 
means of correcting the situation. Natural 
disasters and the vagaries of the political arena 
created further reasons for relaxing fiscal 
discipline. 
Fiscal performance deteriorated somewhat in 
the DECS countries. Gains made in 1993, when 
the overall budget deficit was reduced from 2% 
to 1¿3% of output, were eroded in 1994 as the 
déficit rose 1.9%. Much of the setback, however, 
was due to a 12% decline in capital revenue. 
Current revenue increased in line with growth in 
activity, remaining at just over 24% of output. 
Contributing factors were the economic recovery 
in 1994 and greater efforts at collection. 
Consumption taxes increased as a proportion of 
total, taxes and now represent 45%. Current 
expenditure also increased slightly to 22% of 
product, the main component being wages and 
salaries, which increased by over 5%. As a 
result, the current surplus declined from 2.7% 
in 1993 to 2.2% in 1994. While Antigua and 
Barbuda achieved a current account surplus, 
after a deficit in 1993, the reverse was true in 
Dominica, and most of the other countries had 
reduced surpluses. Capital investment as a 
percentage of output remained the same and 
went mainly to the development of 
infrastructure. 
Belize improved its fiscal performance in 
1994, reducing its deficit, excluding service on 
the debt, from 6% of output the previous year to 
a lMeover 2% in 1994. It achieved this result by 
a sharp cut in capital expenditure from 15% of 
output ta 1993 to 9% in 1994. Current 
expenditure rose from a little over 23% of output 
to nearly 25%. Spending on wages and salaries 
wentup 12%, while interest payments increased 
from 5.7% to 9% of current expenditure. Total 
revenues and grants rose marginally in nominal 
terms but declined from 31% to 29% as a 
percentage of output. Current revenue grew only 
5 The high level was due largely to the inflationary 
marginally and remained at around 28% of 
output. Taxes on internatioral trade and 
transactions grew by over 4% and continued to 
represent a high percentage, in this case 48%, 
of current revenue. Capital revenue, chiefly 
from sales of assets, declined, while grants 
increased. 
In Barbados, fiscal performance changed 
little from 1993. Excluding debt service 
payments, the deficit shrank slightly to just over 
2% of output. Current revenue jrew by 4.4%, 
spread evenly among the major taxes, while 
current expenditure increased ty 5%. Major 
areas of growth in spending were employee 
remuneration (5%), debt interest and principal 
repayments (nearly 9%), and gooes and services 
(17.5%). Overall expenditure increased only 
3.6%, however, because of a cut o F nearly 9% in 
capital expenditure. 
In Jamaica fiscal performance was weighed 
down by the debt service burden and the cost of 
monetary policy. Debt interest and principal 
repayments absorbed nearly 83% (f government 
revenues, or over 27% of output, compared with 
49% of revenues and 16% of outpul in 1993.5 The 
effort to achieve a primary surplus of 8.6% 
excluding debt servicing was commendable but 
ultimately insufficient to preveni a deficit of 
nearly 19% of output after meeting debt 
obligations. Total revenue increased from 32% 
to 35% of output, although the ratio of tax 
revenues to output remained stable at 28%. 
Consumption tax accounted for nearly 30% of 
tax revenues, the same proportion as in 1993 
and a 10% increase over the percentage in 
fiscal 1991/1992, the year in which it was 
introduced. 
Privatization of public sector enterprises 
continued in Jamaica, although sale was 
completed on only five of the 2) enterprises 
selected: four agricultural enterprises and the 
national airline. The privatization of the airline 
contributed to the debt service problem, since 
accumulated arrears had to be cleared before 
the airline could be transferred to private 
operators. Expenditures other than debt service 
payments increased from 22% of output to just 
over 24%. Gross investment increased from 
of nominal interest rates. 
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over 5% of output to nearly 7% and was spent 
primarily on infrastructure. Current 
expenditure, excluding interest, increased 
slightly to 16% of output, in part because of 
unforeseen personnel costs. 
In Guyana fiscal accounts were burdened by 
large debt service payments and the considerable 
cost of controlling excess liquidity. Interest and 
principal repayments absorbed 82% of current 
revenue in 1994, compared to 76% in 1993, a 
figure that still appeared modest compared to 
114% in 1992. Current revenue increased by 
9%, although it was lower than projected because 
of a shortfall in the collection of customs and 
excise taxes. Capital revenues, 33% of which 
came from privatizations, increased by 
approximately 220%. Current expenditure, 
excluding interest payments, increased 9%, 
chiefly in public sector wages and salaries. 
Allocations for health and education increased in 
1994, accounting for 14% and 17%, respectively, 
of current expenditure. 
Trinidad and Tobago consolidated its fiscal 
adjustment. The deficit of nearly 3% of output in 
1992 was virtually eliminated it 1993, and the 
balance was maintained in 1994. The rate of 
increase of current revenue declined, due mainly 
to a slow-down in the growth of p îtroleum sector 
revenues, which rose by bardy 2%, while 
non-petroleum revenues rose newly 12%. This 
confirmed a definite trend, si: ice petroleum 
sector revenues as a proportion of current 
revenue fell from 41% in 1990 to 25% in 1994. 
The chief boosters of tax revenues were income 
tax (up 10%), property tax (up 50%) and 
value-added tax (up 8%), while n< >n-tax revenues 
increased by 33%. Expenditure increased by 
nearly 9%; transfers and subsidios increased by 
12%, with transfers to households rising 34%, 
including severance pay and retirement benefits 
to public employees affected by cut-backs. 
Government consumption expenditure increased 
48%, reflecting among other things the doubled 
cost of the school meal programme and a 7% 
increase in interest payments. Capital 
expenditure rose 20% and went primarily to road 
improvement, health care, primar y education and 
infrastructure for squatter settlements. 
3. Trends in the main variables 
a) Economic activity 
i) Agriculture. Agriculture continued to be 
affected by adverse weather conditions and 
unpredictable markets for the main export crops. 
The situation was exacerbated by the low 
competitiveness of bananas and sugar from the 
OECS countries. Belize, Guyana, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago, however, ran counter to 
this discouraging trend and had a good year in 
1994. 
Agriculture did well in Belize, with increases 
in sugar, citrus and banana production. Forestry 
and logging also expanded, but the shrimp catch 
declined. In Jamaica agricultural production for 
domestic consumption continued to make great 
strides and benefited to some extent from the 
recent exchange rate depreciation. The 
performance of export crops was mixed, 
however; earnings from bananas and 
non-traditional exports increased, while sugar 
earnings declined, because of lorward selling 
of the 1994 crop in 1993 and i smaller sugar 
cane crop; coffee output also declined. In 
Trinidad and Tobago agriculture significantly 
increased its contribution to output, led by 
sugar, which made up for two years of decline. 
Agricultural production lor domestic 
consumption also expanded, although at a 
more modest rate. 
In Barbados, the decline in agricultural 
output observable since 1990 persisted, but eased 
somewhat thanks to a slight improvement in 
sugar. Fishing, agricultural experts and cotton 
also grew marginally. Agricultui al output in the 
OECS countries declined for the second 
consecutive year. Banana production fell in all 
four producing countries becaase of adverse 
weather conditions throughout the year. 
Problems with market arrangements created 
further uncertainty in the industry and 
As in the case of Jamaica, these high percentages are attributable to the inflationary component of nomi nal interest rates. 
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encouraged some switching to other export fruit 
crops. Other traditional export crops, such as 
sugar, cocoa and nutmeg, were also affected by 
bad weather, which reduced output. 
ii) Manufacturing. The manufacturing sector 
in the Caribbean has encountered serious 
problems in recent years, and there is still no clear 
indication that it has overcome them. One 
problem was that the replacement of an 
import-substitution development model with a 
model emphasizing trade liberalization and 
export orientation caused dislocation, since 
enterprises were geared to local markets. Another 
problem was that some traditional manufacturing 
activities Involving the processing of traditional 
export crops, particularly sugar, suffered a 
decline along with the agricultural export crop on 
which they were based. In some countries where 
the adjustment process was well established, 
manufacturing expanded into areas such as 
garment assembly. The development of a strong, 
export-oriented manufacturing sector remains 
the goal of much current policy, since it is 
considered the most likely means of absorbing 
technological innovations and integrating the 
growing youth population. 
Manufacturing contributed some 16% of 
output in Belize, close to the regional average. 
To a large extent it involved processing of 
agricultural products, and this segment 
remained diverse and dynamic, exporting 
sugar, molasses, bananas, citrus fruits and 
marine and forestry products. There was also a 
significant segment involved in assembly 
activities. The sector experienced broad-based 
growth in 1994. 
In Jamaica the manufacturing sector 
experienced its second consecutive year of 
overall contraction, although some export-
oriented branches did better. Manufacturing felt 
the negative impact of tight monetary policy and 
high nominal interest rates, frequent work 
stoppages, rising labour costs and increasing 
foreign competition. Domestic consumption of 
manufactured goods declined, while exports 
increased by over 20%, especially textiles and 
wearing apparel, which accounted for over 50% 
of thé sector's exports. 
In Trinidad and Tobago the manufacturing 
sector is in the process of restructuring. Output 
for domestic consumption showed signs of 
lagging in 1994 in the face of increasing 
competition from imports, while manufacturing 
exports increased. Growth was strongest in steel, 
chemical products, cement and assembly and 
related industries. Activity declined, on the other 
hand, in food products, beverage! and tobacco, 
textiles and wearing apparel and printing and 
publishing. 
The steady decline in manufacturing in 
Barbados since 1989 was reversée in 1994, with 
strong sectoral growth, to which all industries 
contributed with the exceptior of wearing 
apparel and chemical products. Wooden 
furniture production was particularly strong, but 
food processing, beverages, lobacco and 
petroleum products all performed well. The 
sector contributed to the increas; in exports, 
perhaps an indication that the country's 
manufactures were becoming moro competitive. 
The sector continued to be heavily promoted by 
government policy. 
Manufacturing represented a smaller share 
of GDP in the OECS countries than in the larger 
islands. Most manufacturing wis based on 
agriculture and involved processing or 
packaging, although garment production and 
assembly of electronic components for export 
presaged a possible new phase of development 
for the sector. Manufacturing activity declined 
for the second consecutive year, with a major 
drop in 1994, primarily because of the poor 
performance of traditional agricultural exports, 
specifically sugar, bananas and soap. There 
was growth, however, in electronic assembly 
activities. Saint Lucia suffered the greatest 
contraction (12%), followed by Dominica 
(down by over 9%), while Grenada and Saint 
Kitts and Nevis also recorded a decline in the 
sector. 
Hi) Petroleum and petrochemicals. In 
Trinidad and Tobago the petioleum and 
petrochemical sector as a whole expanded by 
over 8%, reversing the decline observable over 
the past three years. Domestic crude production 
increased 6% in 1993. This was ¡¡ufficient to 
Does not include the petioleum and petrochemical industries, which are discussed in the next section. 
121 
reduce imports 9% and still allow exports to 
increase slightly. Slight increases in output were 
recorded for all petroleum products except fuel 
oil, which fell by 10%. Crude oil prices, 
however, were on average lower than in 1993. 
Drilling activity increased 80% over the 
previous year. 
The petrochemical sector expanded by 25% 
after a three-year decline. The output of natural 
gas and fertilizers increased substantially, the 
latter also benefiting from improved prices. 
Methanol output more than doubled. The 
increased output coincided with the first full year 
of production of the second methanol plant, 
which went into operation at the end of 1993. 
Methanol exports not only increased in volume 
but commanded prices twice as high as in 1993, 
reflecting strong global demand. 
iv) Mining. The minerals sector experienced 
strong growth in many countries after performing 
poorly for a number of years. Mining and 
quarrying operations in Guyana accounted for 
12% of output and grew by some 6%, thanks 
mainly to gold, while bauxite production 
increased only moderately. Gold was the major 
export product, representing 26% of 
merchandise exports; earnings from gold 
increased by 20% in 1994. Earnings from bauxite 
increased 5%. Although total bauxite export 
volume expanded 126%, higher-priced calcined 
bauxite declined by 23%; the volume of dried 
bauxite increased by 185%. 
In Jamaica, mining, which accounted for 
roughly 10% of output, expanded by nearly 7% 
in contrast to a 2.5% reduction in 1992 and virtual 
stagnation in 1993. The bauxite/alumina 
industry, the chief contributor to the sector, 
benefited from a sustained revival in the world 
aluminum market, due primarily to the general 
recovery of the United States economy. Bauxite 
production increased by over 2%. Total exports 
of crude bauxite, however, declined by nearly 7% 
because of reduced United States demand due to 
the accumulation of stocks and because of 
cancelled contracts with Russia. Alumina 
production, however, increased by 8%, and 
alumina exports by 13%. Gross earnings from 
bauxite and alumina increased by 17%, while 
foreign capital inflows to the sector increased by 
over 5%. 
v) Tourism. The strong growth in tourism in 
1993 flagged in 1994. For the subregion as a 
whole, the number of stopover arrivals (tourists 
requiring accommodation) increased by over 
4%, but there were considerable differences 
between one country and the lext. The OECS 
countries, for example, record ;d increases of 
11%, while the average increase for the CARICOM 
countries as a whole was lower than the regional 
average. The subregion's earnings from tourism 
increased 5%, while the OECS COI intries did better 
than average (8%). As in the previous year, the 
number of cruise ship visitors increased only 
slightly, by about 1%, a growth ate much lower 
than the average of 9% recoided during the 
period 1987-1992. 
Value added in the OECS coun [ries by the hotel 
sector and other tourist industrie s increased 10% 
and managed to offset the weak performance of 
the agricultural sector. The only exception to the 
rule was in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
where tourist arrivals declined by almost 1%, 
after strong growth in 1993. Stopover arrivals 
and earnings from tourism increased in the 
remaining countries, with doubl» ¡-digit growth in 
Anguila, Grenada and Saint Lucia. 
The performance of the remaining CARICOM 
countries varied quite widely, from Barbados, 
which improved substantially over the previous 
year, to Jamaica, which experiînced a decline 
after many years of strong growth. In Barbados 
the value added by tourism incre< ised by over 9%, 
compared with 4% the previous year; the number 
of stopover arrivals increased 'r.5%, compared 
with 3% in 1993; and the numbîr of cruise ship 
visitors increased 7%, close to the average rate 
of growth of 7.5% in this segment the country 
had maintained since 1986. The tourist industry 
in the Bahamas had a lacklustre year. Stopover 
arrivals increased only 2%, compared to 6% in 
1993. The growth figure, moreover, obscures the 
fact that tourist-days actually diminished by 1%, 
after 4% growth the year before, so that earnings 
increased barely 2%. The declir e in the number 
of cruise ship visitors reached an alarming 12%, 
so that the total number of touiists fell by over 
6%. 
Belize also had a relatively poor year, as 
tourist arrivals increased only ',.%, after a 13% 
increase in 1993. Gross earnings from tourism, 
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however, expanded by 3%, and although the 
industry was still considered small and relatively 
unimportant, its earnings exceeded those from 
merchandise trade. In Jamaica the sector 
contracted. Despite continued investment -the 
total number of rooms increased by over 4%-
stopovers arrivals did not increase and foreign 
exchange earnings declined. The number of 
cruise ship visitors also declined (-5.5%), so that 
the total number of tourists decreased by a little 
over 2%. This reversal from 1993 levels was 
significant, since stopover arrivals, for example, 
increased by 8% in 1993. The decline in 1994 
was attributable to negative coverage in overseas 
media following episodes of violence against 
visitors. 
In the non-CARICOM countries of Aruba, the 
Netherlands Antilles and the United States 
Virgin Islands, tourism was the dominant activity 
and accounted for 22% of the total market. In 
Aruba the number of tourists increased by close 
to 4%, nearly equalling growth in 1993, while 
earnings rose more than 6%. In the Netherlands 
Antilles the industry enjoyed a revival, the 
number of tourists increasing by 12%, going 
mainly to Saint Maarten, which experienced an 
increase of 13%, while Curaçao and Bonaire 
recorded increases of 6% and 1%, respectively. 
Fewer visitors went to the United States Virgin 
Islands; stopover arrivals were down by 6%, after 
increasing 11% in 1993. However, the number of 
cruise Ship visitors rose 3%, so that these islands 
received more cruise passengers than any other 
Caribbean destination with the exception of the 
Bahamas. 
Cruise ship figures in general were highly 
erratic, with sizeable gains and losses recorded 
as cruise operators switched destinations in this 
highly competitive segment of the market. 
Several countries sought to maximize earnings, 
while cruise operators sought to minimize land 
costs and expenditure. This made for an unstable 
market, since it was easy for operators to switch 
destinations at short notice. As a result, cruise 
ship arrivals varied widely between destinations 
and accounted for a smaller share of the 
Caribbean market as a whole. 
Tourists arrived from the three major markets 
in fairly equal numbers. Visitors from the United 
States numbered 5% more than in 1993. The best 
period was in the winter mont lis, when the 
increase was 8%, in contrast to only 3% in the 
summer months. Saint Lucia and Curaçao 
received 40% more visitors from the United 
States, while Antigua, Barbados, iaint Kitts and 
Nevis and Saint Vincent received f ;wer. Tourists 
from Canada increased 4%, mainly during the 
winter months, and showed a preference for the 
Bahamas, Barbados and Jamaica and especially 
for Curaçao and Saint Maarten. There were also 
more tourists from Europe (4%), es serially in the 
winter, when the increase was 8%. Europeans 
tended to prefer the Bahamas, Babados, Cuba, 
Saint Lucia and the Dutch-speaking islands. 
Antigua and Grenada saw a greater number of 
European visitors, while Jamaica vas visited by 
10% fewer than in 1993. 
vi) Employment. Although unemployment 
remained an intractable problem lor many and 
in particular the larger coun:ries in the 
Caribbean, the employment situation improved 
somewhat in 1994. The smaller countries 
recorded lower rates of unemployment, and in 
some instances labour shortages constituted a 
short-term constraint on economi; expansion. 
This was the case in Aruba and to a lesser 
extent in Saint Kitts and Nevis. Moreover, 
there was a growing awarenesu that more 
flexible labour market policies might assist in 
reducing the levels of unemployment which 
prevail even at high points in tie economic 
cycle. This is particularly true for young 
people, who, although often well trained, 
experience especial difficulty entering the 
labour market. 
In Barbados the upturn in the e« momy began 
to bring down levels of unemployment. An 
increase in the labour force and increased female 
participation rates obscured the extent of job 
creation in 1994; the major contributors, in 
descending order, were the service sector, 
government, commerce and tourism. Rates of 
participation in the labour force w;re 75% for 
men and 61% for women. 
In Jamaica, despite slow grewth in the 
economy, employment expanded three times as 
fast as the size of the labour force. Nt w jobs went 
predominantly to men. Male unemployment, 
which had been rising since 1991, declined by 
12% thanks to increased jobs in construction and 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
in community, social, personal and financial 
services. Female unemployment also declined, 
though only by around 2%, as more jobs were 
created in services, commerce, hotels and 
restaurants. Women continued to have fewer job 
opportunities, and the same was true for young 
people (under 25 years of age). Private sector 
employment increased by 4%, while public 
sector employment declined by nearly 5%. 
Participation rates remained unchanged from the 
previous year at 74.6% for men and 62.4% for 
women. This represented a halt in the decline in 
the male participation rate during the previous 
five years. 
Job opportunities expanded faster than the 
labour force in Trinidad and Tobago, so that the 
number of unemployed fell by 6%. As in most 
other Caribbean countries, unemployment 
among women (22%) was higher than among 
men (16%). Entry into the job market continued 
to be difficult for young people, who experienced 
a considerably higher level of unemployment 
-40% for the 15-19 age group, 29% for the 
20-24 age group- than the population as a 
whole. Women, too, had more difficulty 
getting jobs, so that unemployment was higher 
among women (22.4%) than among men 
(16.3%). Services provided more than half of 
jobs, followed by agriculture (13%) and 
manufacturing (10%). Employment expanded 
notably in services and in agriculture, 
especially sugar production. 
In Aruba, on the other hand, unemployment 
rates were quite low, so that policies to 
improve productivity and labour market 
flexibility were given high priority. 
Noteworthy were initiatives related to 
education and training, efforts to reduce the 
number of public employees by providing 
incentives for personnel to transí er to the private 
sector, measures to induce nat: onals residing 
abroad or currently not in the labour market to 
seek employment locally anc more liberal 
procedures for granting work peí mits. 
b) Prices 
Inflation in the Caribbean sut region in 1994 
continued to be low in general, but a few 
countries experienced changes. Most had price 
increases of 5% or less, reflecting the impact of 
economic liberalization and niacroeconomic 
policies oriented to maintaininj; a stable real 
exchange rate, even without changing the 
nominal rate. The OECS countries as a group had 
an average weighted rate of inflation of 2%, 
although Saint Lucia had price increases of 
nearly 6%. During the period 1991-1993, 
inflation had averaged nearly 4% for the OECS 
countries. Other countries that pursued similar 
macroeconomic policies were Aruba, despite 
cost pressures due to a labour shortage, the 
Bahamas, Barbados and Belize, although the 
latter was beginning to have problems in the 
fiscal area. 
Trinidad and Tobago fell into a different 
category; there inflation declined to a little under 
9% in 1994 after reaching nearly 11% in 1993 
when the exchange rate was deregulated. The 
monetary based expanded by 24%, MIA by 
10.6%, but M2 by only 2.3%. 
A third category comprises countries that had 
inflation rates higher than L0% in 1994, 
including Guyana with a 16% increase in prices 
and Jamaica with 35%. While the annual average 
rate in Jamaica increased, the pace of price 
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Table V-3 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: CONSUMER PRICES 
(Average percentage change) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
increase slowed over the course of the year, so 
that inflation in the last quarter was only 3%. The 
country thus succeeded in controlling inflation, a 
prime goal of economic policy. The goal was 
achieved» however, thanks to large inflows of 
capitel, which stabilized the exchange rate but 
simultaneously destabilized the monetary 
situation, and this was reflected in high nominal 
interest rates. Inflation control was complicated 
by the deregulation of some prices, including the 
price of sugar, by greater difficulty in covering 
the costs of public utilities and by the drought that 
affected the supply and cost of some domestic 
products. 
Suriname, finally, remained in severe 
disequilibrium, manifested in particular by 
runaway inflation, which rose to 360% from a 
level of 140% in 1993. Insufficient control 
over monetary and fiscal policy was the chief 
factor in the price increases. In particular, 
central bank financing of the fiscal and 
quasi-fiscal deficit, equal to 13% of output, 
contributed to the increase in domestic credit. 
The quasi-fiscal deficit was caused by a policy 
of multiple exchange rates, now abandoned. 
Controlled interest rates became increasingly 
negative, and this, combined with a lack of 
confidence in the policies being pursued, 
prompted capital outflows and a reduction in net 
foreign assets and led to a real contraction in 
broad money. 
c) The external sector 
i) Foreign trade and balance of payments. 
The trade balance for the region as a whole 
improved in 1994 on the basis of an 8% increase 
in exports and a somewhat lower ir crease of 4% 
in imports. Significant improvements in the 
merchandise trade account were po¡ ted in Aruba, 
Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad 
and Tobago. The balance of services also 
improved, chiefly because the major component, 
earnings from travel, increased by 5%. 
Altogether, the current account defi< :it contracted 
23% from its 1993 level. International reserves 
increased in a number of countries particularly 
Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago, but declined in Belize, 
Guyana and Suriname. 
This overall picture, however, obscures 
contrary developments in the OECS countries, 
where exports declined nearly L2%, while 
imports increased 3%, so that the trade deficit 
widened by over 10%. The weak peiformance of 
traditional agricultural exports, especially 
bananas and sugar, reduced export earnings. The 
trade deficit widened in all the OECS countries, 
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Table V-4 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 
(Millions of dollars) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
although to varying degrees; at one extreme was 
Saint Lucia, where the deficit increased 24%, at 
the other Grenada, with only a 1% increase, while 
the other countries fell into the 6% to 10% range. 
The deterioration in the merchandise trade 
performance of the OECS countries was not fully 
compensated by earnings from services, which 
rose 9% and equalled 20% of output in 1994. 
Earnings from tourism and remittances by 
nationals residing abroad were up 8% and 7%, 
respectively. The current account deficit 
nevertheless widened by 17%. Capital inflows 
were up 4% and largely took the form of private 
direct investment in hotels and telecom-
munications. International reserves fell by 3% 
and by the end of 1994 were equal to 2.5 months 
of imports. 
The trade deficit widened in Barbados in 
1994 despite good growth in exports of sugar, 
electronic components and food and beverages, 
since imports also grew quickly. With the 
pick-up in the economy, imports of intermediate 
consumer goods and capital goods increased. 
The strong performance of tourism, however, 
which brought in 13% more in earnings, ensured 
an improvement in the current account, which 
showed a surplus equal to nearly 6% of GDP, up 
from 5% in 1993. The capital account also 
showed a surplus, since government borrowing, 
which exceeded debt repayments, and private 
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capital inflows were sufficient to finance the 
hotel construction. Reserves therefore rose to an 
amount equal to 11 weeks of imparts, compared 
to seven weeks at the end of 199ÍÍ. 
In Belize the balance of payments was 
strengthened by the good growth in agricultural 
exports. Citrus, banana and molasses exports all 
increased and were sufficient to compensate for 
declines in sugar and marine products. At the 
same time imports declined, so that the trade 
deficit narrowed by 25%. This improvement 
made up for meagre earnings frcm tourism and 
other services. Transfers remainc d substantially 
unchanged, with government transfers 
compensating for reduced private transfers. The 
capital account surplus achieved in 1993 
declined to some extent due to a reduction in 
long-term official capital, while private inflows 
contracted only slightly. In consequence, the loss 
of reserves in 1994 was $4 millio i, in contrast to 
$19 million in 1993. 
In Guyana, export earnings increased, thanks 
to gold, rice and bauxite, while sugar earnings 
remained virtually unchanged Imports also 
increased, but more slowly, so that the trade 
deficit narrowed by 42% and the current account 
deficit by 27%, despite a small increase in net 
outgoing payments for servias. In Guyana, 
unlike most of the countries in the Caribbean, 
tourism is relatively unimpcrtant. Capital 
Table V-5 
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: EXTERNAL DEBT 
(Millions of dollars) 
Total 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and information provided by international financial institutions. 
inflows, however, dropped drastically with 
respect to 1993, since disbursements to 
government declined by nearly 50% and private 
capital flows by 38%. Since, simultaneously, 
debt repayments increased 42%, the overall 
balance-of-payments deficit widened by almost 
30%; 
The solid performance of merchandise 
exports in Jamaica improved the balance of 
payments. The merchandise deficit contracted by 
20% due to increases in both traditional and 
non-traditional exports. Among traditional 
exports, alumina and bananas increased by 9%, 
while sugar and bauxite declined. 
Non-traditional exports grew by 17% and 
contributed nearly as much as traditional 
products to the growth of total exports. Imports 
fell slightly, chiefly due to a 6% drop in consumer 
goods, while imports of capital goods declined 
marginally and raw material imports increased. 
The balance of services deteriorated by 12%, 
mainly because of a 5% decline in the travel 
account, which had been growing steadily since 
1988. Private transfers, chiefly remittances from 
nationals living abroad, increased by 75%, 
shifting the current account from deficit in 1993 
to surplus in 1994. The capital account showed a 
reduced surplus, since private inflows remained 
fairly constant while repayments of official debt 
increased substantially. Overall, international 
reserves expanded considerably to i he equivalent 
of 2.5 months of imports. Capital inflows from 
nationals living abroad were attracled by interest 
rate differentials, greater confidence in the 
emerging liberalized foreign exchange market 
and the availability of better financial 
instruments. 
Export performance was strong in Trinidad 
and Tobago. The trade balance more than 
doubled, thanks to a strong increase in production 
and in international prices of methanol. Export 
earnings from chemicals increased jy over 80%, 
and earnings from fertilizers, natjral gas and 
manufactures were also up. Imports, on the other 
hand, declined by 13%, especially imports of 
machinery and transport equipment, although 
ores and scrap iron imports for the ¡iteel industry 
increased and food imports remained stable. The 
balance of services deteriorated lor all items 
except travel and freight. The travel account 
continued to show a deficit, since tourism was a 
minor component of the economy, but with 
increased earnings and lower expenditures the 
deficit contracted. The current account surplus 
increased five-fold, and this was sufficient to 
offset the erosion of the capital account, which 
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moved from a small surplus in 1993 to a deficit 
in 1994. Private capital flows were slightly lower 
overall, for while direct investment, including the 
proceeds of privatization, increased, so did 
outflows of short-term and commercial bank 
capital. Official capital outflows also increased, 
primarily to service the debt. The overall balance 
nevertheless improved by 23%, and reserves 
increased from the equivalent of 5 weeks of 
imports to 8 weeks. 
In Aruba, despite an increase in imports of 
consumer goods, the trade deficit was reduced by 
20% thanks to a 170% increase in earnings from 
petroleum. This contribution was sufficient to 
expand the current account surplus, even though 
earnings from tourism declined 3%, the free zone 
posted a deficit, and unrequited transfers abroad 
increased. Repatriated revenues from the 
petroleum sector surfaced in the capital account, 
however, causing a large increase in the capital 
account deficit. Even so, net foreign assets 
increased by 4%, and non-petroleum coverage of 
merchandise imports increased from 4.5 to 5.1 
months. 
ii) External debt. The external debt for the 
subregion as a whole contracted by 1%, due to 
declines in the Bahamas, Guyana and Trinidad 
and Tobago, and only small increases in 
Barbados, Jamaica and the OECS countries. 
Guyana reduced its debt by nearly 3%. The 
composition of the debt shifted, with a smaller 
share accounted for by supplier credit and a 
greater share by official bilateral and multilateral 
debt. Amortization costs increased by 43%, 
raising the debt service to exports ratio one 
percent higher than in 1993. Trinidad and 
Tobago made persistent efforts to reduce its 
stock of debt and succeeded in bringing it down 
from 46% to 44% of output. The 2% reduction 
figure understates what was actually achieved in 
1994, because adjustments due to the devaluation 
of the dollar against other convertible currencies 
amounted to nearly US$75 million. The currency 
composition of the debt was ultimately 
readjusted so that by year end 7D% of the debt 
was denominated in dollars, 16% in special 
drawing rights and less than 5% n yen. 
The external debt of the DECS members 
increased 3%, although it déclin îd slightly as a 
percentage of output. The largest increases were 
recorded in Saint Kitts and Nevi; (nearly 10%), 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (6%) and Saint 
Lucia (4%). All other members posted increases 
of 3% or less. The increase in the debt was due 
to the accumulation of arrears of principal and 
interest payments, representing 44% of the total 
outstanding in 1994. Debt service payments were 
small and declined by 4% from th i previous year. 
Repayments equalled 2% of output and were 
down considerably, both in 1993 and 1994, from 
the 10% figure for the five preceding years. 
There was a marginal increase in external debt 
in Barbados and Jamaica and an 8% increase in 
Belize. In Barbados external debt represented a 
little over 24% of output, down from the 28% 
figure posted since 1990. There was a substantial 
change in the composition of the debt, however; 
bilateral debt dropped to less than 3% of the total 
after the debt owed to the Canadi m Government 
was pardoned, and multilateral (¡ebt dropped to 
39% of the total because of reduced borrowing 
from international financial inst tutions. Bonds 
represented nearly 40% of the total debt. In 
Jamaica the increase was in government direct 
debt, which accounted for 76% of the external 
debt, compared with 70% in 1993. Both 
government-guaranteed debt and Bank of 
Jamaica debt declined and accounted for 11% 
and 12%, respectively, of total external debt. 
Some $84 million in debt was rescheduled in 
1994, and the Netherlands forgave a total of $8.4 
million. In consequence, actual debt repayments 
in 1994 were 1% lower than the year before. In 
Belize, the debt was equal to 3i% of output, a 
little lower than in 1993. Disbursements came 
chiefly from the Caribbean Dev ;lopment Bank 
(CDB), the International Bank for Reconstruction 






1. General features of recent trends 
Economic activity maintained an upward trend 
in 1994, especially during the first half, so that 
the level of activity was 7% higher than in the 
previous year. Cumulative growth since 1990, 
which stood at approximately 35%, equivalent to 
an average annual growth rate of 8%, enabled per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) to return to 
the levels attained in the early 1980s, before the 
debt crisis broke out. 
From the point of view of trends in aggregate 
demand, the increase in investment was 
especially noteworthy. The capital formation 
ratio thereby regained a significant portion of the 
ground lost during the 1980s. 
Growth was seen across the board, with 
manufacturing and mining expanding more 
slowly than other sectors. However, the 
unemployment rate continued to worsen, 
exceeding 12% in October. Meanwhile, inflation 
remained at very low levels; the variation in the 
consumer price index (CPi) was less than 4% for 
the entire year. This trend was associated with the 
strengthening of behaviour appropriate to a 
low-inflation regime. 
While the surge in domestic spending was 
curbed during the period, it contributed to 
widening the trade gap (f.o.b. value), which rose 
from US$ 2.4 billion to US$ 4.14 billion, in spite 
of the dynamic growth of exports, especially 
manufactured goods. 
For the period as a whole, the balance-
of-paymen deficit on current account 
increased substantially, to about US$ 10 billion. 
External financing requirements were covered by 
major capital inflows. Nevertheless, it became 
evident, following the rise in interest rates in the 
United States in February, that international 
credit terms were less favourable than before. 
Economic policy continued to follow the 
general approach defined earlier. The authorities 
continued to place emphasis on act ieving a fiscal 
balance within the narrow constraints which the 
convertibility plan imposed (in monetary 
management. However, the cental government 
posted a small deficit, on a cash-management 
basis in contrast to the previous y sar's surplus, 
since expenditure increased whili; income fell. 
The gap arose in the second hal* of the year, 
when the public sector posted a c irrent-saving 
deficit, prompting the authorities to propose 
spending cuts. In late 1994, the Government 
decided not to proceed with t tie extended 
facility agreement signed with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); however, 
this instrument was renewed a short time later, 
after its objectives had been reformulated in 
the light of the new macroeconomic 
environment. 
With respect to foreign trade poicy, the most 
significant development was the definition of a 
common tariff structure for the Southern 
Common Market (MERCOSUR). Sales to Brazil 
made up a high proportion of total exports, 
reflecting the region's growing importance to 
Argentine trade. 
The turbulence in capital flows to the region 
resulting from the devaluation of the Mexican 
peso in December 1994 hid intense 
repercussions, including a drop in the demand 
for Argentine securities. At first, the behaviour 
of those holding such securities appeared to 
reflect a clouding of country exposure 
perceptions and uncertainty as to the viability 
of the fixed exchange-rate system. 
Nevertheless, the signals given by the 
Government enhanced the widespread feeling 
that any change in the par value of the currency 
could spark mayor upheavals, given 
Argentina's experience with inflation and the 
growing use of the dollar as the currency in 
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ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
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ARGENTINA 
which contracts were denominated. Thus, it 
became clear that the economy would adapt to 
the new external financing conditions by 
maintaining the fixed exchange-rate system then 
in force. 
In the early months of 1995, the financial 
system came under strong pressure. While 
deposits shifted to the institutions perceived to 
be more solid, the total volume of deposits, in 
both dollars and local currency, contracted 
sharply. The reluctance to keep funds in the 
banks was associated with an increase in 
deliberate currency holdings, which was 
exacerbated by a seasonal low in the demand for 
money. Furthermore, the Central Bank was 
obliged to expand domestic credit as a result of 
its support for struggling financial institutions. 
Against this backdrop, international reserves 
diminished, and the degree to which the 
monetary base was backed by foreign exchange 
decreased, while remaining within the limits set 
by the convertibility system. 
In early March 1995, securities prices 
plunged further, while the drop in deposits 
aroused fears of a run on the banks. One factor 
contributing to this climate was probably 
uncertainty as to the fiscal situation, given the 
decline in tax revenues. The authorities then 
decided on Draconian adjustment measures, 
including nominal cuts in highest government 
salaries and a tax increase, a notable feature of 
which was a 3% rise in the value-added tax 
(VAT), Similarly, an agreement with IMF was 
announced and loans were negotiated with 
other multilateral institutions. The resources 
obtained from these sources and from a loan 
agreement signed by large Argentine firms 
with foreign banks enabled the Government to 
build up a stock of funds with which to make 
payments on its debt and assist in the 
restructuring of the banking system. 
Furthermore, the Central Bank's charter was 
amended in order to enable it to act with greater 
flexibility as a lender of last resort, and a 
new bank deposit insurance system was 
announced. 
These announcements had an impact on the 
demand for securities and stocks. The change of 
attitude in the markets for those instruments 
reflected a more favourable mood among 
investors, including, obviously, :hose in other 
countries. This led to a clear rebcund in prices, 
which offset a substantial portion of the drop 
that had occurred since mid-December. The 
response with respect to the demand for 
deposits was less clear, althougt the risk of a 
massive withdrawal lessened. The easing of 
tensions in the financial system became more 
apparent after the elections in mid-May, in 
which the President was voted back into office, 
and solid congressional backing for his 
administration was expressed. Ii subsequent 
weeks, the volume of bank depos its recovered 
substantially. 
Be that as it may, the volatility ill the financial 
markets persisted. It remained to be seen how the 
restructuring of the financial syste m, which had 
begun with a number of operations involving 
transfers of ownership and several 1 »ank closings, 
would proceed. Moreover, while there had been 
signs in late May of a possible relaxation in the 
supply of credit, restrictive financhg conditions 
persisted. A large number of firms, especially 
smaller ones, continued to face severely limited 
access to credit, and such loans is they could 
raise were financed at significantly high interest 
rates. 
This appeared to give rise to a considerable 
change in the pattern of demi nd and the 
incentives for various types of activities. In early 
1995, consumption apparently contracted, while 
exports surged strongly, which led to a 
turnaround in the trade gap. This was partly in 
response to external stimuli, such as the 
strengthening of Brazilian demand, but it also 
demonstrated the flexibility of supply geared to 
the external market, which helped to sustain 
production in various sectors. At the same time, 
a range of activities were affected by the slump 
in the local market, which led to fairly dissimilar 
trends in manufacturing. Overall output in this 
sector rose during the first quarter, a noteworthy 
achievement in the light of the turbulence the 
financial markets. Nevertheless, it ¡ eemed clear 
that the effects of slack domestic demand would 
be felt over the next few months. In that context, 
the interaction between the level of economic 
activity, the development of fiscal policy and the 
behaviour of the financial markets proved to be 
a decisive factor. 
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Table 1 
ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 




Contribution to growth of GDP C 
Consumption 
Gross fixed investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross fixed investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate e 
Open unemployment rate 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 




Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) g 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 









(as percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 
(on exports) 











































Percentages of GDP 
18.1 17.9 14.9 13.4 
14.9 16.7 13.9 16.6 
3.2 1.1 0.9 -3.2 
Percentages 
40.5 40.5 41.4 40.5 
6.9 6.3 7.6 7.4 
565.8 442.2 323.5 100.0 
Growth rates 
174.8 387.7 4 923.8 1 343.9 
181.6 431.6 5 386.4 798.4 
99.5 104.3 97.6 100.0 
0.0002 0.0009 0.0290 0.4150 
122.4 129.7 143.1 100.0 
Millions of dollars 
-4 235 -1572 -1305 4 552 
511 3 837 5 505 8 359 
8 140 11 143 11759 14 796 
7 629 7 306 6 254 6 437 
2 319 3 430 -43 -1173 
-2 213 1921 -1322 3 092 
Percentages 
56.4 50.0 70.3 42.7 
48.2 40.1 49.0 25.4 

























9.7 8.3 4.2 3.2 
3.4 4.8 2.5 3.8 
-1.3 -0.1 0.7 2.1 
-2.9 -4.3 -1.4 -2.2 
15.4 18.6 19.9 22.1 
15.0 14.9 16.0 17.2 
0.4 3.7 3.9 4.9 
40.9 41.6 43.8 43.3 
6.5 7.0 9.6 11.5 
259.1 203.7 263.7 363.9 
84.0 17.5 7.4 3.9 
56.7 3.2 0.1 5.8 
99.3 102.2 104.8 105.2 
0.9171 1.00 1.04 1.04 
83.3 77.5 74.0 78.0 
-647 -6 546 -7 363 -10 070 
3 236 -3 448 -4 729 -6 535 
14 382 14 794 15 766 18 575 
11 146 18 242 20 495 25 110 
3 276 11095 9 911 10 694 
1 978 4 250 2 596 503 
34.0 29.2 27.2 27.6 
24.0 19.0 13.1 13.2 
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Money and credit 
Banking system monetary 
balance 
Net domestic credit 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
in local currency 
M2 
Dollar deposits 


























273.8 8 013.1 
293.1 14 888.4 
354.3 5 607.7 
337.6 4102.8 
483.7 213.7 















































































Sourcei BCLAC, On the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c Measures the impact ofthe variation <f each aggregate 
on the growth of ODP. Derived by multiplying the annual rate of variation of an aggregate by the ratio of that a ggregate to GDP. 
Includes variation in stocks. e Percentages of the working-age population. Percentages of the economically active 
population. * Corresponds to the exchange rate for exports. Refers to the net balance-of-payments interest on exports 
of goods and services. 'Includes the central government, the national social security system and public e iterprises, based 
on final budget figures. J Interest rate on deposits deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
ARGENTINA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 
I II III IV 
1993 
II III IV 
1994a 
II III IV 
Consumer prices 
(12-month 
variation, %) 30.1 19.6 17.9 17.5 12.1 12.3 8.9 7.4 5.1 3.0 3.7 3.9 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
(Index: 195*0*100)b 79.1 77.5 77.7 75.7 75.1 74.5 73.3 73.1 73.4 75.4 80.3 82.9 




-15.3 -0.8 -6.1 7.0 4.5 -2.0 5.3 5.7 6.0 3.9 1.2 6.1 
3.1 20.3 9.9 16.6 14.9 8.7 15.8 17.7 19.9 16.6 12.6 19.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Preliminary figures. Refers to the exchange rate for exports. 
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2. Economic policy 
The convertibility system introduced in 1991 
severely restricted monetary policy, thus also 
placing strict limits on fiscal management. One 
of the priorities of economic management in 
the following years was to reach and maintain 
equilibrium in public finances. The rapid 
increase in receipts from broad-based taxes 
(particularly the VAT) played a crucial role in 
reducing the fiscal deficit and enabled policies 
to be more focused on the allocative effects of 
taxation. Thus, a variety of minor taxes were 
reduced or eliminated and employer 
contributions to the social security system 
were lowered, as a means of reducing the 
costs of activities exposed to foreign 
competition. 
The overall balance of the public sector was 
once again at the centre of attention in 1994, as 
the impact of the social security cuts and the 
pension scheme reform began to be felt. 
Meanwhile, VAT receipts increased more slowly. 
Overall, central government tax revenues 
increased by a much smaller amount than in 
earlier periods, while outlays continued to 
expand. This meant a significant decrease in the 
primary surplus, which was reflected in a small 
overall deficit, prompting the authorities to 
propose spending cuts. 
With respect to foreign trade policy, the 
launching of the MERCOSUR customs union was 
especially noteworthy. Customs tariffs were 
abolished in intraregional trade, except in respect 
of a list of products that are to receive special 
treatment during a transitional period (four years 
for Argentina and Brazil). At the same time, the 
structure of the common external tariff (14% on 
average) was defined. As regards capital goods, 
the main topic of discussion, an agreement was 
reached on a convergence towards the common 
tariff over a six-year period, in the case of 
conventional machinery; the period would be 11 
years in the case of computer and 
telecommunications products. 
a) Fiscal policy 
After two years of surpluses, the national 
non-financial public sector posted a 
cash-management deficit in 1954, totalling 84 
million pesos. The primary surplus, excluding 
privatizations, decreased frcm 5.1 billion 
pesos to 2.3 billion pesos, or the equivalent of 
0.8% of GDP. These figures reflected quite 
different trends between the f rst and second 
halves of the year; thus, a small primary deficit 
was recorded in the second half of 1994, as 
compared with a considerable surplus in the 
first half. 
The fiscal performance in 1994 was 
characterized by an expans on of current 
expenditure, which rose from 16% to 17% of 
GDP, and by slower growth of current income, 
which remained at around 17% of GDP. On the 
expenditure side, the constant increase in 
social security benefits, whict accounted for 
more than half of the increase n total primary 
expenditure, stood out. One factor influencing 
this trend was the transfer of the social security 
funds from some local jurisdictions to the 
central government, but the main impetus 
stemmed from higher payments under the 
existing scheme. On the incorr e side, the cuts 
in employer contributions and the pension 
scheme reform implemented in the second half 
of the year led to a declin; in resources 
estimated at 2.1 billion pesos for the period; 
this was partially offset by the revenues 
obtained from refinancing >ocial-security 
debts, VAT receipts were affected by the 
substantial increase in tax reba es to exporters. 
At any rate, in the second half of the year there 
was only a slight nominal increase in gross 
(i.e., pre-rebate) VAT receipts as compared 
with the same period in the previous year. On 
the other hand, the rapid increase in revenues 
from the profits tax, to which c langes aimed at 
expanding the tax base, had been introduced, 
continued. 
After prolonged discussion, a new pension 
scheme came into force in 1994. Active 
workers could choose between joining the 
new capitalization system, by transferring 
their personal contributions to the recently 
created private pension funds, or remaining in 
the existing public-sector system. The 
number of people opting for the capitalization 
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system was on the rise, reaching 3.5 million by 
latel994. 
The number of privatizations was not as 
high as in 1993, when equity shares in the 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) oil 
company were sold. Nevertheless, the 
Government raised about US$ 700 million 
from privatizations in 1994 especially from the 
transfer of natural gas exploration and 
transport. In addition, the central government 
carried out various financing operations during 
the year. Gross sales of debt paper exceeded 
US$ 5 billion; Eurobonds, totalling US$ 2.6 
billion, accounted for the bulk of the issues. 
Loans were also raised from foreign banks and 
multilateral lending agencies. 
b) Monetary policy and the financial 
markets 
Monetary aggregates grew more slowly. 
The monetary base expanded by slightly more 
than 1%, down from 36% in 1993. Intervention 
in the foreign-exchange market during 1994 
had a slightly expansionary net monetary 
effect. Government securities purchase and 
buyback operations between the Central Bank 
and financial institutions reached a higher 
volume than in previous years, thus also 
contributing to an increase in the monetary 
base, especially in the second half of the year. 
Notwithstanding the higher volume of 
domestic credit transactions by the Central 
Bank, its gold and foreign exchange reserves 
made up 98% of the monetary base at the close 
of 1994, and were thus well in excess of the 
minimum levels required by the convertibility 
system. 
The slower pace of primary money creation 
in 1994 was linked to a downturn in the demand 
for liquid assets in local currency. Thus, the 
rate of growth of the means of payment (Ml) 
slowed to 13%, down from 34% in 1993. For 
the year as a whole, a rise in the liquidity 
coefficient was seen, so that the MI/GDP ratio 
increased to 4.8%. However, the increase was 
smaller than in previous years, suggesting a 
virtual exhaustion of the remonetization 
process. Meanwhile, the volume of private 
interest bearing deposits in local currency rose 
considerably faster than price le /els, but more 
slowly than in previous years. At the same time, 
bank deposits in dollars expanded more rapidly 
thanthoseinlocalcurrency;dollaitermdeposits, 
in particular, swelled by almost one third. Total 
deposits in the financial system, o: 'which dollars 
constituted more than half by the end of 1994, 
rose 19%. The volume of bank loans also 
expanded, although by a smaler ratio than 
deposits; the reduction in the amo unt of loans to 
the public sector made it possible to increase 
private-sectorfinancingbyalmosl20%.Ahigher 
proportion of bank lending operations were in 
dollars as well. 
Trends in the financial rrarkets were 
influenced by international developments. The 
gradual rise in United States inteiest rates from 
February onward had far-reaching effects. The 
prices of Argentine securilies reacted 
disproportionately to the drop in United States 
bond prices. Furthermore, the volatility of these 
prices increased. Stock prices also showed 
greater instability, falling from the highs reached 
in February. 
While these adjustments in se< urities prices 
suggested a change in the structu re of external 
financing, they did not have a strc ng impact on 
the lending markets. The prices of stocks and 
bonds remained above the mid-1! >93 levels. In 
the second half of 1994, before the crisis in 
December, prices fluctuated without showing 
a downward trend, and bank interest rates rose, 
although only moderately. In aiy event, the 
lending markets continued to display marked 
segmentation, in the form of vast differentials 
in interest rates and credit avi liability for 
various categories of operations and 
borrowers. 
The Central Bank implemented a variety of 
measures linked to the prudential management 
of the system. In 1993 a minimum capital 
requirement for banks, of 8.5% of financing 
operations had been established; this 
percentage had risen to reach 11.5% in early 
1995. The capital requirement ratio varied in 
accordance with the banks' portfolio risk 
assessment. In 1994, rules were adopted for 
rating debtors in accordance with their ability 
to pay, based on a flow-of-funds estimate, and 
for establishing reserves for bad debts. 
137 
3. Trends in the main variables 
a) Economic activity 
The 7% expansion in GDP in 1994 prolonged 
the rapid-growth phase that had begun in 1991. 
Domestic demand again increased faster than 
output. The acceleration in domestic spending 
was due primarily to the buoyancy of investment, 
which rose by somewhat more than 18% in 1994, 
with a cumulative growth of 120% over the 
four-year period. Consequently, the investment 
ratio continued to rise, reaching 22% in 1980 
dollars, which was close to the levels reached 
before the 1980s crisis. 
The strengthening of capital formation in 
1994 was due to the same stimuli as in the recent 
past. Residential construction was bolstered by 
the same increase in total income and by the 
continuing expansion of mortgage loans, which 
had facilitated housing purchases after a 
prolonged "dry spell" in private home finance. 
Meanwhile, the substantial rise in the 
incorporation of imported machinery and 
equipment meant a significant increase in total 
investment in this category, despite the drop in 
domestic production of machinery. The low 
relative prices of equipment and the financing 
offered by foreign suppliers continued to 
stimulate purchases of such goods. In 
manufacturing, current or planned investments 
were concentrated in the production of food and 
other items of mass consumption, the iron and 
steel industry, and automobile manufacturing; 
the prospects offered by foreign markets, 
especially Brazil, played a role in several 
projects. In addition, the incentives which 
firms received for modernizing their plants, 
with a view to improving performance in a 
competitive environment, continued to have an 
impact on the entire sector. At any rate, even 
though the value of imported industrial 
machinery rose, its share of the country's total 
imports sank to slightly less than one third. In 
contrast, a larger share went to services; 
transport, telecommunications and the 
electrical and financial sectors all continued to 
absorb large volumes of imported equipment. 
The growth rate of total consumption in 1994 
was similar to what it had been in the preceding 
year, and was thus substantially lower than the 
rate seen in 1991-1992. This revealed a 
slowdown in household expenditure, which had 
expanded rapidly during the initial phases of the 
convertibility programme, with an elastic 
response to rising incomes and the renewed 
availability of credit. The 1994 fij jures confirmed 
that the domestic savings ratio had recovered, 
following a period of distinct declines. 
Nevertheless, the generation of domestic savings 
lagged substantially behind the resources 
allocated to capital accumulation, as shown by 
the foreign trade balance. 
The physical trade balance for goods and 
services continued to deteriorate The volume of 
imports continued to expand rapidly (20%), 
resulting in a cumulative rise of 265% over the 
low 1990 levels. A notable feature of import 
trends in 1994 was the surge in purchases of 
machinery and equipment. Meanwhile, export 
volumes registered significant growth 
(approximately 15%). 
For the third year in a row, goods-producing 
sectors expanded more slowly tlian total output 
in 1994. However, their growtli rate exceeded 
that of the previous year, owing :o the improved 
performance of agriculture and construction, as 
well as the significant increases in mining 
production. While the boom in the basic services 
sectors slowed somewhat, othei services again 
showed strong growth, especially because of the 
higher volume of financial and commercial 
transactions, which largely reflected the 
increased flow of goods. While the registered 
output of community and personal services 
increased more slowly than in 1993, their growth 
far outpaced the natural population increase. As 
a result, the "other services" category accounted 
for more than 55% of total GD]' growth, while 
goods-producing sectors contributed somewhat 
less than one third. 
Agricultural production rose t y just under 2% 
to recover from the previous year's drop. The 
grain harvest for 1993-1994 ros; by almost 5% 
as a result of a small increase in the sown area 
and, above all, improved yiells. Among the 
notable results were the increase in soya 
production, which returned to the level of 11.3 
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million tons achieved during the 1991-1992 
growing season, and the solid expansion of the 
sunflower harvest by 30%, reach 3.9 million tons. 
These two factors account for the growth in 
oilseed grains. In contrast, the cereals harvest 
declined somewhat, reflecting lower wheat and 
sorghum production; maize output rose to just 
over 10 million tons. A major increase in total 
grain production was forecast for the 1994-1995 
season, with abundant wheat, maize, soya and 
sunflower crops. 
Cattle-slaughtering dropped slightly to just 
under 12 million head. The average slaughtering 
weight fell, while the percentage of cows 
slaughtered increased, but not to the point of 
endangering stocks. Nominal cattle prices declined, 
which meant a relative disadvantage with respect 
to the prices of industrial goods and major grains, 
such as wheat. While the volume of exports 
swelled, it did not return to the levels of the early 
1990s. The share of meat production for foreign 
markets (11% in 1993) increased to 14%. Foot-
and-mouth disease was brought under control, a 
notable development which creates new marketing 
opportunities for Argentine meat products. 
The upward trend in oil and natural gas 
drilling contributed significantly to increase 
mining production. Furthermore, during 1994, 
large-scale production projects were announced 
for metallic minerals, including copper and 
precious metals. 
The rate of GDP growth in manufacturing, 
slightly more than 4%, was lower than in 
previous years. Seasonally adjusted data suggest 
that the level of activity was lower in the second 
half of the year than in the first. Nevertheless, 
there were no signs of a clear break in the 
expansionary phase. On the whole, the domestic 
demand for industrial products appears to have 
fluctuated without showing any clear trend; 
however, the flow of exports increased. 
While the growth of the motor vehicle 
industry again exceeded the average for the 
manufacturing sector; the rate of increase in the 
number of units manufactured (19%) did not 
equal the exceptional records of the previous 
three years. Meanwhile, the production of certain 
household appliances fell precipitously, while 
remaining at levels well above where it had been 
prior to the recent sharp upturn. In general the 
rate of output of consumer durables slowed, but 
remained high. 
In contrast, activity rose steeply in a number 
of major intermediate goods sectsrs. In several 
cases, this marked a recovery frcm the decline 
brought on by foreign competition In addition to 
the impact of productivity gains and steady local 
demand, this trend appeared to partially reflect 
improved international prices; at lhe same time, 
the use of trade weapons (countervailing 
measures against unfair competition, specific 
duties and quotas, as appropriate) reduced the 
competition from imports in some sectors. 
The food industries, encompassing a wide 
range of products, recorded siz sable growth 
(around 6%). Output also grew in construction-
related industries. At the same time, there was a 
significant rise in the production of transport 
equipment for investment purposes, given the 
constant increase in automobile production and 
the surge in tractor production. On tie other hand, 
the information available indie; ites that the 
manufacture of machinery declined substantially. 
During 1994, major transfers of ownership or 
control of industrial firms took pli ce, which, in 
several instances, meant that fsreign firms 
entered the market or expanded. Such operations 
involved the food, consumer chemical products 
and paper industries, in particular. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The increase in the consumer pri:e index (CPi) 
for 1994 as a whole was less than 4%, the lowest 
in the past four decades. There was 1 ittle variation 
in the relative prices of the various spending 
components. Of particular ncte was the 
decreased inflation in the prices of private 
services (from nearly 11% in 19! >3 to 5% in 
1994), which was thus barely higher than the 
general price increase. The infla ion in food 
prices also slowed to less than 2% for the year, 
with lower nominal prices for major items, such 
as fresh meat and fruits, vegetables and pulses. 
Clothing prices declined again, this time by 2%, 
for an overall drop of 5% in the most recent 
two-year period. 
For the first time in five years, the wholesale 
price index rose at a faster pace than the 
consumer price index. The diffère ice was not 
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great, but it meant a reversal of traditional trends. 
The increase of almost 6% in the wholesale price 
index during 1994, as compared with the stability 
seen in 1993 and the rise of only 3% in 1992, 
reflected mainly higher international prices. These 
price rises were reflected directly in the imports 
component of the index, which jumped more 
than 19%, and indirectly in the prices of locally 
produced agricultural and manufactured goods. 
During 1994, nominal wage increases in 
manufacturing kept pace with the CPI. This meant 
that real wages remained at far higher levels than 
during the hyperinflationary periods, although 
without returning to the levels characteristic of 
the previous decade. Because of the growing 
misalignment of relative prices in previous years, 
industrial wages in 1994 remained high as 
compared with the prices of manufactured goods. 
The effect on costs was mitigated by the 
productivity gains achieved in numerous 
activities and by reduced social security 
contributions. 
The recent economic upswing has been 
characterized by worsening unemployment, 
which has been rising steadily since the end of 
1991. This trend intensified in 1994, when for the 
first time in the series, the open unemployment 
rate in several large urban areas exceeded 10% 
in the May survey and 12% in the October one. 
The increase in unemployment between October 
1993 and October 1994 was almost 3%, and it 
had a major impact in Greater Buenos Aires. The 
unemployment rate declined in only three of the 
25 areas in which the survey is conducted, and 
these had smaller populations. This proves that 
the worsening of unemployment is 
geographically widespread. Furthermore, the 
data for Greater Buenos Aires show substantial 
increases in the unemployment rate for all 
categories of workers, whether classified by sex 
or by age. 
In contrast to the situation up until mid-1993, 
the labour force participation ratio declined in 
1994, while remaining at record high levels. 
There was also a drop in the employment ratio, 
which measures the ratio of employed workers 
to the total population. For the 25 large urban 
areas, this ratio fell to 35.8% in October 1994, as 
compared with 37.1% in October 1993 and 
37.4% in May 1993. This trend suggests that the 
number of jobs declined, in spit i of the marked 
increase in GDP. 
During 1994 public discussion c întred on various 
changes to the labour code whicli were designed 
to streamline hiring procedures, especially for 
small-scale enterprises and young workers. 
Moreover, an unemployment jenefit scheme 
remained in force, and provided assistance to 
some of the workers affected by lay-offs. 
c) The external sector 
Although the rise in United States interest 
rates had an impact on the financial resources 
available to Argentina, the inflow of resources 
from abroad remained at very hi jh levels during 
1994. A small portion of the financing -much 
smaller than in previous years- was allocated to 
the build-up of reserves, since the demand for 
money was increasing even more slowly. The 
funds were intended mainly to cover the 
substantial current-account deficit. 
During the second half of the year there were 
signs that the current-accou it deficit was 
beginning to decrease. Nevertheless, the figures 
for the whole year showed a wid îning of the gap 
seen in previous years to over US$ 10 billion, 
which is equivalent to about two thirds of 
merchandise exports. The increí se in the deficit 
over the already high 1993 le\el reflected the 
trends in merchandise transactions, whose deficit 
(f.o.b) increased to US$ 4.14 billion. This was 
partially offset by a small reduction in the real 
services deficit. The rise in international interest 
rates had an impact on the respective account 
balance; similarly, the flow of profits and 
dividends was higher. Accordingly, the financial 
services deficit rose by some US $ 700 million to 
Argentina's balance-of-payments accounts are being revised with respect to financial transactions. The doubts arise mainly 
from the calculation of resident and non-resident asset holdings and the income flows associated with them. ' rhe comments in the 
text are based on estimates obtained with the traditional methodology, which extend the series prepared by t le Central Bank. An 
alternative calculation method exists which allocates a larger amount to residents interest earnings, resultini; in a lower estimate 




US$ 3.85 billion, which was similar to the 1992 
amount and lower than the 1991 figure. 
Capital flows remained in the US$ 10 billion 
range, so that the net transfer of resources abroad 
-i.e., the external financing in excess of the 
financial services deficit- contracted slightly, but 
still hovered around the US$ 7 billion mark. The 
structure of external financing had specific 
characteristics in 1994. Income from 
privatizations fell markedly, to some US$ 600 
million. Although direct investment increased, 
its size as recorded in the balance of payments 
remained below US$ 700 million. Income from 
the sale of private bonds dropped in net terms to 
US$ 1.45 billion, or 14% of total net receipts. 
Thus, the maintenance of external credit flows 
was associated with the significant rise in other 
private capital flows, totalling US$ 6.1 billion, 
which represented well over half of total net 
financing. One factor contributing to this trend 
was the expansion of trade credit derived from 
the increase in imports, especially of machinery 
and equipment. 
The foreign trade deficit was 58% higher than 
the 1993 figure, which had already set a record. 
Nevertheless, if seasonal factors are discounted, 
the deficit had clearly fallen by late 1994 from its 
massive levels at the beginning of the year; this 
trend was attributable chiefly to the surge in 
exports, especially in the fourth quarter. 
Merchandise exports were up 20% over the 
previous year, owing to higher sales volume for 
the leading export categories, since market prices 
improved by barely 2% on average. Among 
primary products, there was sizeable growth in 
exports of all animal products (meat, hides and 
wool), as well as oilseeds and oils and other 
agricultural products. Notable increases were 
seen in the volume of exports of soya beans 
(almost 39%), sunflower oil (more than 49%), 
and soya oil (23%). In contrast, exports of cereals 
contracted owing to lower shipments of maize 
and sorghum, which were only partially offset by 
the increase in wheat exports, although sales did 
not reach the volumes recorded prior to the 1993 
drop, Fish exports were virtually stagnant 
following a peak period. 
The growth rate of non-agricultural exports 
accelerated to almost 27%, thereby raising the 
share of total sales of such goods to nearly 43%. 
Sales of fuels spurred mainly by higher crude oil 
exports, again showed rapid growth (32%), 
reaching a level more than double that of three 
years earlier. Foreign sales of road vehicles also 
continued to show strong growth (38%), 
bolstered by growing Brazilian d« mand, as well 
as the special regime applied to tie automotive 
sector, which enables firms to impart products at 
low tariff rates if they agree to export the end 
product. The value of exports reached a record 
level owing to the growth of nearly 23% in other 
non-traditional products. Various categories of 
goods shared in the 1994 growth, including 
machinery and electrical equipment, metal 
manufactures, chemical products s nd textiles. 
Exports to the MERCOSUR countries rose 28%, 
or more than the total, accounting for more than 
30% of total exports. The share >>f MERCOSUR 
exports was even higher (34%) in tlie second half 
of the year, a trend which underline s the growing 
importance to Argentine trade of 1 he demand in 
neighbouring countries. Argentine trade with the 
MERCOSUR countries showed a surplus in the 
second half of the year, in contrasl to the earlier 
situation. Meanwhile, imports fron MERCOSUR 
countries increased somewhat less than the total; 
their share was just under 24%, with similar 
percentages in both halves of the year. 
The value of merchandise impôts (ci.f.) was 
28% higher than in the preceding year, reaching 
US$ 21.5 billion. Thus, import growth 
accelerated, taking into account tlie figures for 
the year as a whole. However, the pi ice of imports 
tended to slacken as the year progressed; if 
seasonal factors are discounted, inport values 
were lower in the second half of 19 H than in the 
first six months. 
The increase in imports in 1994 affected all 
categories of goods classified ty economic 
purpose, but the higher volume of capital goods 
was especially noteworthy. The value of 
equipment purchases grew by nearly 50%, 
representing more than a tenfold increase over 
«heir 1990 level, and their share of the total rose 
to 28%. Similarly, imports of cons umer goods, 
which had slowed in the previous year, showed 
renewed vigour, reaching some US $ 5.3 billion. 
The increase of nearly 18% in imports of 





1. General feat» 
In 1994 the Bolivian economy grew by over 
4% for the second consecutive year, while 
inflation continued on a downward trend, 
falling to an 8.5% annual rate, its lowest level 
in 18 years. At the same time, Bolivia managed 
to reduce its fiscal and trade deficits. These 
achievements are signs of further progress 
towards the attainment of macroeconomic 
equilibria and a sustained economic recovery; 
however, per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) is still 13% below the level reached in 
1980. 
Export growth was a key factor in this 
panorama, as domestic demand fell. Indeed, 
the notable improvement in exports (which 
grew by almost one fifth, bolstered by a 
rapid expansion of non-traditional products) 
was the main factor driving overall demand, 
and accounts for a demand increase equal 
to more than 6% of the previous year's 
GDP. However, the bulk of this contri-
bution was counteracted by a sizeable 
decrease in fixed capital formation and in 
inventories. 
Given the virtual stagnation of imports, the 
increase in exports significantly reduced the 
balance-of-payments deficit on current 
account, which, combined with new foreign 
capital flows, made it possible to increase 
international reserves. These external 
resources were more than sufficient to finance 
a small non-financial public-sector deficit 
(-4.2% of GDP), which made it possible to 
reduce domestic borrowing. 
The abundance of foreign exchange 
contributed to a comfortable management 
of the foreign exchange market such that, 
during the year, dollar values fell at an 
annual rate of almost 7%. Given the high 
of recent trends 
dollarization of the Bolivian ecoromy, and the 
role that the exchange rate plays in domestic 
price formation, this trend made an essential 
contribution to the new, if slight, slowdown 
in inflation. 
The contractionary behaviour of net credit 
to the public-sector provided support for 
monetary policy. During the first 10 months of 
1994, the main factor in the growth of the 
money supply had been the purchase of 
international reserves. However, the financial 
assistance which the Central Bank of Bolivia 
had to provide, beginning in November, to two 
banking institutions closed by the Bank 
Supervisory Authority substantially increased 
the money stock towards the end of the year. 
The Central Bank somewhat aleviated the 
problem of refunding deposits to the public 
through the use of term instruments, which 
partially postponed the expansion to the 
following year. At any rate, this move 
changed the framework of monetary policy for 
the succeeding months. 
Against this background, the <arly months 
of 1995 were marked by a fresh surge of 
inflation, which reached a 12-nnnth rate of 
somewhat over 10% by mid-year. While the 
programme adopted early in tie year had 
forecast a higher growth rate, the rate slowed 
to under 4% per year during the lïrst quarter. 
The shift in trends also affected the external 
sector, with a significant increase in imports 
stemming largely from the faster pi ice of public 
investment, while exports declined after the 
rapid growth achieved in the previous year. 
The privatization programme began in the first 
half of the year with the sale of three 
electricity-generating enterprises, which 
netted US$ 140 million. 
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Stabilization continued to be the chief goal of 
economic policy almost 10 years after the 
outbreak of hyperinflation. In a context of trade 
liberalization, strategy continued to be based on 
the generation of current-account saving by the 
public Sector, the restriction of capital 
expenditure to the domestic and external 
resources available, and a crawling-peg 
exchange-rate system adjusted to the inflation 
target. Thus, the authorities have adopted a 
mainly passive approach to monetary policy, 
taking steps to keep money creation within the 
bounds set by the inflation target. 
During 1994, for the first time since the 
adoption of the macroeconomic stabilization and 
structural adjustment programme in 1985, the 
country managed also to reduce the high degree 
of dollarization of the economy that had been 
generated during the hyperinflationary periods in 
the mid-1980s. In this connection, steps were 
taken to eliminate the marginal reserve 
requirement on deposits in local currency, 
abolish the offsetting of currencies (local and 
foreign) in the setting up of reserves and raise the 
ceiling on the foreign exchange position of the 
financial system. 
The method of determining the exchange rate 
was changed. After the middle of the year, in an 
effort to keep the real exchange rate from falling, 
the reference value ceased to be paired with the 
United States dollar, and was based on a basket 
of currencies. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The main objective of fiscal policy has been 
to achieve a current-saving surplus. In 1994, 
fiscal policy was also geared to reducing the 
non-financial public-sector deficit, which 
continued to be more than amply financed from 
external resources. 
The overall deficit, which had increased to 
levels approaching 6% of GDP in 1993, fell to 
slightly over 4% of GDP in 1994. With this result, 
Bolivia came close to meeting its target of 3.3%, 
thanks to an income expansion of over 1.5 
percentage points of GDP, since spending 
pressure increased, but only slightly. 
lie policy 
While in general the structure of current 
income was unchanged, the share < if tax revenues 
increased, from 9.3% to 10.5% of GDP. This was 
due to more efficient tax collection, which made 
it possible to increase the tax base 1 >y 2% through 
various tax inspection procedures. In 1994 there 
were no changes in the tax rates. 
Current expenditure, meanwhle, rose only 
marginally (0.2% of GDP). Wages, interest 
payments and, in particular, transfers to the 
private sector increased in real terms. The 
increase in the wage bill included the severance 
payments made by the Regional Development 
Corporations to approximately 600 employees 
laid off as a result of the Populai Participation 
Programme, as well as compensation paid by the 
Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), some 
3,000 of whose workers chose voluntary 
retirement. 
The deficit was financed throi gh resources 
from international agencies, primarily the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDE), the 
World Bank and the Andean Development 
Corporation; foreign grants and donations 
continued to make a significant contribution 
(2% of GDP). The public sector financed its 
cash requirements by issuing securities 
-treasury bills totalling US$ 92 million and 
municipal bonds worth US$ 3 million- so that 
domestic financing, through the ("entrai Bank 
decreased slightly. 
b) Foreign exchange policy 
The main aim of foreign excharge policy up 
until June 1994 had been to maintain a stable 
bilateral real exchange rate based on the dollar. 
To that end, minor devaluations had been carried 
out in order to close the gap resulting from the 
differences between nominal excha ige rates and 
domestic and foreign inflation rates. 
Beginning in July, a broader objective was 
sought, namely, maintaining a stable multilateral 
exchange rate over the medium term, To that end, 
the Central Bank introduced a reference rate 
based on a basket of four currencies, -the dollar, 
the pound sterling, the yen and lhe deutsche 
mark- weighted according to their share of the 
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Table 1 
BOLIVIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994" 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 






Nominal exchange rate 
(bolivianos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 









(as percentages of GDP) 


















































































































































































69.8 74.1 71.9 100.0 108.3 116.3 120.0 127.8 
Millions of dollars 












20 53 83 137 
-388 
-158 -106 -194 -575 -498 -216 
867 977 917 773 892 1 181 
1 025 1083 1 112 1 348 1 390 1 398 
295 355 444 780 826 520 
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(on exports) 
119.1 103.5 81.8 68.1 59.1 62.7 61.9 68.1 
36.3 38.6 27.7 23.2 24.5 22.4 19.5 14.1 
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Table 1 (conclusion) 
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Capital expenditure (net) 
Fiscal balance 
Money and credit 
Banking system monetary 
balance 
Net international reserves 
Net credit to the public sector 
Credit to the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
in local currency 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 
On loans 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign currency g 
1987 1988 1989 



































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. 
c Measures the impact of the variation o f each aggregate 
on the growth of ODP. Derived by multiplying the annual rate of variation of an aggregate by the ratio of that a) gregate to GDP. 
4 Percentages of the working-age population. ° Percentages of the economically active population. Refers to net 
balance-of-payments interest on exports of goods and services. 
exchange rate. 
' Interest rate on deposits deflated by the variation in the 
Table 2 
BOLIVIA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 1993 19!>4a 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Consumer prices 
(12-month 
variation, %) 13.2 12.6 12.1 10.4 7.6 7.7 9.5 9.3 7.9 7.7 7.0 8.5 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
(Index: 1990<*100) 114.1 117.4 120.6 118.4 117.0 120.9 120.3 121.7 123.9 127.0 Î29.7 130.6 
Real Interest rate 
(annualized, %) 
Ondeposits -0.1 14.6 15.8 17.3 12.5 14.1 5.9 14.9 14.1 13.0 5.3 4.6 
On loans 5.2 34.3 43.1 48.0 40.5 37.9 37.2 47.8 52.6 44.2 38.1 39.1 
Source: ECLÀC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. 
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balance of payments. The official exchange rate 
managed by the Central Bank of Bolivia takes 
into account not only the real effective reference 
rate but also cyclical fluctuations in the foreign 
exchange market. 
In a continuation of the trend seen since 
1990, the nominal exchange rate rose by 
around 5% during the first half of 1994; in the 
second half, however, with the use of a new 
methodology, it increased by slightly under 
2%. Meanwhile, the average annual real 
exchange rate -weighted, that is, against a 
basket of currencies of Bolivia's main trading 
partners- continued to increase, this time by 
over 6%, reaching a record high. 
c) Monetary policy 
Monetary policy has thus become mainly a 
passive tool, subject to the demand of 
economic agents for real balances. However, 
in late 1994, the Central Bank's provision of 
massive financial assistance tò two institutions 
which had become insolvent led to a sudden 
expansion of money creation and a 
simultaneous contraction of bank reserves. 
This resulted in a sizeable increase (37%) in 
the amount of money in circulation. 
In fact, gross credit to the rest of the 
financial system was exceptionally high, 
owing to the closing and subsequent sell-off of 
the Sur and Cochabamba banks ordered by the 
Bank Supervisory Authority in late November 
1994. Given the Central Bank's role as the 
lender of last resort, these banks sought loans 
for the refund of deposits. Deposits under 
US$ 5,000 were refunded in bolivianos; 
deposit refund certificates were used for higher 
amounts. 
The monetary balance of the consolidated 
banking system showed an expansion in the 
money supply of around 33%. Savings and time 
deposits in bolivianos expanded by almost two 
thirds, in response to the continuing high dollar 
equivalents of domestic interest rates in local 
currency (12% per year, which remained 
consistently above the devaluation rate, and the 
measures taken to increase the percentage of 
financial liabilities in local currency. 
Nevertheless, this sizeable increase had only a 
minor impact, as dollar-denominated deposits, 
which grew by only 7%, continued to represent 
80% of the banking system's total currency 
liabilities. 
The expansion of these liabilities was 
attributable mainly to the increase in 
international reserves (24%) and in credit to the 
private sector (13%). For the second year in a 
row, net international reserves re se substantially, 
this time by US$ 132 million, reaching a peak of 
some US$ 500 million in late 1Í >94. 
d) Structural reforms 
In 1994 Congress approved the constitutional 
reform, which took effect in August. The 
educational reform was adopted at mid-year, and 
generous support for its impleme ntation has been 
received from international r lultilateral and 
bilateral agencies. The programme to capitalize 
public enterprises made legislative headway. 
Moreover, Congress ratified the Popular 
Participation Act giving greater autonomy to 
municipalities, which entered into force in 
mid-1994. 
Towards the end of the year, the Bolivian 
Government and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) reached agreement on a new 
programme under the enhanced structural 
adjustment facility, which establishes a 
medium-term economic programme covering 
the period from 1 October 1994 to 31 December 
1997. It emphasizes the maintenance of 
macroeconomic stability, the educational and 
pension reforms, the civil ser'ice programme 
and the capitalization of thi; major public 
enterprises, in an effort to improve the climate 
for investment and to bolster essential public 
services. 
The programme calls for raii ing the real GDP 
growth rate from around 4% iii 1994 to 6% in 
1997, while at the same time gradually reducing 
the inflation rate to 5% per year. The 
non-financial public-sector deficit might 
increase to 4.4% in 1995, but will fall to 2.7% in 
1997. The projections include an increase in 
international reserves of some L S$ 40 million to 
US$ 50 million per year. 
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3. Trends in ti 
a) Economic activity 
The gross domestic product, driven by exports 
of goods and services, rose again by 4%, which, 
except during 1992, has been the trend rate seen 
since 1989. Thus, Bolivia has gradually been able 
to regain, at a rate of 2% per year, much of the 
per capita GDP which it lost during the first half 
of the 1980s; 
In fact, the 20% increase in the physical 
volume of exports was a key element in the 
expansion of overall demand, since domestic 
demand dropped 3%. A significant aspect of this 
trend was the sharp contraction of investment in 
both fixed capital and inventories, to the point 
where the gross domestic capital formation/GDP 
raio M below 8% in 1980 dollars, its lowest 
figure in many years. The paltriness of that figure 
stands out even more sharply considering that 
external saving accounted for 6.5% of GDP, 
which means that domestic saving levels were 
very low; Private consumption, meanwhile, grew 
at a moderate pace, while public consumption 
stagnated against the backdrop of an austerity 
programme. 
While total demand expanded, it did so more 
slowly than iB previous years. This directly 
affected imports, which dropped by nearly 3% in 
real terms. 
The output of basic goods and services grew 
faster than total output, while the production of 
other services continued to slacken gradually. 
Electricity generation showed the greatest 
momentum (13%), capping seven years of strong 
expansion. Mining also grew significantly (by 
over 6%), largely because of increased petroleum 
and natural gas drilling, which was up by more 
than- 11%. Other mining activities grew 3%, 
which was drastically lower than the 1993 figure 
(11%). Tungsten, antimony, gold and silver 
mining increased, while tin, zinc, copper and lead 
mining declined. Medium-scale mining grew 
sipificantly, while State-owned and small-scale 
mining declined. 
The pace of agricultural expansion 
accelerated to almost 5%. For the second year 
running, industrial crops intended mainly for 
export, suchas cotton, sugar cane, sunflower and 
BOLIVIA 
main variables 
soya, exhibited high growth rates. For soya, in 
particular, international prices and the growing 
foreign demand for pulses and their by-products, 
especially from the Andean Group countries, 
made possible a major growth ol soya exports. 
Meanwhile, coca production dea eased because 
of the eradication programme carried out in 
regions deemed to be overproducing it, notably 
El Chapare in the Department of (̂ ochabamba. 
The accelerated rise of manufacturing 
continued; manufacturing expanded by almost 
5% in 1994, but growth was mon: even than in 
1993. In the first place, only two se ctors declined 
(plastics and basic non-ferrous met ils), as against 
seven sectors in 1993. Furthermore, tobacco, 
clothing, industrial chemicals, oilier chemicals, 
and glass and glass products all grew by over 
10%. Construction slipped again, g rowing by just 
2%, owing to the fall-off in public investment 
during the first half of 1994 and to a slowdown 
in private construction. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Consumer prices continued ta follow the 
downward trend seen in recent years; their 8.5% 
increase in 1994 was the lowest since 1976, 
although still above the target of 7 5%. 
The trend in the exchange rate w¡ is the primary 
factor influencing this state of affa irs. However, 
in the last two months of the year, the growth in 
the money supply, combined with the inflation 
imported from Brazil and Peru, reversed this 
trend, a situation which lasted into early 1995. 
The prices of food, beverages and housing rose 
faster than other prices. From a regional 
standpoint, the sharpest increase was seen in 
Cochabamba, and the lowest in La Paz. 
Wage trends were fairly unifoim, since the 
real minimum wage rose 10%, while the average 
private-sector wage increased by almost 9%. 
Public-sector compensation inceased by a 
smaller amount. 
The Bolivian mining sector was restructured 
through a programme which increased the 
proportion of private enterprises of relatively 
high capital intensity, while reducing that of 
traditional mining enterprises, especially 
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State-owned and small-scale companies. This 
change made it possible to raise the average wage 
in the mining sector. 
There was no significant change in the 
unemployment rate. A slight increase in open 
unemployment coincided with a faster pace of 
economic growth, indicating that the demand for 
labour increased more rapidly than the supply. 
c) The external sector 
The 32% increase in the value of exports of 
goods and services, while imports remained 
sluggish, narrowed the trade deficit sharply to 3% 
of GDP, less than half the previous year's figured 
For the first time, non-traditional exports 
surged ahead of mining to form the leading 
export category. This impressive performance 
was due to sales of jewellery items, jnainly gold-
based, totalling US$ 142 million (a dramatic 
increase over the US$ 58 million worth sold in 
1993 and the paltry US$6 million worth in 
1992); soya (totalling US$ 119 million in 1994 
as against US$ 74 million in 1993); and wood, 
which rose from US$ 53 million in 1993 to 
US$ 86 million in 1994. 
The explosive growth of jewellery exports is 
attributable to the establishment of inbond-
assembly (maquiladora) enterprises which 
import gold for jewellery manufacturing. Some 
of these enterprises are no longer solely 
maquilas, as they handle the entire production 
process, using Bolivian gold. 
Meanwhile, gold also played an outstanding 
role in mining exports, which rose 14%; gold thus 
became the leading export product in this 
category, displacing zinc, exports of which fell 
by 12%. The biggest markets for Bolivian exports 
were the United States (23%), the United Kingdom 
(20%), Argentina (16%, especially for natural 
gas), Peru (10%, especially for soya), Belgium 
(6%) and Colombia (5%, especially for soya oil). 
In contrast, the value of imports (nearly 
US$ 1.2 billion) was similar to what it had been 
in 1993, as prices rose in the same proportion 
(3%) as volumes fell. The increase of around 
26% in consumer goods purchases contrasted 
with the 13% drop in capital goods purchases, 
especially for industry. Purchases of 
intermediate goods increased by somewhat less 
than 7%, as demand dropped in agriculture and 
construction and rose in industry and fuels. 
The main import suppliers wsre the United 
States (25%), Argentina (12.5°/ o), Brazil and 
Japan (both 11%) and Chile (8%). 
Approximately 40% of Bolivian imports 
originated in the Latin American Integration 
Association (LAIA) area and 20% in Europe. 
The balance-of-payments deficit on current 
account was more than offset through external 
resources, so that international reserves 
increased for the fifth consecutive year. 
Unrequited official transfer payments 
constituted a significant share oJ capital flows, 
rising by 12% to reach their highest level in the 
past 10 years (equal to slightly less than 4% of 
GDP). The largest donors were the United States 
(US$ 101 million), Argentina (U5$ 51 million), 
Switzerland (US$ 28 million), Japan (US$ 17 
million), the European Union (U 5$ 13 million), 
and IDB (US$ 12 million). 
During 1994 Bolivia received US$ 350 
million in foreign loans, or 7% mere than in 1993 
(consisting of 52% concessional debt and 48% 
commercial debt), of which US$ Í188 million was 
provided by multilateral agencies and US$ 62 
million by bilateral agencies. Among the 
multilateral lenders, IDB stood oui, with US$ 136 
million, as did the Andean Development 
Corporation (ADC) (US$ 72 million and the 
World Bank (US$ 68 million). Among the 
bilateral lenders, the biggest flews were from 
Germany (US$ 27 million), Spain (US$ 15 
million), France (US$ 9 million) and Japan 
(US$ 7 million). These disbursements were 
earmarked mainly for the execution of 
multisectoral projects channelled to the private 
sector and for the energy, water and transport 
sectors. 
By late 1994 the medium- and long-term 
public external debt balance had reached 
US$ 4.2 billion, which was equal to an 11% 
increase, the fastest in the past eight years. A 
share of this increase was due 13 the increased 
value of debts denominated in cuirencies that had 
appreciated against the dollar. 
The multilateral public exterral debt rose by 
13%; there were notable increases in the debt 
incurred to ADC (35%), the world Bank (13%) 
and IDB (10%). Meanwhile, the bilateral public 
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debt increased by 10%. A breakdown of 
Bolivia's public external debt shows a higher 
percentage of multilateral creditors (56%) 
followed by bilateral creditors (43%), while 
borrowing from the private sector represented 
only 1% of the total. The Inter-American 
Development Bank (57%), the World Bank 
(32%) and ADC (7%) stood out among the first 
group, while the biggest bilateral creditors were 
Japan (32%), Germany (22%) and Belgium (9%). 
In March 1994 the central batiks of Bolivia 
and Brazil signed a memorandum of 
understanding stipulating that Bolivia's total 
debt to Brazil, which amounts to I IS$ 68 million, 
would be paid off in three instalme nts (40%, 30% 
and 30%) through the purchase o;'United States 
Treasury 25-year zero-coupon bonds. Bolivia 
made the first payment on 30 June, purchasing 
US$ 10.9 million worth of these bonds, which 




1. General trends 
The performance of the Brazilian economy in 
1994 was strongly influenced by the 
implementation of the Real Plan, which -in 
contrast with the seven previous stabilization 
programmes that Brazil had tried out over nearly 
a decade- succeeded in slashing what had 
become a runaway inflation rate. The plan was 
implemented in the midst of the election 
campaign to fill executive and legislative seats at 
the federal and state levels. The new 
administration which took office in January 1995 
embraced the main thrust of its predecessor's 
economic policy and confined itself to making 
adjustments to strengthen the stabilization 
programme. 
Thus, the inflation rate fell from 5,000% in the 
12-month period ending in June 1994 to only 
34% in June 1995. The country's gross domestic 
product (GDP) expanded by almost 6% in 1994, 
thus marking up its highest rate since 1987, and 
its pace of growth picked up even further in the 
first quarter of 1995, when it reached an 
annualized rate of 10%. Per capita GDP climbed 
by nearly 4%, although it still fell short (-4%) of 
its 1989 level. The balance of payments showed 
a small deficit (US$ 1.5 billion) on current 
account, but the capital account posted a surplus 
of US$ 8 billion. For the third year in a row, the 
country increased its international reserves 
considerably, adding over US$ 7 billion in 1994, 
which brought them close to the US$ 39 billion 
mark. Meanwhile, May 1994 saw the conclusion 
of negotiations with creditors for the 
rescheduling of Brazil's external debt service. 
The unemployment rate slipped from 5.4% to 
5.1% and the average wage in the manufacturing 
sector in São Paulo increased by about 10%. On 
the fiscal policy front, a more determined effort 
to keep public accounts under control enabled the 
public sector to build up a larger primary surplus 
than in 1993 (the equivalent of ¿ .1% of GDP), 
which gave it an operating surplus amounting to 
1.2% of GDP. 
In contrast with previous stabilization 
initiatives, the new plan was notable for its 
transparency regarding the meisures to be 
adopted and the timing of their implementation; 
it also ruled out the use of price freezes, 
intervention in contracts, or any Dther type of 
drastic or unexpected action. The plan was 
divided into three stages, each cf which was 
announced and outlined in December 1993. The 
first stage involved a fiscal adjustnent aimed at 
balancing the budget in 1994. The second stage, 
which began in March 1994, sought to coordinate 
the economy's prices by creating a new unit of 
indexation. The third stage of ttie plan was 
launched in July with the introduc ion of a new 
currency, the real; this stage also called for 
modifications in exchange and monetary 
policies, and extended the life of most indexed 
financial contracts. 
Its results were both immediate and 
spectacular, but they did not spell the end of 
inflation. It was not until mid-1995 that action 
was taken to consolidate the stabilization 
process and consolidate a sustained form of 
economic growth. To this end, the 
administration embarked upon the legislative 
process necessary to amend the Constitution 
with a view to streamlining State monopolies, 
lifting restrictions on foreign capital, reforming 
the tax system and the management of the public 
sector, and making thorough-goin¡; changes in 
the social security system. In addi ion, in June 
the initial steps were taken to all but dismantle 
those mandatory indexation mechanisms still in 
force, which had required that annual 
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The need for such structural reforms lay in the 
fact that, the plan's successes notwithstanding, 
there had also been some developments that 
jeopardized the consolidation of the stabilization 
process. These included the reappearance of 
inflationary pressures, which had thwarted 
efforts to push the monthly rate of increase in the 
consumer price index (CPI) below 2%; a strong 
expansion of demand; the danger that indexation 
mechanisms would again come into widespread 
use; and the withdrawal of external financing in 
the wake of the Mexican crisis. These problems 
were exacerbated by exchange-rate lags and the 
difficulty of controlling liquidity. One particular 
cause for concern was the fact that the country's 
foreign trade in goods had taken a definite turn 
for the worse following the introduction of the 
new plan. The US$ 13 billion surplus recorded in 
1993 narrowed to US$ 10.4 billion in 1994, and 
the monthly balances, which had been 
consistently positive ever since 1987, began to 
slip into the red in November 1994; as a result, a 
cumulative deficit of US$ 4.26 billion was 
incurred in the first six months of 1995. This 
abrupt turnaround was attributable to a surge in 
imports, whose monthly levels junped from just 
over US$ 2 billion in the first half o E1994 to some 
US$ 4 billion in the final quarter o f that year and 
to almost US$ 4.3 billion in the fin t half of 1995. 
Exports mounted at a satisfactory pace, but 
considerably more slowly than im sorts. 
The introduction of a new currency also 
triggered major changes in other components of 
the balance of payments, which ¡iwung from a 
surplus of US$ 8 billion in the fi-st half of the 
year to a deficit of just over US$ 1 billion in the 
second. In addition to the turnabout in 
merchandise trade, net inflows of loreign capital 
thinned substantially, dropping to a meagre 
US$ 770 million. This setback wns attributable 
to widespread uncertainty as to whether the 
monetary authority would impose stricter 
controls on such flows, delays in implementing 
the privatization programme and a considerable 
appreciation of the local currency, even in 
nominal terms. 
2. Economic policy 
Brazil's new stabilization plan, which had been 
launched late in 1993, was the cornerstone of its 
economic policy in 1994. In order to achieve its 
first objective, which was to put the country's 
fiscal accounts in order, a number of reforms 
were introduced which were designed to improve 
the use of public resources. To the same end, the 
collection of social security contributions was 
brought up to date, a new tax came into effect and 
the debts of states and municipalities were 
rescheduled. The striking drop-off in inflation 
helped to moderate the erosion of tax revenues. 
Once the public sector's accounts had been 
brought under control, the plan moved into its 
second stage, whose purpose was to coordinate 
price formation within the economy. Previous 
stabilization initiatives undertaken in Brazil had 
involved the use of price freezes, but experience 
had shown that this mechanism not only directly 
interfered with the operation of contracts, but 
also frequently generated lags in prices, which 
then remained far below the inflation rate. In 
other instances, economic agents had created a 
variety of indexes for use in correcting prices, 
contracts and obligations in an eff M to protect 
their real incomes. For example, virtually all 26 
states, the Federal District and the country's 
major cities had established units of account for 
the calculation of taxes based on local or national 
indexes. In order to standardize these 
mechanisms, the federal govern» tient created 
what it termed a "unit of real value" (URV), 
which was calculated on the basis of an average 
of three price indexes.1 The daily pri ce of the URV 
in cruzeiros reales was set by the (Central Bank 
on the preceding day. The VRV was also 
calculated retroactively so that the fue historical 
values of various prices could be determined. In 
addition, the Central Bank announced that it 
would use the URV as a reference for its 
1 These were the consumer price index for the city of São Paulo developed by the Institute of Economic Reset xch Foundation 
(PIPE), the special broad-based national consumer price index prepared by the Brazilian Geographical and Statistical Institute (IBGE), 
and the general price index computed by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation. 
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Table 1 
BRAZIL: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994a 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 




Contribution to growth of GDP 
Consumption 
Gross fixed investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross fixed investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate e 
Open unemployment rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 




Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchage rate 
(reales per dollar) g 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 








(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 




























































































































106.2 116.3 104.0 100.0 104.7 
0.0143 0.0953 1.0305 0.00003 0.00015 
156.8 143.2 108.4 100.0 118.5 
Millions of dollars 
-1407 4 172 1007 -3 809 -1443 
8 830 16 187 13 385 7 485 7 485 
28 157 36 046 37 495 34 661 34 369 
19 327 19 859 24 110 27 176 26 884 
3 572 -2 461 693 5 054 1640 
1800 2 114 1586 1139 209 
Percentages 
103.3 102.9 108.1 
0.00164 0.03215 0.64250 
127.7 115.4 91.0 
6 266 -608 -1451 
12 301 8 068 4 833 
40 005 42 896 48 525 
27 704 34 828 43 692 
8 802 9 821 7 965 
15 001 8 811 7 344 
21.0 18.2 16.1 16.1 16.0 16.3 15.7 13.21 
31.2 27.3 25.7 28.1 25.1 18.3 19.7 13.2 
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Table 1 (conclusion) 




Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of 
banking system 
Money (Ml) 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 
On loans 
Equivalent interest rate 
in foiteigfl currency 
1987 1988 1989 
Percentages of GDP 
23.5 20.5 20.9 
29.2 25.3 25.8 
-5.7 -4.8 -6.9 
Growth rates 
27.9 15.0 3.0 
128.2 570.3 1384.2 
Annual rates 















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact <>f the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficientes were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's anni al growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Includes variations in inventories. c Percentages oi ' the working-age 
population. Percentages of the economically active population. g Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation 
in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
BRAZIL: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 1993 1994' 
i n in iv i H m rv i n m iv 
Gross domestic 
product (Index: 












On deposits 46.5 8.6 49.7 22.8 6.8 35.3 22.2 27.8 35.5 43.0 7.8 17.8 




variation) 896.5 1059.2 1207.7 1466.7 2*129.4 3 167.6 5 879.2 5 753.1 2 622.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
'Preliminary figures. 
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operations in the foreign-exchange market. The 
new index could only be used in the case of 
contracts with a life of more than one year. 
Wages were converted to URVS on a 
mandatory basis; their average value for the 
four-month period from November 1993 to 
February 1994 was used in calculating their 
conversion based on the day on which the wages 
had been paid. Thus, from March on, wages were 
completely indexed, although they were paid in 
cruzeiros reales according to the price of the URV 
on the day of payment. URV-denominated wage 
levels could be raised only during each job 
category's annual round of wage bargaining in 
those cases where it could be demonstrated that 
the real level that had previously been calculated 
had been lower than their average real level 
during the preceding 12 months. The 
Government encouraged the private sector to 
convert its prices to URVs, but it stipulated that 
the new value should not exceed the average for 
the final quarter of 1993. 
Between April and June, public utility charges 
and rates (for electricity, telecommunications 
services, petroleum supplies and water) were 
converted to URVs, and here again the real 
average value method was used. However, the 
guidelines for converting rent payments and 
private school tuition were not announced until 
after the new currency was brought into use. 
These two activities implemented their own 
conversion guidelines, however, and this caused 
their adjustments to be higher than they would 
have been if the average real value method had 
been employed. 
The introduction of the URV gave rise to a new 
relative price structure, but the simultaneous 
indexation of wages prevented this from 
precipitating a sharp decrease in income levels. 
The reduction in uncertainty paved the way for 
the gradual reappearance of credit mechanisms 
-especially for retail trade- which had virtually 
been wiped out by the country's earlier high 
inflation rates. This buttressed the upward trend 
in economic activity which had already been in 
evidence throughout 1993. 
This slow, orderly adjustment of relative 
prices was upset, however, when the introduction 
of the new currency was announced in June. The 
private sector was very concerned about how 
prices might behave under the new monetary 
regime, and private economic agents therefore 
widened their profit margins substantially; this, 
in turn, caused the monthly rate oi price increases 
to rise from 43% in May to 48% in June. 
The introduction of the new currency, which 
entered into circulation on 1 July, differed in 
important respects from the four previous 
currency changes implemented in Brazil since 
1986. First, it was stipulated thîit one real, the 
new currency, would have the sa lie value as the 
URV had as of 30 June, or 2,750 c 'uzeiros reales. 
The actual process of replacing the individual 
currency units then circulating outside banks 
with more than 3 billion new bill» and coins was 
accomplished without any major setbacks, 
thanks to the broad-based structure of the 
banking system and the experience which 
economic agents had gained in using conversion 
factors for different indexes. 
The Government also pledgïd to maintain 
international reserves at a level e quivalent to the 
total value of reales in circulation, as well as 
placing a cap on currency issues ; nd establishing 
new fiscal restrictions. The adoption of the real 
brought about drastic changes in monetary and 
exchange policies, thus calling into question 
some of the guidelines recently developed by the 
authorities themselves. The Central Bank 
withdrew from the foreign-exchange market, 
which triggered a sharp apprécia ion of the real; 
at the same time, in responso to the rapid 
expansion of the demand for meney, it injected 
liquidity into the economy by purchasing 
government securities from the private sector. 
Meanwhile, the National Treasury adopted a 
tight money policy, and reserve lequirements on 
bank deposits were raised. 
The problems created by the introduction of 
the new currency were considerably greater than 
had been expected. The level of < onsumer prices 
climbed steeply in July and Aug ist, marking up 
a cumulative rate of 12% for the se two months. 
This was due both to the effect!; of the upward 
spiral in the prices of manufactures observed in 
June, prior to the adoption of the new currency, 
and the impact on agricultural (rices of supply 
problems caused by severe frosts which 
devastated production area:;. Once these 
situations had been overcome, in nation subsided 
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so rapidly that by September the rate of price 
increases was under 1%. This trend was reversed 
once again during the next two months, however, 
when the effects of a protracted drought were 
reflected in the prices of livestock products, thus 
boosting the monthly rate of price variations to 
over 2%. In December the impact of this situation 
Started to taper Off as the supply of meat and meat 
products began to increase. 
As with other stabilization initiatives, the Real 
Plan's effects on tradables and non-tradables 
were quite different. Prices of services in general, 
as well as rents, exhibited a momentum all of 
their own, and recorded above-average increases. 
Between July and December, the upsurge in the 
housing component was twice that of the general 
index. Meanwhile, wholesale prices of 
manufactures remained virtually unchanged 
between August and December. 
The slackening of inflation contributed to a 
rapid build-up of purchasing power, especially 
among low-income groups, which had 
traditionally been bypassed by the financial 
system's indexation mechanisms. The slowing of 
inflation, and the resulting decrease in the cost of 
money, made it possible for lenders to extend 
more credit and to do so over longer terms; this 
meant that installment payments represented a 
much smaller percentage of monthly wages, 
which stimulated commerce. In the State of São 
Paulo, sales during the second six months of the 
year were about 30% higher, in real terms, than 
in the same period of 1993. 
Consumer credit played a particularly 
important role in the expansion of sales. Four 
months into the plan's implementation, the total 
amount of loans granted by the financial system 
to the private sector was 43% higher than it had 
been at the end of June, and direct consumer 
loans had jumped 120%; this situation prompted 
the authorities to tighten up credit controls. 
Nominal interest rates plummeted in the 
second half of the year, but then held at around 
4%. Real interest rates fluctuated, but remained 
positive. As state banks ran into financial 
difficulties, the targets set for the management of 
monetary aggregates became meaningless. 
These changes in the exchange system were 
coupled with lower tariffs and the deregulation 
of external trade in order to foster the growth of 
imports. Measures along these lines included a 
reduction in the tariff on a variety of electronic 
goods and motor vehicles to a rale of 20%; the 
early implementation of planned lariff rollbacks 
in order to bring tariff levels inte line with the 
common external tariff maintained by 
MERCOSUR; the elimination of tariffs on a range 
of equipment and intermediate goods, such as 
petrochemicals and aluminium; and the 
application of low tariffs on external mail-order 
purchases. 
These measures led to a vigorous expansion 
of imports during the second half of 1994. The 
turnaround in the balance of trade that began to 
develop in November was part of the 
stabilization strategy and was aimed at ensuring 
a high level of supply, enhancing the 
competitiveness of Brazilian troducts and 
increasing the demand for foreign exchange in 
order to soak up the growing supply of external 
resources. Thus, the appreciation ol the exchange 
rate initially served as an anchor for the 
stabilization process, until such tiro; as structural 
reforms could be introduced ir both fiscal 
accounts and the financial system. 
The steep devaluation of the Mexican peso 
which occurred in the final days of 1994 seriously 
compromised this strategy by sparking an 
immediate withdrawal of capital flows and 
heightening doubts as to the sustair ability of the 
considerable amount of financing needed to 
cover the balance-of-payments current account. 
In addition, this atmosphere of uncertainty 
bolstered the arguments of some segments of the 
business community regarding the pace of the 
liberalization process and the need to bring the 
exchange rate back to where it had been, in real 
terms, prior to the implementation of the plan. 
a) Fiscal policy 
Putting the public sector's ac:ounts on a 
sound footing was essential to the stabilization 
plan's success. This had been the goal of the 
constitutional reforms of February 1994, which 
provided for a 20% reduction ir mandatory 
allocations of taxes and sociil security 
contributions, thus allowing the ac ministration 
greater flexibility in its use of fiscil resources. 
Another factor contributing to the fiscal 
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adjustment was the strong upturn in real tax 
revenues made possible both by the 
regularization of social security contributions, 
which had been disputed in the courts, and by the 
application of a provisional tax on financial 
transactions. The smaller real decrease seen in 
tax receipts when inflation dropped off sharply 
(known as the Tanzi effect) during the second 
half of the year exerted a similar influence. 
Furthermore, a law was passed under which the 
debts owed by states and municipalities to the 
federal government were rescheduled over a 
20-year term; this law also stipulated that at least 
11% of these administrative units' net receipts 
must be used to service those debts. 
As part of the third stage of the plan, in 
mid-1994 the Government took further steps to 
balance the public sector's accounts and thus 
head off the plan's demise. No new external 
borrowing was allowed and requests for 
increases in budget appropriations were denied. 
An analysis of the year as a whole leads to the 
conclusion that the Government's fiscal policy 
worked well in terms of both income and 
expenditure. The one-year tax on financial 
movements brought in more than US$ 4 billion 
in additional receipts. As regards expenditures, 
the Social Emergency Fund made it possible to 
use receipts from social security contributions to 
pay for activities which had previously been 
financed from other sources. In addition, the 
1994 budget was not approved until October, 
which forced the federal government to hold 
down its current expenditures so as not to exceed 
its monthly allotments, which were calculated on 
the basis of the original budget proposal. 
These promising developments 
notwithstanding, spending by the National 
Treasury did expand owing to an increase in the 
wage bill (including social security benefits) 
from US$ 23 billion to US$ 29.3 billion and an 
upswing in other current disbursements 
(excluding interest payments) from US$ 11.3 
billion to US$ 13.1 billion. The central 
government's outlays on interest payments 
remained at around 1.4% of GDP, and its real 17% 
gain in income therefore allowed it to post a 
primary surplus equivalent to 2.7% of GDP and 
an operating surplus of 1.2%. The various states 
and municipalities, as well as State enterprises, 
did not do so well, since their operating deficits 
actually widened. 
The solid advances made in the area of 
public-sector accounts in 1994 and the tight 
money policies adopted by the Treasury during 
the second six months of the year combined to 
give the Government a fair amount of 
manoeuvering room, and it was Iherefore able to 
avoid the problems that would have arisen if it 
had been forced to delay making essential 
changes in the fiscal policy fnmework in the 
areas of tax reform and spending controls. In 
addition, a portion of the inconie derived from 
the monetization of the federal debt was 
transferred to states that were having difficulty 
placing their debt paper on this market; these 
instruments were replaced with federal 
government securities, with the Central Bank 
serving as the intermediary. Nïvertheless, the 
states' problems persisted, and late in the year the 
authorities had to intervene in the two largest 
state banks, the Banco do Estaco de São Paulo 
(BANESPA) and the Banco do Estado do Rio de 
Janeiro (BANERJ). 
b) Exchange policy 
In an environment marked by strong 
inflationary pressures, economic uncertainty and 
sizeable capital inflows, the Government held to 
its policy of maintaining a sliding parity during 
the first six months of 1994 in an effort to 
preserve the stability of the real exchange rate 
and thus stave off any serious inbalances in the 
current account. The Central I lank bought up 
large amounts of foreign exctange while the 
debate continued as to whether or not additional 
restrictions on inflows of exernal financial 
resources were needed in older to provide 
monetary policy-makers with greater 
manoeuvering room. 
When the new currency was introduced, the 
Central Bank announced that it would maintain 
international reserves at a level equivalent to the 
total value of reales in circulation; it also pledged 
to fully meet the demand for fon sign exchange at 
a one-to-one parity. 
However, no sooner had the new currency 
been adopted than exchange po: icy underwent a 
complete change in direction breaking with 
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previous plans and even with the guidelines 
formulated by the authorities themselves just 
days before. In a departure from its normal 
practices, the Central Bank withdrew from the 
foreign-exchange market as of 1 July, allowing 
the price of the dollar to be determined by supply 
and demand. Since there was a definite 
oversupply of dollars (both from exports and 
from capital inflows) which was driving up 
international reserves and the money supply, the 
currency appreciated significantly, with the 
exchange rate reaching 0.82 reales to the dollar 
in November. The real exchange rate, too, 
reflected a steep rise in the currency's value 
(28%) between June and December. In the last 
quarter, the Central Bank stepped back into the 
market, although on a smaller scale, to avert a 
major downturn in the nominal exchange rate. 
In an effort to deal with the country's growing 
merchandise trade deficit, in March 1995 the 
authorities instituted an explicit system of 
currency bands in order to strengthen the real 
exchange rate; this led to an immediate nominal 
devaluation on the order of 6%. An increasing 
level of uncertainty in the economy was 
evidenced by a severe erosion of international 
reserves. Urgent adjustments were made in the 
exchange-rate mechanism, but the system of 
currency bands remained in place. In June, the 
bands were shifted upward in a move which, 
unlike the measures adopted in March, were 
greeted with equanimity by economic agents. In 
the second quarter of 1995, international reserves 
began to rebound to the levels recorded prior to 
the outbreak of the Mexican crisis. 
c) Monetary policy 
The monetary policy applied during the first 
half of 1994 was a continuation of the policy 
pursued in the final months of 1993. Real interest 
rates had been raised in September 1993 in an 
attempt to sterilize the bulk of the monetary 
expansion generated by the Central Bank's 
large-scale purchases of foreign currency. 
With the introduction of the real, the Central 
Bank sought to anchor the currency by 
establishing quarterly caps on currency issues, 
although it reserved the right to raise that ceiling 
by up to 20%. Freed from the need to intervene 
in foreign-exchange operations, following its 
withdrawal from the currency mar cet, the Central 
Bank was able to boost the supply of liquidity in 
the economy by buying governnent securities 
from the private sector. The contractive role 
played by the National Treasury owing to the 
favourable outturn of its primary accounts, 
facilitated matters. In order to ward off an 
over-expansion of liquidity, on th<; very day that 
the new monetary regime entered into force the 
Central Bank raised the reserve requirement on 
any increase in demand deposits to 100% and the 
minimum reserve on time and savings deposits 
to 20%. 
The rapid expansion of credit w hich occurred 
early in the second half of 1994 prompted the 
authorities to tighten up controls on financial 
institutions. Accordingly, in September the 
Central Bank raised the reserve requirement on 
time and savings deposits from 20% on any 
increase in such deposits to 30% of their total 
amount. In October a reserve requii ement of 15% 
was applied to all bank loan operations in an 
effort to cut down on exporters' us e of overseas 
lines of credit to finance domestic transactions. 
In addition, restrictions were placed on the use of 
non-bank financial intermediation mechanisms. 
The behaviour of the monetary t ase was quite 
uneven in 1994. It shrank during tfce first half of 
the year, falling from the equivale: it of 0.8% of 
GDP in late 1993 to 0.5% the following June. In 
the second half of the year, howeve:-, it expanded 
so swiftly that by year's end it had risen to 2.5% 
of GDP. The main components of he monetary 
balance followed a similar trend, w ith a striking 
contrast being observed between lhe country's 
level of external assets in the firs and second 
halves of the year. 
Another factor that had a major influence on 
the behaviour of the monetary base was the 
assistance furnished to government banks. The 
first six months of 1994 saw no mon than a slight 
increase over the meager level recorded at the 
end of 1993, but this variable shot up during the 
second half of 1994 to more than 29! • of GDP. The 
accounts corresponding to ojien-market 
operations also underwent major changes: in the 
first half of 1994, they contracted, but in the 
second half, they expanded by the « quivalent of 
over 4% of GDP. 
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One of the objectives of monetary policy was 
to reduce interest rates on deposits, with the 
primary aim being to cut down on the fiscal cost 
of public-sector debt. Nominal monthly interest 
rates plunged in the second half of 1994, but 
subsequently remained at around 4%. 
Furthermore, fluctuations notwithstanding, real 
rates were consistently positive. In turn, the 
decision to authorize the use of government 
a) Economic activity 
With the introduction of the Real Plan, 
Brazil's economic reactivation gathered steam in 
1994; not only did growth speed up, but it was 
also more widespread. As a result, output 
regained the levels that Brazil had attained in the 
late 1980s. 
As early as 1993, expectations regarding 
economic growth had been changing in the light 
of the steps taken to open up the economy, the 
Government's privatization plans and the greater 
transparency of economic management. 
Nevertheless, it was the stabilization programme 
-even when still in its preparatory phase- which 
sustained the economy's buoyancy and set the 
stage for a second consecutive year of robust 
growth. 
GDP rose by 5.7% in 1994. Moreover, its 
growth rate clearly picked up speed as the year 
went by, since the rate accelerated from 3.5% in 
the first half of the year to 7.9% in the second. 
Per capita GDP, meanwhile, was up 3.9%. The 
upturn in GDP took in all sectors of economic 
activity. Agricultural and manufacturing output 
each expanded by around 8%, and services grew 
by just under 5%. At the subsector level, the 
communications industry boasted the largest 
increase (13%), while financial institutions were 
the only one to experience a decline (-2.8%). The 
investment rate -which had amounted to 13.7% 
and 14.5% in 1992 and 1993, respectively-
continued on its upward path, reaching the 
equivalent of 15.4%. 
Within the manufacturing sector, notable 
increases were recorded for mechanical 
engineering (21%), metallurgy (11%), electrical 
equipment (19%), and transport equipment 
securities to meet reserve requirements enlarged 
the market for those securities an d thus increased 
the Central Bank's ability to execute its policy of 
differentiated interest rates. As i result of these 
measures, the setting of targets for monetary 
aggregates became irrelevant aid State-owned 
banks ran into financial trouble owing to private 
agents' unwillingness to hold those banks' 
securities in their portfolios. 
(14%). On the other hand, non-durable and 
semi-durable consumer goods edged up by a 
scant 2%, with downswings being registered for 
tobacco (-15%) and pharmaceuticals (-3%). 
The utilization of installed capacity topped 
80% for the first time in the 1990s and was the 
main reason for the country's gains in 
production. The utilization rate approached peak 
levels for motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts and 
components, electronics, textile!!, beverages, oil 
refining, plastics, pulp and paper, and packaging 
in general. 
The level of activity in manufacturing was 
very uneven. The strong expansion observed in 
the first quarter of 1994 slackened in the second 
quarter as a result of the uncertainty engendered 
by the stabilization plan and the presidential 
elections. In July, once the Real Plan had been 
unveiled and the electoral situation had become 
more clearly defined, the economy became 
galvanized once again, as all sectors and regions 
of the country took part in a leactivation that 
carried it to its highest growth ra te for the year in 
December. This trend continuée in the first few 
months of 1995, but subsequently faltered once 
again. 
Domestic demand for consumer durables 
soared due, in particular, to the demand for 
household appliances (30%) and motor vehicles 
(15%). There was also a considerable surge 
(20%) in demand for capital goods as a 
consequence of investments in agriculture, 
transport and the capital goods industry itself, 
with particularly large increases being observed 
in the production of tractors (84%), harvesters 
(42%), and heavy trucks (36%). 
In agriculture -another mainstay of economic 
growth in 1994- there were notable increases in 
3. The main variables 
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the harvests of levant cotton (18%), sugar cane 
(19%), cassava (13%) and soybeans (10%). The 
excellent yields achieved by cotton growers 
made up for the 32% drop in the acreage planted 
with this crop in the State of Paraná, Brazil's 
main cotton-producing region. Larger soybean 
and kidney bean harvests were attributable to the 
fact that the amount of land planted with these 
crops was increased in response to the 
profitability of these products in the previous 
season. In the livestock sector, poultry-farming 
continued to supplant beef cattle at a rapid pace 
as a consequence of rising beef prices. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The 930% increase in the nationwide 
consumer price index in 1994, as compared to a 
2,500% rate in 1993, was concentrated in the first 
half of the year, when the cumulative rise totalled 
760%. The index rose by just 20% in the second 
half of the year. Excluding July, when the change 
in currency caused the index to skyrocket, the 
monthly rate of price increases was just over 2% 
for the year, and this trend continued in the first 
half of 1995. The trend in wholesale prices was 
similar, although foodstuffs climbed much more 
sharply (1,600%). 
For the first time since 1989, the forward 
momentum of the Brazilian economy led to an 
increase -albeit a small one (0.7%)- in 
formal-sector employment, primarily in services 
and commerce. Moreover, there was a break in 
the downward trend in formal employment in 
manufacturing as employment held steady at 
1993 levels. This was not true of construction, 
however, which witnessed a further decline in 
formal employment. Formal employment levels 
in large metropolitan areas were unchanged from 
the preceding year, which indicates that the slight 
expansion in this variable occurred outside those 
areas. More specifically, employment in the 
manufacturing sector of São Paulo continued to 
decline; set against a background of strong 
growth, this trend provided evidence of 
significant progress in the modernization of 
industrial facilities together with substantial 
productivity gains. 
The expansion of the informal component of 
the labour market intensified, as the growth rate 
of around 6% in less formal job categories 
-self-employed workers and wajje-earners not 
covered by welfare and labour legislation- was 
several times higher than the rate for formal job 
positions. The sectors reporting the most rapid 
growth in overall employment weie construction 
and commerce. 
Aided by the expansion in employment, 
average annual rates of open urban 
unemployment dropped from 5.4 % to 5.1% in 
1994. Late in the year, as economic activity 
mounted, an even further decline : n this rate (to 
3.4% in December) brought it down to levels 
similar to those of the early 1990s 
Overall, wages continued to exhibit an 
upward trend in 1994. The wages of industrial 
workers in São Paulo were up by about 10% in 
real terms, partly because several unions 
managed to win bigger raise: than those 
stipulated by law when the Real Plan was 
introduced. There were also signs tfiat the labour 
income of workers in less formal job categories 
were higher as well. Consequently, hidden 
underemployment in metropolitar areas eased 
slightly, from an annual average of 23.1% to 
22.7%. The wages of temporary agricultural 
workers also rose considerably during 1994. 
In contrast, the minimum wag; fell in real 
terms. The two increases decreed since the Real 
Plan's inception were not enough to offset the 
erosion in that wage which occurred in the early 
months of 1994. During the second half of the 
year, the real wage levels of work© s covered by 
welfare and labour laws, taken as a group, 
declined. 
c) The externa] sector 
In the first half of 1994, an agreement was 
finally reached with creditors regarding the 
rescheduling of Brazil's external lebt service, 
and the flow of external resourcss increased 
significantly, making it possible tc step up the 
effort (which had been ongoing since 1992) to 
replenish the country's international reserves. 
The second six months of the year ' vere notable 
for the swift rise in imports, while capital flows 
slowed. 
Merchandise exports swelled by ] 2% to a total 
of US$ 43.6 billion and showed a definite 
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tendency to speed up over the course of the year; 
compared to the same period of the year before, 
merchandise exports were up 6% in the first six 
months of 1994 and nearly 15% in the second six. 
A much sharper increase was seen in 
merchandise imports (29%), which moved up to 
almost US$ 33.2 billion; here, too, there was a 
definite acceleration in this growth trend, since 
the rate of increase was 17% in the first half of 
the year and 40% in the second. 
All the main export categories expanded in 
1994. Semi-manufactured goods achieved the 
highest growth rate (27%), with sales of US$ 6.9 
billion, followed by commodities (18%), with 
US$ 11.1 billion in sales. Exports of 
manufactured goods grew at a more moderate 
-yet steady- pace (6.4%) throughout the year. 
This category's performance was not as solid as 
it had been during the two preceding years, 
mainly because of the steep appreciation of the 
real in the second half of 1994 and the upsurge 
in domestic demand for exportable products. 
Nevertheless, external conditions conducive to 
manufactures were to be found in various 
markets. 
The satisfactory performance turned in by 
exports of commodities and semi-manufactures 
was mainly attributable to higher international 
commodity prices. Sales of coffee (both beans 
and instant coffee) doubled, reaching US$ 2.56 
billion, in large part due to an average increase 
of 130% in coffee prices on the international 
market. Total sales of soybean products (17.5 
million tons) amounted to US$ 4.1 billion. In 
addition to higher prices (increases of 8.5% for 
soybeans and of 31% for soybean oil in bulk), the 
total sales volume jumped by 22%, thanks to a 
bumper harvest of 25 million tons. The increase 
in exports of sugar in its various forms was 
predominately due to stronger international 
demand, since India had to purchase 700,000 
tons -a third of Brazil's total sales- to cover 
domestic production losses. The export prices of 
such mineral products as iron alloys and 
aluminium were up sharply (24% and 12%, 
respectively). Sales of orange juice and pulp and 
paper also received a boost from the international 
market. 
Rising international prices and Brazil's 
existing capacity to meet demand paved the way 
for a sizeable expansion of i:s sales to the 
European Union (19%), which increased its 
purchases to US$ 11.8 billion and thus 
consolidated its position as Brazil's leading 
export market. Exports to the Ur ited States rose 
by 12%, thereby nearing the USJ 9 billion mark. 
The countries belonging to ALADI continued to 
figure as Brazil's second largesl export market, 
since even though exports to these countries rose 
by just 8%, they nevertheless amounted to US$ 
9.5 billion. Sales to the Asian economies moved 
up to US$ 7.1 billion owing to lhe effect of the 
dollar's devaluation in those maikets, especially 
Japan's. The slow-down in the giowth of exports 
to members of ALADI reflected the fact that trade 
flows to these countries are predominantly made 
up of manufactures, whose export levels sagged 
in 1994. The drops in sales to Venezuela (-28%) 
and Chile (-10%) were particularly striking. 
Exports to the MERCOSUR countri es grew by 10% 
to about US$ 6 billion. Argentina continued to be 
the second-largest individual market for 
Brazilian products (US$ 4.1 billion). 
All sectors' import levels showed sizeable 
gains in 1994, with the exception of fuels, whose 
purchases expanded by only 6%, As early as the 
first half of 1994, the implementation of the 
stabilization plan and mounting domestic 
demand served to speed up the growth rate for 
imports, and this trend intensified sharply in the 
second half of the year. Imports of consumer 
goods climbed by 66% and imports of raw 
materials and capital goods rose by 34%. In 
another notable development, motor vehicle 
imports jumped 180% in the second half of 1994. 
Leading suppliers were the industrialized 
countries in general and the coun ries comprising 
MERCOSUR. Imports from the European Union 
grew by 47% while those from the United States 
rose by 30% and, as a result, the trade surplus 
with those countries shrank bj over US$ 1.7 
billion. Imports from MERCOSUI, countries were 
up 60% in the case of Uruguay, 38% in the case 
of Argentina and 29% in the case of Paraguay; 
consequently, Brazil's surplus with those 
countries narrowed by US$ 370 billion. 
The various tariff reductions and, more 
particularly, the significant ippreciation of 
Brazil's new currency set the staj;e for the import 
boom which occurred in the latter half of 1994. 
164 
BRAZIL 
Imports picked up from a monthly average of 
US$ 2.3 billion in the first half of the year, to US$ 
2.8 billion in September, US$ 3.2 billion in 
October and US$ 4.6 billion in December. Since 
monthly exports remained in the range of US$ 
3.7 billion in the second half of 1994, by 
November the country was posting its first 
monthly deficit in merchandise trade since 1987; 
in November this financial gap amounted to 
nearly US$ 500 million, but it then jumped to 
almost US$ 900 billion in December. Despite the 
adoption of restrictive measures, such as tariff 
hikes and the introduction of import quotas on 
motor vehicles, the merchandise trade balance 
continued to show a deficit during the first six 
months of 1995; the cumulative shortfall for this 
period totalled US$ 4.2 billion and stood in sharp 
contrast to the US$ 7 billion surplus generated 
over the same period in 1993. 
This turnaround in Brazil's trade position 
prompted a considerable increase in supply in 
important sectors of the economy. For example, 
between August and December the value of 
monthly imports of motor vehicles escalated 
from US$ 106 million to US$ 186 million and the 
average number of imported units leaped from 
11,700 per month in the third quarter of 1994 to 
almost 30,000 in the fourth quarter. Imported 
motor vehicles trebled their share of apparent 
consumption in this sector from 6.7% in the first 
quarter of 1994 to 22.3% in the fourth quarter. 
Trends in external supply were also noteworthy, 
with the value of imports of raw materials during 
the second half of the year standing 28% above 
the level recorded for the same period in 1993, 
while the corresponding increase for imports of 
capital goods totalled 56%. 
The upswing in foreign trade spurred the 
growth of related services. Net outlays for 
transportation and insurance climbed from 
US$ 1.8 billion in 1993 to US$ 2.2 billion in 
1994. The widening deficit on the services 
account was also attributable to international 
travel, which accounted for a net outflow of 
US$ 1.2 billion, or over 50% more than in 1993. 
On the factor services account, net "interest 
payments amounted to US$ 6.4 billion in 1994, 
the lowest figure recorded so far in the 1990s. 
The higher level of international reserves and the 
regularization of bilateral loan payments owed to 
Brazil opened the way for a : 13% jump in 
interest income, for a total sum of US$ 1.7 
billion. On the other side of the coin, a reduction 
in interest payments was made jiossible by the 
new debt agreement that enterec into effect in 
May 1994 and by a narrowing olthe spread on 
Brazilian corporate bonds. Foreign profit 
remittances totalled US$ 2.5 billicn as a result of 
both a strong showing by foreign 1 irms operating 
in Brazil and a drop in the effective exchange 
rate. Unrequited private transfei payments to 
Brazil increased to US$ 2.6 billion, which was 
US$ 900 million more than in 19S3. 
The net result of current transactions was a 
deficit of nearly US$ 1.5 billion, which, though 
less than 0.5% of GDP, was more than twice the 
size of the deficit recorded in 19S3. This figure 
was the outcome of a decline in thi; merchandise 
surplus and an expansion of trie deficit in 
non-factor services, although ths was partly 
offset by a reduction in the delicit in factor 
services and an upturn in unrequited private 
transfer payments. 
External capital flows went thro ugh two quite 
distinct stages in 1994. In the first six months of 
the year, prior to the implementation of the Real 
Plan, the capital account recorded î net inflow of 
US$ 7 billion -including US$ 5.7 billion worth 
of investments in the stock exchang ; and US$ 7.9 
billion worth of loans and bond!- and a net 
outflow of US$ 4.4 billion in short-term capital, 
with much of this sum corresponding to 
payments of arrears in debt servia from earlier 
years. With the advent of the Rial Plan, net 
capital inflows plunged to just US$. billion, with 
the stock exchange absorbing US$ 1.6 billion and 
loans and bonds dwindling to negligible levels. 
The greater buoyancy of foreign trade and 
improved price stability contributed to an 
expansion of credit from suppliers and 
multilateral organizations, and this lowered the 
deficit in the first half of 1994 from US$ 1.5 
billion to just US$ 270 million. The turnabout in 
the flow of speculative capital was largely 
attributable to uncertainty regarding the future 
course of exchange policy and the continuity of 
economic policy, together with an appreciable 
fall in the real exchange rate. 
The second quarter of 1994 saw the 
conclusion of an agreement coveting Brazil's 
165 
foreign debt with creditor banks and the Paris 
Club. A total of US$ 46.5 billion in debt was 
refinanced, including US$ 6.4 billion in arrears 
on bank debt. The discount obtained via the bond 
options that were made available amounted to 
US$ 3.9 billion. Under the agreement with the 
Paris Club, the refinancing of US$ 42.6 billion 
worth of debt was arranged. Brazil was obliged 
to use some US$ 3.1 billion of its own resources 
in order to put up the necessary guarantees. As 
of the end of 1994, Brazil's total external debt 
stood at around US$ 149.5 billion (US$ 119.5 
billion in medium- and long-lerm debt and 
US$ 30 billion in short-term obligations). The 
level of short-term debt had risen due, in large 
part, to an upsurge in the lines of credit taken out 
by commercial banks for the purpose of 
financing foreign trade operation:;, as the level of 
such credit trebled in the peri 3d 1992-1994, 
rising to US$ 28 billion. 
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1. General features of recent trends 
In 1994 economic activity continued on the 
upward path it has followed since the completion 
of the liberalization programme at the end of 
1991. Readily available external financing 
allowed private consumption to expand 
greatly, which, combined with the expansion 
of public spending and gross investment, gave 
a strong impetus to domestic demand. Thus, the 
growth rate accelerated to around 6%. The 19% 
inflation target could not be reached despite 
the virtual stabilization of the nominal 
exchange rate. Inflation remained at the same 
level as in 1993, i.e., around 23%, in what 
appears to have been a pause in the downward 
trend in the consumer price index (CPi) since 
1991. 
The balance-of-payments deficit on current 
account increased, reaching the equivalent of 5% 
of GDP, which was similar to the surplus 
registered in 1991. The Bank of the Republic 
continued to accumulate reserves in the context 
of a fluid supply of external resources. Despite 
the measures adopted to limit short-term capital 
flows, the real exchange rate dropped for the third 
year in succession. 
Public-sector management produced a 
surplus, thanks to a substantial rise in current and 
capital revenues, since total expenditure grew at 
a robust pace. The new administration which 
took office in August proposed social-welfare 
targets which imply greater State hvolvement in 
economic activity through allocation of public 
income and expenditure. These targets were 
formalized through the adoption of the National 
Development Plan 1994-1998. The Government 
also added an institutional weapon to its fight 
against inflation by concluding a partnership 
agreement with business and labour leaders in 
December. 
The measures intended to curb domestic 
demand triggered a substantial rise in interest 
rates, which continued well into 1995, 
endangering real economic peiformance as 
regards both investment financing and the 
profitability of the export sector. In particular, 
the measures designed to limit short-term 
external financing caused the composition of 
capital flows to shift in favour of long-term 
investment. For this reason, tie Mexican 
financial crisis of early 1995 had limited 
repercussions in Colombia. In the fi :st two weeks 
of 1995, the Bogotá Stock Exchange index rose 
13% in current pesos; the subsequent 20% drop 
between mid-January and mid-April was due 
largely to the prevalence of hi¡;h domestic 
interest rates. 
The policy of high interest rates seemed to be 
slowly cooling down domestic denand during 
the first half of 1995, by gradually slowing the 
growth of GDP and inflation. 
2. Economic policy 
In the context of buoyant domestic demand and 
abundant external financing, the quest for 
macroeconomic equilibria rested mainly on 
the monetary policy applied by the Bank of 
the Republic, although at the cost of a rise 
in domestic interest rates. The public sector 
despite a sharp increase in expenditure, 
cooperated in this policy by not se îking credit 
from the monetary authorities and by 
keeping a portion of the extern; I resources 
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a) Fiscal policy 
The year 1994 was in line with the 1990s trend 
towards the achievement of fiscal balances, 
despite the increased share of public-sector 
activity within GDP. The non-financial public 
sector's total income and expenditure, net of 
domestic transfers, equalled 33% and 30% of 
GDP, respectively, as compared with levels of 
around 24% in 1990 and 29% in 1993. This 
yielded a surplus of 2.6%, one third of which was 
generated by the central government. 
The substantial increase in expenditure was 
financed through a comparable growth of current 
income, equivalent to two percentage points of 
GDP. Capital inflows increased by a similar 
amount, exceeding 1,400 billion pesos, through 
income from privatizations (mainly the Bank of 
Colombia) and the granting of the concession for 
the cellular telephone system. The sum of these 
special revenues was nearly equal to the 
consolidated public-sector surplus. 
Without this income, the central 
government's accounts would have shown a 
deficit. Since the resources had been provided by 
foreign investors, the Government decided to 
keep them outside the country, together with 
some of the profits of the National Coffee Fund, 
so that the flow of foreign exchange would not 
lead to an expansion of domestic liquidity. 
Nevertheless, in order to meet its Treasury 
payments, the Government increased its 
borrowing, particularly in the domestic market. 
Abroad, the Government continued to service a 
portion of its debt through resources obtained 
from the sale of bonds on more favourable 
financial terms. 
The chief source of regular income, tax 
receipts, expanded by one third, somewhat more 
rapidly than nominal GDP, after the still larger 
increase seen in the preceding year, following the 
1992 tax reform. Two of the main sources of 
revenue, the income tax and the value-added tax 
(VAT), which were of comparable magnitude, 
maintained their relative share after the previous 
year's restructuring; together they accounted for 
over 80% of tax revenues. 
The surge in the national government's total 
income (50%) made it possible to sustain an 
increase in public spending of around 40%, in 
spite of the downturn noted in the second half of 
the year. The major items of expenditure grew at 
a rate similar to that of total expenditure, with the 
exception of interest on the foreign and domestic 
debt. The interest on the foreign debt continued 
to display a favourable trend, growing by only 
11%, which reflected the country's prepayment 
policy and improved debt profile, as well as the 
steady value of the dollar. The interest on the 
domestic debt, on the other hand, rose 
substantially (66%), owing to hgher interest 
rates. 
Transfer payments, mostly to decentralized 
national entities, continued to be the principal 
item of national government expenditure. The 
increase in the proportion of current revenues 
which they absorbed can be attribut ;d to progress 
in the decentralization process. Total transfer 
payments, which rose to nearly 8% of GDP, again 
constituted nearly half of total government 
expenditure. 
Despite the growth of transfer payments, 
regional and local government accounts were in 
deficit, as their expenditure rose fas ter than their 
income. In the remainder of the pub iic sector, the 
Metro de Medellín and the Sociedac Carbones de 
Colombia (CARBOCOL) also recorded deficits. 
The highest surpluses were seen in the 
electrical sector and the Empresa Colombiana de 
Petróleos (ECOPETROL), as well ÍS the social 
security fund and the National Coffee Fund. 
The improved showing of the public services was 
associated with the rise in service charges and the 
pressure of demand. The National Coffee Fund's 
surplus is attributable to the rise in international 
coffee prices. The social security reform 
instituted in 1993 was reflected in increased 
income and contributed to the surplus in the 
social security account. In 1994 nevf regulations 
came into force allowing workers under 40 to 
join private pension funds that compete with the 
State-owned Social Security Institui e. 
The budget estimates contained in the overall 
economic development plan foresee a 
comparable growth of public income and 
expenditure, which will reach 34% of GDP in 
1998. The central government accounts, 
however, show deficit projections for the next 
few years, which will be offset by a surplus in the 
rest of the public sector. 
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Table 1 
COLOMBIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994a 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 




Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
























































































































































104.7 101.9 102.7 100.0 
Growth rates 
96.7 95.0 97.6 
344 -205 -187 
1 324 562 1 195 1 813 










668 1 890 1225 207 
(on exports) 
f 
43.6 43.4 43.4 42.4 











































557 2 363 925 -2 081 -2 833 
2 731 1158 -1638 -1883 
9 072 9 209 9 901 11867 
6 341 8 051 11539 13 751 
-527 167 2 062 2 998 
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40.7 32.5 32.1 30.9 
12.4 9.8 7.1 8.4 
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Table 1 (conclusion) 
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Money and credit 
Banking system monetary 
balance 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) g 
Savings and time deposits 
in local currency 
M2 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 
On loans 
Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign currency 
1987 1988 1989 

























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c Measures the impact of the variation oi each aggregate 
on the growth of GDP. Derived by multiplying the annual rate of variation of an aggregate by the ratio of that aj gregate to GDP. 
Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the economically active population. Refers to net 
balance-of-pay ments interest on exports of goods and services. 
deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
g In the hands of the private sector. Interest rate on deposits 
Table 2 
COLOMBIA: MAIN QUARTERLY ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1992 1993 1994 a 







27.1 28.1 26.8 25.1 24.1 21.4 21.4 22.6 23.4 23.0 22.3 22.6 
90.4 88.0 91.5 89.9 86.6 85.9 85.0 90.6 78.1 75.4 73.8 74.0 




-10.8 -7.7 8.9 15.1 -9.5 3.0 7.9 9.4 -12.3 5.4 15.7 17.5 
-5.2 3.1 16.0 22.0 -2.8 11.4 17.4 18.7 -4.8 14.7 25.5 24.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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b) Monetary policy 
The programme developed by the monetary 
authorities at the beginning of 1994 was designed 
to curb inflation so as to avoid excessive hikes in 
interest rates and a further real appreciation of the 
peso. Accordingly, a target range was set for 
growth in the means of payment (Ml) of between 
20% and 28% over the previous year's levels, 
which was regarded as consistent with the goal 
of lowering inflation to 19% and ensuring 5% of 
GDP growth. 
In practice, monetary growth, which was 
faster during the first quarter, exceeded the top 
of the range during the first 11 months, but had 
diminished by the end of the year to the point 
where it met the target.1 The monetary base 
registered a similar expansion, lower than in the 
previous year. 
As in 1993, the redemption of maturing 
exchange certificates became the main factor in 
the expansion of the monetary base. The amount 
of these instruments, which had reached a 
maximum of 1,200 billion pesos in December 
1992, dropped from 340 billion pesos in 
December 1993 to slightly less than 60 billion 
pesos in December 1994. Adding to the 
expansionary effect of these debt repayments 
was the decrease in the amount of other securities 
issued by the Bank of the Republic in the context 
of its open market operations (from 1,700 billion 
pesos in January to 994 billion pesos in 
December). Only on certain occasions, such as 
in August, did these operations have a 
contractionary effect. 
The expansion of liquidity in the broad sense 
(M2) was greater than the growth in the means 
of payment. At the start of the year, the first 
aggregate continued to expand at the brisk pace 
of the previous year, driven by the influx of 
foreign capital. In the context of a buoyant 
demand for credit, this liquidity made it possible 
to maintain the growth of the financial system's 
loan portfolio seen within the 50% range since 
the end of the previous year. 
Since these trends were incompatible with the 
inflation target, the Board of Directors of the 
Bank of the Republic set a limit in March of 2.2% 
per month (30% per year) on the expansion of the 
The Ml target includes official deposits. Money in the 
172 
financial system's loan portfolio. At the same 
time, it established controls on short-term 
external borrowing. The first measure did not 
have the full effect intended, and in August the 
monetary authorities were forced to take action 
on interest rates, restricting the growth of 
liquidity through open market operations. 
Nominal interest rates on deposits, which in the 
early months of the year had remained at around 
25%, climbed to nearly 40% ir November and 
December, while interest rates on loans were 
10% higher. Real interest rates, which had been 
negative at the outset, rose acco rdingly, to reach 
averages of 20% and 27%, respectively, in 
November. The rate of growth of the loan 
portfolio of financial intermediaries slowed, 
ending the year at around 45%. Overall 
expansion of liquidity was 47% in 1994. 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
In January the Bank of the Republic decided 
to abolish the exchange certificates that had 
previously been used to delay lhe monetization 
of foreign exchange earnings. Instead, it 
established a currency band of 1 % on either side 
of a reference exchange rate, whose fluctuations 
formed a "crawling band". Tlie Bank of the 
Republic undertook to intervene in the market by 
buying and selling foreign cumncy in order to 
keep the exchange rate within tlie band. 
Despite the measures adopted in 1993 to stem 
short-term borrowing, the real af prédation of the 
peso persisted, given the huge influx of foreign 
capital. This trend was heightened by the 
expectations of a further appreci ation of the local 
currency and the widening gap b îtween domestic 
and foreign interest rates, attributable to current 
monetary policy. The dollar equivalent of the 
interest rates on deposits increased gradually to 
reach a last-quarter average of around 45%, 
based on the trend in the exchange rate during 
that period. 
The monetary authorities ihen decided to 
place tighter restrictions on capital inflows by 
raising the reserve requirements on foreign loans 
and increasing their time-limits I o five years. The 
Government also attempted to stem the illegal 
of the private sector was up 31%. 
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influx of foreign exchange from drug trafficking, 
in particular, by prohibiting the investment of 
foreign capital in real estate and real estate 
companies. 
Nevertheless, the supply of foreign currency 
from all sources showed great buoyancy during 
1994. In December, with market exchange rates 
a) Economic activity 
The accelerated GDP growth seen since 1991 
continued in 1994, with an increase of nearly 6%. 
This rate meant an increase in per capita GDP of 
around 4%, the highest since 1986. Domestic 
income rose approximately 8%, bolstered by the 
improvement in the terms of trade. 
As in the preceding two years, domestic 
demand, which expanded by almost 9%, 
stimulated the growth of GDP. External demand 
did not play a significant role, since the volume 
of exports increased by barely 1%. 
Demand was fuelled mainly by private 
consumption, which was up 6%. Increased 
capital formation in the public sector and among 
private investors was also a contributing factor. 
Public consumption, which increased by 17%, 
became a significant motor of the economy, 
although it accounted for a smaller share of total 
demand. 
Total investment was up 12%, after two years 
of brisk recovery, thereby accounting for more 
than 23% of GDP. Both the private sector and the 
public sector, but especially the former, 
contributed to the investment growth. 
Output lagged behind the growth of aggregate 
demand, so that demand had to be met partially 
through a substantial expansion in the volume of 
imports (16%). The excess of expenditure over 
income led to a resulting balance-of-payments 
deficit on current account. This was easily 
covered by external savings, which financed one 
fifth of domestic investment. 
Non-tradables, particularly construction and 
services, were again the sectors displaying the 
greatest buoyancy. The growth of construction 
(12%), which had been booming since 1992, was 
accompanied by a spectacular surge (of between 
50% and 56% annually for most of the year) in 
on the floor of the band, the central bank 
proceeded to lower it rather than be forced to 
purchase substantial amouns of foreign 
exchange. In short, the peso wis devalued by 
only 3% in 1994, which, in view of the 
differential in domestic and foreign inflation 
rates, meant a real appreciation o ' 18%. 
the investment portfolio of savings and loan 
associations -one of the highesi growth rates 
registered by all financial intermediaries. 
A similar trend, indicative oj the boom in 
retail commerce, was seen in the portfolio of 
commercial financing companies. However, 
vehicle sales returned to lower levels after the 
spectacular gains of the previous year. In 
contrast, sales of furniture aid household 
appliances continued to climb rapidly. Other 
services also posted favourable results, with total 
growth of nearly 9%. The largest increases were 
in financial and government services, with the 
latter accounting for nearly one tenth of GDP. 
Industry as a whole grew mois slowly than 
total output. Coffee-threshing contacted by 7%, 
while other manufacturing expandi ;d by less than 
5%. The results were highly dissimilar in various 
industrial branches, with few exceptions, the 
patterns seen in 1993 were repealed. The push 
from construction and services was transferred to 
the related industries; wooden funiture, plastic 
products, metallic products (especially those 
made of iron and steel), pottery i rticles, paper 
products and printing registered double-digit 
growth. The traditional industries, 1 owever, such 
as clothing, tobacco, rubber produc ts and leather 
goods, remained depressed. 
Agricultural output increased only slightly 
(2%) after the 1993 upturn. The coffee harvest 
continued to fall, this time by 11%. Growth 
faltered in both annual and permanent crops, as 
well as in the livestock sector. A¡ in previous 
years, poultry farming turned in the best 
performance. In the last quarter sf 1994, the 
Government adopted an agricultural 
modernization programme whose implications 
reach beyond the economic and sccial spheres, 
since Colombia's security and violence problems 
have a significant impact on rural areas. 
3. Trends in the main variables 
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Mining remained nearly stagnant, on the 
whole, as did oil drilling, since the increased 
production expected from the Cuisiana oilfields, 
which are expected to give a strong impetus to 
sectoral output, was delayed. Precious minerals 
suffered a sharp drop in production, while, coal 
and iron ore recovered somewhat from the 
previous year's decline. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The rise of nearly 23% in consumer prices was 
similar to the 1993 figure and higher than the 
official target (19%). The upward trend in 
inflation seen since the previous August, fuelled 
by the surge in demand, was halted only in June. 
Thus, in the second half of 1994, the consumer 
price index (CPi) stabilized, as a result of more 
restrictive monetary policies applied by the Bank 
of the Republic and the stability of the nominal 
exchange rate. 
Moreover, various groups of products showed 
more uniform trends in prices. In particular, the 
food price index, which had lagged considerably 
behind the inflation rate in 1993, shared in the 
overall rise in 1994, thus regaining some ground. 
The largest increases were seen in services 
(health and education) and housing. In the case 
of public services, prices and rates rose 27% on 
average. 
If services are excluded, the producer price 
index (PPT) posted a smaller increase, of less than 
21%. This result is in line with the clear trend 
towards uniformity among various groups of 
goods, since the PPI had risen only 13% in 1993. 
The largest increase in 1994 was influenced by 
the recovery of agricultural prices. 
While the course of the exchange rate helped 
to slow the CPi, the real appreciation of the peso 
precisely reflected the shift in the relative prices 
of tradable and non-tradable goods to the 
advantage of non-tradables. The producer prices 
of imported goods rose barely 10%, as compared 
with the 22% increase in the prices of domestic 
products. 
In order to limit the impact of the inertial 
aspects of inflation, which influence current 
expectations and indexation practices, the 
Government and labour and business sectors 
signed the Social Pact on Productivity, Prices and 
Wages in December. Its aim is to reduce inflation 
gradually, setting an 18% target for 1995. The 
Government committed itself to a fiscal policy 
which, in keeping with this goal, foresees a 
moderate fiscal surplus and the management of 
public-service rates. 
In view of the practice of pegging workers' 
wages to the previous year's inflation, the fact 
that inflation levels in 1994 were similar to those 
of 1993 meant that the average real wages of 
industrial workers were only marginally higher 
than in 1993, remaining at 4% nbove the 1990 
level. The real minimum wage, he wever, was 4% 
lower than at the beginning of the 1990s and 
almost 2% lower than in 1993. Employment did 
not vary significantly during the year, so that the 
unemployment rate was similar to what it had 
been the year before, i.e., around 9%. 
c) The external sector 
The gap between the growth rates of real 
domestic spending and outpu; widened the 
current-account deficit to more than US$ 2.8 
billion, or almost 5% of GDP. The current account 
has deteriorated steadily since 1991, when it 
showed a surplus in the same percentage after the 
initial deregulation measures. 
Although expenditure exceeded current 
income, the Bank of the Republic accumulated 
net reserves of more than US$ 13( l million during 
the year, so that by the end of 1994 net reserves 
totalled over US$ 8 billion. This was due to the 
inflow, for the second year running, of large 
amounts of foreign capital which, in net terms, 
exceeded the amount recorded in 1993 by over 
US$ 1 billion, and bordering on a record figure 
of US$ 3 billion. The build-up of foreign 
exchange could have been much greater, had it 
not been for the Government's decision to keep 
a significant percentage of its foreign-currency 
resources, stemming from privatizations, the 
granting of the cellular telephony concession and 
coffee exports, outside the country. If this capital 
outflow is excluded, the balance of payments 
actually shows a surplus of some JS$ 1.5 billion. 
The deterioration of the current account 
covered the trade balance for both goods and 
services. The trade deficit was up from more than 
US$ 1.6 billion in 1993 to nearly US$ 1.9 billion 
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in 1994. Exports of goods rose 15% and imports 
by 20%. The export performance was marked by 
the coffee boom, with producers benefiting from 
the rise in international prices, which bolstered 
revenues by nearly US$ 1 billion. In contrast, the 
value of oil exports contracted by 11%, owing to 
the drop in both physical volumes and prices. 
Pending the expansion of crude oil shipments 
from the Cuisiana oilfields, oil slipped below 
coffee as the leading Colombian export in 1994. 
Despite the real appreciation of the peso, 
non-traditional exports (i.e., excluding oil, 
coffee, coal and ferronickel), which accounted 
for more than half the total, were up 13%. Among 
industrial exports, beverages, certain chemical 
products, iron ore and steel, some non-metallic 
mineral products and clay, pottery and other 
china turned in a strong performance. Textile and 
clothing exports declined again, this time by 2%. 
The three major import categories contributed 
to the overall boom. Capital goods, driven by 
investment, showed an outstanding increase. The 
contribution made by this group of imports, 
which has risen in recent years, climbed to 
around 40%, placing it almost on a par with 
intermediate goods. Consumer goods accounted 
for the remainder of the increase in imports. 
The primary factor in the deterioration of the 
trade balance for services was the doubling of the 
amount of interest paid by the private sector, 
which demonstrated the rapidity with which 
private debt has increased recently. On the other 
hand, the substantial increase in dividends from 
Colombian investments abroad (which, while 
still relatively modest, grew from an average of 
US$ 20 million in 1988-1990 to US$ 66 million 
in 1993 and to US$ 180 million in 1994) testifies 
to the expansion of such investments in recent 
years. 
The expansion of net capital inflows by nearly 
US$ 1 billion occurred simultaneously with 
changes in their composition. While short-term 
capital flows had exceeded lonj;-term ones in 
1993, long-term capital took the lead in 1994, 
verging on US$ 3.8 billion net, as ;ompared with 
US$ 900 million in the previous 3 ear. 
Two main factors account for this change. 
First, foreign direct investment w«s up by almost 
US$ 1 billion, reaching nearly Uii$ 2 billion, or 
more than three percentage points of GDP. 
Colombia received abundant resources for the 
development of the Cuisiana oilfk Ids, as well as 
from privatizations and the grunting of the 
cellular telephony concession. 
Secondly, the steps taken by tli e Bank of the 
Republic since 1993 to limit short-term, 
speculative capital flows transformed private 
borrowing patterns. While short-term borrowing 
fell by half (from US$ 1.1 billion ii 11993 to US$ 
570 million in 1994), long-term borrowing 
tripled (from US$ 800 million to UÍ1$ 2.6 billion). 
At the same time, the public sector continued to 
reduce its foreign debt, this time jy more than 
US$ 800 million (mainly long-term debt). A 
large share of this decrease was linanced with 
resources from bond issues in the international 
markets, mainly in the United Statt s. The public 
sector was responsible for a net outflow of 
short-term capital amounting to more than US$ 
1.1 billion, by leaving resources obtained from 
the sale of enterprises outside the country, so as 
to contribute to the achievement of the monetary 
and foreign-exchange targets. 
The total private-sector debt, which had been 
less than US$ 5 billion in 1993, incnased to US$ 
8 billion, an amount equal to the tota 1 net reserves 
held by the Bank of the Republic. The 
public-sector debt contracted slightly, so that the 
country's total external debt rose for the second 
year running, from US$ 18.4 billón to nearly 
US$ 21.3 billion. Debt-service payments, 
including both amortizations and interest 
payments, also increased, to accourt for 43% of 




1. General features of recent trends 
In 1994 the Costa Rican economy expanded 
significantly, by over 4%, although more slowly 
than in the previous two years. Despite the 
growth of aggregate output and a decrease in the 
foreign trade deficit, signs of macroeconomic 
disequilibria were perceived during the year. 
These consisted mainly of a massive fiscal 
imbalance, the acceleration of domestic price 
increases to an annual 20%, and the persistence 
of a high deficit on the current account of the 
balance of payments. 
Economic performance was influenced 
by the electoral climate and the financial 
setback resulting from the failure of a large 
In 1993 fiscal policy generated a financial 
surplus in the consolidated public sector and the 
inflation rate was brought down to an annual 1%. 
However, these results were tenuous; the 
inflation drop, in particular, had been supported 
in part by maintaining the nominal exchange rate 
and postponing adjustments in public-service 
rates. In fact, the rate of variation in prices 
doubled in 1994, while government accounts 
posted a sharp imbalance. 
Fiscal policy was characterized by a rapid 
increase in public spending linked to special 
outlays during the electoral period and to 
the growing burden of the domestic debt 
that had been accumulating. The need to 
resort to local lending sources intensified, 
owing to the postponement of the third stage 
of the Structural Adjustment- Lending 
programme (SAL ill) agreed on with the World 
Bank, which meant that the external funds 
envisaged in the programme would not be 
forthcoming. 
State bank. In the external seel or, while the 
terms of trade improved, espec: ally because 
of the sharp rise in coffee prices, the country 
faced a less promising situation vith regard to 
financing. This caused a decrease in capital 
inflows, so that a significant portion of the 
current-account gap was covered at the cost 
of a drop in reserves. While lotal exports 
increased at a healthy pace, Cost i Rican trade 
developed in an environment of harsher 
competition; in looking towards t tie future, the 
challenge of finding ways to stimulate the 
economy's linkages with the glosai economy 
wasposed. 
The Government's high financing needs had 
a major influence on monetary management and 
the behaviour of credit markets. The money 
supply grew substantially; i particular 
contribution in that regard wis made by 
public-sector funding requirements and the 
injection of resources to bolster the i ;ommitments 
of the Banco Anglo-Costarricense, whose failure 
was precipitated by losses in foreign securities 
holdings. Given the stimuli which tended to 
expand the monetary mass, the authorities 
utilized bond issues to restrain the liquidity 
increase generated. Thus, a portion of the funds 
which would otherwise have been diverted to 
private financing were absorbed* and probably 
stimulated a rise in the interest rate, Meanwhile, 
the costs of domestic debt service became a 
major element of pressure on fiscal policy. 
Exchange-rate policy continued to evolve 
within a system of managed flexibility. The 
dollar price slippage was a little mc re rapid than 
in 1993, and it accelerated somtwhat in the 
2. Economic policy 
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second half, owing, in particular, to greater 
difficulties in obtaining external financing. The 
rise in the exchange rate during 1994 was far 
smaller than the increase in domestic prices; 
however, the average real effective exchange rate 
for 1994 was slightly higher than it had been in 
the previous year. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The central Government deficit grew to 7% of 
the gross domestic product (GDP), after having 
been under 2% the year before. The pronounced 
rise in the deficit was attributable to the increase 
of 54% in current expenditure (around 30% in 
real terms), while income rose by only 16%. 
Fiscal management in 1994 was 
expansionary, especially in the area of wages and 
purchases of goods and services. Moreover, the 
amount of transfers to the private sector 
increased sharply for such items as pensions, 
which rose by 47%, and tax-credit certificates 
(74%). In addition, interest expenditure 
increased by 60%, reflecting the higher financial 
burden created by the sale of securities to cover 
spending. In an exceptional case, transfers to the 
Banco Anglo-Costarricense also increased, 
representing over 9% of current government 
expenditure. However, even though such outlays 
were not registered, current expenditure appears 
to have increased by nearly 40%, in other words, 
much more than prices. 
The marked increase in the fiscal gap revealed 
the feeble effect of the recent legislative changes 
aimed at overcoming the rigidity of central 
Government expenditure, especially as regards 
pensions and tax-credit certificates. In the case of 
pensions, following the adoption of the new 
Pensions Act, amendments were introduced 
which maintained the special schemes for some 
groups of pensioners. As regards tax-credit 
certificates, extending the time span of benefits 
(while reducing the annual amounts) postponed 
the impact on the public exchequer. Domestic 
debt constituted another important source of 
pressure on spending; debt service climbed to 
17% of current outlays. The value of bonds in 
circulation, including those of the financial and 
non-financial public sector, increased by 50% 
from 1993 to 1994, coming to represent 27% of 
GDP. Two thirds of this mass of bonds emanated 
from the central Government and non-financial 
public institutions, while the remainder were 
issued by State commercial banks a id the Central 
Bank of Costa Rica. While extern U public debt 
service had traditionally involved complex 
negotiations with creditors, the gradual 
replacement of external debt by comestic debt 
proved financially onerous. 
Government investment increajed by nearly 
40% in 1994. Despite this strong upturn, the 
funds allocated to capital formation decreased as 
a share of total expenditure. Thî amount of 
investment by the consolidated public sector as a 
whole rose to 4.1% of GDP, a somewhat higher 
figure than in previous years. In general, the 
shortage of funding sources and the rigidity of 
current expenditure have affected t le volume of 
public investment, and this has limited the supply 
of infrastructural services. 
Central Government tax revenue as a share of 
GDP decreased by around 0.8% h 1994. Tax 
receipts were affected by the decrease in the sales 
tax from 11% to 10%, the lowering of import 
tariffs on raw materials and the slower growth of 
imports. In addition, the collection of a tax on 
coffee exports when the international price 
exceeded US$ 0.80 per pound was suspended by 
a judicial decision, and this deprived the 
Government of a major source of revenue. 
Moreover, income tax receipts, which had 
climbed steeply the year before owing to 
provisions which eliminated exemptions and 
expanded the tax base, increased more slowly. 
In contrast to the situation in previous years, 
public enterprises did not help to offset the 
financial imbalance in central Government 
accounts. The Costa Rican Electricity Institute 
required financing worth 11.66 bil ion colones 
(as compared with a surplus of 7.012 billion 
colones in 1993) as a result of the large 
investments it made in modernizing the 
telephone system (chiefly, the development of 
cellular telephony) and, to a lesser extent, in 
speeding up the construction of elec rical plants. 
The Institute's costs were financed, in part, 
through sales abroad of bonds worth US$ 50 
million. The deficit of the Costa Rica a Petroleum 
Refinery (3.7 billion colones, as against a surplus 
of nearly 7 billion colones in 1993) was due 
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Table 1 
COSTA RICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage (lower level) 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Prices (December to December) 
National consumer prices 
Wholesale prices 
Industrial producer prices 
External sector 
Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(Colones per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 





International reserves (variation) 
External debt 
Public debt 
(as percentage of GDP) 











































































































































































































































































Table 1 (conclusion) 
COSTA RICA 








Money and credit 
Banking system monetary 
balance 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
in national currency 
M2 
Dollar deposits 




Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign currency g 
1987 1988 1989 





























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c Measures the impact of the variation < if each aggregate 
on the variation of output. Derived by multiplying the annual rate of variation of an aggregate by the ratio of hat aggregate as 
a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the economically active population. e Percentages of the workinj :-age popul ation. 
In 1993 the wholesale price index was discontinued and replaced by an industrial producer price index. ; Interest rate on 
deposits deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 




II III IV 
1994" 
II III IV 
Consumer prices 
(12-month 
variation, %) 26.4 23.4 19.0 17.0 10.2 9.3 8.9 9.0 11.4 12.1 16.3 19.9 
Real exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 107.1 99.0 104.1 101.8 100.4 99.5 100.0 102.7 102.5 101.6 101.0 100.1 
Real interest rate 
(annualized, %) 
On deposits 
On loans c 
-11.0 -4.6 7.3 4.4 10.3 -0.7 12.9 6.8 3.0 0.6 -3.7 -7.1 
-0.2 7.2 18.0 14.2 21.2 11.0 25.7 19.5 15.6 13.6 9.5 5.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. b Deposits ( 180 days). c Short-term. 
mainly to its payment of overdue taxes to the 
Government (during the second half) and to slow 
price adjustments. Meanwhile, the Costa Rican 
Development Corporation contributed resources 
from the sale of the State enterprise Cementos del 
Pacífico. 
The new Government that took office in 
mid-1994 put forward various fiscal reforms. As 
regards expenditure, consideration was given to 
the restructuring of ministries, staff cuts and 
changes in the pension system. In the tax area, 
far-reaching measures were proposed to the 
legislature, including modernizing the 
management of the tax and tariff system and 
imposing harsher penalties for evasion. 
Furthermore, proposals were made for applying 
a tax of 1% on corporate assets, which could be 
credited to income tax, limiting interest 
deductions and updating presumptive income. 
The Government also planned to establish a 
unified corporate income tax rate of 30% and to 
create new brackets for wages and pensions with 
a maximum marginal rate of 30%; the tax 
package also included a rise in the sales tax from 
10% to 15%, a tax on motor vehicle ownership 
and the elimination of various taxes of lesser 
scope. Through these measures, the authorities 
sought to strengthen government revenue and 
facilitate the signing of agreements with 
multilateral lending institutions; however, the 
procedure for parliamentary approval of the tax 
reforms ran into difficulties. 
b) Monetary policy 
Monetary management was limited by the 
massive fiscal deficit, and by uncertain public 
expectations, which were expressed in a growing 
dollarization of financial investments and a 
shortening of the time span on deposits. 
The quantity of means of payment grew by 
27%, in other words, much more rapidly than in 
the previous year (8%). Primary money creation 
was attributable solely to the Central Bank's 
domestic credit operations, since the movement 
of net international reserves had a contractionary 
effect. The expansion of the monetary base, 
which had significant momentum despite the 
higher volume of regulatory securities, was 
fostered by the Central Bank's progress in 
meeting the liabilities oí the Banco 
Anglo-Costarricense. In addition, loans to the 
central Government grew sharply; this was 
partially offset by the sustained lowering of 
credit to other official institutions. 
The transactions of the banking system as a 
whole also showed a more rapid ii icrease in credit 
to the public sector, while the increase in loans 
to the private sector slowed markedly; these, at 
any rate, rose slightly less than prices. The 
behaviour of deposit demand was marked by a 
change in the composition of deposits. One 
notable phenomenon was the none inal drop of 5% 
in the mass of time deposits in local currency, 
while, at the same time, deposits in foreign 
currency grew by over 25%. The marked shift in 
public preferences towards foreign-exchange 
assets probably stemmed from :oncerns about 
the evolution of the exchange rate and 
uncertainty factors associated wii h the change of 
government and the failure of the Banco 
Anglo-Costarricense. Moreover, it is likely that 
there was a continuing redistribution of deposits 
from State banks, whose interest iates on deposits 
were lower than the system aveiages, to private 
banks. 
Bank interest rates did not change 
significantly during 1994; they remained at 
higher nominal levels than the previous year's 
average. Given the acceleration of prices, this 
meant that as an annual average, he State banks' 
real rates on deposits were negative, while the 
real rates on loans diminished as compared with 
the previous extremely high levels. In any case, 
the yields on deposits (and especially on loans) 
amply exceeded the monetary depreciation rate; 
thus, the holding of assets in local currency 
implied a demand for significant cover 
premiums. 
Towards the end of the yeai the authorities 
adopted a number of measures to control 
monetary expansion. Chief among them was the 
graduated rise in the legal reseive requirement 
from 1 November onward. The percentages 
fluctuated between 43% for more liquid deposits 
and a minimum of 10% for time deposits of over 
six months, for all banks with the exception of 
those which purchased monetary stabilization 
certificates. The higher reserve requirements had 
an impact on the spread between interest rates on 
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loans and deposits, which was already large 
owing to the magnitude of brokerage costs. 
The Government's objectives included 
improving banking services and reducing the 
Central Bank's losses. In keeping with such aims, 
proposals were submitted for modernizing and 
a) Economic activity 
The gross domestic product grew by over 4%, 
i.e., at a rate similar to the average for the past 
eight years, but lower than the one registered in 
the biennium 1992-1993. Apparently, the 
slowdown in the economy was more pronounced 
in the second half of 1994, given the policies 
aimed at controlling expenditure and the greater 
shortage of external resources. As regards 
aggregate demand, the most expansive 
component in 1994 turned out to be consumption, 
which grew by nearly 6%. Following two years 
of accelerated growth, fixed investment rose only 
moderately (4%); none the less, capital formation 
as a percentage of GDP remained at higher levels 
than in the recent past. Meanwhile, the increase 
in the volume of exports and imports of goods 
and services was much smaller than in the 
previous year; in 1994, foreign trade flows 
evolved at a pace comparable to that of aggregate 
activity. 
While the domestic saving ratio shrank, owing 
to the growth of consumption at a faster rate than 
GDP, the terms of trade improved and factor 
payments abroad diminished somewhat. 
Accordingly, the national saving rate was close 
to 15% of GDP, higher than in 1993, but still far 
from the magnitude of resources needed to 
finance investment. Thus, external saving 
climbed to over 9% of GDP, as compared with 
over 10% in 1993: in other words, it still 
represented around 40% of total saving. 
On the supply side for goods and services, the 
GDP increase was distributed among the main 
branches of activity. In general, moderate growth 
rates were seen in the various sectors, with the 
exception of basic services, which expanded by 
over 7%, well above the average. 
The agricultural sector maintained a growth 
rate of close to 3%, lower than aggregate GDP. 
expanding the services provided liy State banks. 
The authorities also proposed the strengthening 
of bank supervision, keeping in mind, in 
particular, the recent failure of the Banco 
Anglo-Costarricense. 
Among the factors which slowed the expansion 
of the sector were the shortage of credit, 
adjustment to the process of ojening up to 
foreign markets and the elimination of 
guaranteed prices, which were fre quently fixed 
above those on the international market. The 
National Production Council, which was in 
charge of marketing basic produci s, reduced its 
size and redefined its tasks; it suspended grain 
purchases and price stabilization Of «rations, thus 
mitigating the losses which such operations had 
caused to the Central Bank. 
In 1994 the production oí traditional 
agricultural export goods did not reflect the 
changes taking place in the international 
economic climate. Thus, the coffer, harvest was 
smaller; low external prices had discouraged 
coffee-growing until May, wher a recovery 
occurred. In addition, yields were affected by 
weather conditions. The price stampede in the 
second half -from July to September, prices 
exceeded US$ 2 per pound, as compared with 
US$ 0.50 per pound at the beginning of the 
period- was not immediately reflected in 
producers' incomes, since a large share of the 
harvest had been sold ahead of time it low prices. 
Meanwhile, the sown area for bananas expanded 
from 49,000 to 52,000 hectares, notwithstanding 
the obstacles created by the European Union's 
unilateral setting of quotas, which, rone the less, 
were insufficient to depress average annual 
prices. Output also increased, although more 
slowly than in previous years (3%, is compared 
with 10% in 1993 and 12% in 1992) The drop in 
sugar cane production was largely associated 
with uncertainty over the possibilities for 
entering the United States preferential market. 
Among agricultural products far domestic 
consumption, there was a notable recwery in rice 
and bean crops. In the case of rice production 
continued to be concentrated in holdings with 
3. Trends in the main variables 
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entrepreneurial management and in irrigated 
areas; in such areas, which continued to expand, 
it is possible to obtain three harvests a year, as 
compared with only one in areas with abundant 
rainfall. Bean production maintained its profit 
levels in relation to other grains; this product 
cannot easily be replaced with imports because 
of consumer preferences. On the other hand, the 
supply of soft maize, whose sown area was 
reduced from 23,600 hectares during the 
1992-1993 growing season to 17,500 hectares in 
1994-1995, deteriorated, as did that of sorghum. 
While cattle slaughtering increased 
substantially, this did not reflect a parallel growth 
of livestock-raising, since herds continued to 
decline, but rather the fact that a growing 
proportion of the slaughter represented animals 
imported from Nicaragua. Meanwhile, the 
outlook for milk production was favourable, as a 
high tariff had been established during the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks; milk and dairy 
products would thus be protected in the domestic 
market, while at the same time, favourable 
exporting opportunities existed. 
The market for non-traditional agricultural 
export goods has become more uncertain, and 
production of some items has slowed, while that 
of others, has continued to expand. In some cases, 
crops for domestic consumption, particularly 
maize, were displaced by other crops for export, 
such as cassava and other tubers. Certain 
products, such as melons, were affected by the 
preferences granted by the United States to 
purchases within the area covered by the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
However, foreign investors continued to 
undertake new types of agriculture (particularly 
banana companies, which sought alternative 
markets), thus increasing their presence in the 
production of non-traditional goods. 
Manufacturing registered an expansion of 
4%, attributable particularly to dynamic growth 
in the first half (6%), since there was a definite 
slowdown in the second half (3%). Despite trade 
liberalization and the gradual elimination of 
subsidies, industry has managed to retain its 
share of GDP, which was somewhat higher than 
in 1980. In 1992 and 1993 industry had been 
encouraged by an expansion of domestic and 
foreign demand (due, in part, to :he recovery of 
the Central American market) and better 
macroeconomic conditions, which reduced the 
uncertainty regarding investment and production 
decisions. These conditions chtnged in 1994, 
when it became more difficult to obtain local 
credit, and external financing contracted. 
Moreover, the decrease in the real exchange rate 
over the year affected the sectors dependent on 
international markets, while the reduction of raw 
materials tariffs from 10% to 5% during the 
period from January to April had the opposite 
effect. 
The manufacturing industry experimented 
with various changes driven, in p irticular, by the 
signing of new international trade agreements, 
some of which were already in force (the free 
trade agreement with Mexico), vhile others had 
yet to emerge (an agreement providing benefits 
parallel to those of NAFTA). For example, there 
were various operations which internationalized 
the capital of large enterprise!;; Costa Rican 
foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco firms were 
bought by Mexican firms, which, encouraged 
by the free trade agreement between Costa 
Rica and Mexico, envisaged a potential 
expansion of the export mar cet to include 
Central America. There was also an increase in 
associations of Costa Rican and foreign 
investors aimed at promoting joint ventures for 
the marketing of foreign brand: in the country 
and abroad. Funds were also invested in 
expanding production capacity for such items 
as confectionery, either in order to take 
advantage of greater access to the Mexican 
market (which, in turn, would îllocate a larger 
proportion of its supply to th< United States 
market through NAFTA), or in preparation for the 
potential signing of an agreement providing 
benefits parallel to those of NAFI A, which would 
open up the United States market. 
Sectoral performance in 1994 was very 
mixed. The chemical products and rubber 
industries, stimulated mainly by Central 
American demand, grew rapidly (21%). The 
publishing and printing industry also expanded 
appreciably (8%). The recovery of banana 
exports from the second quarter onward, and the 
increased output of other non-traditional 
agricultural products, such as pineapples, which 
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require cardboard packaging, partially explained 
this behaviour. The metallurgical industry, 
driven by external demand, maintained its 
dynamic growth, especially in electrical 
machinery. On the other hand, other activities, 
such as textiles, leather goods and footwear, were 
harmed by imports. Moreover, some 
maquiladora industries, especially 
confectionery, were transferred to other 
countries in the region in which wages were 
lower. However, others (for example, 
electronics) expanded their production capacity. 
In any case, in aggregate terms, maquila exports 
have remained virtually constant since 1992. 
The construction sector behaved as it had on 
other occasions when a change of command was 
imminent; in general, housing construction tends 
to be concentrated towards the end of presidential 
terms, and this reduces the funding available 
when a new Government takes office. Other 
factors were lesser fluidity of credit and a 
slowdown in economic activity in the second half 
of 1994. However, tourism and commerce helped 
to stabilize the demand for buildings; 
construction also received a higher percentage of 
total credit. The overall effect of these factors 
was an increase in sectoral GDP of slightly over 
4%. 
The output of basic services grew 
significantly. A factor contributing to the large 
increase in electricity generation was the start-up 
of Miravalles, the first geothermal plant, with a 
capacity of 55,000 MW. The outlook for 
increasing the energy supply expanded owing to 
the approval by the Legislative Assembly of 
loans from the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB) for execution of the third phase of the 
electrical development programme. In that 
phase, financial support would be provided for a 
177-MW hydroelectric project, expansion of the 
geothermal plant and a 20-MW wind energy 
project. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The inflation rate hovered at around 20%, 
amply exceeding the forecasts made at the start 
of the period. The same thing happened to the 
industrial producer price index. The rise in 
consumer prices intensified in the fourth quarter, 
when the average monthly rate of variation was 
nearly 2%. 
This evolution probably came : n response to 
a number of stimuli. The rapid increase in total 
spending in previous years may ha' re had belated 
effects, exerting pressure on the supply capacity, 
especially in sectors with fewer linkages to the 
international market. Moreover, the strong 
injection of means of payment during 1994 
meant that the availability of cash did not 
constitute a major restriction on price hikes; the 
increase in real wages also stimulated 
consumption. In addition, in the light of the 
change of government, the private s ector appears 
to have made adjustments in anticipation of any 
institution of controls. (However, the new 
authorities retained regulated prices for only 
eight products.) The increases in jublic-service 
rates, especially in the second hall, which were 
designed to compensate for substan tial backlogs, 
also played a role. 
Average real wages rose by slightly under 4%, 
as against 10% the year before, while minimum 
wages did not rise as much. While the new 
government had set itself the goal rf improving 
wages, it ran up against strong limitations owing 
to the massive fiscal deficit and higher inflation. 
In any case, the authorities decided to award 
persons earning the minimum wage an education 
grant equivalent to just under 2% of the wage. 
Moreover, in 1994, in contrast to the previous 
year, nominal wages in the public sector 
increased by a smaller percentage than in the 
private sector. 
While GDP growth was slover than in 
previous years, the unemployment iate remained 
only slightly above 4%. In fact, there were signs 
of a labour shortage for some agricultural 
activities, such as the harvesting of sugar cane 
and coffee, which led to the employment of 
foreign workers. 
c) The external sector 
The current-account deficit remained high 
(US$ 515 million), although somewhat lower 
than in the previous year, as it dropped from 7% 
to 6% of GDP. Despite the improvement in the 
terms of trade (4%) and higher export volumes, 
the main contribution to the current-account 
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imbalance stemmed once again from trade in 
goods, which posted a deficit of US$ 650 million. 
The surplus in real services increased slightly, 
mainly because of higher income from tourism. 
Net outlays for factor services remained at 
around US$ 200 million, a figure similar to that 
of the previous year. In 1994 there was a marked 
decline in capital inflows, which were under US$ 
300 million; that amount represented only 
slightly more than half the average for the past 
five years. As a result, the current-account 
imbalance was covered largely through a drop in 
reserves, amounting to US$ 220 million. 
The above-mentioned evolution in the capital 
account took place despite the fact that direct 
investment flows continued to increase (reaching 
US$ 300 million, equivalent to nearly 60% of the 
current-account deficit). The chief upset in 
financial movements took place in government 
operations, which posted a net deficit of US$ 250 
million, as compared with an income of US$ 75 
million the year before. This was partly due to 
the fact that in 1993 the public sector had 
incurred short-term debt in order to increase 
reserves, a debt which it had to repay in 1994. 
Despite the huge payments made by the 
Government, nearly US$ 90 million worth of 
arrears were accumulated on debts to the Paris 
Club. 
Real exports of goods and services increased 
by 11% in 1994. Sales abroad of coffee and 
tourism services received a large boost, growing 
by 49% and 18%, respectively, and coming to 
represent 30% of the total. The value of coffee 
exports rose because of the steep international 
price increase, despite the withholding of 20% of 
the export supply, agreed on by the Association 
of Coffee Producing Countries, which was 
associated with a drop of i% in shipped 
volume. Meanwhile, banana exports increased 
by around 3%, despite the difficulties of 
gaining access to the European market. Total 
non-traditional exports increased by 10%, 
driven by higher sales of niscellaneous 
articles, which grew by 18% tc exceed US$ 1 
billion; these offset the drops in the shrimp and 
fish and clothing categories In any case, 
non-traditional exports, which have expanded 
rapidly in recent years, laced greater 
competition from other countries in Central 
America and outside the subregion. Income from 
maquila exports remained practically unchanged 
from 1993; the investments mado in that activity 
reflected the impact of competition from 
economies with a cheaper laboi r force, as well 
as uncertainty over the efftcts of NAFTA. 
However, NAFTA'S implicit eroding of the 
preferences which Central American products 
had enjoyed in the United States market does not 
appear to have affected Costa Rican exports 
greatly in practice, except in the case of specific 
products, such as melons. During 1994 Costa 
Rica engaged in various trad; negotiations, 
including talks on the signing of a free trade 
agreement with Mexico. 
Imports of goods continued to grow, although 
less rapidly than in the prev ous biennium. 
Purchases in other countries slackened, in an 
environment of reduced increases in domestic 
spending and less fluid financing, 
notwithstanding the lowering of : mport tariffs on 
intermediate and capital gooes, which were 
brought into line with the Central American 
common external tariff. 
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1. General trends 
After experiencing a deep slump in production in 
the years since 1990, the Cuban economy 
managed to halt its slide in 1994, growing by a 
modest 0.7%. However, per capita GDP remained 
close to the lowest levels to have been recorded 
during the past 20 years. 
The improved economic performance seen in 
1994 was related to Cuba's increasing foreign 
investment inflows, which boosted activities 
such as tourism, mining and some manufacturing 
industries. Economic reforms also had an impact, 
as they provided new opportunities for the 
operation of market mechanisms and led to the 
decentralization of business management. This 
prompted both the Government and agents of 
production to seek out new modes of economic 
behaviour. Furthermore, there was an 
improvement in the terms of trade thanks, in 
particular, to the rise in international prices for 
traditional export products, such as sugar and 
nickel, and a drop in petroleum prices. 
After having risen to 34% of GDP in 1993, the 
fiscal deficit shrank by more than 70% in nominal 
The reforms initiated several years earlier 
continued apace in 1994. These measures have 
sought to diversify the country's forms of 
ownership and management and to give the 
market a greater role in the allocation of 
resources in an effort to make the economy 
function in a more viable manner within the 
overall framework of the existing model, which 
stresses distributive considerations. In 1994 
measures were adopted to encourage foreign 
investment and tourism; in addition, markets for 
the sale of agricultural products were set up and 
steps were taken to downsize the State. 
terms to 7.4% of GDP. This made it possible to 
adjust monetary policy, which in turn helped to 
restrain inflationary pressures and to spark an 
appreciation of the local currency in the informal 
foreign exchange market. 
Although the deficit on the current account of 
the balance of payments narrowed, it could not 
be financed entirely out of the capital account 
surplus, and the country therefore had to draw 
upon its international reserves lo cover the 
shortfall. In one noteworthy dsvelopment, 
tourism receipts amounted to more i han US$ 800 
million in 1994; this meant that the tourism sector 
edged out sugar as the leading source of hard 
currency, since earnings from sugar îxports came 
to just US$ 700 million. This trend was the result 
not only of a considerable expansion of tourism 
services, but also of the country's smaller 
1993-1994 sugar-cane harvest, whi:h was down 
to 4 million tons. This contraction hurt Cuba's 
chances of obtaining fresh external :redits, since 
the country's sugar output has tradi ionally been 
put up as a guarantee for such loan:, 
In the light of these developments, the accord 
reached by the National People's Assembly on 2 
May 1994 was of particular significance; this 
agreement laid the formal groundwork for a new 
line of economic policy that would place 
emphasis on efficiency and on a strict control of 
national budget performance at all levels. 
Specifically, the Assembly en rusted the 
Government with the tasks of: i) reducing 
subsidies for corporate losses (as veil as other 
budgeted expenses) while at the same time 
increasing revenue with a view to significantly 
cutting the deficit; ii) ensuring the stability of 
2. Economic policy 
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funds deposited in the People's Savings Bank; 
iii) assessing increases in the prices and rates 
charged for selected products and services; and 
iv) phasing in a new, comprehensive tax system 
which would take considerations of equity into 
account while also helping to put Cuba back on 
a sound financial footing. 
These economic liberalization initiatives 
made it permissible to conduct types of 
commercial transactions which had previously 
been considered illegal. This was an especially 
significant development in the case of foodstuffs, 
inasmuch as the greater mobility of output helped 
to alleviate supply problems towards the end of 
the year. Since 1993, the equivalent of 2.6 million 
hectares (most of the land held by the State) has 
been transferred to basic cooperative production 
units (UBPCs) for development. In October 1994, 
the transportation and sale of agricultural goods 
were deregulated. In addition, the involvement 
of private intermediaries in financial and 
commercial transactions was legally recognized. 
In a similar vein, special incentives, involving 
payments in kind and in hard currency, were 
offered to some 115,000 workers in high-priority 
sectors such as ports, fisheries, electric power 
generation, nickel production and the 
engineering, food, building materials and 
tobacco industries. In addition, the legal right to 
work on one's own account was extended to 
include 135 activities (mainly personal services) 
employing some 170,000 people, or about 5% of 
the economically active population. 
Nevertheless, these new economic units were not 
authorized to hire salaried employees, nor were 
they allowed to operate in the health or education 
sectors, with the free delivery of these services 
remaining an exclusive responsibility of the 
State. 
The steps taken to downsize the State included 
streamlining the central government's structure 
and conferring greater operational autonomy 
upon public-sector enterprises and local 
authorities. Meanwhile, fiscal policy focused on 
reducing the deficit in public finances. 
Specifically, a system of taxation (which had, for 
all intents and purposes, ceased to function in 
1967) was re-instituted in 1994; however, owing 
to the population's lack of experience with 
paying taxes, a transitional period of two years 
was envisaged before the system would become 
fully operational. June saw tie adoption of 
Decree-Law No. 150, which introduced tax 
evasion as a new offense in ttie Penal Code. 
During 1994, the Government also raised the 
prices and rates charged for a variety of goods 
and services in order to bodst government 
revenues, as well as implementing various 
cost-cutting measures. 
The operational crisis besetting the economy 
and the reforms that were implemented had a 
number of social repercussions. One of those 
consequences was sharper income differentials 
(which were heightened by inflationary 
pressures); another was that lhe traditionally 
ample supply of services in such areas as 
education, health, sports and culture was 
constricted by greater funding sonstraints. The 
tension arising out of the conflict between social 
objectives and the difficult search for ways to 
boost production and strike a macroeconomic 
balance once again attested to tte seriousness of 
Cuba's economic problems, whose causes were 
to be found in both internal and external factors. 
Among the latter, the embargo imposed by the 
United States continued to weigh very heavily 
upon the country. 
Efforts to improve relations between Cuba 
and the United States made seme headway in 
1994 thanks to the agreenents reached 
concerning migration and th<; United States 
Government's authorization fori he restoration of 
telephone links between the two countries. In 
addition, talks were held between Cuban 
authorities and United States fir lis which would 
be interested in investing in Cuba in the event 
that the ban on such operations were to be lifted. 
Normalization of relations with I he United States 
would also pave the way for Cuba to gain access 
to credit from multilateral lendiig agencies. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The aim of fiscal policy was to reduce the 
public sector's sizeable deficil, and the fiscal 
deficit did in fact drop considerably (to 7.4% of 
GDP), thanks to a 24% jump in i icome and a 9% 
decline in expenditure. 
One notable development in connection with 
government revenues was the hcrease in direct 
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taxes on the earnings of self-employed workers, 
farmhands and members of cooperatives; the 
wages of government employees continued to be 
tax exempt, although a proposal was put forward 
that would require all workers to pay social 
security contributions. Meanwhile, revenue from 
indirect taxes on goods and services rose by 
nearly 50%, largely as a result of increases in a 
number of prices and charges. In particular, price 
hikes on cigars, cigarettes and alcoholic 
beverages had a significant impact on 
government income. In contrast, the adjustments 
made in the prices of fuels, electricity, postal 
and telegraphic services, and workers' 
cafeterias had less of an effect. Regulations 
concerning taxes on overseas trade and non-tax 
levies had yet to be defined. Furthermore, the 
practice of subsidizing those products included 
in the family shopping basket was continued in 
view of the administrative difficulties entailed in 
the policy alternative, which would involve 
concentrating transfer payments in low-income 
sectors. 
On the expenditure front, a decrease was seen 
in outlays on personnel, goods and services, and 
transfer payments to public-sector enterprises. 
This trend thus attested to the financial impact of 
the steps taken to streamline the structure of the 
central government and to decentralize business 
operations. The administrative reorganization 
begun in April ushered in changes in the existing 
institutional framework, which had been geared 
to the demands of integration with the former 
bloc of centrally-planned economies. As a result 
of this governmental overhaul, 15 ministries 
and other bodies were eliminated and the civil 
service was reshaped in line with the reforms 
that were being undertaken; specifically, the 
formulation of macroeconomic policy was 
entrusted to the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Planning and the Ministry of Finance and 
Pricing, while the Ministry of Foreign 
Investment and Economic Cooperation was 
created to handle issues related to inflows of 
external capital. The downsizing of the civil 
service translated into an 11,500-job reduction in 
the government payroll and a gradual 
reclassification of employees. 
Public spending on health and education was 
cut back; specifically, this entailed the 
introduction of charges for a number of services 
-such as the meals served to students at 
elementary-level boarding schools, the teaching 
materials used in universities, anil supplies of a 
drug to combat the epidemic cf neuropathic 
diseases- which had previously seen provided 
free of charge. Similarly, it was decided that 
attendance at sporting and cultura I events would 
no longer be free. In addition, the subsidies 
provided to cover the losses ol' State-owned 
enterprises were reduced. The management of 
corporate finances was also nore strictly 
controlled, and a considerable reduction in the 
volume of business firms' accounts receivable 
was therefore seen during the year. 
The social security system conlinued to place 
a heavy burden on government coffers. This 
system's deficit was a reflection cf the shortfall 
it was experiencing in the face of the large 
numbers of people -more than 10% of the 
population- who were drawing retirement 
benefits or pensions and the mounting level of 
wage-based subsidies being paid to workers hurt 
by adjustment measures. 
b) Monetary policy 
Any analysis of the monetary situation in the 
Cuban economy should take inte account the 
special features of its system of business 
transactions. A number of different markets 
coexist, and they differ from one an ather in terms 
of the methods by which buyers ard sellers gain 
market access, their degree of formality, their 
price determination modalities, and the means of 
payment employed. A variety of economic 
circuits can thus be said to exist, each with its 
own method of operation. As of lale 1994, three 
different currencies were in circulation: the 
Cuban peso, the dollar and a convei tibie peso (to 
which, in a number of cases, rationing 
instruments should be added). Cubí n pesos were 
used in the government-regulated, formal 
market. In recently-opened markets, in which 
prices were freely determined, trans ictions could 
be conducted in all three currencies. This was 
also the case in informal markets. In the State-run 
dollar stores, purchases could be made (at 
controlled prices) either in dollars or in 
convertible pesos. As a general rule, 
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public-sector workers were paid in Cuban pesos, 
while workers in the tourism industry, foreign 
firms, or activities accorded a high priority 
received part of their pay in hard currency. 
Public-sector enterprises conducted transactions 
both in local and foreign currencies; the existence 
of two sets of accounts increased the complexity 
of management operations. 
The convertible peso, whose dollar parity was 
fixed, was introduced for use in State-run shops 
in December 1994 (after several postponements 
occasioned by the country's low level of 
international reserves). The expectation was that 
it would continue to be lawful to hold dollars (it 
being estimated that one fourth of the population 
already had access to dollars, albeit in small 
amounts), but that their circulation would not be 
allowed; authorized stores would therefore deal 
solely in convertible pesos. 
In any event, the monetary authorities sought 
to tighten the money supply in 1994. This led to 
an appreciation of the Cuban peso on the 
informal foreign-exchange market and to a 
slow-down in the inflation rate. The general 
public held a substantial portion of liquid 
assets in savings accounts in anticipation of a 
currency exchange, while interest rates on 
bank deposits did not fall into step with 
prevailing price trends. 
c) Foreign exchange and trade 
policies 
In view of the domestic economy's 
operational requirements and the country's 
changed international position, the official 
parity of the Cuban peso came under scrutiny 
in 1994. Nevertheless, no change was made 
in the exchange rate of one peso to the dollar, 
which had been in force for the past three 
decades. The price of the dollar on the informal 
market remained far higher than the official 
rate, but it did drop considerably (from 150 
to 50 Cuban pesos) over the course of the 
year. 
As part of the Government's policy of 
opening up the economy, foreign trade 
operations were decentralized, and a majority 
of them were therefore transferred to public-
sector enterprises. At the same time, the practice 
of selling some of the stock h public-sector 
enterprises to foreign investors proceeded, 
with the idea being to step up this process and 
to extend it to include all production sectors. 
As of late 1994,180 joint ventures involving 
external financial inputs totalling about US$ 1.5 
billion had been set up with firms from 38 
countries (primarily Spain, Canada, France, Italy 
and Mexico). These operations encompassed a 
total of 26 different activities, with a 
concentration in tourism and in hydrocarbons. 
Thus, a number of these ver tures were in 
operation in the tourism and hotel management 
industry, and agreements were concluded 
regarding the use of risk capital for the 
exploration of potential oil fields and mining 
deposits. Other such partnerships dealt with the 
production of textiles, leather goods, perfumes, 
toiletries, rum, fruit juices, beur and mineral 
water. The largest joint ventures entered into 
during the year were in telecommunications 
and in the mining of nickel. Another five were 
set up in the agricultural sector, particularly for 
citrus crops. In addition, the first such 
negotiations to be conducted in connection 
with the real estate industry were undertaken, 
and there was a possibility that these talks 
might be broadened to include other service 
activities. It was anticipated that foreign 
investment would play an increas ingly important 
role in the real estate sector in the areas of sales, 
rentals and time-share contracts. In the financial 
sector, five foreign banks were maintaining 
offices in Cuba. 
The authorities announced that a new foreign 
investment law would be enacted which would 
seek to encourage the inflow of capital by 
offering investors guarantees h keeping with 
international practices. In a similar vein, 
agreements for the reciproca! protection of 
investments were signed with, the Governments 
of Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Canada, the 
Russian Federation and Colomb a, and headway 
was being made towards the conclusion of 
similar agreements with Germany and 
Switzerland. In another development in 1994, 
Cuba joined the Association of Caribbean 
States, thereby entering into its attendant 
commitments regarding ntraregional 




a) Economic activity 
Total supply rose slightly as a result of an 
upsurge in both output and imports. On the 
demand front, the resurgence in private 
consumption contrasted with declines in public 
consumption and fixed capital formation. 
The slight increase in GDP was attributable to 
the expansion of manufacturing (8%), tourism 
(6%), electricity, gas and water services (4%) and 
mining (1%); in contrast, the sugar-cane harvest 
was down and agriculture as a whole turned in a 
poor performance. 
The agricultural sector suffered a decline for 
the second consecutive year owing to a drop in 
farming activity (both in sugar cane and in other 
crops) even though livestock and poultry 
production both showed some signs of recovery. 
A shortage of inputs, adverse weather conditions 
and insufficient motivation on the part of the 
labour force all had a negative effect in terms of 
the tasks of cropland preparation, planting, 
cultivation and harvesting. The incentives 
created by the deregulation of the agricultural 
sector did not begin to make their effects felt until 
late in the year. 
Activity in the sugar-cane industry continued 
to follow the downward trend of the early 1990s: 
output amounted to some 4 million tons, which 
was about half of what it had been five years 
earlier. Meanwhile, the difficulties facing other 
agricultural activities served to aggravate 
existing food shortages up until the final months 
of the year. In particular, tuber and vegetable 
production declined for the second year running, 
although rice and maize output increased. The 
tobacco and citrus-fruit harvests were larger, 
thanks to the foreign-currency self-financing 
arrangements that were in place. New systems for 
prefinancing the country's sugar output were also 
introduced in 1994. These mechanisms (which 
did not entail any privatization commitments) 
provided for the purchase of fertilizers, 
herbicides, spare parts and other inputs which 
were then paid for out of the earnings, from the 
harvest. The authorities were projecting a harvest 
of more than 5 million tons of raw sugar for the 
1995/1996 crop year. The introduction of new 
mechanisms to boost worker productivity was 
n variables 
being planned, as was the use of ioreign capital 
to expand the sugar industry's refiling capacity. 
In contrast, livestock production rebounded, 
thanks to an expansion of the cattli; herd -which 
grew to 4.6 million head- and an in< Teased output 
of milk, eggs, poultry and pork. 
The divestiture of most State-owned land 
through the creation of basic cooperative 
production units (UBPCS), which had begun in 
1993, was completed in 1994. This, by the end 
of the year, only 25% of the arable area in Cuba 
remained in government hands. In October, 
agricultural produce markets entered into 
operation (in each of the country's nunicipalities 
and in 29 locations in Havana) in which prices 
were freely determined by supply and demand. 
Farmers in the private sector were luthorized to 
sell their produce in these markets; the produce 
from State-owned productior units and 
cooperatives could also be sold in these markets, 
once their obligations in respect OK sales to the 
Government had been fulfilled. It was decided 
that farmers could either sell their produce 
directly in these markets or through ¡ i commercial 
agent -an arrangement that implied i recognition 
of the role of market intermediaries. Mounting 
volumes of an entire range of farm p roducts were 
being sold on these markets, but the sale of 
potatoes and of cattle products (such as meat, 
milk and cheese) was still not permi ted. Sales of 
these items were taxed at a rate \rtiich varied 
according to the locality concerned. 
The trends observed during the closing 
months of 1994 indicated that the private sector 
accounted for around 75% of these sales, in spite 
of the fact that it held just a fraction jf the arable 
land. State production surpluses accounted for 
another 15% of these sales, with the cooperative 
sector providing the remaining 109 o (4% from 
the UBPCS and 6% from the Agricultural 
Production Cooperatives). The abovî breakdown 
of the flow of products being channeled to these 
• new markets was a reflection of the 
Government's firm commitment to providing a 
subsidized supply of such itens for the 
State-controlled sector, as well as tf the effort 
being made to promote a variety ol exportable 
crops (e.g., citrus fruits) to which a considerable 
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percentage of the country's arable land has been 
devoted. 
Bringing about a recovery in agricultural 
production, including that of State-owned farms 
and cooperatives, was one of the country's 
political priorities. In the past, the agricultural 
sector had based its operations on input-intensive 
techniques involving the use of fertilizers and the 
mechanization and electrification of production 
processes. In recent years, however, the sector 
had been suffering from an acute shortage of 
fuels, fertilizers, herbicides, spare parts and other 
inputs which severely hampered production. 
These and other problems resulted in a situation 
in which, as one example, most of the more than 
1,500 UBPCS devoted to sugar-cane production 
proved to be unprofitable in 1994. 
As a result of the slump in agricultural 
production, food imports amounted to 
approximately 20% of the total. The high level 
of rice imports -a staple in the population's diet-
was particularly noteworthy. In spite of the fact 
that Cuba has suitable land and infrastructure for 
rice production, the 1994 harvest was only half 
the size that it had been five years earlier. An 
increase in the country's production of vegetable 
fats -which were also being imported owing to 
an insufficient local supply- was also believed to 
be feasible. 
The mining sector expanded for the third year 
in a row, boosted by larger foreign investment 
flows; oil production showed growth (up 18%, to 
1.3 million tons), as did the output of natural gas, 
copper and zeolite. By the end of 1994, risk 
contracts had been signed with overseas 
companies for the exploration, drilling and 
extraction of oil in 19 tracts representing more 
than half of the country's potentially productive 
areas; hydrocarbon output for 1995 was 
projected at 1.5 million tons, or three times as 
much as in the late 1980s. Despite the potential 
for nickel and cobalt ore production, output 
declined yet again, on this occasion by 10%. 
Contracts were signed with two companies, one 
Canadian and one Australian, in 1994 with a 
view to regaining former production levels of this 
ore. 
There was an upturn in manufacturing, 
although the sector continued to be hampered by 
shortages of fuel, raw materials, spare parts and 
other imported inputs. Nevertheless, with no 
more than a few exceptions, output did increase 
in the various branches of industry, and 
especially in fuel, non-electrical machinery, 
construction materials, textiles, beverages and 
tobacco. In contrast, there was a drop in sugar 
production. 
Construction witnessed a slight downturn, 
despite building activity in the tourism, 
agricultural and other foreign investment-related 
industries. Residential building rose by 13%; a 
particularly sharp increase in the construction of 
homes for agricultural and sugar-industry 
workers reflected the effort being made to 
maintain the labour supply in th< se two sectors. 
Following the steep downhll slide of the 
energy sector seen during he preceding 
four-year period, in 1994 the sector experienced 
an upturn thanks to a greater supply of 
hydrocarbons, which made it possible to increase 
its generation of electricity. ! however, as a 
consequence of the deterioration of the country's 
thermal power plants due 1o insufficient 
maintenance and repairs, power failures 
continued to occur, although they lasted for 
shorter periods than they had until recently. In 
1994 new types of incentives were also 
introduced for workers in the electricity sector, 
and this contributed to an impiovement in the 
operation of generating plants and of 
transmission and distribution networks. 
The growth of the tourism sector was a key 
feature of the Cuban economy in 1994. The main 
tourist centres are the city of Havana and the 
beach resort of Varadero, but investments were 
also channelled into developing Í acuities in other 
areas, especially the islets along the northern 
coast. There were also plans to promote 
eco-tourism and water sports, but constraints 
associated with the economic embargo halted the 
development of cruise ship activities. None the 
less, with the help of foreijm capital, the 
construction of the first docking facilities for 
cruise ships in the port of Havan; t did make some 
headway. Tourism was estimated to be the direct 
source of some 50,000 jobs and, indirectly, of 
another 200,000. Hotel capacity reached 24,000 
rooms, with a further 27,000 rooms being slated 
for construction by the end of th<; 1990s, with the 
assistance of foreign investment. Tourism was 
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instrumental in generating demand for a range of 
locally-produced products, although a 
considerable portion of the necessary inputs were 
purchased abroad. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Any analysis of price levels and movements 
is complicated by the existence of segmented 
markets and by Cuba's use of different units of 
accounts and means of payment. The country's 
market segmentation was associated with wide 
price spreads for identical products. For example, 
the price (in dollars) of petrol in the informal 
market was almost 45% below the price charged 
(in the same currency) by State-owned petrol 
stations, which in turn were selling rationed fuel 
at a significantly lower price (expressed in Cuban 
pesos). Other notable examples were rice and 
beans, which fetched much higher prices (around 
30 times as much) in the free market than in the 
regulated market, where they were sold at 
subsidized price levels. 
In 1994, a considerable increase in consumer 
prices was recorded in the formal sector, which 
primarily deals in the local currency. Thus, the 
consumer price index registered a 28% increase 
for merchandise and a 50% jump in public food 
prices. Particularly steep increases were seen in 
such products as cigarettes, twists of tobacco, 
beer, rum, aguardiente and fuel for private motor 
vehicles. In September, residential electricity 
rates were increased for monthly consumption 
levels over 100 kilowatts (this was estimated to 
apply to around one half of all households). Price 
hikes were also instituted for transport by rail, air 
and sea, as well as for long-distance bus trips. The 
charges for water and sewerage services rose, as 
did both domestic and international telegraphic 
and postal rates. Retail prices for workers' 
cafeterias also climbed. However, a reform of the 
retail price system, which would have entailed 
reductions in the subsidies for products included 
in the population's basic shopping basket, was 
postponed. 
In the informal sector, which accounted for a 
significant portion of retail trade, prices fell due 
to the lower level of liquidity and the 
deregulation of agricultural markets. In dollar 
stores, prices dropped slightly after having risen 
sharply in 1993. Sales by these stores may well 
decline if restrictions imposed by the United 
States Government on transfer payments by that 
country's residents to Cuba prove to be effective. 
Despite the increase in the cost of living 
caused by newly-implemented fiscal measures, 
the increase in official prices and the elimination 
of many free services, public-sector wage rates 
were not raised. In activities class fied as being 
of a high priority, incentives involving payments 
in kind and in United States dollars were 
introduced in an effort to raise the productivity 
of labour. On the government wige scale, the 
average wage (excluding these incentives) was 
about 190 pesos, while the minimum and 
maximum wage rates were 100 aid 450 pesos, 
respectively. 
Staff strength in semi-publk enterprises 
remained unaltered owing to a concern about 
employment levels, despite an aw£reness of the 
fact that these firms' manning tables exceeded 
their technical requirements. A benefits scheme 
for unemployed workers was in effect under 
which they were guaranteed a payment 
equivalent to 100% of their wage for the first 
month and subsequent payments equivalent to 
60% of their regular wage for a period whose 
duration depended on the numbei of years of 
service. (For example, a worker wilh 20 or more 
years of service to his or her credit v 'ould receive 
payments for a period of 18 montlis.) Workers 
would, however, lose their entitlenents if they 
rejected a specified number of suitable job offers. 
The increase in opportunities for private 
enterprise created new jobs (which in some cases 
afforded higher pay levels than ihose of the 
public sector), but not enough to provide work 
for the entire labour force, especially the young 
working-age population. In orcer to avert 
transportation problems, retraining programmes 
have been implemented which make it possible 
for people to obtain employment in 
establishments close to their homes, 
c) The external sector 
The balance-of-payments current account 
deficit narrowed in 1994 as a result (if a decrease 
in the merchandise trade deficit and a surplus on 
the balance of real services; in contrast, 
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unrequited private transfer payments were 
thought to have stagnated while, in spite of tax 
incentives for reinvestment, the repatriation of 
profits by foreign firms increased. For its part, 
the capital account posted a surplus thanks to the 
level of direct investments and unrequited 
official transfer payments. However, given the 
shortage of external loans, capital inflows were 
not large enough to cover the whole of the current 
account deficit, and the country therefore had to 
draw down its international reserves still further. 
The shortage of foreign exchange meant that 
the external debt could not be fully serviced; 
consequently, the level of debt, measured as a 
percentage of exports of goods and services, 
remained high. However, by making use of debt 
swaps, Cuba was able to make some headway in 
amortizing the nearly US$ 350 million of debt it 
owed to Mexico. Through such swaps, Mexico 
invested in the Cuban telecommunications firm 
and expanded its investments in tourism and in 
cement production activities. In another 
development, the Canadian Government 
resumed its flow of assistance to Cuba. 
Exports of goods rose by almost 16%. Sugar 
accounted for approximately 70% of all external 
sales in the first nine months of 1994, with 
minerals being the source of a little over 10% and 
fishery products, medicines and medical 
equipment, and tobacco and related products 
each making up about 5% of the total. The value 
of sugar exports rose owing to the increase in 
international prices, which mon than offset the 
drop in sales volume. Nickel also fetched higher 
prices, and its export volumes climbed as well. 
Exports of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology 
products continued to expand, reaching over 
US$ 100 million. Some of the riajor categories 
of merchandise imports, which declined by 4%, 
were fuel (40% of the total value of imports in 
the first nine months of the year; and food (20% 
of the total during the same period). 
In the country's services trade, the chief 
highlight was the increase in the number of 
tourists visiting the island. Tourist arrivals 
totalled approximately 620,000, jp 13% over the 
year before. This reflected the expansion of hotel 
facilities and service infrastructure and an 
improved international publicity campaign, in all 
of which external capital was heavily involved. 
In August, however, the flow of visitors began to 
taper off, and the Government's 1 JS$ 900 million 
target for gross tourism receipts could therefore 
not be achieved; instead, receipts amounted to 
just US$ 800 million, with n< t profits being 
estimated at 30% of that figure. Tourist arrivals' 
main countries of origin in 1994 vere as follows: 
Canada (17%), Italy (10%), Spain (10%), 
Argentina (8%), Mexico (8%), France (5%) and 
Great Britain (4%). 
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1. General features of recent trends 
The adjustment programme that had been 
implemented by the Chilean authorities since the 
previous year realized its chief objective during 
1994: to cut inflation while maintaining growth. 
The inflation rate fell below 9%, its lowest level 
in the past 30 years, and the gross domestic 
product (GDP) rose 4%, which brought the 
average annual growth rate for the past 11 years 
to around 6.5%. 
The attainment of the growth and inflation 
targets outlined at the start of 1994 was made 
easier by an unexpected improvement in external 
conditions, so that the balance of transactions on 
both the current account and the capital account 
was substantially strengthened. This situation 
was reflected in a moderate but persistent 
appreciation of the peso, which, in November, 
led to a 10% drop in the central value of the 
exchange rate band. 
With the favourable trend in the terms of 
trade, national income went up by 6.5%, which 
enabled the adjustment programme to reduce the 
The main feature of 1994 was the deepening of 
the adjustment effort, whose aims were to 
reinvigorate the battle against inflation and to 
curb the growth of spending, thereby bringing it 
in line with the development of productive 
capacity, as well as the initial forecasts of adverse 
trade balances. 
In the previous two years, pent-up demand 
had exerted pressure on the prices of 
non-tradable goods and on the current-account 
balance. It seemed essential to continue to reduce 
expenditure, in view of the single-digit inflation 
target and external climate which, at the 
beginning of the year, was less than auspicious. 
current-account deficit from the preceding year's 
level of around 5% of GDP to 2.2%. The 
merchandise trade balance showec a surplus of 
US$ 660 million. 
While consumption posted somewhat lower 
growth than output, domestic saving (in 1980 
dollars) accounted for one fifth of GDP, the 
highest ratio in the country's history. Meanwhile 
fixed-capital investment remained at the high 
1993 level of 22% of GDP. Despite tt\e slowdown 
in income, which is characteristic of an 
adjustment programme, the public sector again 
helped to generate savings, this time contributing 
an amount nearly equal to 5 percentage points of 
GDP (in current values). 
The sharp decline in domestic demand eroded 
the pace of job creation and raised the 
unemployment rate from 4.7% to 6%, which, 
nevertheless, was one of the lovest average 
annual rates in the past two decades. The increase 
in real wages (4.5%) was greater than that of 
average productivity (3.5%-4%). 
The estimates made for 1994 at t le end of the 
previous year had indicated a further drop in the 
price of copper (still the country's main export 
product), a trade deficit of nearly US$ 1 billion 
and a current-account deficit of aro and US$ 2.4 
billion, or 5% of GDP. Moreover, successive rises 
in United States interest rates made it necessary 
to adjust to a smaller flow of extern il resources. 
The authorities therefore pressed on with a 
policy aimed at curbing the growth c f output and 
expenditure, which in 1993 had gone up by 6% 
and 8%, respectively. Under this policy, 
adjustment was to be accompanied b y financing, 
which meant accepting a current-account deficit 
2. Economic policy 
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somewhat higher than the trend level (3%-4% of 
GDP). 
However, because of the improvement in the 
terms of trade and continuing high domestic 
interest rates, the current-account deficit did not, 
in practice, amount to even half the trend value. 
In a more favourable external climate than had 
been anticipated, the control of expenditure was 
reflected in a moderate downturn in domestic 
activity, whose impact on unemployment was 
greater than had been expected. The spending 
curb combined with a downward trend in the 
exchange rate to make it easier to attain the 
inflation target. 
The adjustment process, undertaken at a time 
of uncertainty in the international markets, 
strengthened the credibility of the economic 
authorities. Its effects were seen mainly in 
consumption. Long-term interest rates had, in 
fact, been lowered at the beginning of the year, 
strengthening the assumption that the adjustment 
period would be short. 
The unexpected boost from the international 
recovery increased export prices and volumes, 
prompting an upward revision of the growth 
forecasts and a downward revision of the trade 
and current-account deficit projections. The 
trends in the terms of trade and the volume of 
exports, which had helped to slow expenditure 
and output during the second half of 1993, began 
to act as a stimulus in the second quarter of 1994. 
Added to the improvement in the trade balance 
was the expansion of foreign investment, which, 
after accounting for 6% of GDP in the previous 
year, soared by over 70%. The abundance of 
foreign exchange led at the end of November to 
an adjustment in the foreign exchange policy, 
whereby the reference dollar was brought into 
line with the market value of the dollar through 
a drop of nearly 10% in the value of the "dólar 
acuerdo". 
At the end of 1994, in the light of the 
downward trend in inflation and the positive 
developments in both total expenditure and the 
external accounts, the authorities revised their 
growth forecasts upward for the following year. 
This outlook was maintained during the first half 
of 1995, notwithstanding the crisis which shook 
Mexico and affected the region's countries to 
varying degrees. 
In Chile's case, the Mexican crisis had a 
direct, if temporary, impact on th; interest rate, 
the exchange rate and stock prices. If 20 
December 1994 is used as a yardstick, the stock 
market index, expressed in dollars, had 
accumulated a loss of 15% by mid-March, but by 
the end of May it was already 20% above the 
reference level. The interest rate on long-term 
Central Bank debt rose slightly, bit by mid-year 
it was clear that this rate's level md trajectory 
were due primarily to domestic factors resulting 
from the rapid growth of domei tic spending. 
Meanwhile, although the exchange rate climbed 
during the first two months of 19! >5, it tumbled 
over the following months, owing to the 
abundant supply of foreign exchar ge. 
In short, the impact of the Mexican crisis on 
the Chilean economy was of limite* I duration and 
scope, being confined to the first quarter of 1995 
and to fluctuations in financial variables, without 
affecting real variables. During this period, 
economic activity expanded bj nearly 7%, 
expenditure by 10% and fixed capital formation 
by over 5%. Unemployment lias dropped 
gradually from a peak of 6.7% in Ssptember and 
October 1994 to 5.3% in the quaiter ending in 
April. In May, the 12-month inflation rate 
reached 7.4%, which was in line with the 8% 
annual target. 
Owing to the surge in exports, the trade 
balance posted a surplus of US$ 1.45 billion in 
mid-May 1995, more than quadruple the figure 
of one year earlier, notwithstanding a rise in 
imports of around 30%. Meanwhile, the balance 
of payments showed a cumulative surplus of 
US$ 490 million. 
a) Fiscal policy 
Public-sector fiscal management generated 
considerable savings during 1994 vhich made it 
possible to reduce both foreign and ( lomestic debt 
and to finance a further increase in investment. 
General-government saving was around 5% 
of GDP, with the cumulative resources of the 
Copper Stabilization Fund accounting for an 
additional two percentage points. The overall 
surplus (2% of GDP) was somewhat smaller than 
in 1993, owing to the sharp increase (11%) in 
public investment, mainly in infrastructure. 
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Table 1 
CHILE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 






Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 

































































Percentages of GDP 
16.9 17.6 19.7 19.8 
13.8 16.7 17.3 17.8 
3.1 0.9 2.4 2.0 
Percentages 
50.9 52.0 52.6 52.5 
9.4 8.1 6.2 6.0 
79.0 84.5 91.3 100.0 
Growth rates 
21.5 12.7 21.4 27.3 
17.1 3.3 22.8 25.7 
103.2 114.8 110.7 100.0 
220 245 267 305 
96.3 102.0 96.4 100.0 


























99.1 79.3 64.0 62.4 
23.6 19.5 16.1 14.5 

















































18.8 21.4 22.8 22.1 
18.1 19.1 17.8 20.1 
0.7 2.4 5.0 2.0 
52.3 52.8 54.5 54.7 
6.5 4.9 4.7 6.0 
109.3 114.3 120.0 124.4 
18.7 12.7 12.2 8.9 
16.5 8.9 6.7 7.8 
97.8 93.5 86.7 95.6 
349 363 404 420 
98.9 95.3 96.6 95.5 
-287 -1 100 -2 418 -1039 
1 514 726 -935 719 
11047 12 418 11834 14 389 
9 533 11692 12 769 13 670 
1 536 3 646 2 838 4 233 
1341 2 443 558 3 708 
52.3 47.1 46.2 47.2 
10.6 7.8 6.0 4.8 
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Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Money and credit 
Banking system monetary 
balance 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
in local currency 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 
On loans 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign currency 8 
1987 1988 1989 
































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c Measures the impact of the variation o f each aggregate 
on the growth of GDP. Derived by multiplying the annual rate of variation of an aggregate by the ratio of that aj ;gregate to GDP. 
Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the economically active population. Refers to net 
balance-of-payments interest on exports of goods and services. 8 Interest rate on deposits deflated by the variation in the 
exchange rate. Private sector. 
Table 2 
CHILE: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 1993 19)4a 




Real exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 










(Index: 1990=100) 115.2 116.5 121.4 123.5 124.3 125.9 128.2 128.0 129.3 131.8 .33.0 
18.0 14.5 15.1 12.7 12.7 13.0 12.3 12.2 13.7 12.7 10.5 
95.1 93.1 99.3 93.7 95.1 98.9 96.4 95.9 95.6 94.8 96.7 
6.4 3.5 -0.8 10.8 4.0 5.7 3.2 8.4 3.1 7.6 5.9 






56.9 46.0 35.4 29.9 6.9 17.2 14.7 22.2 13.9 15.7 19.9 22.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Private-sector money. 
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Thus, the authorities played a counter-cyclical 
role, given that the adjustment process had 
resulted in a weakening of private investment. 
The overall surplus was used to amortize around 
US$ 610 million in both foreign and domestic 
debt. 
Real tax receipts, excluding copper revenues, 
grew somewhat less than output (3%). This was 
due to the entry into force of cuts in personal 
income taxes and to the slower growth of 
domestic demand and imports. The fact that 
imports began to recover only in the second half 
of the year, combined with a falling dollar, led to 
a drop of nearly 7% in the yield from foreign 
trade levies. 
In accordance with the policy implemented in 
recent years, current expenditure grew less than 
output, and the total expenditure increase was not 
greater than the rise in potential income. Thus, 
current spending grew by slightly more than 3% 
in real terms and total spending by less than 5%. 
Wage trends were similar in the public and 
private sectors, with public-sector wages 
increasing by over 5%. 
Public enterprise subsidiaries of the State-
owned Production Development Corporation 
-13 health care companies, 3 electricity 
companies, 5 transport firms and 3 coal 
companies- generated net earnings worth more 
than US$ 100 million, which was double the 
previous year's figure. 
b) Monetary and exchange rate policies 
On the basis of the downward trend in 
inflation, the slowdown in expenditure and the 
favourable outlook for the external sector, the 
authorities declared in mid-November that the 
adjustment process was complete. They then 
proceeded to lower the short-term interest rate on 
Central Bank readjustable paper to 6.1%, after 
reducing it to 6.25% in mid-October, thereby 
ending a 22-month cycle during which the rate 
had remained unchanged at 6.5%. Furthermore, 
the limits and rules applied to the activities of 
institutional investors, private pension funds, life 
insurance and general insurance companies and 
foreign mutual funds were broadened and relaxed. 
The lowering of long-term interest rates at the 
beginning of 1994 helped to ensure that the 
adjustment programme did not affect the high 
investment ratio. The reduction in short-term 
domestic rates and the increase in foreign rates 
had narrowed the arbitrage margin, while at the 
same time, a 30% reserve requirement on 
short-term external loans had been maintained. 
By the end of the year, the margin for interest rate 
arbitrage had all but disappeared, in contrast to 
the situation with regard to exchange rates, as the 
expectations of an appreciating exchange rate 
increased. 
At the beginning of February 1994 the Central 
Bank suspended bidding on 4-ycar readjustable 
instruments, which resulted it a widespread 
lowering of interest rates on longer-term notes. 
After that date, the Bank stuck to 90-day and 8-, 
10-, 12-, 14- and 20-year instruments. 
In mid-April the Central Bank adopted a set 
of measures to ensure further liberalization of the 
foreign-exchange market and other measures 
intended to do the same for the capital account. 
The first group raised the percentage of export 
revenues exempt from the obligation to sell 
foreign exchange on the formal nr arket from 10% 
to 15%; extended the time-limi for such sales 
from 150 to 180 days; and incrensed the amount 
exempted from US$ 5 million to US$ 10 million. 
These measures were intended to facilitate cash 
management for exporters by ensuring greater 
sales flexibility and greater avails bility of foreign 
exchange. 
The measures to liberalize the capital account 
consisted of lifting some of ¡he restrictions 
applied to companies issuing American 
Depository Receipts (ADRS) and public offering 
bonds abroad and raising the upper limit on the 
foreign investments of private pension funds 
from 3% to 4% of their total resources. 
The continuing nominal appreciation of the 
peso dominated the monetary and foreign-
exchange situation during 1994. ¡ SX the beginning 
of the second half of the year, money creation 
through foreign-exchange opérations began to 
expand rapidly, exceeding thi; inflation and 
growth estimates. The annualize! growth rate of 
private money, which had been around 14% in 
May, rose to 21% in October. This was due not 
only to the drop in the estimated cost of holding 
money, in view of the lower inflationary 
expectations, but also, and especially, to the 
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foreign-exchange operations which the 
authorities were forced to carry out in order to 
maintain the flotation band. 
Between January and October 1994 the value 
of the dollar dropped 4%. During November, it 
remained on the floor of the band, a sign that the 
market was pushing for harder revaluation, on the 
basis of the strong showing by the trade balance 
and the capital account, which had generated a 
steady increase in the Central Bank's 
international reserves. Because of its massive 
purchases of dollars, the Bank had sustained 
copious losses, for, while the subsequent increase 
in its reserves had generated profits, it had also 
forced the Bank to carry out much more costly 
open-market operations in order to cushion the 
monetary impact. 
The gap between the market value of the 
dollar (the average bank value) and the "dólar 
acuerdo" had gradually increased from the 6% 
registered in 1993. The nominal value fell from 
430 pesos in January to 411 pesos at the end of 
November, while the value of the "dólar 
acuerdo" reached 462 pesos. By the end of 
November, the gap had grown to 10%, fuelling 
expectations of an appreciating exchange rate 
and sales of dollars to the Central Bank. Since the 
resulting monetary impact began to undermine 
the feasibility of the 1995 inflation target, the 
Bank modified its exchange rate policy at the end 
of November, lowering the flotation band by 
10% and changing its internal structure. 
From then on, the Central Bank established a 
new reference value for its basket of currencies, 
around which it allows fluctuation! of up to 10% 
on either side of the flotation bard. While this 
reference value came to rest on the floor of the 
previous band, that in itself did net constitute a 
revaluation, since it remained subject to market 
reaction. Strictly speaking, the value of the dollar 
could have dropped 10%, as the flo jr of the band 
had fallen by that amount, but the in itial drop was 
only 4%. 
In addition, the Central Bank reduced the 
relative weight of the dollar with in the basket 
of currencies from 50% to 45%, raised the 
yen's share from 20% to 25% and kept that of 
the deutsche mark at 30%. It also took steps to 
increase the net demand for foreign exchange, 
eventually requiring dollar-only cash reserves 
on foreign loans, a measure aime d at curbing 
speculative capital flows; abolished the 
upper limit on the bank's foreign exchange 
position, in an effort to diversify reserve 
holdings; raised the maximum amount of 
export earnings that are exempt from 
compulsory sale on the formal foreign 
exchange market; and extended the time-limit 
for foreign exchange operations from 210 to 
270 days. This set of measures, which 
expanded the opportunities for external saving, 
constituted an acknowledgement of the 
structural changes that had taken place in the 
country's external accounts. 
3. Trends in the main variables 
a) Economic activity 
The expansion of both private consumption 
(somewhat less than 4%) and exports (7%) 
contributed to the growth of economic activity. 
The effects of the adjustment were clearly visible 
in the slower growth (from 8% to under 3%) of 
domestic demand, which had been cooled down 
by the restrained increases in public spending 
(2%) and fixed investment (3.5%). 
Economic activity was boosted by the 
recovery of tradable goods, particularly those 
linked to fishing, forestry and agriculture. 
Mining and industry grew by 3%, or less than 
total output; in mining, this was due o the decline 
of some subsectors, such as oil and coal, and in 
industry, to the cooling down of domestic 
demand. The industrial products wliich compete 
with imports (textiles, clothing, leather goods 
and footwear) contracted by between 6% and 
10%, whereas industrial exports ma< le significant 
gains, notably fish meal (27%), tinned fruit, 
pulses and fresh produce (12%), methanol (8%) 
and cellulose and paper (6%). Construction was 
1 Between 1986 and 1994, the external debt/GDP ratio fell from 110% to 41%, and the net international reserv '.s/external debt 
ratio increased from 9% to 62%. 
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up only 2%, and that increase was due to public 
works-related projects, as private construction, 
both residential and non-residential, sagged as a 
result of the drop in domestic demand. From the 
third quarter onward, trade recovered, thanks to 
the upturn in consumer goods imports. 
The most dynamic sectors were fishing 
(19%), transport and communication (9%) and 
agriculture and forestry (7%). The fishing growth 
was due to the increase in the catch for the 
production of fish meal and fish oil and to the 
higher productivity of salmon and trout farms. 
The performance of agriculture and forestry 
continued to be linked to the buoyancy of the 
export sectors, especially fruit-growing and 
silviculture. In contrast, traditional agricultural 
production, linked to annual crops, dropped 
slightly. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
In 1994, for the first time in over three 
decades, the Chilean economy achieved a 
single-digit inflation rate (9%), thus reaching the 
target set by the authorities. One of the factors 
contributing to this achievement was de 
adjustment of domestic spending, aided by the 
policy of high interest rates which the Central 
Bank had applied since November 1992 and had 
begun to moderate only at the end of 1994. The 
intensity of the domestic spending effort is 
shown by the decrease in the annualized inflation 
rate for non-tradable goods and services from 
18% in January to 12% in September. Other key 
elements were the downward trend in the 
exchange rate and the moderate rise in tradable 
goods prices. 
Starting in August 1994, the annualized 
inflation rate, which had been stuck in the 
12%-13% range for 20 months, showed a marked 
downturn; from October onward, it was 
measured in single digits. The adjustment 
process was based on the slower growth of more 
labour-intensive non-tradables, which was 
reflected in a rise in unemployment, from levels 
of under 5% during the last quarter of 1993 to 
6.7% in the quarter ending in September 1994 
(with average annual rates of 4.6% and 5.9%), 
Chile is now the world's second-largest producer of salmon 
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and in a slower growth of employment 
opportunities. Job creation, which had grown at 
an annualized rate of 6% in the second half of 
1993, plunged to 3.5% in the firs t quarter of 1994 
and to 1% in the third quarter. The lower 
expectations of finding a jcb also cut the 
expansion of the labour force, which had been 
robust up to that point, to 3.4' í in the second 
quarter and only 0.7% in the thin 1 quarter (a 2.3% 
average annual rate). 
The costs of adjustment wore paid by the 
labour market in terms of numbers of jobs, not 
prices. The rise in the unemplcyment rate, at a 
time of slower growth in the labour supply, was 
accompanied by a significant gain in the 
purchasing power of wages. At the beginning of 
the second quarter, annualizes nominal wage 
increases were in the 17%-18% range, dropping 
to between 13% and 14% in the last quarter. The 
average purchasing power of wages rose 4.5% in 
1994, a somewhat higher increase than in the real 
minimum wage. 
c) The external sector 
The balance-of-payments deficit on current 
account exceeded US$ 1 billion and the 
capital-account surplus was more than US$ 4.2 
billion. With an errors and omissions deficit of 
US$ 570 million, the overall balance-of-
payments figure approached US $ 3.2 billion. 
The current-account deficit fell to 2.4% of 
GDP (5.6% in 1993), thanks to the considerable 
improvement in the trade balance, which amply 
offset the slight deterioration in f inancial services 
and transfer payments. 
In contrast to an initial prediction that the 
deficit would be virtually the same as in the 
preceding year (US$ 980 million), the 
merchandise trade balance closed with a surplus 
of US$ 660 million, since the growth in the value 
of exports (25%) was much higher than for 
imports (7%). 
A strong recovery in the terms of trade was 
seen in 1994. Copper prices posted an average 
rise of 21%, while the December price 
represented an increase of 79% over the 
last-quarter average for 1993 Copper prices 
and fish meal. 
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began to rise at the beginning of the year and 
gained unexpected strength during the second 
half of 1994. 
Similarly, international prices for fish meal 
began to rebound during the last six months of 
1994, while the average annual price of cellulose 
was up 47% over the previous year. Meanwhile, 
annual oil prices fell by 9%, generating 
favourable trade prices for oil- importing 
countries like Chile. 
Merchandise exports reached US$ 11.5 
billion, with an expansion of 25% in value and 
9% in volume. The most dynamic exports were 
industrial goods (26%), led by metal products, 
electronics and transport equipment (33%) and 
food products and beverages (20%). The volume 
of mining exports rose 10% (although copper 
exports were up only 6%), as did primary 
products, with forestry (12%) and fishery (37%) 
exports playing a leading role. 
Manufacturing exports grew by 15%, thereby 
accounting for over one sixth of total exports, 
with sales of more than US$ 2 billion. 
The value of copper exports jumped 31%, 
driven by the 21% rise in international prices. 
Exports of other traditional products also 
expanded by 27%, with increases of 18% in value 
and 8% in volume. Bleached cellulose and 
methanol showed particularly large increases. 
Overall foreign sales of fish meal, physical gold 
and doré, oxide and ferromolybdenum, fresh fruit 
and raw cellulose were up nearly 20%. 
The value of non-traditional exports grew 
19% as the net result of larger shipped volumes 
(20%) and a slight drop in prices (-1%). 
Outstanding results were seen for agricultural, 
seafood and farm food products, wine and 
tobacco, planed wood and, in the electronics and 
transport sectors, copper wire and transport 
equipment. 
The adjustment process intensified the 
slowdown in imports, whose growth rate in 
current dollars sank to 6% from 25% in 1992 and 
10% in 1993. During the second half, however, 
imports began to recover, growing by 12%. 
The increased buoyancy in the major export 
markets was reflected in exports to Latin 
America and Asia, which surged by around 30%. 
Exports to North America grew by 21%, and to 
the European Union, by nearly 12%. At the 
country level, exports to Russia increased by 
nearly 150%, although their initial level was 
fairly low, and exports to Thailand, by over 70%. 
The European recovery was seen in higher sales 
to Belgium (54%), Finland (46%) and Portugal 
(33%). 
In 1994, one third of Chilean exports went to 
Asian countries, and another one c uarter (26%) 
to the European Union. Latin America accounted 
for 21% and North America for thï other 18%. 
The major market for non-copper exports was 
Latin America (27%). For coppor, the main 
market was Asia (46%), followed by the 
European Union (32%). 
In recent years the balance-of-payments 
capital account has undergone significant 
changes. The average annual surplus increased 
from US$ 1.2 billion during 1987-1!>91 to almost 
US$ 3.6 billion during 1992-1994. Moreover, a 
steady decrease has been seen h short-term 
capital flows as a percentage of total capital 
income: 95% in 1989,67% in 1992,50% in 1993 
and 28% in 1994. The structure of capital flows 
is shifting from foreign debt to foreign 
investment and venture capital and from 
short-term to long-term debt and pul lie to private 
debt. Thus, the restrictions on capitiil flows have 
apparently been effective in reducing the 
vulnerability of the Chilean economy to potential 
external shocks, as was evident aftei the eruption 
of the Mexican crisis at the end of 1994. 
The capital account, excluding reserves, 
posted a surplus of more than USS 4.2 billion, 
equal to 9% of GDP, which made it possible to 
finance the current account and build up reserves 
totalling US$ 3.7 billion (8% of CDP). Capital 
inflows were concentrated in the last quarter, 
when they exceeded US$ 2.3 bilion, which 
increased the pressure on the excha lge rate. 
Foreign investment (capital plus loans) 
increased by 70%, thus approaching US$ 4.7 
billion, a new record figure equal tc» 9% of GDP. 
Some US$ 2.5 billion (up 48%) flowed in under 
the provisions of Decree-Law 600 (62% in 
capital investments and the remainder in 
associated loans) and slightly over US$ 1.7 
billion (up by almost 110%) througl ADR issues. 
Two thirds of the capital received under 
Decree-Law 600 went to mining, 14% to services 
and 13% to industry. 
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Net foreign investment, excluding associated 
loans, accounted for nearly 42% of capital 
flows. As in 1993, the main foreign 
investment modality continued to be portfolio 
investment, consisting almost entirely of net 
ADR revenue, which rose 65% to nearly 
US$ 1.4 billion. 
Secondary ADRS -stock purchases on the local 
exchange and their subsequent conversion into 
ADRs negotiable on the New York Stock 
Exchange- brought in around US$ 620 million, 
while another US$ 750 million was received 
from primary ADR issues, i.e., stocks issued 
directly by foreign companies. At the end of 
1994, ADR operations on the New York Stock 
Exchange totalled nearly US$ 3 billion, of 
which 30% was concentrated in a telephone 
company. 
Net reserves increased by slightly more than 
US$ 3.7 billion, which brought the net total to 
around US$ 13.5 billion, an amount somewhat 
higher than one third of GDP and equal to nearly 
15 months' worth of exports. 
Chilean foreign investment continued to rise 
(to almost US$ 760 million, which represents 
around 1.5% of GDP. At the end of 1994, there 
were projects under way worth almost US$ 8.1 
billion, to which domestic enterprises had 
directly contributed some US$ 3.25 billion. 
More than three quarters of this investment was 
in Argentina and Peru and 93% of the total was 
in Latin America. The target sectors include 
electricity, trade, banking and finance, private 
pension funds and insurance, printing and 
publishing, communication, services and 
information technology. 
On 31 December 1994, tie foreign debt 
totalled US$ 21.6 billion, which was 12% higher 
than the figure of one year earlier. This was due 
essentially to the 23% increase in private debt, 
which came to almost US$ 2.4 billion. 
In November Chile formalized its 
membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (APEC), wiile pursuing its 
negotiations to join the North American Free 




In 1994, the general course taken by Ecuador's 
economy was once again primarily determined 
by the economic programme which had been 
launched two years earlier in an effort to 
reduce inflation and introduce major reforms 
in the public, external and financial sectors. 
Whereas in 1993 -the first year of the plan's 
application- the contractive conditions 
characteristic of stabilization policies had 
predominated, in 1994 the economy's growth 
rate picked up to over 4% per annum, resulting 
in an increase in the country's per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP). The greater robustness 
of the economy stemmed from a rapid increase 
in domestic demand together with a substantial 
expansion of exports. Nevertheless, since 
imports were also up sharply, the current 
account deficit widened; this shortfall was 
more than covered, however, by Ecuador's 
abundant inflows of external resources 
(particularly long-term funds), which included 
a copious inflow of direct investments made 
under the new terms granted to investors in the 
petroleum industry, as well as in other areas of 
production. Attractive domestic interest rates 
and the relative stability of the sucre were also 
contributing factors in the country's short-term 
capital inflows. As a result, a marked increase 
(equivalent to about 2.5% of GDP) was seen in 
international reserves for the second year in a 
row. 
Despite the reduction in petroleum revenues, 
the fiscal adjustment process made headway, 
and this was reflected in a reduction of the 
non-financial public-sector deficit to just 0.2% 
of GDP and the posting of a surplus by the 
consolidated public sector amounting to 0.4% 
of GDP. Such factors as the relative stability of 
the exchange rate (which, in the presence of a 
trends 
policy effort to open up an economy to external 
trade, has a direct impact on the price of 
tradables), the existence of balanced fiscal 
accounts and an increased demand on the part 
of the public for real money bala ices all made 
it possible to cut the annual inflai ion rate from 
31% in 1993 to 25% in 1994, the lowest rate 
since 1985. 
In the light of this favouralle economic 
situation, the Government designed an economic 
programme for 1995 which would seek to boost 
growth, achieve a small suiplus in the 
non-financial public sector and significantly 
reduce the inflation rate. However, the armed 
conflict which broke out with Pera early in the 
year led to changes in a number of key variables 
(capital inflows, public spending and interest 
rates) and forced the authorities to r. ut aside those 
objectives and to turn their attention to achieving 
GDP growth of between 3% and 3.¡¡%, striking a 
fiscal balance, holding the increase in the 
consumer price index (CPi) to between 19% and 
21%, and carrying out a nominal devaluation of 
approximately 17% within a cirrency band 
having a spread of 100 sucres between its floor 
and ceiling rates. 
The available indicators for the first months 
of the year revealed that up until May the fiscal 
deficit widened as a direct consec uence of the 
cost of the border conflict, while inflation 
remained slightly below the level recorded the 
year before. Exports grew rapidly during the 
first four months of the year, large ly as a result 
of higher oil prices. However, imports climbed 
even more steeply due, in psrticular, to 
purchases undertaken in connection with the 
above-mentioned conflict, and the country's 
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Economic policy continued to be geared 
towards reducing inflation by means of strict 
fiscal discipline, a devaluation in line with the 
targeted level of price variations and a 
monetary policy which sought to curb the 
expansionary effect of foreign capital inflows. 
Against this backdrop, in May a stand-by 
agreement was signed with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in which targets were set 
for 1994 with respect to growth (+3%), the CPI 
(+20%), the consolidated public sector's 
deficit (0.5% of GDP) and an increase in 
international reserves (US$ 275 million). 
Thanks to this stand-by agreement and the 
renegotiation of the foreign debt with 
commercial banks, which resulted in an 
agreement in keeping with the Brady Plan, the 
country's international financial relations 
returned to normal. Trade policy continued to 
promote trade integration and to deepen the 
country's integration both at the regional level 
(through the adoption of the Andean Group's 
common external tariff and the conclusion of an 
agreement with Chile) and at the world level 
(progress in negotiations regarding the 
possibility of Ecuador joining the World Trade 
Organization). 
a) Fiscal policy 
The fall in the price of oil had a severe impact 
on government income. After Congress rejected 
a proposal by the executive branch to increase the 
value-added tax (VAT) from 10% to 18%, a 
decision was taken to raise fuel taxes drastically. 
This measure was applied to petrol early in 1994 
and to diesel fuel towards the end of the year. 
Consequently, the retail prices of these products 
matched their international price levels for the 
first time since Ecuador became an oil-exporting 
nation. Even so, the public sector's oil revenues 
still fell in real terms. 
In addition, as part of the effort to lessen the 
country's dependency on earnings from the 
petroleum industry, steps were taken to broaden 
the tax base and improve the tax collection 
system by conducting a national census of 
taxpayers, passing legislation to reform existing 
ic policy 
tax laws and modernizing the customs service. 
Although the country still had a ling way to go 
in its drive to put a stop to tax evasion, a slight 
real increase was recorded in i ion-petroleum 
revenues, particularly from import duties and the 
value-added tax. 
On the other hand, the surplus generated by 
State enterprises shrank in real teims, mainly as 
a result of the fact that some typ es of charges 
(e.g., communications and electricity rates) 
lagged behind prevailing price levels. Taken as a 
whole, then, the current income of the 
non-financial public sector declinei 1 in real terms. 
In order to meet the target of reducing the 
fiscal deficit to 0.5% of GDP, the public sector 
implemented a policy of strict fiscal discipline; 
this led to decreases in both current expenditure 
(down from 19.4% to 17.4% of GEP) and capital 
outlays (down from 7.6% to 7% of GDP). In 
contrast, debt servicing rose to the equivalent of 
nearly 5% of GDP in 1994. 
This policy of spending restraint was 
extremely successful in achieving its aim, so 
much so that the non-financial public-sector 
deficit narrowed by more than expected. Thus, if 
the Central Bank's surplus (which was mainly 
attributable to the low preferential exchange rate 
used by the Bank for making its payments to the 
State oil company, PETROECUADOR, for oil 
exports) is taken into account, then the 
consolidated fiscal balance showed a surplus of 
0.4% of GDP. 
b) Foreign exchange policy 
Since 1993, a floating exchange rate 
-combined with Central Bank inter mention in the 
foreign exchange market- has been used for all 
external transactions. Within this framework, the 
selling rate for Central Bank transactions is 
calculated on the basis of the interbs nk exchange 
rate. 
Up until November, the Central ] Jank held the 
buying rate at 250 sucres below thî selling rate 
for the acquisition of the foreign exchange 
generated by oil exports. The spread was then 
maintained at 180 sucres for severa months, but 
was lowered to 150 sucres early in 1995. 
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Table 1 
ECUADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 




Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) ' 
Nominal exchange rate 
(sucres per dollar)8 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 








(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 
(on exports) 





































































































































































































































































Table 1 (conclusion) 
ECUADOR 








Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of banking system 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
(in local currency) 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 
On loans 
Equivalent interest rate 






























































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact c f the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annuil growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. d Percentages of the working-age population. e Pi ¡rcentages of the 
economically active population. f Calculated on the basis of 1980 weightings. g Up to and includinj 1992, this entry 
refers to the exchange rate on the regulated market. From 1993 on, it refers to the exchange rate on the open mai Icet. Refers 
to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. ' Interest rate on deposits, 
deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
ECUADOR: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
I 
1992 
II III IV I 
1993 
II III IV I 
l<94a 
n III IV 
Gross domestic product 
(Index: 1990=100) 107.9 109.3 109.1 108.7 110.1 110.3 111.9 111.6 112.7 113.4 117.3 118.3 
Consumer prices 
(12-month 
46.7 50.4 61.1 60.2 56.1 52.2 35.5 31.0 31.6 26.5 26.2 25.4 variation) 
Real exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 




Money supply (Ml) 
(12-month 
variation) 
95.5 91.0 94.4 98.0 89.8 84.2 82.4 79.5 79.1 77.4 78.5 78.5 
-3.3 -10.7 -16.7 -0.8 -5.3 -6.9 15.0 1.3 -5.1 3.3 15.2 14.2 
-2.1 -7.2 -11.1 13.6 10.1 1.9 28.0 12.7 3.9 11.6 23.4 21.5 
40.1 34.1 29.3 44.5 48.7 46.8 51.2 49.4 52.0 44.1 62.3 35.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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Beginning in 1994, the exchange rate applied to 
the Central Bank's internal accounts (390 sucres 
to the dollar) was discontinued. 
In the course of the year, the sucre was 
devalued by 14% in nominal terms, which 
amounted to a real average annual rate of 
revaluation of approximately 7%. None the less, 
the real exchange rate remained stable during the 
second half of the year, which meant that the rate 
for the fourth quarter was only 1% lower than it 
had been at the end of the preceding year. This 
situation was the net result of the combination of 
a real revaluation with respect to the United 
States dollar and a real depreciation vis-à-vis the 
currencies of other trading partners, both in the 
region (Chile, Colombia) and in other areas of 
the world (Germany, Japan). 
c) Monetary policy 
Given this system of floating exchange rates, 
the heavy inflow of external resources which was 
precipitated by Ecuador's high interest rates 
prompted the Central Bank to intervene in the 
foreign-exchange market to prevent the local 
currency from appreciating too sharply. 
Accordingly, the Central Bank increased its 
international reserves, and the rate of money 
creation which this step entailed remained high 
throughout the year. 
The non-financial public sector was able to 
keep its accounts virtually balanced while at the 
same time increasing its external borrowing. As 
a result, most of the expansion of the money 
supply caused by the rise in reserves was 
absorbed through an increase in the public 
sector's deposits, which was thus substituting 
external debt for domestic debt. Even so, since 
the demand for money grew as the inflation rate 
eased, the money supply swelled by some 36%. 
The attractive interest rates offered on 
deposits in sucres triggered an increase of around 
65% in local-currency savings and time deposits. 
The broadly defined money supply (M2) thus 
expanded by some 52%. Dollar-denominated 
deposits trebled, but continued to represent no 
more than a small percentage of total deposits. 
In their attempts to engineer a drop in lending 
rates, the authorities reduced the cost of financial 
intermediation by lowering the bank reserve 
requirement applying to sight deposits from an 
initial 28% to 25%, and then to 10%; in addition, 
banks were no longer required to invest in 
low-yield government bonds. The growth in the 
money supply was accompanied by a heavier 
demand for loans, with tlie result that 
private-sector credit jumped by 'U%, which was 
equivalent to a real rate of over 40%. 
Enactment of the Omnibus Financial 
Institutions Act spurred the expansion and 
diversification of the capital market and 
simplified its supervision through the 
Superintendency of Banks. Activity on the stock 
exchange picked up, but at US$ 800 million, the 
total trading volume for the year was still quite 
small. As in the previous year, mi >st of the trading 
was in common stock. 
d) Trade policy 
Trade received a major boost from the 
lowering of tariffs and the establishment in 
October 1992 of a free trade area among the 
Andean Group countries. The Government of 
Ecuador continued its efforts to carry forward the 
economy's integration into regional and world 
markets in 1994. Thus, on 31 ianuary 1995, a 
Common External Tariff (CET) came into effect 
for Colombia, Ecuador and Venîzuela. The CET 
is comprised of four tariff levels: 5% for primary 
products; 10% for semi-processed goods; 15% 
for intermediate goods; and 20% for final 
products, with the exception of motor vehicles, 
where the applicable tariff rate is 35%. The CET 
was to take full effect as of 31 December 1995. 
Exceptions to the CET were dîtermined on a 
country-by-country basis. In the case of Ecuador, 
exceptions were granted for 400 sub-items, but 
these exemptions were to be phased out over a 
four-year period. 
In other developments, progr;ss was made in 
negotiations regarding Ecuador s entry into the 
World Trade Organization (W o>, which was 
expected to take place some time, in 1995. 
Bilateral negotiations were also pursued with a 
view to strengthening Ecuador's trade links with 
a number of countries, including Chile, Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic and Mexico. Meanwhile, 
multilateral talks between States members of the 
Andean Pact and of MERCOSUR made headway. 
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In late 1994, Ecuador and Chile signed an 
economic complementarity agreement which 
called for a step-by-step removal of tariff 
barriers. 
e) Structural reforms 
In order to improve market efficiency, a 
number of regulations that had hindered external 
trade, domestic commerce and price formation 
were rescinded. In addition, various laws of a 
sectoral nature were enacted: the Omnibus 
Financial Institutions Act, which was designed to 
make the financial market run more smoothly; 
the Customs Act, which simplified customs 
formalities and opened the way for the authorities 
to award port and customs service concessions to 
private-sector interests; and the Agricultural 
Development Act, which superseded agrarian 
reform laws, placed strict limits on 
expropriations and streamlined land-related 
transactions. This law sparked severe social 
conflicts which gave rise to serious 
confrontations. 
In 1994, the Government announced its 
Strategic Programme for the Modernization of 
the State. The Programme's main objectives 
included the following: rationalization of the 
State apparatus and of the Government's role 
in the economy; greater government 
efficiency; promotion of broad-based equity 
ownership among the citizenry; and the 
promotion of investment through privatization. 
Implementation of a staff-reduction scheme for 
public-sector institutions continued. This 
scheme, under which employees were offered 
compensation in return for their voluntary 
separation from the civil service, was taken up by 
some 20,000 public employees. 
Congress exempted the petroleum, electricity 
and telecommunications sectors from the types 
of privatization operations governed by the State 
Modernization, Privatization and Provision of 
a) Economic activity 
GDP grew at a rate of 4% per annum -about 
double the rate recorded the year before- while 
Utility Services by Private Enterpr se Act, which 
entered into effect in 1994. In this same 
connection, the Government drew up a package 
of proposed reforms of the Constitution; this 
package was approved in a ref;rendum and 
submitted to Congress. The proposed reforms 
would, inter alia, broaden the powers of the 
executive branch in matters pertaining to public 
spending and streamline privatization processes 
in the mining, energy, telecommunications and 
social security sectors. Final approval of the 
principal reforms was contingent upon the 
outcome of negotiations between the executive 
and legislative branches. 
The process of privatizing the national airline, 
Ecuatoriana, was begun in 1994 wit li the airline's 
conversion into a stock corporation and the 
determination of the privatization procedures to 
be followed. Other measures design ;d to increase 
the role of the private sector included the ready 
access offered to prospective investors in new 
activities such as the expansion of the 
trans-Ecuador oil pipeline and tie award of 
concessions for the provision of such public 
services as signposting and maintenance of 
motorways, customs services and rubbish 
collection in Guayaquil. The process of reducing 
the number of production enterprises in State 
hands was also carried forward wii h the sale of 
the Government's share in one of ihe country's 
cement plants. 
In an effort to offset the social effects of the 
adjustment programme, the Emergency Social 
Investment Fund entered into operai ion. The aim 
of this Fund was to finance project!! in the areas 
of infrastructure, social services and 
institution-building as well as to set up revolving 
funds. The Fund had a total of USJ 120 million 
at its disposal, most of which was provided from 
overseas sources, and was expected i o operate for 
a period of four years. As of the end of 1994, 
2,300 projects involving a total of U! >$ 44 million 
had been approved. 
per capita GDP expanded by some 29 i, which was 
close to the all-time high reached in 1981. The 
growth of exports and private consumption 
paved the way for the 6% increase registered in 
3. The main variables 
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total demand, while public consumption 
continued on a downward trend which had 
already lasted for several years. 
Gross domestic investment's share of GDP 
rose to more than 15%, thus rebounding to the 
level it had reached two years earlier. The growth 
rates for public- and private-sector fixed capital 
formation were similar, but the bulk of the 
increase in this variable was attributable to the 
private sector, given its large share of the total. 
Most of these investments were in machinery and 
equipment, although there was also considerable 
investment in the construction sector. The 
expansion of investment was financed with 
external savings, while national saving remained 
at around 10% of GDP. 
Manufacturing, construction and mining 
(especially of petroleum) all recorded marked 
growth in real terms. Financial services, 
commerce and basic services grew at much the 
same rate as overall output. The increase in 
petroleum production was a result of the opening 
of new oil fields which were to be developed by 
foreign companies; in addition, the seventh 
round of tenders for oil prospecting took place, 
leading to the award of leases for the exploration 
and development of seven new tracts to 
international consortiums. In view of the fact that 
the trans-Ecuador oil pipeline was approaching 
full capacity, the initial steps were taken to call 
for tenders for the pipeline's expansion (at an 
estimated cost of US$ 600 million). 
Growth in the rest of the manufacturing sector 
sped up, with particularly notable increases in 
non-metallic minerals and basic minerals, 
textiles, wood, paper and printed matter, 
chemicals, and machinery and equipment. A 
number of these activities have benefited from 
increased exports to other member States of the 
Andean Group and from foreign direct 
investment in recent years. 
After experiencing a period of contraction, 
construction staged a significant recovery 
thanks, in particular, to the boost it received from 
external funds. The process of modernizing the 
financial sector, which had been initiated several 
years earlier, was given a fillip by the enactment 
of the Omnibus Financial Institutions Act, while 
increased private consumption, combined with 
closer external trade links, had a favourable 
impact on trade. Among the bisic services, a 
particularly strong performance was turned in by 
the transport, storage and communications 
sector, which expanded as a result of increased 
commercial activity. 
After the downturn of the preceding year, 
agricultural production rose slightly in 1994; 
notable increases were register© 1 in such major 
crops as bananas, coffee, African palm, rice, 
potatoes and flowers, as well as livestock. 
Banana production increased significantly, 
despite the expected decline in the area 
harvested, which was encourage 1 by the offer of 
compensatory payments. In the case of coffee, 
favourable prices provided an incentive for the 
use of improved farming techniques and the 
harvesting of the entire crop. In œntrast, fishery 
production declined yet again, due, among other 
factors, to recurring problems in the shrimp 
industry, including the affliction which has come 
to be known as the "Taura syndiome". 
Lastly, community, social and personal 
services registered a decrease owing to the 
persistent contraction of government services. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The economic programme in force was 
backed up by the relative stability of the 
exchange rate within a context marked by the 
liberalization of trade and a cautious fiscal 
policy. This meant that inflation continued to 
slow down even though various factors were 
pulling the rate in the opposite direction; these 
factors included the introduction of fuel price 
hikes for fiscal reasons, growing demand for 
consumer goods and increased money creation. 
The rise in the CPI for the year came to around 
25%; although this figure excîeded the 20% 
target set down in the country's agreement with 
the IMF, it was nevertheless below the 31% level 
recorded in 1993. 
In order to compensate for these higher price 
levels, the fringe benefits and supplementary 
allowances provided to persons earning the 
minimum wage were adjusted in January; in July, 
further increases were made in I hese benefits as 
well as in the minimum living wage. Overall, 
these wage hikes represented a real increase of 
16% in the minimum living wage (including 
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fringe benefits) and thus constituted one more 
step in these wage levels' partial recovery from 
the substantial losses of purchasing power 
sustained in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
The average income of the working 
population increased by 4% in real terms. 
However, a polarization of labour income levels 
was to be observed. Wage-earners in 
medium-sized and large firms (except in the 
construction industry) located in urban areas 
witnessed a rise of almost 9% in their real average 
remunerations, but workers in the urban informal 
sector saw their earnings increase by a bare 3%. 
The urban unemployment rate fell from 8.9% 
to 7.8%. This positive change was due, firstly, to 
a considerable reduction in the overall urban 
participation rate and, secondly, to a slight 
increase in the number of jobs. This was 
concentrated in the formal sector, where there 
was a notable rise in paid employment in 
construction, commerce and, to a lesser extent, 
community, social and personal services; 
industrial employment levels were down, 
however. Nevertheless, not all areas experienced 
a decrease in unemployment, since the level of 
unemployment actually rose in Guayaquil. 
Mention should be made in this connection of 
the projects begun in 1994 under the aegis of the 
Emergency Social Investment Fund. Although 
these projects may have been of minor 
importance in quantitative terms, they were 
nevertheless successful in creating some 
temporary jobs. Employment in the urban 
informal sector dropped slightly, and this was 
reflected in a slight reduction in the rate of 
underemployment; consequently, 46.2% of the 
economically active population (EAP) in urban 
areas was classified as being underemployed in 
1994, as compared to the 47.7% figure recorded 
in 1993. 
c) The externa] sector 
After a lackluster performance in 1993, 
exports of goods increased by some 21%; all the 
main export products shared in this growth. 
Earnings from petroleum sales were adversely 
affected by very low prices early in the year, and 
even though prices recovered somewhat in the 
final two quarters, their average level for 1994 
was still the lowest to be recorded in the last six 
years. Nevertheless, because export volumes 
were up, the total value of the petroleum 
industry's external sales (including petroleum 
products) climbed by 4%, bringinj; this sector's 
share of total exports to about 3:>%. Even so, 
petroleum exports remained below their 1992 
level. 
Ecuador managed to increasî its banana 
exports by about 15%, notwithstanding the 
quotas established by the European Union for 
banana imports from various group i of countries. 
This increase reflected both a growth in sales to 
countries belonging to the Eure pean Union, 
thanks to the direct contacts established with 
importers, and greater access to new markets, 
especially in Eastern Europe. However, the 
specific quota agreements signed by the 
European Union and a number of 
banana-producing countries, which were slated 
to take effect in 1995, may have ¡;ome adverse 
effects on Ecuador in the future. 
The value of coffee exports incre ased fourfold 
due to higher prices and a larger harvest. The 
volume of shrimp sales decreased yet again, but 
higher prices meant that the vahe of exports 
actually rose by 14%. Exports of cocoa, fish and 
non-traditional agricultural products (flowers, 
fruits and vegetables) climbed significantly, as 
did external sales of industrial products, 
including most processed agricultural products 
as well as metal, textile, chemical and 
pharmaceutical manufactures. Siles of these 
items exhibited a sharp increase over their 1993 
levels, largely as a consequence ol! the creation 
of the Andean Group free trade area. 
Non-traditional exports were up by 28% as a 
whole, for a total value of US$ 661 million. 
The higher growth rate for exports was a 
reflection of the demand genet ated by the 
European Union, the Andean Groip (especially 
Colombia) and several other Latin American 
countries, particularly Chile and Mexico. The 
tourism sector continued to expand as it marked 
up a growth rate of 10%, thus becoming the 
country's fifth most important source of foreign 
exchange. 
Imports of goods (c.i.f.) were up by about 
42%, which was higher than the growth rate for 
exports. This expansion was seen across the 
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board, but was especially remarkable in transport 
equipment (118%), fuels and lubricants (93%), 
durable consumer goods (49%) and non-durable 
consumer goods (44%). Smaller increases were 
recorded in the categories of capital goods (8%, 
excluding transport equipment) and inputs for 
agriculture and industry (32%). 
The bulk of this expansion was accounted for 
by imports from the Andean Group countries and 
the other States members of the Latin American 
Integration Association (ALADI) (particularly 
from Brazil and Mexico), which exhibited 
growth rates of 176% and 105% respectively. As 
a result of this steep increase, Ecuador's 1993 
trade surplus with ALADI, and specifically with 
the Andean Group, gave way to a deficit in 1994. 
In contrast, the upturn in some traditional exports 
to Europe made it possible for Ecuador to mark 
up a trade surplus with that continent, after 
having recording deficits in previous years. 
Ecuador's merchandise trade balance slipped 
from the US$ 588 million figure recorded in 1993 
to US$ 445 million in 1994. Since the country's 
deficit in non-factor services widened slightly, its 
overall trade surplus shrank from US$ 443 
million to US$ 268 million. Moreover, due to 
higher payments for factor services, the current 
account deficit jumped from US$ 660 million to 
US$ 942 million (the equivalent of around 5% of 
GDP). 
On the capital account, the level of foreign 
direct investment was quite high (US$ 530 
million) for the second year in a row. These 
investments were primarily channeled to the 
petroleum sector, although since 1993 the 
amount of foreign direct investment in 
non-petroleum-related activities has also been 
rising. Other major sources of capital inflows 
included increased official-sector lending, 
import credits and the short-term capital that was 
attracted by high interest rates. The decision to 
use Global Depositary Receipts (GDRS) as a 
vehicle for offering shares in one of the country's 
cement companies on the United States stock 
exchange marked the first time ever that stock in 
an Ecuadoran firm had been traled outside the 
country. All told, the inflow of external resources 
was more than sufficient to oflset the current 
account deficit and thus served to build up the 
country's international reserve!! by US$ 458 
million to the unprecedented level of over 
US$ 1.7 billion. 
By the end of 1994, the external debt had 
mounted to nearly US$ 13.7 billion, which was 
an increase of almost 7%. In October 1994, 
Ecuador signed a Brady-style agreement to 
restructure its external debt with commercial 
banks (US$ 4.5 billion of principal, US$ 2.3 
billion in interest arrears and US3I 800 million in 
penalty interest). The principal could be 
exchanged either for discount bonds (with the 
discount amounting to 45%) having 30-year 
maturity and grace periods at 13/16% over 
LIBOR, or for par bonds, which a so had 30-year 
maturity and grace periods but carried interest 
rates that would gradually increase from 3% to 
5%. Approximately 58% of the creditors opted 
for the discount bonds and 42% for the bonds 
at par. The bulk of the interest payments were 
to be made over a span of 20 years with a 
10-year grace period at rates equivalent to 
13/16% over LIBOR. Broadly si caking, it was 
estimated that the rescheduling package 
translated into a reduction of around one third in 
the country's commercial debt. In order to 
finance the restructuring of hi; debt -which 
entailed the purchase of United States Treasury 
zero-coupon bonds- Ecuador rea ived assistance 
from the International Monetary Fund, the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the 
Government of Japan, the Andeai Development 
Corporation, the Latin Americar Reserve Fund 
and the World Bank, with which it signed a 
structural adjustment agreement. Ecuador also 
proceeded to renegotiate its debt with the 
countries of the Paris Club; the corresponding 
agreement was to cover the refinancing of debt 
principal and interest payments corresponding to 




1. General trends 
In 1994 El Salvador's economy once again 
expanded at a satisfactory rate, albeit somewhat 
more slowly than during the preceding two years. 
Apart from strictly economic factors, production 
and investment once again reaped the benefits of 
the progress being made towards peace. The 
presidential elections, which led to a changeover 
of governmental authorities, had no more than a 
passing effect on economic trends. In the external 
sector, marked price increases were seen in 
merchandise exports, and the continuing rise of 
transfers into the country by non-residents 
contributed to the growth of national income. 
The gross domestic product (GDP) expanded 
by 4.5%, thus rounding out five consecutive years 
of growth in per capita GDP. Every major 
component of expenditure was up sharply; fixed 
investment and the volume of exports of goods 
and services both expanded by over 10%, while 
consumption rose by around 6%, thereby further 
weakening the already meagre rate of domestic 
saving. In contrast, an improvement was to be 
observed in national saving owing chiefly to the 
increase in transfers frorri abroad. External saving 
declined as a percentage of GDP, although it was 
still above 5%. With the exception of agriculture, 
which contracted once again, all the principal 
sectors of activity expanded. Nevertheless, the 
rate of job creation was not high enough to drive 
unemployment below the 9% mark. 
The central government surpassed its 2.5% 
deficit-reduction target by an ample margin, 
bringing the deficit down to just 2% of GDP. This 
result was attributable to both a rise in tax receipts 
and a drop in capital expendiiure. Central 
Reserve Bank credit to the public sector 
contracted during 1994; althougi the money 
supply expanded due to the build-up of reserves, 
the rise in liquidity was controlled through the 
extension of bank reserve requirements to 
include foreign-currency deposits i nd the sale of 
Monetary Stabilization Certificates (CEMs). 
Against this fiscal and monetary ba :kground, the 
exchange rate rose quite slowly, wh ich translated 
into a further appreciation of the colón in real 
terms, and the 12-month rate of cc nsumer price 
increases slowed to slightly under 9% in 
December. 
Merchandise exports were stimulated by 
improved international prices, though the pace 
was slower than during the precedin g year. At the 
same time, however, merchandise imports also 
expanded, and the trade deficit therefore 
widened. This was offset by a higher surplus on 
the real services account, thanks ;o the robust 
upturn in exports of these services and, in 
particular, to the growth of private transfers. 
Consequently, the deficit on the balance-of-
payments current account remained at US$ 300 
million, or around 3% of GDP. Thî deficit was 
easily covered by the funds flowing into the 
country through the capital account, especially in 
the form of unrequited official transfers and 
external financing for the public sector. The 
dollar value of the public sector's foreign debt 
rose slightly, owing in part to changes in the 
exchange rates of the currencies in which El 
Salvador's debt is denominated. 
2. Economic policy 
The country's economic policy objectives for 
1994 were to consolidate its macroeconomic 
adjustment, speed up economic growth, cut 
inflation and consolidate its reforms in public 
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finances and the financial system in order to 
backstop the expansion of exportable supply and 
to increase national saving and investment in 
production activities. The authorities who took 
office at mid-year revised the targets for the 
period in question and began to work on 
modifying the country's economic policy. 
Announcements made in February 1995 heralded 
a further opening of the economy through more 
rapid tariff reductions and the establishment of a 
fixed exchange-rate system. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The non-financial public-sector deficit (prior 
to the calculation of the level of grants and 
donations) shrank substantially in nominal terms, 
and the public sector's financing requirements 
were down from 3.6% to 2% of GDP. Saving 
reached the same figure (up from 0.7% in 1993) 
and thus covered almost half of capital 
expenditure. The rise in public-sector saving 
resulted from a substantially higher level of 
current income, while the rate of increase in 
public-sector spending slightly exceeded that of 
GDP. At the same time, capital expenditure 
contracted in real terms and the public sector took 
in revenues amounting to nearly 0.3% of GDP 
from the sale of some of its assets. The 
public-sector deficit was covered entirely by 
external resources, since, as planned, the 
Government paid off loans taken out on the local 
market. Grants and donations totalled less than 
they had the year before, but even so they 
accounted for two fifths of the total net external 
financing received by the public sector (and were 
equivalent to somewhat more than 70% of the 
deficit). 
The across-the-board increase in the public 
sector's current income (30%) was, in the 
aggregate, higher than had been projected. 
Non-tax revenues and the operating surplus 
marked up by public enterprises exceeded the 
original targets; in contrast, the rise in tax 
revenues, although considerable (23%), was less 
than expected, and this placed some constraints 
on the Government's spending programme. 
The taxes displaying the most significant 
trends were the income tax, the value-added tax 
(VAT) and import duties. In connection with the 
income tax, the principal compon ;nts of the tax 
base were revised and steps vere taken to 
institute a withholding scheme fcr a portion of 
the taxes levied on earnings from coffee sales. 
April's fiscal reform did away with the wealth 
tax. Then, in September, the estimated tax 
payments to be made in advance b; ' own-account 
professionals were raised from 2% to 10% while 
the tax on gross corporate income v ras hiked from 
1% to 1.5%. 
Since its introduction in 1992 the VAT has 
become the most important single tax, generating 
over two fifths of total tax receipts. In addition, 
the momentum exhibited by imports led to a 
disproportionately large increase ir receipts from 
customs duties as remaining custou is exemptions 
were discontinued. At the same time, taxes on 
exports were almost completely el iminated. 
The level of taxation rose to nearly 11% of 
GDP; this was one half of a percentage point 
above the 1993 coefficient, but war. still far from 
the levels of the mid-1980s. Duiing 1994 the 
measures adopted to improve tax administration, 
cut down on tax evasion and broade n the tax base 
began to have an impact. Nevertheless, at year's 
end the prevailing view was that ta:c evasion was 
still widespread and that revenues could be 
increased through better enforcement. 
The most notable developments in terms of 
other sources of current income were the 
increased level of social security contributions 
and, in particular, the expansion of the operating 
surplus posted by public-sector enterprises. This 
surplus swelled to 1.4% of GDP (from 1% in 
1993), partly as a result of rate adjustments (in 
the case of the energy sector, rate s climbed by 
30%). 
Capital revenues rose consideribly. In 1994 
some of the facilities of the San Bartolo free trade 
area were sold off, as were assets of the 
Salvadoran Coffee Institute. The Salvadoran 
Institute for Agrarian Change (isrA) divested 
itself of a portion of its assets in compliance with 
the special assessment applyinj; to it as a 
contributor to the land-transfer programmes 
outlined in the Peace Agreement. Th e Legislative 
Assembly also passed a law on the privatization 
of sugar refineries and alcohol prod uction plants 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact oi the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e Pe-centages of the 
economically active population. Real minimum wage in manufacturing and service sectors in San Salvadoi. g Refers to 
net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. 
by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Interest rate on d îposits, deflated 
Table 2 
EL SALVADOR: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 
I II III IV 
1993 
II III IV 
1994a 
II III IV 
Consumer prices 
(12-month 
variation, %) 7.6 7.2 14.5 19.9 21.2 23.4 15.0 12.3 12.9 9.9 9.6 8.9 
Real exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 98.4 100.0 99.0 95.2 91.7 89.6 84.5 83.7 82.4 82.8 83.5 82.6 




3.80 0.80-23.40 -6.00 5.30 -2.80 4.60 4.20 0.40 6.10 4.50 5.70 
8.90 4.10-20.20 -3.00 8.20 0.60 8.80 8.50 4.50 10.80 9.80 11.70 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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The expansion of nearly 18% seen in the level 
of public-sector current expenditure was within 
the projected range. Civil servants received pay 
raises; staff were recruited for institutions 
involved in the implementation of the Peace 
Agreement (the National Civil Police and the 
Office of the National Counsel for the Defence 
of Human Rights); and compensation was paid 
to demobilized members of the Armed Forces 
and National Police. Expenditure on health and 
education was also increased. 
Capital expenditure was 20% below the target 
figure. The original public investment 
programme, which had been only partially 
completed the year before, provided for a volume 
of physical works which outstripped the sector's 
performance capacity; in addition, resource 
transfer procedures were modified, leading to a 
lower level of expenditure than expected. 
Although more attention was devoted to social 
sectors than in the past, three fifths of total 
investment still went to the energy sector, 
telecommunications, water supply systems, 
transport and storage facilities. 
b) Monetary policy 
While growth in the means of payment 
(13.5%) was somewhat higher than in 1993 
(12.5%), the expansion of local-currency 
liquidity slowed, with the increase in M2 
dropping from 36% to 22%. Time deposits were 
the best-performing component of this aggregate 
in 1994, indicating that the interest rates being 
offered proved attractive to savers. Dollar 
deposits also showed a substantial gain (40%), 
though their share of the total volume of broad 
money (M3) amounted to only just over 5%. 
The expansion of the monetary base (19%) 
was particularly influenced by the build-up of 
international reserves, which accounted for more 
than 80% of total primary money creation during 
the year. The Central Reserve Bank expanded its 
domestic credit by less than 11% as, in net terms, 
many public-sector loans were paid off. Much 
the same sort of situation was to be observed in 
the financial system as a whole, with the net 
contraction of credit to the public sector 
amounting to 28% as a result of debt amortization 
and the rise in public-sector deposits. The 
expansion of liquidity was therefore fueled by 
private-sector loans (which were up 27%) and, to 
a lesser extent, by the increjse in foreign-
currency reserves. 
The main objective of monetiiry policy was to 
regulate the volume of liquid a ssets in order to 
promote the stabilization of pi ices and of the 
exchange rate. In April the revised charter of the 
Central Reserve Bank (BCR) was approved. 
Under the new provisions, the BC R was to confine 
itself to its functions as a central bank and to 
relinquish those related to the granting of credit. 
In addition, as of 1996 the Bank would no longer 
be permitted to finance the government treasury. 
In July the Multisectoral Investment Bank was 
created to take over the BCR'S credit lines and 
portfolios; the BCR then proceeded to put an end 
to rediscounting operations, maintaining a credit 
window only for immediate liquidity. 
During 1994 the legal rese-ve requirement 
remained at 20% for time deposits and 30% for 
sight deposits; in September, a 10% reserve 
requirement was introduced for ioreign-currency 
deposits. A portion of these mandatory reserves, 
equivalent to what is in effect i 5% surcharge, 
bears interest. The BCR continued to engage in 
open-market operations through its issuance of 
Monetary Stabilization Certifiâtes (CEMs). In 
August an agreement was concluded under 
which financial institutions would hold 2% of 
their financial assets in CEifc, which was 
tantamount to a rise in the interest-bearing 
portion of their required reserves. These 
certificates, which are exempt from income tax 
and VAT, gradually took on grealer importance as 
instruments of monetary policy, although these 
sterilization measures weie not free of 
quasi-fiscal costs. Stabilization bonds accounted 
for almost 10% of the aggregate amount of 
money plus quasi-money in 1994. The 
circulation of these instrument! was, however, 
apparently confined to a small {¡roup of holders. 
In addition, there was a shift in demand towards 
longer-term (six-month and one-year) CEMs. 
In November the central government issued 
Treasury Notes (LETES) for the ïrst time ever in 
an effort to augment its supply o f resources in the 
short run. The attractive yields of these notes 
encouraged the redemption cf other Central 
Bank securities as they matured, and the 
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outstanding balance of these other instruments 
had therefore fallen by the end of the year. At the 
same time as the LETES were issued, the 
requirement that banks invest in CEMS was lifted. 
Bank interest rates were higher than inflation. 
Nominal yields on time deposits weakened 
slightly in the second half of the year, but this 
was not true of the rates applying to loans, which 
actually rose in some banks. As a result, the 
spread between the interest rates on loans and 
deposits had widened to nearly six points (in 
terms of annual rates) by the end of the year. 
c) Exchange policy 
Sustained foreign currency inflows meant that 
in the first three quarters the exchange rate 
against the dollar varied only slightly. In 
September, when the flow of foreign exchange 
diminished, the BCR intervened in the market; as 
a result, the exchange rate held at a level only 
slightly above where it had been at the start of the 
year. The average value of the dollar for the year 
was 0.5% higher than in 1993, for a real 
appreciation of some 5% in the effective 
exchange rate. The introduction of a fixed 
exchange rate of 8.75 colones to the dollar (the 
rate in effect during the last quarter of 1994), 
together with full convertibility, proved to be one 
of the most prominent components of the new 
economic plan for 1995 and sparked a heated 
debate as to its potential impact on inflation and 
the real exchange rate. 
d) Trade policy 
The working meetings held in connection 
with the framework convention which the 
Central American republics had signed with 
Colombia and Venezuela in 1993 had still not 
a) Economic activity 
Overall demand increased significantly (7%), 
though less sharply than in the preceding two 
years. The volume of exports of goods and 
services rose by 11% (20% in 1993) while 
domestic demand slowed from 7% to 6%. The 
resulted in any specific proposa. Steps were 
taken, however, towards an agree: nent with the 
Dominican Republic, and a trade a] jreement with 
Ecuador was ratified. In the context of 
negotiations with Mexico, techa'.cal meetings 
with Guatemala and Honduras -lhe other two 
members of what has come tc be known 
as Central America's Northern Triangle-
proceeded during the first half of ti e year. These 
meetings were later held on a bilateral basis. 
Nevertheless, towards the end of 1)94 the thrust 
of Salvadoran trade policy shifted as priority was 
placed on the country's attempt to arrive at an 
arrangement similar to the North A merican Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This new trade policy 
also provided for a more rapid lib îralization of 
the economy from 1995 on; tariffs, which had 
been slated to remain within a 5%-20% range, 
were to be reduced to rates of between 1% and 
6% over the next five years. 
During 1994 El Salvador took action under 
GAIT provisions to counter measures that were 
affecting its trade. One specific ou :come of this 
effort was that the Textiles Surveillance Body 
found in favour of El Salvador, which had 
appealed against the attempts made jy the United 
States to impose a quota on Salvat oran exports 
of cotton and synthetic shirts. 
With regard to the country's tiade in basic 
grains, in the final quarter the system of 
price bands used in setting variable import 
duties was discontinued, whi:h affected 
the Central American process of tariff 
harmonization for these products. One of the 
immediate effects of this step, which was 
announced during the harvest, was a drop 
in producer prices. At the same time, 
authorization was granted for the 
establishment of the Agricultural Products 
Exchange as an auxiliary credit hstitution. 
fastest-growing component of domestic 
spending was fixed investment, which expanded 
by 12%. The increase was particularly steep in 
investment in machinery and equipment. 
Substantial amounts of transport eqi ipment were 
imported while, among machinery imports, one 
particularly noteworthy acquisition was the 
3. The main variables 
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purchase of a power plant by a private firm; the 
electricity generated by this plant is to be 
distributed by the State-run power company. 
Private construction was stimulated by housing 
projects in the western part of the country and by 
the renovation of commercial infrastructure in 
the metropolitan and eastern regions. The 
construction of industrial and service facilities 
experienced a downturn, however. 
There was only a slight rise in public 
investment. Public works projects moved ahead 
more slowly than planned, partly due to the 
changes that had been made in disbursement 
procedures at the end of 1993 and partly because 
1994 was an election year and a new 
administration took office. Significant delays in 
bridge and road construction were experienced 
during the year. Among the main public bodies, 
the Executive Commission for the Lempa River 
Hydroelectric Project (CEL) and the National 
Telecommunications Administration (ANTEL) 
recorded normal investment levels, but this was 
not true of the National Water and Sewerage 
Administration (ANDA). The public sector 
invested more heavily in machinery and 
equipment than in construction owing, in 
particular, to its acquisition of telephone and 
transport equipment and the effort being made to 
overhaul the electrical power sector. 
The formation of the National Civil Police 
helped to boost public consumption, whose 3% 
expansion outstripped the growth rate recorded 
for the preceding year. The rate of increase in 
private consumption faltered slightly, dropping from 
7% to 6%, but remained higher than GDP growth. 
With a rise of nearly 14%, imports were the 
most vigorous component of total supply. Among 
domestic sectors of activity, the strongest 
performances were seen in areas oriented primarily 
towards the national market, such as construction 
(where output was up 10%), commerce (8.5%) 
and basic services (8%). The overall growth rate 
for the goods-producing sectors of the economy, 
which account for nearly half of GDP, was 
considerably lower than the aggregate figure 
owing to the downturn in agricultural output. 
Trends in the coffee and basic grain crops, 
which together account for nearly 45% of total 
agricultural output, caused activity in this sector 
to contract by nearly 3%. More generally, the 
debts accumulated by agricultural producers 
were probably also a factor, while the drought 
that hit the region in late July re suited in losses 
in basic grains crops estimated at 20%. Coffee 
output was down in the western region (the main 
production zone), and the country was therefore 
unable to reap the full benefits ol the increase in 
international coffee prices seen midway through 
the year. The sugar-cane harvest v ras also slightly 
smaller. Output in the livestock subsector rose by 
3%, while fishing and poultry farming 
experienced a strong expansion -above 10%-
despite the fact that prospects in the Central 
American market did not materii lize. 
Manufacturing maintained a robust growth 
rate of nearly 8% which was chiefly attributable 
to a greater utilization of installed capacity. 
Machinery and metal product» and wooden 
articles were among the most active branches of 
industry in 1994. The textile, clothing, paper, and 
beverages and tobacco industries were hurt by 
restrictive trade measures and by problems in 
carrying forward their retooling process. The 
maquila industry (i.e., inbond assembly 
activities) continued to display a great deal of 
momentum. 
The output of electric power and drinking 
water services rose considerably (7%), although 
at a slower rate than the year before. During 
1994, hydroelectric power gîneration was 
affected by the drought, and the si ipply of thermal 
energy -whose direct production costs are 
higher- was increased accordingly. 
The growth of the communications and 
transport sector (8%) was chiefly a result of the 
expansion of local telephon; services. In 
December, the rates for international calls were 
cut in order to make them more campetitive with 
collect call services. In the transport sector, an 
increase was seen in the movemei it of cargo, both 
by sea and by air. Trends in commerce were 
influenced by the larger supply of merchandise, 
especially imported goods. A number of branch 
offices and new shopping centres were opened 
for business as well. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The ascent of the Consumer I'rice Index (CPi) 
slowed to an annual rate of just under 9% in 
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December. In the first quarter the cumulative 
increase in the CPI was over 3%; a 1.4% jump in 
August was triggered by expectations that the 
prices of staples would rise in the wake of the 
damage caused by the drought. Nevertheless, 
price movements slowed in the latter part of the 
year and, as a result, the overall increase for 1994 
stayed within the targeted range (between 8% 
and 10%). 
Food prices were higher than average. 
Seasonal variations in the supply of fruit and 
vegetables and shortages of maize and eggs 
pushed food prices up sharply in August. 
Housing recorded its major rises in June, when 
electricity rates went up, and in December, 
when rents were raised. In 1994 the pricing 
system for hydrocarbon products was changed 
in order to align the rates with international 
price levels; in a similar vein, towards the end 
of the year the rate structure for water 
consumption was modified and water charges 
were increased. International telephone charges 
were reduced, however. 
Wages were adjusted at the start of the third 
quarter. Civil servants received a 10% pay raise 
in July. The adjustment of minimum wages led 
to increases of nearly 13% in the manufacturing, 
trade and service sectors and of around 12.5% for 
agricultural workers, with different pay rates 
being received for harvesting activities. Wage 
differences based on workers' gender, age or 
disability were also eliminated. 
When measured in terms of consumer prices, 
agricultural workers' real wages improved by an 
average of 1.5% during the year, while industrial, 
service and trade workers' real wages rose by 
2%. The pay rates for day labourers working in 
the sugar-cane and cotton harvests climbed 
somewhat, but the real incomes of coffee pickers 
lagged behind. 
Reforms to the labour code agreed upon in the 
Forum for Economic and Social Consultation, 
which was established under the terms of the 
Peace Agreement, entered into effect in April. 
Measures agreed upon in the Forum included 
provisions calling for the creation of a Higher 
Labour Council, a tripartite consultative body 
which was due to begin work in March 1995, and 
the ratification of several International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) agreements. 
At around 9%, the unemployment rate was 
similar to the preceding year's level. According 
to fourth-quarter estimates, the ns.tion-wide rate 
amounted to 9.4% while the raU among those 
members of the EAP other than pirsons seeking 
work for the first time was 6%. ITie number of 
workers covered by social security rose by 
12.5%, however. Towards the erd of the year, 
unemployment in rural areas was comparatively 
low -around 4%- as growers bejjan to harvest 
their crops (mainly coffee and sugar cane). 
c) The external sector 
The trade deficit in goods anc real services 
rose again in 1994 (to overUS$ 1.2 billion). Even 
so, thanks to the trends in factoi services and 
private transfers, the current account deficit 
remained in the range of US$ 300 million. 
Capital inflows were more than sufficient to 
cover this gap, and international reserves 
therefore grew by some US$ 140 million. 
The value of merchandise îxports rose 
substantially (12%), although at «i slower pace 
than the year before. The 1994 inc ease was due 
to an upsurge in export prices (over 20%) which 
easily offset the nearly 8% declire in physical 
volume. By contrast, the growth in imports, c.i.f. 
(18%), was primarily attributable to a 
quantitative increase. Thus, the physical balance 
of El Salvador's merchandise trade deteriorated 
markedly. 
In 1994 El Salvador's trade deficit within the 
Central American subregion grew substantially. 
Its customary deficit with Guatemala and Costa 
Rica worsened in net terms, while it 5 surplus with 
neighbouring countries (chiefly Honduras and 
Nicaragua) shrank. 
The value of non-traditional exports, which 
made up three fifths of the total, rose 14%. In 
contrast to what occurred in 1993, m )n-traditional 
exports to Central America grew less than sales 
of such products to the rest of the w< irld did (10% 
versus 13%). In terms of value, :he strongest 
increases in sales to Central American countries 
were in shoes, processed food products and 
detergents; outside the subregion, the greatest 
growth was observed in kitchen, tibie and bed 
linens. Sales of the two largest product lines of 
recent years -medicines and paper a rid cardboard 
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packaging- slackened owing to the contraction 
of external demand. 
Traditional exports (the foremost being 
coffee) rose by a little over 8% in value, 
compared with 36% in 1993. Decreases in sugar 
and shrimp sales, together with the 30% drop in 
the volume of coffee exports, were contributing 
factors. Nevertheless, thanks to a substantial rise 
in international coffee prices, the value of coffee 
sales went up by 15%. The largest coffee 
shipments (550,000 quintals) took place in July, 
when prices were starting to pick up, whereas in 
October, when prices peaked, only 60,000 
quintals were exported. Then, when the price 
tumbled from US$ 214 per quintal in September 
to US$ 144 in mid-November, the main 
producing countries called an emergency 
meeting. The Central American nations, 
Colombia and Brazil agreed upon a coordinated 
coffee marketing plan based on quarterly 
programming of exports from 1995 on, the 
establishment of a reference price of between 
US$ 180 and US$ 200 per quintal, and 
continuation of the practice of holding back one 
fifth of the exportable supply. 
Imports of goods, c.i.f., climbed at a faster rate 
than in 1993, although they failed to match the 
pace set in 1992. The largest increase was in 
capital goods (18%), followed by intermediate 
and consumer goods. The value of oil imports fell 
in 1994 owing to lower prices, while the demand 
for fertilizers and construction materials 
expanded. As regards consumer products, 
imports of durables rose more than non-durables, 
even though the latter reached a value of US$ 500 
million. 
The figure for net revenues from real services 
includes the aggregate value of maquila 
activities, which amounted to US$ 130 million. 
In absolute values, maquila exports totalled 
US$ 430 million (US$ 140 million more than in 
1993), while imports of parts and components 
came to some US$ 300 million (US$ 200 million 
in 1993). 
Unrequited private transfers amounted to 
US$ 1 billion, which was more than the value of 
merchandise exports. Thus, remittances financed 
the bulk of the trade deficit for goods and 
services. Since the remainder wa i easily covered 
by capital movements, by the end of the year the 
Central Bank's reserves had increased to the 
equivalent of nearly four months' worth of 
imports. 
Official grants and donations totalled 
US$ 280 million, which was somewhat less 
than the current-account deficit. On the other 
hand, an increase was seen in long-term external 
lending, particularly to the public sector. 
Amortization payments also incr;ased, however, 
especially on the part of commercial banks, and 
the net amount of long-term financing therefore 
fell to around US$ 40 million (US$ 100 million 
in 1993). Accurate figures on private capital 
movements were unavailable, but it is likely that 
inflows were stimulated by interest rate spreads 
and the country *s lower level of f jreign exchange 
risk. 
The Government entered into a number of 
credit arrangements with multilateral 
organizations during the year, obtaining US$ 118 
million from the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), US$ 71 million lirom the World 
Bank and US$ 97 million from the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration 
(CABEi). Loan agreements for smaller sums were 
also signed with bilateral organizations and 
financial institutions. El Salvador was able to 
honour its amortization commitments and the 
Central Reserve Bank madiî prepayments 
amounting to nearly US$ 150 million. Even 
including exchange losses of around US$ 25 
million on deposits denominated in yen and 
deutsche mark, the external public debt rose very 
little (by US$ 67 million). This, the country's 
debt ratios improved, with an interest load 
equivalent to just over 7% of txports and debt 
servicing equivalent to 28% of lixports. 
As a result of the debt forgiveness agreements 
which the Government of El Salvador signed 
with the Governments of the United States and 
Canada in September 1994, the operating budget 
for the El Salvador Environmental Fund 
(FONAES) was approved in order to provide 
financing for environmental protection, 




1. General trends 
In 1994 the Guatemalan economy once again 
recorded growth of around 4%, while inflation 
was kept to the moderate rate of about 12%. 
These results were achieved despite the tense 
political situation created by the existing 
stand-off among the different branches of 
Government and the slow pace of talks aimed at 
putting an end to the armed conflict being waged 
in the country. Bolstered by higher prices for 
Guatemala's leading exports (especially coffee 
and sugar), the country's terms of trade also 
showed a significant improvement in 1994. 
Moreover, the implementation of the 
Government's monetary and fiscal policies went 
smoothly until late in the year, despite the 
tensions besetting both. Thanks to this 
combination of circumstances, no appreciable 
pressure was brought to bear on the 
foreign-exchange market, and the price of the 
dollar actually dropped slightly. 
In 1994 economic policy was shaped by the 
shadow agreement reached with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) during 1993 as a prelude to 
the conclusion of a stand-by agreement. The 
stand-by agreement did not, however, 
materialize, due to the Government's failure to 
meet a number of targets, particularly in the areas 
of public finances and electricity rates. As a 
result, the country even had difficulty in 
renewing the shadow agreement. 
Some of the more noteworthy features of the 
original agreement reached with the IMF included 
the deregulation of fuel prices and the 
liberalization of the foreign-exchange market, 
the adjustment of electricity rates, a renegotiation 
of the country's debt with the Paris Club, and tax 
Potential imbalances loomed, however. In 
spite of favourable trends in external prices, the 
country's huge deficit on the current account of 
the balance of payments, which vas financed 
entirely out of capital inflows, wai; not reduced 
to any significant extent, as it still e quailed about 
5.5% of GDP (as compared to 6% in 1993). In 
addition, the state of public finance > deteriorated 
due to the mediocre results achieve d in terms of 
tax collection. Tax receipts fell to less than 7% 
of GDP (the figure for 1993 had bee 17.5%); both 
a decrease in income tax receips and, more 
generally, the continuation of aiministrative 
practices which provide little incentive for tax 
compliance contributed to this stuation. The 
public sector's demand for financing exerted 
heavy pressure on the managemenl of monetary 
policy in the latter part of 1994, and this was 
reflected in a substantial increase n the money 
supply. 
reforms designed to raise tax revenues to the 
equivalent of 8.5% of GDP and eisure a total 
public-sector deficit of a scant 0,5% of GDP. 
Other targets included the avoidance of any 
variation in net international reserves, a cut of 
443 million quetzals in net credit I o the central 
government, and a reduction in the Bank of 
Guatemala's quasi-fiscal losses. 
Monetary targets were largely met, since the 
net international reserves held by the Bank of 
Guatemala rose by approximately US$ 60 
million and net credit to the central government 
was down by almost 500 million quetzals. On the 
other hand, quasi-fiscal losses exceeded the 
established target by the equivalen of around 
0.2% of GDP, while the public-s actor deficit 
2. Economic policy 
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overshot the original target by the equivalent of 
almost 2% of GDP. During 1994 the authorities 
also deregulated fuel prices and relaxed controls 
on the foreign-exchange market, as well as 
regularizing Guatemala's debt with countries 
belonging to the Paris Club. Electricity rates were 
not adjusted, however, because the 
constitutionality of the planned adjustment was 
being challenged in the courts. 
The stand-off between Congress and the 
Executive blocked the passage of legislation 
aimed at strengthening the tax collection system. 
This situation precipitated a drop in income-tax 
revenues, as it proved impossible to expedite the 
amendment of a number of discrepancies in the 
relevant tax law which, early in 1994, had 
prompted a finding that the collection of 
revenues under this tax category was 
unconstitutional. The dispute among the different 
branches of government was finally laid to rest 
by the election of a new Congress and new 
judicial authorities, who took office in 
September. Tax reform legislation was passed by 
Congress in late December, but there were some 
indications that members of the business 
community would challenge its constitutionality 
in the courts. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The central government's fiscal balance 
showed a deficit amounting to 1.5% of GDP. 
Although this was similar to the figure for 1993, 
in 1994 a decrease was seen in both government 
income and government expenditure (measured 
as a percentage of GDP). Indeed, the most striking 
feature of the situation with respect to public 
finances was the fall-off in tax receipts. Revenue 
from direct taxes plunged by more than 25% in 
nominal terms, while the increase in receipts 
from indirect forms of taxation was not large 
enough to keep pace with inflation. 
It would appear that the shortfall in tax 
revenues can be traced to a number of different 
factors, including flaws in the internal revenue 
service, the absence of stiff penalties for those 
who fail to pay their taxes, and the numerous 
exemptions contained in the Income Tax Act; in 
addition, collection of the value-added tax (VAT) 
was inadequately supervised. The Constitution 
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also places a number of stumbling blocks in the 
path of tax legislation, since its inc usion of a set 
of provisions of an almost statutory nature leaves 
the door wide open for legal challei iges to the tax 
laws. 
Against this background, 1994 saw a sharp 
decline in public expenditure, as the 1.5% 
nominal increase in this spending level was far 
below the rate of inflation. A particularly notable 
reduction was observed in real investment by the 
central government, and this adversely affected 
the condition of motorway ind energy 
infrastructure, as well as the leve! of attention 
provided in such areas as health, ed ¿cation, legal 
services and public safety. By wa) of example, 
the Government's decision to suspe id its transfer 
payments to the National Electrification Institute 
had a direct impact on the maintenance and state 
of repair of electrical power generators. 
Motorways were also affected, since only some 
15 million quetzals were spent on highway 
projects rather than the 65 million quetzals that 
had originally been budgeted. By thi ; same token, 
the Government was forced to delay its transfer 
payments to the Judiciary, and this meant that 
funding was not available for the im] Cementation 
of the new Procedural Penal Code, which was 
one of the mechanisms to be used I o modernize 
the justice system. Difficulties were also 
encountered in recruiting schoolteachers, 
running hospitals, and paying at d outfitting 
members of the police force. 
The precarious financial position of the 
Government, which had made a commitment to 
reduce its debt with the Bank of Guatemala, 
prompted it to launch a public offeri ig involving 
a total of 850 million quetzals in securities. In so 
doing, it used up the whole of its 
Congressionally-authorized quoi a for bond 
issues for fiscal years 1987 through 1993, and in 
1994 it was therefore necessary for Congress to 
renew its authorization in order for the 
Government to issue any more paper. The 
resources generated by this means were used to 
reduce the Government's debt with the Bank of 
Guatemala by about 500 million quetzals and to 
finance current expenditures, particularly the 
public-sector payroll. 
Fiscal problems hampered the 
implementation of monetary policy. The 
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Table 1 
GUATEMALA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Prices (December to December) 
Consumer prices (nation-wide) 
External sector 
Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal bank exchange rate 
(quetzales per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 








(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of exports) 



















































Percentages of GDP b 
14.8 14.1 13.6 13.1 
7.8 8.1 8.5 10.3 
7.0 6.0 5.1 2.7 
Percentages 
53.4 52.5 52.3 52.1 
11.4 8.8 6.1 6.5 
126.8 157.5 141.3 100.0 
Growth rates 
10.1 11.0 20.2 59.8 
92.5 93.7 94.9 100.0 
2.5 2.6 2.8 4.5 
84.1 85.0 85.4 100.0 


























34.4 29.7 29.9 30.1 
10.9 11.7 10.4 10.7 

















































15.5 19.1 17.3 16.8 
13.5 11.5 10.6 10.3 
2.0 7.6 6.7 6.5 
52.1 52.1 52.1 52.1 
6.4 5.7 5.5 5.2 
80.7 72.5 62.8 
10.0 14.2 11.6 11.6 
107.9 111.1 111.5 115.9 
5.0 5.2 5.6 5.7 

























23.6 20.8 17.8 16.4 
5.7 7.5 4.9 4.6 
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Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of banking 
system 
Domestic credit 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
(in local currency) 
M2 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 
On loans 
Equivalent interest rate 
in foreign currency g 
1987 1988 1989 









































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact c f the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in ODP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e P srcentages of the 
economically active population. Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods 
and services. 8 Nominal interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
GUATEMALA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 1993 l)94 a 







10.1 8.9 11.2 14.2 12.0 14.4 13.4 11.6 14.2 11.8 12.0 11.6 
88.6 85.6 87.5 86.4 85.8 86.7 90.0 90.2 87.3 84.9 83.9 82.1 
Real interest rate 
(annualized) 
On deposits (%) 
On loans (%) 
-2.0 -0.4 -3.1 -7.9 5.6 -5.2 3.5 - -2.2 1.5 -1.8 -4.3 
5.7 7.7 4.7 0.1 16.3 4.9 15.0 11.1 8.5 13.4 11.5 7.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of figures from the Bank of Guatemala. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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measures adopted early in the year called for a 
reduction in open-market operations and a 
lowering of legal reserve requirements in order 
to pave the way for a drop in interest rates. These 
steps were to be coupled with compensatory 
policies to enable the Government to retire more 
of its debt with the Bank of Guatemala than 
originally planned and to increase public-sector 
deposits with the Bank. The debt retirement 
target was attained, while public-sector deposits, 
especially those made by the central government, 
exhibited a positive trend up until the last quarter 
of 1994, increasing from 1.182 billion quetzals 
in January to 2 billion quetzals in September. 
From October on, however, the level of these 
deposits began to decrease, and by the end of 
1994 they had dropped to 1.276 billion quetzals. 
b) Monetary policy 
Over the course of 1994, the monetary base 
grew by 16%, which was higher than the rate of 
variation in domestic prices. Domestic loan 
operations conducted by the Bank of Guatemala 
were the main source of primary money creation. 
Further factors contributing to this expansion 
were the increase in the Bank of Guatemala's net 
international reserves -which was attributable in 
part to sharply higher export prices- and the 
disbursement in December of a US$ 35 million 
loan by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB). 
The money supply jumped by 40% in 1994, 
after having expanded by 21% the year before. 
Despite the fact that interest-bearing deposits 
continued to mount at a relatively slow rate (8% 
in 1994), local-currency liquidity (M2) also rose 
in real terms. The increase made by the banking 
system in the supply of domestic credit 
outstripped the inflation rate, with loans to both 
the public and private sectors growing by around 
20%. 
Throughout the year the monetary authorities 
implemented a policy designed to bring down 
interest rates; under this policy, the legal reserve 
requirement was lowered, first from 21% in 
January to 20% in June and then from 20% to 
14% between July and December. As a 
complementary measure, open-market 
operations were suspended starting in August. 
The authorities partially offset these 
liquidity-boosting measures by r using the level 
of mandatory investments whicli banks had to 
make with the Bank of Guatemala from 15% to 
19.5% between January and September. The 
initial expectation had been that tie relaxation of 
monetary policy could be ba anced out by 
increasing public-sector deposits with the Bank 
of Guatemala by a greater amount than originally 
planned. However, as noted earlier, the trends in 
these deposits did not follow the e spected course. 
Overall, interest rates on financial 
transactions moved downwsrd. Thus, on 
average, nominal bank lending Rites fell to 20% 
for the year -compared with 25% in 1993- while 
the drop in the yields of securities issued for 
purposes of monetary control was even more 
dramatic. In view of the lack of volatility 
displayed by both the inflation and exchange 
rates, a majority (around 70%) of the securities 
floated on the open market had tei ms of over nine 
months, as had also been the case in 1993. 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
Measures were implemented during the year 
that altered the way in which the foreign 
exchange market operated and made the system 
more flexible. In March 1994, a series of 
decisions issued by the Monetary Board 
stipulated that all sales and purchases of foreign 
exchange would thereafter be conducted in the 
banking market at a rate of exchange freely 
agreed upon by the parties involved. This put an 
end to the pre-existing system, which had been 
based on daily auctions conducted by the Bank 
of Guatemala using a base rate determined in the 
preceding auctions. Under the njw scheme, the 
Bank of Guatemala was authorised to step into 
the market in order to avert shaip swings in the 
exchange rate. The Bank ol Guatemala's 
intervention in the market during 1994 entailed 
US$ 85 million in currency sales and US$ 130 
million in purchases. These transactions partially 
offset the currency's tendency I o appreciate in 
value as a result of the comparative lack of 
uncertainty as to the market's course in the 
immediate future, given the higher prices being 
brought by Guatemala's leading export products 
on the international market. 
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3. The m; 
a) Economie activity 
Gross domestic product (GDP) increased by 
4%, which was 1% above the population growth 
rate. Accordingly, per capita GDP rose, although 
at a slow pace, for the eighth year in a row; even 
so, this coefficient was still lower than it had been 
at the start of the 1980s. The improvement in the 
country's terms of trade, together with a smaller 
volume of net payments to external factors, 
caused national income to climb by about 5% in 
1994, which was higher than the growth rate for 
GDP. 
Domestic spending and export volumes rose 
by similar amounts (more than 4%). Exports 
drew their momentum from the strong growth 
recorded in non-traditional items, since sales of 
traditional products were sluggish. The volume 
of imports of goods and services once again 
expanded faster than domestic activity, and the 
country's merchandise trade deficit widened as a 
result. 
Consumption expanded by nearly 5%, 
reflecting increases in both government and 
private-sector expenditure. Private consumption, 
which rose by the equivalent of more than 4% of 
GDP, was influenced by higher real wages, 
remittances from abroad and the greater 
availability of credit. The fact that consumption 
rose faster than output signified a continuation of 
the downward trend seen since 1991 in nominal 
saving's contribution to the financing of 
investment; in 1994 that contribution came to 
slightly more than 10% of GDP. The flow of 
external saving, for its part, remained at around 
6.5% of GDP. The higher level of economic 
activity notwithstanding, fixed investment 
slackened, and the coefficient for fixed capital 
formation therefore fell to around 13.5% of 
GDP. 
The growth of GDP was spread out among 
all the major areas of production activity with 
the sole exception of construction, where, for 
the second year in a row, output was lower than 
it had been the year before. One explanation 
for this decline may be the saturation of demand 
for high-income housing and upscale shopping 
centres. In contrast, construction of hotel 
variables 
complexes and of housing for middle-income 
groups was more buoyant, althoi gh the growth 
rate for these activities was still enly moderate. 
The output of services once a;;ain expanded 
faster than the production of goods. Basic 
services displayed a notable degre< of dynamism, 
expanding by around 7%. Growth ivas especially 
marked in telephone services, but the increase in 
the output of electricity, gas and water services 
was also significant. Under the "ether services" 
heading, upturns were observed in financial 
activities (6%) and commerce (;>%). The 2% 
growth rate recorded for the production of goods 
was rather slow and represented a slight 
downturn from 1993. The continied lackluster 
performance of agriculture, slack activity in 
manufacturing and the slow-down in 
construction were all factors in thi.t outcome. 
The agricultural sector recorded only modest 
growth (2%) despite greater liquidity and 
improved prices for its leading exiort products. 
This may be partially attributable to the steep 
decrease in crops intended for domestic 
consumption, which were hard-hit by a severe 
drought, and the slow pace of growth seen in the 
production of coffee and sugar cane. Farming 
activities also felt the effects or land tenure 
disputes which prompted takeovers of some rural 
properties; in addition, a number of crops were 
damaged by pests and diseases. 
The coffee harvest, which is the country's 
largest crop, expanded by a scant L%. This was 
largely due to the delayed effect (if a sustained 
period of low international prices, during which 
there was less of an incentive to maintain coffee 
plantations in good condition. This situation was 
aggravated by the producer countries' agreement 
to withhold exportable surpluses fix m the market 
in an effort to drive up international coffee prices. 
The amount of land devoted to sugir-cane crops 
increased, but sugar production ros ; by only 3%. 
Consequently, export volumes of sugar grew by 
a mere 1%, the lowest rate in recent years. One 
highlight on the export front was th< ; 7% increase 
in banana production, which was reflected in a 
significant rise in the volume of bi nana exports 
(11%). Rebounding international prices and the 
buoyancy of the United States market played a 
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major role in this achievement, since these 
factors far outweighed the effects of the barriers 
erected by the European Union against imports 
of bananas from Latin America. 
Cardamom production climbed by almost 
16% in response to highly advantageous 
international prices. Even so, export volumes 
were far below the very high levels characteristic 
of the 1980s. It is likely that cardamom was 
exported through triangular trade arrangements 
with other countries. Cotton production fell yet 
again (-32%) despite better international prices. 
Non-traditional export products -particularly 
some fruits and vegetables- turned in a 
reasonably robust performance. 
The output of basic grains plunged as a result 
of the acute drought that devastated 
grain-producing areas; maize production was 
sharply lower (-15%), and an even more dramatic 
fall was seen in the case of rice (-21%). Bean 
production also showed a steep drop (-11%), as 
the impact of the drought was compounded by a 
viral disease which is transmitted by the whitefly. 
The upward trend exhibited by livestock and 
farming activities in recent years continued 
apace. The size of pig and cattle herds increased, 
as did the number of animals slaughtered. Much 
the same situation was observed in the poultry 
industry. The output of milk, eggs and honey also 
climbed. 
Manufacturing maintained a modest rate of 
growth (3%) despite the significant increase in 
exports to Central America and improved 
earnings from sales to the United States by 
maquila operations producing textiles and 
clothing. Given the solid performance of 
manufacturing exports, it must be assumed that 
the overall sluggishness of the manufacturing 
sector was due to a weak showing on the part of 
industries which cater to the domestic market. 
The economy's top performers include the food, 
glass and chemicals industries. 
One new development in 1994 was a closer 
monitoring of industry's impact on the 
environment. Three textile firms were 
temporarily shut down, while others became the 
target of complaints from environmental 
watchdog agencies. This prompted a number of 
companies to decide to install water treatment 
facilities for their plants. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Inflation was under 12%. This was higher than 
the 8% target set at the start of the year, but was 
quite close to the rate recorded in 1993. 
An examination of the variations between 
annual averages reveals widely d iffering rates of 
price increases. The steepest uoswing was in 
education (36%), but food and beverages -both 
of which figure prominently in the shopping 
baskets of low- and middle-incone groups- also 
registered above-average price hikes (16%). The 
other categories (clothing, medical care, and 
transport and communications) had 
below-average price increases of between 4% 
and 8%. 
Real wages recovered slightly, but remained 
below the wage levels of the eirly 1980s. The 
aggregate level of employment showed almost 
no variation, with employment rising in 
manufacturing and commerce but apparently 
declining in such sectors as agriculture, mining, 
construction and other services. Although the 
open unemployment rate fell somewhat (to 
5.2%), underemployment contirued to be very 
widespread. Consequently, (he equivalent 
unemployment rate (which takes both indicators 
into account) was still above 37% of the 
economically active population <EAP). 
c) The external sector 
Despite the sizeable increase in merchandise 
exports, the country's trade in goads and services 
again showed a very large de ficit: more than 
US$ 1 billion, or nearly 8% of GDP. This was 
partially offset by the continued rise in private 
transfer payments, which include remittances 
sent by Guatemalans residing overseas 
(amounting to about 2.5% of GDJ). Nevertheless, 
the current account deficit toppsd the US$ 700 
million mark, which was equivalent to over 5% 
of GDP. Capital inflows were down from the high 
levels recorded in 1993, with the drop in flows 
of short-term funds being especially marked. 
Inflows made up of loans to commercial banks 
and import-related commercial credits 
constituted particularly noteworthy components 
of the country's capital movements. Despite the 
downturn, however, these inflo ÏVS did prove to 
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be large enough to cover the current account 
deficit. 
The value of merchandise exports rose by 
12%, the highest growth rate to be recorded in 
the last five years. Sales to Central America and 
to the rest of the world exhibited similar growth 
rates. Prices of the leading traditional exports 
-including coffee, sugar and cardamom-
climbed steeply, while banana prices rose at a 
more moderate pace. Non-traditional exports, for 
their part, showed a significant increase (on the 
order of 10%). 
Imports of goods, c.i.f., expanded by 7% to 
almost US$ 2.8 billion. Higher purchases of 
consumer goods (up 21%) were the main factor 
contributing to the increase. In contrast, imports 
of capital goods decreased slightly. Imports of 
intermediate goods rose moderately (4%) as the 
net result of a small drop in petroleum and fuels 
and a small rise in building materials. 
With respect to trade in real services, tourism 
showed a deficit for the first time in six years; 
this turnaround was attributable to a rapid 
increase in costs and the drop in income caused 
by the cancellation of trips in reaction to the 
area's political instability. Income received in the 
form of private transfer payments totalled about 
US$ 400 million, which was more than the 
country's export earnings from coffee. 
The most important event in connection with 
the external debt was the successful conclusion 
of negotiations with most of the countries 
belonging to the Paris Club. These negotiations 
allowed Guatemala to regularize its payments 
situation with Canada, France, Germany and 
Italy. Although it was unable to regularize its 
bilateral debt with Spain, Guatemala did make 
substantial inroads by setting up a negotiation 
process and reducing its debt witi that country 
from US$ 480 million to US$ 180 million. On 
the other hand, Guatemala's failure to meet 
targets agreed to in its understandir g with the IMF 
prompted that organization to cut off funding; 
this situation may eventually have an adverse 
effect on Guatemala's access to other multilateral 
sources of credit. 
The public sector's net extenal debt rose 
slightly, from US$2.086 billior in 1993 to 
US$ 2.108 billion in 1994. The Bank of 
Guatemala's debt decreased by US$ 140 
million in the course of 1994, but the 
non-financial public sector's climbed by 
US$ 162 million over the same psriod. Part of 
the reason for the increase in the latter's debt 
was the appreciation of currencies included in 
the basket of currencies in which some 
obligations with international financial 




1. General trends 
The recession which overtook Haiti after its 
institutional breakdown in 1991 continued to 
worsen in 1994 as a consequence of the sanctions 
imposed by the international community, since it 
was not until late in the year that efforts to find a 
solution to the crisis met with success. 
Thus, the gross domestic product (GDP), which 
had dropped by nearly 20% in the preceding three 
years, fell by more than 12% in real terms, 
bringing per capita GDP to US$ 260, the lowest 
in the region. 
After the initial failure of the negotiations 
coordinated by the United Nations, the trade 
embargo was tightened in May, causing severe 
damage to the economy. The transport and 
energy sectors were especially hard hit because 
of the resulting oil shortage, and the already 
shaky condition of the real economy was thus 
exacerbated. It was not until October, when 
civilian government was restored, that the 
embargo was lifted. 
Exports and imports contracted. In the course 
of the year, the local currency (the gourde) was 
devalued by an average of 20% in nominal terms, 
domestic prices jumped by 52% during the 12 
months leading up to September 1994, and 
unemployment topped 60%. These indicators 
account for the country's high rate of clandestine 
emigration. In addition, a severe deterioration of 
government operations was seen as fiscal 
revenues plummeted. Moreover, all this occurred 
in the midst of a serious institutional crisis which 
had a particularly strong impact on the banking 
system. 
This was how the situation stood at the close 
of fiscal 1994, when the reinstatement of a 
civilian president made it possible to lift the 
embargo and normalize the country's trade and 
financial relations with the rest of ti le world. The 
authorities instituted reforms providing for the 
elimination of the constraints which were 
hampering the recovery of production, 
discouraging investment and limiting the 
country's ability to absorb the anticipated flow 
of foreign aid. 
Nevertheless, the prospects :br an early 
resumption of growth remained incertain. By 
1994, in the aftermath of a three-year political 
crisis and the more recent imposition of 
international sanctions, the production base of 
Haiti's economy had gone into a tîilspin. With 
the virtual disappearance of the country's 
subcontracting industry, the manufacturing 
sector lost its most dynamic corrponent. The 
shortage of petroleum products led people to 
plunder forested areas in order to obtain fuel and 
to supply the market for charcoal, t lereby doing 
serious damage to the agricultural ecosystem. 
Furthermore, topsoil washed down by the rains 
turned into mud that dirtied coasti 1 waters and 
suffocated the coral reefs and fish farms, all of 
which hurt fishing and tourism and made the 
resumption of sustainable growth even more 
problematic. 
2. Economic policy 
In 1991, the first democratically elected 
Government in Haiti's history had sought to 
establish a healthy macroeconomic environment 
and to cultivate the credibility it nee led to obtain 
The years referred to in this report are fiscal years, which run from 1 October to the following 30 Septemb :r. 
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more international assistance by undertaking 
reforms in the areas of finance, the civil service, 
exchange-rate and trade regimes, and pricing 
policy. In particular, the Government took steps 
to bring the country's fiscal accounts under 
control by raising taxes and cutting expenditure, 
especially by trimming surplus staff from the 
government payroll. Late in September 1991, 
however, after this administration had been in 
office for only eight months, the entire picture 
changed when a military coup brought down the 
Government and installed a defacto regime from 
which the international community withheld 
recognition. 
The country's economic policy in 1994 was 
in large part shaped by the severe deterioration 
of the public sector's finances in 1992 and 1993 
as a consequence of the slump in economic 
activity and inefficient fiscal management. The 
persistence of a large budget deficit in 1994 
forced the Bank of the Republic to increase its 
currency issues and, given the suspension of 
external financing (the chief source of funds in 
previous years), to accumulate arrears in its 
servicing of foreign and domestic debt. 
With a civilian president once more in office 
and the political situation beginning to return to 
normal, in October 1994 the first steps were taken 
to bring the country's fiscal situation under 
control, downsize the public sector, liberalize the 
foreign trade regime and do away with the 
restrictions that were hampering private 
investment. 
a) Fiscal policy 
During 1994 a serious deterioration was seen 
in Haiti's public finances as the result of a sharp 
drop in current income (-26%). This decrease 
was, in turn, caused by the general downturn in 
economic activity, the effects of international 
sanctions and the worsening performance of 
public enterprises. Another highly significant 
factor was the country's increasing 
ungovernability, which took the form of rampant 
tax evasion and a lack of accountability with 
regard to expenditure. As a result, the tax 
performance ratio fell to a mere 3.4% of GDP. 
Meanwhile, current expenditure rose by 12%, 
mainly because of a 40% jump in extrabudgetary 
outlays. Expenditure on civil seivants' wages 
was up by 6% in nominal tenas; this item 
accounted for over half of all pubic expenditure 
and far exceeded total income. Capital 
expenditure was once again negligible. 
Accordingly, the central government's deficit 
continued along its upward path, rising from 
3.8% to 5.4% of GDP. Given the evaporation of 
foreign finance and the absence of a domestic 
financial market, the expansionary pressure 
which the fiscal shortfall brought I o bear on the 
money supply mounted. As a resul t, 85% of the 
deficit was covered with credits from the Bank 
of the Republic and the remainder was financed 
by deferring payments on foreign and domestic 
debts. 
As the year came to a close, th ; expectation 
was that the normalization of tie country's 
political situation would open thï way for a 
resumption of foreign assistance, in¡ ismuch as the 
country's short-term requirements, for example, 
were estimated to amount to over US$ 500 
million. 
b) Monetary policy 
As already mentioned, money cr< ation and the 
resulting inflation tax were once igain used to 
enable the public sector to function in 1994. The 
credit extended to the Governmenl, which rose 
by 26%, thus became the chief factor in the 
expansion of the monetary base and liquidity. 
The effect of this was mitigated by t tie lower rate 
of increase in net credit flows tc the private 
sector, which had been dealt a heavy blow by the 
contraction in the production bise and the 
country's economic problems. The nominal 
growth in these credit flows dropped from 25% 
in 1993 to only 6% in 1994, which translated into 
a sharp reduction in real terms. 
In July, Parliament approved the Bank of the 
Republic's proposal to suspend the legal ceiling 
on the issuance of currency. Over the year the 
money supply (Ml) swelled by 19%. This 
expansion was concentrated in currency outside 
banks, which increased by 25% -an 
understandable preference in view of the 
uncertain economic situation and the 
proliferation of informal activities. E ank demand 
deposits, by contrast, rose only 8%. 
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Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Prices (September to September) 
Consumer prices 
External sector 
Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(gourdes per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 








(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of exports) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
Growth rates 
-0.7 0.9 1.0 -0.2 
-2.6 -1.1 -1.0 -2.2 
-0.6 0.3 -4.5 4.1 
-0.1 1.7 0.4 -1.2 
10.1 6.8 3.4 3.0 
-1.2 0.2 0.9 1.2 
Percentages 
-0.3 2.8 -3.3 2.9 
0.2 - - -0.2 
-0.5 2.8 -3.3 3.0 
0.2 -0.9 -1.2 -1.3 
2.7 -3.1 1.5 -4.6 
-3.3 2.1 4.1 2.9 
Percentages of GDP 
21.7 20.6 19.2 18.0 
10.9 8.4 7.3 8.2 
10.8 12.2 11.9 9.8 
Percentages 
129.1 129.3 120.4 100.0 
Growth rates 
-13.8 8.3 7.3 21.8 
115.5 109.0 84.2 100.0 
5.5 5.9 6.3 7.4 
88.2 93.1 96.4 100.0 


























68.3 73.1 78.0 53.9 
5.9 8.4 9.7 8.6 
1991 1992 1993 1994' 
-0.8 -14.3 -5.1 -12.2 
-2.8 -16.0 -7.0 -14.0 
0.1 -12.3 -7.2 -11.9 
0.5 -9.8 -9.7 -15.8 
-8.1 -13.1 -6.7 -42.0 

























19.8 12.5 12.0 5.9 
8.9 5.2 2.3 -2.0 
10.8 7.3 9.7 7.9 
84.7 71.7 60.4 44.3 
6.8 23.8 26.9 52.1 
95.4 84.8 72.6 69.9 
7.7 9.1 12.4 14.9 

























48.2 50.2 55.8 60.1 
10.0 7.1 7.5 12.0 
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Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of banking 
system 
Domestic credit 
To the central government 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
























































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact cf the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annuil growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. 
exports of goods and services. 
Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payi tients, divided by 
Increased liquidity in the formal 
foreign-exchange market brought pressure to 
bear on the local currency, whose average 
nominal value for the year proved to be one fifth 
lower than in 1993. The economy's high liquidity 
drove down nominal interest rates to negative 
levels in real terms. From March to September 
1994, nominal interest rates on fixed-term 
deposits were between 5% and 6%, depending on 
the term, while interest rates on savings deposits 
hovered below 3%. With the credit market 
weakened by the country's exceptionally severe 
recession, interest rates on loans jumped from 
13% to 23%. This exacerbated the a ready critical 
plight of financial intermediaries, which since the 
preceding year had been requirec to maintain 
very high minimum reserves (73% on current 
accounts and 46% on savings deposits). 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
In 1994 all the components of supply and 
demand were down, in some cases quite sharply. 
As a result of the trade embargo and the existing 
constraints in terms of foreign financing, 
investment crashed (-57%) to 6% of GDP, which 
was less than one third of the level recorded at 
the beginning of the decade. Private consumption 
also fell (-9%), as did public consumption (-8%), 
and domestic demand therefore slunped by 14%. 
The embargo against the defacto re gime led to a 
37% drop in export volume, which meant that in 
1994 foreign sales were 40% lower :han they had 
been in 1991. 
The supply of goods and services within the 
economy shrank by 17%, GDP plunged by 12% 
and the volume of imports contract ;d by 37%. 
International trade sanctions wer Î tightened at 
the beginning of the year. This led to more 
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frequent power outages and exacerbated the fuel 
shortage, which, in turn, prompted a drastic 
slow-down in production activities, particularly 
manufacturing. The lack of fuel and of imported 
inputs, especially fertilizers, compounded the 
structural problems which have plagued 
agriculture in Haiti for some time (such as soil 
erosion, a lack of credit and low investment 
levels), thereby driving the sector's output down 
by 8%. 
Industrial production fell by 27%. The trade 
embargo had a devastating effect on the maquila 
(inbond assembly) industry, which, by the end of 
the fiscal year, had all but disappeared. In May 
1994, this sector employed barely 8,000 people, 
compared to 44,000 in September 1991. During 
this same period, the number of business firms in 
operation tumbled from 252 to 44. Industries 
oriented towards the domestic market and import 
substitution were hurt by the contraction of local 
demand, the lack of imported intermediate 
goods, the meagre domestic supply of 
agricultural produce and competition from 
contraband goods. 
The construction industry suffered a 
downturn equivalent to one-half its aggregate 
annual value, partly because of the suspension of 
public works due to budgetary constraints and 
partly as a result of sagging investment in 
housing owing to the financial squeeze and the 
rising cost of transport and building materials, 
particularly cement. 
b) Prices and employment 
Cumulative inflation over the preceding 12 
months reached 52% in September 1994, an 
unprecedented level for Haiti and double the 
previous year's figure. 
Some of the factors helping to fuel inflation 
were the expansion of the money stock and the 
reduction in supply caused by the slump in 
production activity and the trade embargo. 
Shortages of goods led to speculative purchasing 
and stockpiling, thereby triggering an 
inflationary spiral which was financed by the 
excess liquidity resulting from the expansion of 
the money supply. The devaluation of the local 
currency also contributed to the rise in prices by 
making imports more expensive. Rising food, 
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fuel and transport prices were particularly 
significant factors in the overal increase in the 
general consumer price index. 
What is more, the official figures may even 
underestimate the real rate of itiflation, in view 
of the proliferation of informal enterprises 
sparked by the breakdown of organized 
economic activity, the adverse market conditions 
existing for foreign trade, and the increase in 
illegal imports. It is likely that the consequent 
reduction of market transparency and 
competitiveness engendered wide price 
spreads, with prices being higher in informal 
transactions. 
These circumstances also hal a social effect. 
The across-the-board rise in pricjs, especially for 
essential goods, eroded the purchasing power of 
wages. In 1994 the minimum vage once again 
dropped in value, this time by 2''% (as measured 
against the rise in the consumer price index). This 
was compounded by soaring unemployment, 
which reached an unprecedented level of over 
60%. This situation inevitably forced large 
numbers of the unemployed to seek out 
alternative means of survival. Thus, traditional 
migratory flows from the country to the city 
reversed direction and a clandes ine exodus from 
the country gave rise to waves of destitute 
emigrants. 
c) The external sector 
For much of the year the most significant 
factor in terms of the external sector and the 
economy as a whole was the lightening of the 
international trade embargo in response to the 
failure of attempts to normalize the political 
situation in the country. It was r ot until October, 
when a constitutionally-based political solution 
had been found, that the sanctions began to be 
lifted. 
The embargo accelerated the pre-existing 
trend towards a decline in the external sector's 
relative importance within the economy. In 1994 
this sector accounted for barely 30% of GDP, 
compared with nearly 50% in 1Í'91 and over 60% 
in 1980. This type of process seriously 
undermines the mainstay of development in a 
small, outward-looking economy such as that of 
Haiti. 
HAITI 
The value of exports fell by almost 40%, 
while the value of imports, f.o.b., went down 
by 35%. In absolute terms, however, the drop 
in the value of imports was much greater, and 
the country's persistent trade deficit 
consequently narrowed. The contraction in 
foreign sales extended to practically all sectors, 
with the exception of Haiti's negligible exports 
of sisal. The country's principal export products 
declined considerably. The subcontracting 
industry in the free trade area saw a 45% drop in 
sales, while exports of local crafts and 
cottage-industry manufactures plummeted by 
55%. The preceding year, these two sectors had 
made a remarkable recovery and had accounted 
for more than two thirds of the total value of 
Haitian exports. 
The embargo, the recession and the 
devaluation of the gourde explain the drop in 
registered imports, although there were signs of 
a surge in illegal imports. The (ifects of this 
decrease were felt the most in production-related 
industries: chemicals (-52%), manufactures 
(-40%), petroleum and petroleum products 
(-35%) and machinery and transport equipment 
(-28%). 
The international sanctions hid an adverse 
effect on unrequited private transfer payments, 
which shrank by 40%. Nevertheless, the current 
account deficit fell from US$ 126 million to 
US$ 93 million, thanks to the steep reduction in 
imports. Income from net capital inflows 
stemming from the increase in humanitarian aid 
was insufficient to cover the deficit on current 
account and capital flight caused he country to 
lose some of its international reseives. 
Despite the suspension of forñgn financial 
aid, accumulated arrears pushed the external 
public debt up to nearly US$ 8i'0 million, or 




1. General trends 
In 1994 the Honduran economy felt the effects of 
a prolonged drought which hurt agricultural 
production and triggered critical electrical power 
shortages. The situation was made worse by 
a decline in the flow of external credit due to 
the country's failure to meet the conditions it 
had agreed upon with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The combination of these 
two factors resulted in a drop of nearly 2% in 
gross domestic product (GDP), a considerable 
depreciation of the lempira, an acceleration of 
inflation to an annual rate of 29%, and a decrease 
in the country's already very low levels of 
personal consumption. 
The slackening of domestic demand was 
accompanied by a reduction in tie volume of 
exports owing to a contraction in the available 
supply of Honduras' main export products. The 
foreign trade deficit none the less narrowed 
somewhat thanks to the fact that the rise in export 
prices outpaced the increase in impc rt prices. The 
resulting improvement in the terms < rf trade made 
up for the decline in production, and national 
income consequently remained une hanged. 
2. Economic policy 
The administration which took office at the 
beginning of the year formulated a policy 
designed to check the build-up of inflation that 
had begun the year before. However, the drought 
and the delay in concluding an agreement with 
the International Monetary Fund, which held up 
the country's receipt of external loans, made it 
much more difficult to attain this goal, 
particularly during the first half of the year. 
Fiscal policy focused on reducing the budget 
deficit by cutting spending and instituting tax 
reforms aimed at boosting revenues. The 
privatization of the Empresa Hondurena de 
Telecomunicaciones (HONDUTEL) was also 
expected to bring in additional income. Although 
the effects of these reforms were not evident in 
the 1994 budget outturn because they were not 
passed until quite late in the year, the fact that the 
initial legislative steps had been taken enabled 
Honduras to reach an agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and obtain 
external credits from the Fund and other multi-
lateral financial institutions, as well as to request 
the renegotiation of its debt with the Paris Club. 
Monetary policy was aimed at curbing 
liquidity by raising the required level of 
interest-bearing reserves; neveitheless, the 
money supply expanded faster thin expected. 
Meanwhile, in response to the sharp change seen 
in the exchange rate during the first six months 
of the year, the Central Bank replao id the system 
of floating exchange rates with an auction-based 
scheme, an approach that helped to slow the 
depreciation of the lempira in the second half of 
the year. 
Finally, in line with its current trade policy, 
Honduras became a member of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in April 
1994. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The central objective of the administration's 
fiscal policy was to improve public finances, 
which had deteriorated during the pi eceding year 
due to the combined effect of a higher level of 
expenditure and a real reduction in income. The 
accomplishment of this objective ivas deemed 
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fundamental not only as one of the tools of a 
sound economic policy but also as a basic 
prerequisite for maintaining the flow of external 
capital from multilateral lending agencies. 
The achievement of a positive level of current 
savings continued to be the country's chief 
fiscal-policy target. Under such a policy, the 
level of investment expenditure depends upon 
how much external financing is received. During 
the early months of 1994, however, spending 
levels continued along the upward path they had 
followed since 1993 due to the inertial 
component of expenditure generated by 
pre-existing spending commitments, wage hikes 
for public employees and hefty subsidy 
allocations. Nevertheless, subsequent measures 
did enable the central government to achieve 
current savings of around 1.4% of GDP and to 
reduce the overall deficit from 9% of GDP in 1993 
to a little over 5% in 1994. 
This accomplishment was made possible by a 
smaller increase in current spending and a 
reduction in capital expenditure, especially in 
investment by the central government, which fell 
by over 30% (around 10% in real terms). Despite 
this deep cut in real investment, the drop in 
capital expenditure was smaller because of the 
high level of financial investment. This, in turn, 
was a result of the outlays which the central 
government had to make on behalf of the 
Empresa Nacional de Energía Eléctrica (ENES) SO 
that an emergency electrical power generation 
project could be carried out in order to deal with 
the country's critical power shortages. To this 
same end, capital transfers to ENEE were also 
increased. 
Current expenditure, which had climbed by 
28% in 1993, rose by only 6% in 1994, for a 16% 
decrease in constant values. The two categories 
showing the largest increases were 
remunerations and debt interest. The growth rate 
registered for interest payments on the debt 
amounted to almost 50%, primarily as a result of 
the ascent of the exchange rate. In sum, the 
pressure exerted by expenditure eased from 
nearly 18% to 15.4% of GDP. 
In an effort to boost income, in October a tax 
reform bill was submitted to the National 
Assembly that called for an increase in some 
taxes, the establishment of a number of new 
levies and a broadening of the t ix base. Under 
the provisions of these reforms, ¡i 1% tax on net 
corporate assets was levied for the twofold 
purpose of making the tax system more equitable 
and of countering income tax evasion with the 
help of an automatic control mechanism; the base 
for the sales tax was broadened by including 
services and eliminating Í number of 
exemptions; the income tax -a flit tax of 10%-
was applied to interest income (in either local or 
foreign currency) from stock transactions, loans 
or deposits other than savings dc posits; the tax 
on private motor vehicles was raised; the excise 
tax on non-essential goods was consolidated at a 
20% rate; a special taxation scheme was devised 
for coffee growers as a means of capturing part 
of the windfall profits afforded by higher coffee 
prices through the establishment of a two-year 
5% tax on exports and a minimum income tax of 
10% on windfall profits; and the customs 
valuation factor used in computing the tax base 
for foreign trade duties was replaced with the 
market exchange rate. In addition, a number of 
tariffs were consolidated, energy prices as well 
as telephone and electricity service rates were 
raised, and the subsidies formerly paid to 
producers of coffee, cement, wheat flour and 
petroleum products were discontir ued. 
The full impact of these refonr s was not felt 
in 1994 because they were passed so late in the 
year. The annual growth rate for current income 
was also somewhat faster in 1994 tl ian it had been 
the year before owing to the increase in domestic 
prices, which boosted sales ta.c receipts in 
particular, and to the application )f the market 
exchange rate to dutiable items. 
The deficit was financed almost entirely with 
external credit, which took off some of the 
pressure for the use of financial resources 
obtained from the sale of securities and the 
placement of loans by the Central Bank, an 
expedient which had been used extensively in 
1993. Owing to these circumstances, the 
non-financial public sector's domestic debt held 
at virtually the same level as the y< ar before. 
b) Foreign exchange policy 
The reduction in inflows of exernal capital 
heightened the trend towards a depreciation of 
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Table 1 
HONDURAS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994a 
Growth and investment 
Gross doemstic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross doemstic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990 = 100) 




Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(lempiras per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 








(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 











































































































































































60.3 60.4 56.1 100.0 107.9 102.4 112.6 125.3 
Millions of dollars 
-330 -318 -329 -282 -317 -413 -464 -319 
-122 -113 -123 
950 1026 1 061 
-91 
1032 
1072 1139 1184 1124 1135 1229 1331 
395 333 300 307 383 424 319 
-120 -188 -264 
1 016 1 041 1 067 
26 -19 -28 
Percentages 






87.3 92.1 92.2 127.8 107.9 109.3 120.9 139.3 
17.8 16.7 16.6 17.2 20.2 25.1 22.8 17.2 
246 










Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of 
banking system 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
(in local currency) 
M2 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 
On loans 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign currency 
1987 1988 1989 











































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact > >f the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. Percentages of the working-age population.. e Open unemployment rate in 
Tegucigalpa. The figures shown for 1993 and 1994 refer to the variation registered for the fourth quart :r as compared to 
the corresponding period of the preceding year. 8 Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payi nents, divided by 
exports of goods and services. The interest rate after it has been deflated by the variation in the average exchange rate 
offered by banks for cash transactions. 
Table 2 
HONDURAS: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 1993 li'94" 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Consumer prices 
(12-month 
variation, %) 13.1 7.9 6.1 6.5 7.3 10.3 13.2 13.0 16.5 21.7 24.1 28.8 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 100.2 100.0 102.4 107.0 105.2 110.9 115.1 119.3 120.4 129.3 127.5 123.9 
Real interest rate 
(annualized) 
On deposits 5.9 3.9 1.0.5 1.7 1.9 -5.6 -2.8 1.9 -9.8 -20.8 -9.4 -12.3 
On loans 15.5 12.7 19.7 9.5 10.3 2.1 7.2 12.9 -0.5 -12.3 1.1 -0.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
the lempira, which had been allowed to float 
against other currencies since the beginning of 
the 1990s. In an effort to slow the exchange rate's 
ascent, midway through the year the Central 
Bank consolidated the interbank market and 
instituted a system based on foreign exchange 
auctions. Under this system, the Central Bank 
bought hard currency from its exchange agents 
at the market's reference rate and auctioned it off 
to buyers whose bids had to be within 1% of the 
benchmark exchange rate, which was set by the 
Central Bank based on the reference rate. 
The Bank's intervention in the exchange 
market and the restriction of bids to a maximum 
variation of 1% every 15 auctions gave the 
foreign exchange market greater stability; as a 
result, the rate for the dollar climbed only 8% 
during the second half of the year, as compared 
to nearly 20% during the first half. 
c) Monetary policy 
As a consequence of the build-up in 
international reserves, an increase in Central 
Bank credit to the public and private sectors, and 
para-fiscal expenditures, the monetary base 
expanded by about 45% during the year. In order 
a) Economic activity 
After two years of strong growth (at annual 
rates of over 6%), in 1994 the economy's gross 
domestic product (GDP) shrank by nearly 2%, 
which translated into a decrease of 
approximately 5% in per capita GDP. 
With the exception of private investment, 
which rose for the third year in a row at an annual 
rate of 9%, the drop in aggregate demand 
occurred across the board. Both public 
investment -which had been the mainstay of 
the country's economic growth during the 
two preceding years- and government 
consumption were lower as a result of the 
administration's policy of narrowing the 
fiscal deficit, while, given the decrease in real 
wages, private consumption contracted at 
much the same rate as GDP. Meanwhile, the 
volume of exports was down due to a decline 
to reduce the system's liquidity, in June the 
minimum reserve requirement wa s raised to 40% 
for commercial banks and 23 Jo for savings 
institutions. A portion of these reserves took the 
form of interest-bearing government securities. 
Thanks to the use of these mechanisms of 
monetary absorption, the money supply 
expanded less (37%) than the monetary base did, 
although its growth rate was still well above the 
rates for preceding years. Under these 
circumstances, even though nominal interest 
rates on deposits and on loans w;re raised, they 
both declined in real terms. Given the real 
decrease in rates on deposits, local-currency term 
deposits were not very attractive and thus 
increased by only 10% in naminal terms. 
Consequently, the expansion of the broad money 
aggregate (M2) was on the order of 22%, and 
bank credit to the private sectcr climbed at a 
similar rate. 
A steady increase was seen di ring the year in 
unregulated types of financial institutions, 
which, by the same token, are not subject to 
minimum reserve requirements According to 
official estimates, the amount of jiinds channeled 
through these intermediaries wis equivalent to 
one fourth of the money supply. 
in shipments of the country's main export 
products. 
The economy's weak performance was partly 
attributable to the prolonged drought, which 
drove down agricultural output and heightened 
the shortfall in electrical power generation. In 
response to the resulting energy crisis, electricity 
was rationed throughout much oJ the year, which 
hurt the manufacturing sector. In addition, the 
cutback in public investment had a severe impact 
on construction and on the suppliers of some of 
the construction sector's inputs, which had been 
expanding at a striking pace for the past two 
years. Almost all the remaining sectors of activity 
contracted as well, with the exception of mining 
and some services representing a very small 
share of total production. 
The agricultural sector slumpi ;d by nearly 3%. 
Production for the domestic market was hurt by 
the drought, which cut the corn h arvest by almost 
3. The main variables 
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25%. The showing of export-oriented agriculture 
was similarly lackluster. The supply of bananas 
decreased as producers were discouraged by 
lower prices on the United States market, 
restrictions imposed on Latin American exports 
by the European Union and the calling of a strike 
at mid-year in one of the main production 
companies. Furthermore, coffee growers, whose 
plantations have been allowed to deteriorate, 
were unable to respond to the upturn in 
international prices. 
The livestock industry made some headway, 
but forestry activities experienced a slow-down 
due to the imposition of a partial ban designed to 
block unsound practices in the development of 
forest resources. The fishery sector had done well 
during the past three years, but registered a 
downturn in output for 1994. The shrimp 
industry, which had been expanding steadily for 
a decade, was ravaged by a disease similar to the 
Taura syndrome that struck Ecuador's shrimp 
farms in 1993, causing its exports to plunge to 
almost half their former level. 
Construction, which had grown at an 
extremely rapid pace in 1992 and 1993, slumped 
by 17% owing to a decrease in public-sector 
building and to a shortage of cement that drove 
up its price and thus increased construction costs 
substantially. The occurrence of a cement 
shortage at a time when production was on the 
rise was accounted for by the fact that a large 
percentage of output was channeled to the 
external market. 
The slow-down in manufacturing (-2%) was 
partly a consequence of the rationing of energy 
supplies, which compounded the effects of 
weaker domestic demand and limits on credit. In 
1994 net electricity generation was 8% below the 
1993 figure; this level of output, plus imports, 
made for a total supply of 2,300 MWh. Since this 
was clearly not enough to meet a potential 
demand for 2,800 MWh, rationing became 
necessary. Almost 70% of all manufacturing 
enterprises had to buy generators in order to meet 
their own energy needs, but this increased their 
costs, since the price per kWh of power supplied 
by ENEE was 50% less than the cost to such firms 
of generating their own supply. With the 
exception of petroleum products, wood and wood 
products, and non-metallic minerals (especially 
cement), most branches of irdustry saw a 
decrease in activity. 
In the time that had passed sine e the Francisco 
Morazán hydroelectric plant cam* on stream, not 
only had the country's effective installed 
capacity failed to increase, but it had actually 
been diminishing as a consequenc e of a failure to 
maintain some thermal power plants in good 
condition and the closure of othîrs. The result 
was a heavy dependence on hydro îlectric power. 
Irregular rainfall in the past few y< ars and a rapid 
deforestation process combined lo lower water 
levels in the reservoirs used by hydroelectric 
plants, and the amount of power bîing generated 
was therefore dropping at a time when demand 
was growing. A number of them al plants were 
brought on line in order to deal wil h this problem 
and, although their costs were higiier, by the end 
of the year it became possible o discontinue 
rationing. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Continuing a trend begun ii the second 
quarter of 1993, the rate of increase in the 
consumer price index accelerated r larkedly, with 
the annual rise (December to Decei nber) jumping 
from 13% in 1993 to 29% in 1994. The largest 
increase -more than twice as much as the year 
before- was in the category of fc od. A similar 
rate was registered for health care, but this 
category carries a lower weightin 5 in the basic 
shopping basket. In contrast, tie price rises 
recorded for clothing, education, reading 
materials and entertainment, and beverages and 
tobacco were lower than the in;rease in the 
overall index. 
This price trend was primarily iccounted for 
by the rising exchange rate, a shortfall in the 
supply of basic grains caused by a reduction in 
domestic supply, and increases in the prices of 
petroleum products and urban transport. In 
November the Government reached an 
agreement with entrepreneurs for tie imposition 
of temporary price controls on 40 ;ommodities. 
These controls remained in force through 
December but their effectiveness proved to be 
somewhat limited. 
Given the rigidity of economic agents' 
perceptions in the face of an upsurge in inflation, 
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real wages fell by 18%. Under these 
circumstances, which were exacerbated by rising 
urban unemployment (in Tegucigalpa the level 
of unemployment was over 8% of the active 
population), strikes were called and 
demonstrations were held. The minimum wage, 
which had not been raised since mid-1993, 
remained unchanged because the Government 
and workers failed to reach an agreement. The 
authorities dealt with this situation by 
unilaterally announcing that a 20% increase in 
the minimum wage would take effect in 1995. 
c) The external sector 
The higher value of exports, lower imports 
and a smaller trade deficit for services all helped 
to cut the deficit on the current account of the 
balance of payments to US$ 320 million. 
Nevertheless, the deficit was still quite large, 
since it was equivalent to one third of the 
country's exports of goods and services and to 
over 10% of GDP. 
The fact that export prices rose more sharply 
than the prices of imports led to an improvement 
in the real terms of trade for goods, and this meant 
that the purchasing power of exports held its 
ground despite a drop in export volumes. The rise 
in prices boosted the current value of 
merchandise exports by more than 2%. 
All the country's main exports (including both 
traditional and non-traditional products) enjoyed 
higher unit values with the exception of bananas, 
whose price slipped by 12%. The increases seen 
in coffee prices (52%) and, to a lesser extent, in 
the prices brought by silver (25%) and shrimp 
(24%) were particularly noteworthy. On the 
other hand, the volume of banana exports fell yet 
again in response to flagging demand in the 
European market and lower prices in the United 
States market. The further increase in the value 
of shrimp exports, which has been mounting 
rapidly in recent years, was attributable to higher 
prices, since the volume of sales was down. 
Producers were unable to respond to soaring 
coffee prices by increasing their exports due to 
the timing of the coffee harvest. The maquila 
(inbond assembly) industry, which had been 
booming since 1991 and had nearly trebled its 
aggregate value at current prices during that time, 
experienced a slow-down in 19<>4 due to labour 
problems. 
In this sluggish economic environment, the 
value of merchandise imports i ell by over 6% 
owing to a reduction in purchas es of consumer 
and intermediate goods from abroad. Imports of 
petroleum and petroleum products gathered 
momentum as it became necessaiy to use thermal 
plants and generators to produce more electrical 
power, but the increase was almo st entirely offset 
by the drop in hydrocarbon prices on the 
international market. Purchases of capital goods 
-especially the acquisition of electrical power 
plants by both private agents and the public 
sector- expanded for the same reason. 
Trade with the rest of Central America had 
been growing since April 199:5 thanks to the 
creation of a free trade area. Merchandise exports 
to the other Central American countries rose by 
25%, which was similar to the growth rate for the 
year before. Because the need to purchase 
electrical power caused imports to continue 
to rise fairly sharply, however, Honduras' 
trade deficit with the rest of the subregion 
widened. 
Factors playing a decisive rele in narrowing 
the trade deficit on the services account included 
the relatively low level of interest rates in 
international markets and some advances in the 
renegotiation of the country's debt, which cut its 
interest payments by some US$ 50 million. 
Delays in signing a letter of in tent with the IMF 
were one of the reasons for the reduction in loans 
from the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) and the World Bank, whicli withheld funds 
that had been earmarked for the agricultural and 
energy sectors. This situation was reflected in a 
decline in the inflow of long-ten a capital despite 
the higher level of direct investments received by 
the country, which totalled US$ 55 million. 
Grants and donations were also down from the 
year before. These difficulties in obtaining 
external capital were one of the factors behind a 
moratorium on roughly US$ 100 million in 
interest payments, which was equivalent to one 
half of the country's total interest bill. Since the 
total sum of interest due and payable is entered 
on the current account, the capital account 
registers a matching amount of short-term 
involuntary financing. 
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The decrease in multilateral loans slowed the 
expansion of the external debt to just 3%, which 
was far below the rates recorded during the two 
preceding years. Even so, the external debt was 
well above the level of GDP and amounted to 
more than three times the value of the country's 
exports. A breakdown of the debt by type of 
creditor reveals that the share of bilateral and 
multilateral agencies held fairly steady at around 
32% and 55%, respectively. The country's 
largest creditor was the IDB, which accounted for 
about one fourth of the debt, followed by the 
World Bank with a little over 20%. 
HONDURAS 
In an effort to ease the burden cf external debt 
payments, the country was striving to improve its 
debt profile with the IDB by replacing hard loans 
with softer loans from the Futid for Special 
Operations. Honduras' agreement with the Paris 
Club had technically been suspended in August 
1993 subject to its signature of a letter of intent 
with the IMF and the payment of its arrears. When 
an arrangement was made with t le IMF, it was 
agreed that talks with bilateral a editors would 
begin in mid-1995. Honduras piarned to request 
that between 50% and 65% of ils debt, which 




1. General trends 
In 1994 the Mexican economy was beset by a 
marked degree of uncertainty and was 
particularly affected by a number of crucial 
political events. Trends in the leading variables 
were in keeping with the Government's 
economic programme for most of the year, but 
the external sector's cumulative imbalances, the 
implementation of an expansionary monetary 
policy at a time when reserves were being drawn 
down, and a number of serious political 
developments all combined to set off a major 
crisis in the last 10 days of December. Economic 
growth sped up to an annual rate of 3.5% after 
two years of meagre results. The rate of inflation, 
whose reduction remained the economic 
programme's main objective, continued to fall, 
reaching just 7% per annum -the lowest rate in 
20 years. The non-financial public sector, for its 
part, was unable to reproduce the strong 
performance it had turned in during the preceding 
three years -when its accounts alternated 
between balance and surplus- but did manage to 
hold its deficit to less than 1% of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Other developments were less 
positive, however. In particular, the deficit on the 
balance-of-payments current account widened to 
US$ 29 billion, or almost 8% of GDP, and the flow 
of external resources, which in past years had 
more than covered this deficit, began to exhibit 
fluctuations that made it necessary for the 
country to draw down its international reserves. 
Furthermore, on the assumption that both the 
outflow of foreign exchange and the higher level 
of uncertainty in the economy were only 
temporary trends which would reverse their 
course once the elections were over -in view of 
the firm support forthcoming from Mexico's 
partners in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the new prospects 
opened up by economic integration- an 
expansionary monetary policy vas adopted. 
Finally, domestic borrowing inci eased, at the 
same time as debt maturities were shortened and 
the face value of debt instruments 'vas pegged to 
the exchange rate in an effort to reduce the 
uncertainty prevailing in financial markets. 
Owing to the fact that in recent years the flow 
of external resources had contain ;d increasing 
amounts of highly volatile short-term financing, 
the confidence level of economic agents came to 
have a major impact on the net balance of 
external finance. The series of decisive political 
events that occurred in 1994 in th; midst of an 
electoral process that was bound to lead to a 
change of administration in the near future 
-together with the existence of esternal, credit 
and banking disequilibria- heightened the 
uncertainty of economic agents an! generated a 
persistent outflow of short-term capital at a time 
when, for the most part, short-tern government 
securities were not being rolled over. This 
outflow swelled dramatically during the final 10 
days of 1994, resulting in international reserve 
losses of about US$ 19 billion lor the year. 
Meanwhile, after the Banco de México first 
raised the ceiling of the exchange- rate band for 
the dollar by 15% and then withdiew from the 
foreign exchange market altogether, the 
exchange rate for the United States dollar began 
to climb steadily. 
At the year's close, the upsurge il i commercial 
bank portfolios of overdue loins and the 
uncertainty prevailing in financial markets gave 
grounds for concern that the level of international 
reserves might be insufficient to cover external 
debt maturities. Against this background, in the 
first months of 1995 currency arid financial 
markets exhibited a high degree of volatility and, 
in response, the authorities launched a strict 
programme of fiscal adjustment and monetary 
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Figure 1 
MEXICO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A n n u a l r a t i 
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control. Emergency talks were held with the 
United States and a number of international 
agencies, and the outcome of these negotiations 
was an unusually large bail-out package of loan 
guarantees. Since financial and exchange-rate 
instability persisted, however, a new set of 
restrictions was put into effect in March, 
when the exchange rate for the dollar was 
more than twice as high as it had been prior to 
20 December 1994. Domestic prices reacted 
Economic policy-makers had to come to grips 
with the problems arising out of the country's 
mounting external imbalances and the 
uncertainty and other negative effects brought on 
by a number of major political events, including 
the electoral process, which came to a head in 
August. On the one hand, the current account 
deficit continued to widen and adverse 
expectations as to the feasibility of financing this 
deficit -and, hence, the viability of the 
exchange-rate regime- intensified among a 
growing number of economic agents within an 
economic environment marked by rising interest 
rates in the United States, stiffer competition 
from other emerging markets and a high -and in 
some cases the highest ever- level of exposure in 
terms of holdings of Mexican securities in 
foreign portfolios. On the other hand, a string of 
political events and acts of violence on the 
domestic front, including the assassination of the 
governing party's presidential candidate, 
undermined investors' confidence. 
All these developments caused a marked 
slow-down in inflows of capital from abroad, and 
this, in turn, helped to keep the exchange rate 
very close to the upper limit of the currency band, 
especially after the first quarter, as well as to 
deplete international reserves, which fell from 
around US$ 29 billion in mid-February to around 
US$ 12 billion in late November. 
In the face of these circumstances (which the 
authorities believed to be only temporary), from 
the second quarter onward monetary policy-
makers focused on offsetting the downturn in the 
flow of resources from abroad by expanding the 
supply of domestic credit without making any 
changes in the exchange-rate system, which 
rapidly, and by June the rate of inflation for the 
previous 12 months had risei to 38%. In 
addition, such an abrupt turnaround was seen in 
the trade balance that in the first quarter the 
country actually posted a surplus in its 
merchandise trade. This set of circumstances 
dampened the level of economic activity, thus 
bringing the incipient recovery observed the year 
before to a halt. The unemployment rate also 
moved upward. 
served both as an anchor for the 3overnment's 
anti-inflationary policy and as <i contributing 
factor in the stability of local finaicial markets. 
By means of this approach, the authorities sought 
to sustain the pace of the recovery being made by 
production activity, which, in spite of the various 
negative political developments troubling the 
country, was beginning to shaw signs of 
considerable strength after having come to a 
virtual standstill the year before. 
At the same time, emphasis continued to be 
placed on the Government's ami-inflationary 
policy, whose principal aim was lo achieve an 
inflation rate comparable to that of Mexico's 
main trading partners based on a îliding-parity 
system under which adjustments were to be 
announced beforehand. The focus o f fiscal policy 
continued to be on achieving a bal meed budget 
within an economic environment in which the 
reduction of the service on Mexico's external 
public debt enabled the Government to increase 
its expenditure levels, especially i;i the area of 
social development. 
The Banco de Mexico's use of open market 
operations, combined with the support of a 
contingency fund set up by the Unit ;d States and 
Canadian Treasuries (based on a seies of swaps 
involving several billion United Stites dollars), 
staved off a further drop in international reserves 
during the second and third quart ;rs. Another 
factor mitigating the destabilizing t ffects of the 
prevailing situation was the preservation of an 
economic and social consensus through the 
reaffirmation on 1 January and igain on 24 
March of the commitment made on 3 October 
1993 to reduce inflation and to raaintain the 
controlled float of the currency. 
2. Economic policy 
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Table 1 
MEXICO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Prices (December to December) 




























































































































































Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(new pesos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 








(as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of exports) 
92.3 88.6 94.6 100.0 94.9 96.2 97.4 97.0 
1.38 2.27 2.46 2.81 3.02 3.09 3.12 3.38 
135.2 110.0 103.2 100.0 91.1 84.1 79.8 82.1 
Millions of dollars 
3 983 -2 544 -5 977 -8 747 -14 995 -24 919 -23 487 -29 165 
9 125 2 617 -67 -2 803 -9 028-18 231-15 156-20 714 
27 508 28 954 33 030 38 411 39 696 41449 44 799 50 077 
18 383 26 337 33 097 41214 48 724 59 680 59 955 70 791 
1602 -4 094 6 154 11050 22 988 26 664 30 719 10 282 
5 758 -6 788 120 2 019 7 619 1934 7 291-18 883 
Percentages 
72.5 58.3 46.3 41.9 40.0 34.6 35.4 37.2 
22.9 21.3 20.4 17.2 16.1 18.2 19.7 18.6 
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Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of banking 
system 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
To the central 
government (net) 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
(in local currency) 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits (30-day) 
Equivalent interest rate in 


































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact c f the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multypling each aggregate's annu il growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. 
economically active population. Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate 
" P îrcentages of the 
Table 2 
MEXICO: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 1993 19<>4" 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Gross domestic 
product 
(Index: 1990=100) 103.3 108.4 103.5 110.9 105.8 108.6 102.6 111.9 106.5 113.9 107.3 116.4 
Consumer prices 
(12-month 
variation, %) 16.9 16.0 15.5 11.9 10.6 10.0 9.6 8.0 7.1 6.8 6.7 7.1 
Real exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 89.5 88.8 88.9 86.0 79.8 80.5 79.9 79.0 77.2 81.2 82.9 87.1 
Real interest rate 
(annualized, %) 
On depos i t s 0 -3.0 3.5 7.2 5.9 7.0 8.6 6.1 5.8 1.1 8.6 7.6 5.9 
Money supply 
( M l ) (12-month 
variation, %) 111.5 105.2 64.5 14.7 19.1 18.4 22.0 17.9 20.0 9.8 8.4 1.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
Preliminary figures. On the basis of non-seasonally adjusted series at constant Mexican prices. )0-day deposits. 
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However, the sharp increase in the circulation 
of Tesobonos (dollar-denominated bonds), 
which had initially helped to ease pressure on the 
peso, subsequently had a perverse effect. 
Beginning in April, the financial authorities 
engineered the replacement of Cetes (treasury 
certificates), Bondes (development bonds) and 
Ajustabonos (adjustable-rate bonds) with, for the 
most part, Tesobonos, an instrument in 
circulation since 1991 whose value is indexed to 
the exchange rate. This move had a far-reaching 
impact. Investors drastically reduced their 
holdings in peso-denominated securities, while 
the value of total Tesobonos issues rose from just 
under US$ 2 billion in April to US$ 29 billion by 
the end of December, as funds released by the 
retirement of Cetes and other debt instruments 
were channelled into the purchase of these 
securities. The enormous quantity of Tesobonos 
in circulation, together with commercial banks' 
external liabilities, served to heighten doubts as 
to the viability of the exchange-rate regime in 
view of the potential demand for foreign 
exchange entailed by these instruments' 
short-term maturities. 
During November and the first half of 
December, international reserves declined even 
further (US$ 5 billion), after having held fairly 
steady between April and October at around 
US$ 17 billion. The new administration, which 
took office on 1 December, decided to raise the 
ceiling of the currency band by 15%. This step, 
taken on 20 December, touched off a widespread 
crisis in the confidence level of economic agents 
and a massive outflow of capital; just two days 
later, this situation forced the authorities to 
alter their exchange-rate strategy by instituting 
a clean float of the peso in an effort to protect 
existing reserves. Against this backdrop, during 
the last week of December the exchange rate 
jumped to a level 67% higher than the rate 
registered at the start of the month; interest rates 
shot up and financial markets became highly 
volatile. 
By year's end, international reserves only 
amounted to slightly over US$ 6 billion. Under 
these circumstances, the service on the external 
public debt, the huge amount of Tesobonos 
scheduled to mature in 1995 (US$ 17 billion of 
which were held by non-residents) and the 
commercial banking systeri's short-term 
external obligations (US$ 15 billion of which 
were to fall due in 1995) add&l to the level of 
uncertainty and put extremely heavy pressure on 
the foreign exchange market. 
In order to head off further instability and 
restore investors' confidence, a harsh adjustment 
programme was implemented n early January 
1995. The programme was des gned to prepare 
the economy for the smaller J low of external 
financing projected for 1995 as well as the 
externally-imposed conditions contained in the 
agreements which the country r ad reached with 
the United States and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The Programme had three main 
objectives: to reduce the current account deficit 
to manageable levels; to ensure that the 
inflationary impact of the devaluation would be 
as slight and as short-lived as possible; and to 
re-establish the conditions necessary for 
economic recovery. 
The most notable features of the 
Government's economic policy was its 
abandonment of the system of currency bands 
and the adoption of an extremei y tight monetary 
policy as one of the cornerstones of its 
stabilization and adjustment piogrammes. The 
Banco de México set a limit oi US$ 10 billion 
new pesos on the expansion of its net domestic 
credit. In keeping with this measure, a 
contractive fiscal policy was implemented which 
called for spending cutbacks and increases in the 
prices and rates charged for the goods and 
services provided by the public sector. In 
addition, it was announced that a new 
privatization drive would be launched and that 
private investors would be allowed into sectors 
which they had previously been prohibited from 
entering, such as railways, telecommunications, 
ports and airports. 
The collapse of the peso in December added 
urgency to talks aimed at seeking out 
international support that would enable 
Mexico to find an immediate solution to the 
crisis. In late January 1995, the authorities 
announced that a foreign loan package 
totalling over US$ 50 billion had been put 
together by the United States Exchange 
Stabilization Fund, the IMF, the Bank for 
International Settlements and commercial 
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banks. Because the relevant markets had already 
partially discounted the effect of this support 
mechanism, Mexico's financial instability 
persisted in the following weeks; another factor 
in this regard was that the goals set forth by the 
adjustment programme with respect to growth, 
inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate 
were seen as being unrealistic. 
For this reason, in March 1995 the authorities 
introduced new economic adjustment measures. 
The principal objective was to stabilize financial 
markets in the short term, especially the foreign 
exchange market (the interbank exchange rate for 
the dollar reached a high of 8 new pesos early in 
March); a great deal of importance was also 
attached to strengthening domestic saving. The 
fiscal measures that were adopted included 
public-sector price and rate hikes; an increase in 
the value-added tax (VAT) rate from 10% to 15% 
as of April 1; and additional cutbacks in public 
spending equivalent to 0.3% of GDP, bringing the 
adjustment for the year to 1.6% of GDP. The 
expectation was that this reduction in public 
spending and the increased revenues from the 
VAT would boost the primary surplus from 2.3% 
to 4.4% of GDP. Support for savers and for 
commercial banks experiencing difficulties in 
connection with capital formation was another 
important feature, given the increase in overdue 
loan portfolios and the size of most institutions' 
foreign debts. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The Government's main policy objectives for 
1994 were to consolidate the progress made in 
putting public finances on a sounder footing, to 
support sectors where State participation was 
more effective from a social standpoint, and to 
make use of budgetary savings made possible by 
past adjustment measures to bolster the country's 
economic recovery, without, however, impairing 
its fiscal discipline. 
With a view to these objectives, and within the 
framework of the Stability, Competitiveness and 
Employment Pact (PECE) and the general 
economic policy approach taken in 1994, the 
composition of expenditure was s lifted towards 
more social spending, and income taxes were 
reduced. In addition, the collection of other 
revenues was stepped up; in some cases this was 
done purely for fiscal purposes, and in others 
-e.g., the prices of goods and sen ices provided 
by the State- there was the furthe r objective of 
correcting price lags. A number of measures 
designed to benefit wage-e irners were 
introduced, including a reduction ii i income taxes 
for workers earning up to fair times the 
minimum wage, income-tax exïmptions for 
persons earning up to two times the minimum 
wage, and an added allowance for workers 
earning the equivalent of the minimum wage or 
less. 
As a result of this policy, expenditure rose by 
8% in real terms, which was doubla the increase 
in income. Thus, the financial sur plus obtained 
in 1993 (equivalent to 0.7% of GDP) gave way to 
a small deficit (0.3% of GDP).2 This turnaround 
was attributable to the federal government 
-which had posted a surplus of around 0.4% of 
GDP in 1993 but recorded a deficit o f 0.8% of GDP 
in 1994- since all the other oficial sectors 
continued to have surpluses comparable to those 
of the preceding two years. Meanwhile, 
public-sector financial intermediaries 
(development banks and various special funds) 
contributed to the reactivation policy by once 
again running a cash deficit, which on this 
occasion was equivalent to 3.6% of GDP and was 
covered primarily with external resources. 
Total public-sector outlays amounted to 27% 
of GDP, chiefly as a consequence of the 11% real 
increase in federal government expenditure. A 
sizeable expansion was observed in transfer 
payments (24%) owing to increased 
contributions for federal agencies involved in 
providing basic education services (12%), for 
rural producers through the Rural Assistance 
Programme (PROCAMPO), and for rural 
development programmes (54%). The wage 
1 The loan package, in its original form, totalled US$ 50.75 billion (US$ 20 billion from the United S tates Exchange 
Stabilization Fund, US$ 17.7 billion from the MF, US$ 10 billion from the Bank for International Settlements ai d US$ 3 billion 
from international commercial banks; this last component was subsequently dropped from the package). 
2 If the non-recurring revenue from the sale of the Government's remaining shares in Teléfonos de México an 1 in commercial 
banks is factored in, then the public sector posted a surplus equivalent to 0.1% of GDP. 
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hikes granted to government employees 
-together with an expansion of employment in 
the areas of education, health, justice and 
national security- drove up the level of payments 
for personal services to almost 10%. All these 
factors combined to increase real current 
expenditure despite a further decline in interest 
on the debt. 
Capital expenditure by the federal 
government climbed 25% in real terms, mainly 
as a result of the increase in investment projects 
(29%) -most of which were executed by the 
National Solidarity Programme- and in 
communications and transportation projects. 
These expenditures had a fundamental impact in 
the first quarter and thus played an important role 
in reversing the recessionary trend in economic 
activity seen in 1993. 
Overall, social spending expanded steadily 
(13% in real terms), with the main focus being 
on the development of the more backward 
communities. The bulk of these resources went 
for projects involving improvements in existing 
educational and health facilities and, to a lesser 
extent, the construction of urban infrastructure 
and rural electrification works. 
The higher level of economic activity and the 
rate adjustments instituted during the year 
boosted the federal government's real income 
(2%), despite the various fiscal constraints to 
which it had agreed in late 1993 under the terms 
of the PECE agreement. Tax receipts were up 5% 
in real terms on 1993, even though income tax 
revenues shrank by 3% following the reduction 
of tax rates (from 35% to 34%) for corporations 
and self-employed individuals, the establishment 
of exemptions for workers earning up to two 
times the minimum wage, the granting of tax 
rebates to wage-earners in certain income 
brackets, and the reduction of the withholding tax 
on foreign interest income. Revenues from 
import duties also dropped (-6%) due to the tariff 
rollbacks made when the North American Free 
Trade Agreement entered into force. 
Increases in other tax categories offset this 
decrease in receipts, however, VAT revenues 
were 10% higher in real terms than in 1993 
thanks to the upsurge in both economic activity 
and imports, as well as the settlement of past 
debts of Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). Revenue 
from the special tax on production and services 
increased by 35%, partly as a consequence of the 
decision to redistribute PEMEX'S tax burden 
between charges and taxes. As a result of this 
measure, non-tax revenues declined by over 3%. 
In contrast, public-sectoi agencies and 
enterprises under direct budgetary control 
recorded a surplus, since their in comes increased 
slightly more than their expenditures in real 
terms. These organizations' spending levels rose 
in the areas of personal services, basic services, 
pensions and public works. This was also true of 
financial costs, which were up li'% from the year 
before. The expansion of physical investment by 
these organizations was much lower (1%), 
although PEMEX and Feder il Electricity 
Company (CFE) projects had a somewhat higher 
profile. 
Most of the federal government's cash 
shortfall was financed with Banco de México 
credits. These operations took p] ace primarily in 
the last quarter. Indeed, up until the end of 
September, the credits granted to the federal 
government by the Banco de Mexico totalled 
some 7 billion pesos, but the figure jumped to 17 
billion pesos during the fourth qi arter alone, thus 
generating a rise in liquidity which had the 
potential to put pressure on prices and the 
exchange rate. 
In 1994 the Government added US$ 6.7 
billion in short- and long-term obligations to its 
external debt, bringing the total debt to US$ 85.4 
billion. Domestic borrowing by I he public sector 
amounted to 164.6 billion new pesos, which was 
35% higher in nominal terms than the figure for 
1993. The 31% increase in government securities 
was particularly noteworthy, especially since it 
entailed a change in the mix of financial 
instruments on the market, as the amount of 
Tesobonos issued increased twenty-four times 
over -with a high percentage of ti lese instruments 
being held by foreigners- whil<¡ the amount of 
Cetes outstanding was 49% lover than it had 
been at the end of 1993. 
b) Monetary policy 
In 1994 financial policy was influenced by a 
series of events which had a major effect on 
expectations. Serious incidei ts of political 
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violence had a substantially negative impact. On 
the other hand, a positive note was struck in 
March with the announcement that standby 
assistance would be forthcoming from the United 
States and Canadian Governments (under the 
terms of the North American Financial 
Assistance Agreement), multilateral 
organizations and a number of foreign 
commercial banks at a time when financial and 
exchange-rate concerns were rife. 
Acting within this framework and faced with 
a steep drop in international reserves, the 
monetary authorities proceeded to make 
substantial changes in their monetary and credit 
policies. For the past three years the authorities 
had systematically sought to dampen the growth 
of net domestic credit, and they had succeeded in 
lowering the annual rate of increase from 42% in 
1990 to just 12% in 1993. In 1994, however, the 
credit supplied by the Banco de México to the 
banking system expanded by twice the amount 
of currency in circulation at the end of the 
preceding year; in addition, the amount of 
financing granted to other financial 
intermediaries almost doubled. 
In April the country's financial authorities 
began to promote the purchase of Tesobonos 
-government paper redeemable at the prevailing 
rate of exchange upon maturity- in an effort to 
keep foreign investment in the money market and 
ease the pressure exerted on the exchange rate by 
volatile conditions in the economy. At the same 
time, a sharp rise in interest rates put a stop to the 
downward trend they had followed ever since 
late 1992. Thus, the nominal annual yield on 
28-day Cetes, which had fallen to single-digit 
figures in the first quarter, remained at an average 
of around 15% throughout the rest of the year. 
Meanwhile, the average interbank interest rate 
doubled from an average of 11% in 
January-March to 22% in October-December. 
This increase, together with the slackening of 
inflation, drove up real interest rates. Yields on 
28-day Cetes rose from an annual average of 3% 
in January-March to 11% in the second quarter 
before slipping back to 9% in the third and then 
to 8% in the last quarter of the year. 
The considerable drop in liquidity resulting 
from the run-down of international reserves was 
more than offset by the expansion of domestic 
credit, and the amount of bills and coins in 
circulation climbed by 14% in real terms between 
December 1993 and December 1994; the real 
monetary base widened by a similar figure. 
However, the real demand for goods declined so 
notably that the money supply increased by a 
bare 1% in nominal terms. The lise in the real 
interest rate spurred the growth of time deposits, 
and the real expansion of the broadly-defined 
money supply (M2) was similar to that of the 
monetary base. 
The expansion in bank credit to the private 
sector (an increase of one third in r eal terms) was 
much sharper and was largely based on the 
financing provided to commercial banks by the 
Banco de Mexico. Unlike what oc< urred in 1993, 
on this occasion a larger increase was observed 
in credit in the local currency ttan in foreign 
currency, though the latter still recorded real 
growth of 9%. 
The combination of greater srivate-sector 
borrowing and high real interest rates led to a 
considerable rise in the ratio o:' commercial 
banks' overdue portfolios in 1994, The value of 
the banks' portfolios of overdue oans swelled 
from less than 30 billion new pesos in December 
1993 to more than 48 billion rew pesos in 
December 1994; this increased the delinquency 
ratio (overdue portfolios as a percentage of total 
bank portfolios) from 7.2% to 8.3% and halved 
financial groups' liquidity and pofits for the 
same period. 
The Mexican stock exchange experienced 
sharp swings. In March 1994 the steady rise in 
the Index of Prices and Quotations (IPYC) which 
had marked 1993 gave way to a period of sharp 
fluctuations, and the index finishec the year 9% 
below its initial level. As a conse< pence of the 
devaluation, returns -as measured in dollars-
tumbled by 43% over the same period. 
The December devaluation sparked an 
immediate reaction in financial markets, as 
evidenced by a brusque hike in hterest rates. 
Nominal yields on 28-day Ceies jumped from an 
average of 13% in October and November to 
31% in late December. Similarly, the cost of 
money on the highly volatile secondary market 
soared, reaching rates of over 50%. 
The steadily worsening ratio of reserves to 
short-term external maturities made it necessary 
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to raise the yields on Tesobonos higher and 
higher, pushing these bonds' annualized yield to 
over 10% by the end of December. Despite this 
higher yield, the monetary authorities still found 
it difficult to place new issues, as wary investors 
took up only a small fraction of the paper on offer 
at the final two auctions of 1994 and the first 
auctions of 1995. 
Outside Mexico, the lack of confidence drove 
down the prices of shares in Mexican firms 
(American Depository Receipts, or ADRs) traded 
on foreign stock exchanges by 40%; the price of 
par bonds (-25%) and discount bonds (-20%) 
being traded on secondary debt markets plunged 
as well. 
c) Foreign exchange policy 
For almost all of 1994, the exchange rate was 
allowed to float within a band whose ceiling was 
raised by four ten-thousandths of a new peso per 
day, equivalent to a depreciation of 4.6% per 
annum. In March, an increase in the going rate 
for the dollar began to be seen which, although 
not without some fluctuations, brought the 
currency very close to the band's ceiling. As a 
result, by the end of November the nominal 
depreciation of the interbank exchange rate had 
reached 11% with respect to the rate registered 
in December 1993. 
The decision to raise the band's ceiling by an 
additional 15% in an effort to curb international 
reserve losses -without, however, coupling this 
move with any package of complementary 
initiatives- backfired when economic agents 
took it as a sign of the monetary authorities' 
growing inability to stem the outflow of foreign 
exchange. Thus, the view held by investors that 
the country's external imbalances were 
unsustainable made itself felt: the demand for 
foreign exchange immediately caused the dollar 
to shoot up to the band's ceiling rate of four 
pesos. Two days later, the Banco de México 
announced that it was withdrawing from the 
foreign exchange market. By the end of the year, 
the exchange rate had reached 5.2 pesos to the 
dollar, which was almost 50% higher than its 
pre-devaluation level. Foreign exchange 
pressures continued into the first months of 1995, 
with an average rate of 5.7 new pesos to the dollar 
in January, 5.8 in February and 6 9 in March. On 
some days, the new peso fell as low as 7.0 to the 
dollar, in a context of considerable volatility. By 
the end of the second quarter, th; exchange rate 
had rebounded to 6.3 pesos to th; dollar. 
d) Structurai reforms 
In 1994, Mexico continued to ] >ush ahead with 
the adaptation of its institutional structure with a 
view to the country's integration into 
international markets, NAFTA entered into force 
as of 1 January, and in May Me> ico became the 
first Latin American member of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). Negotiations on trade agreements were 
also concluded with a number of countries, 
including Costa Rica, Colombia and Venezuela. 
On the domestic front, in April the central 
bank (Banco de México) was given autonomy as 
part of the governmental refont i process. With 
respect to the effort to modernize and liberalize 
the financial system, the formation of new types 
of financial intermediaries -sich as limited-
liability finance companies- was authorized and 
rules were drawn up governing the opening of 
branch offices of foreign financial institutions. 
Within this framework, foreign b anks, insurance 
firms and leasing companies were given 
permission to set up operations ia Mexico. 
In 1994, new rules for foreign investors came 
into force. These were contained in the Foreign 
Investment Act passed in the final days of 1993, 
which redefined the areas reseived for private 
Mexican citizens and the State, and those in 
which non-Mexicans would be allowed to 
participate. In addition, a number of regulatory 
provisions were modified as par; of the ongoing 
process of modernizing the laws governing 
relations between economic agents and their 
external links, some of which were derived from 
the implementation of NAFTA. In other 
noteworthy developments, customs laws were 
overhauled, regulations issued under the 
provisions of the laws on foreign trade were 
modified, the Consultative Committee on 
International Trade Practices vas established, 
new provisions on rules o: origin were 
introduced, Mexico acceded to the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (Per), the Institute of 
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Metrology and Standardization was set up, 
legislation on public investment was enacted and 
the Mexican Institute of Intellectual Property was 
created. In the area of agricultural policy, a new 
a) Economic activity 
Following a lackluster performance in 1993 
which extended into the first quarter of 1994, 
production activity picked up so briskly that the 
annual growth rate for 1994 as a whole verged 
on 3.5%. The most dynamic components of 
demand were investment -both public and 
private- and exports, with growth rates of 8% and 
9%, respectively. The greatest contribution, 
however, was made by private consumption, 
which expanded by 4% and accounted for 80% 
of the increase in GDP. 
The upswing in gross domestic investment 
boosted this variable to 22% of GDP. External 
saving once again played a very conspicuous role 
by providing 46% of the financing for capital 
formation (in 1980 dollars). The two components 
of investment -machinery and equipment, and 
construction- were very buoyant, the former 
especially so. It is interesting to note that private 
investment, in particular on the part of large 
corporations, continued to become increasingly 
dependant on external finance. 
Exports of goods and services virtually 
doubled their real rate of growth; a substantial 
portion of this upswing was due to the boost in 
demand for manufactured goods generated by a 
stronger United States economy. The export 
boom led to an upturn in intra-industry trade and 
was heavily concentrated in certain industries 
within the manufacturing sector and in large 
corporations. 
The gap between the expansion of total 
demand (6%) and GDP growth was covered by a 
sizeable increase in imports (15%). The 
performances of the various production sectors 
continued to be quite mixed. Basic services was 
the most buoyant activity, with both the 
transport, storage and communications and the 
electricity, gas and water sectors recording an 8% 
growth rate. Construction expanded by more than 
6%, primarily as a result of the stimulus provided 
mechanism for the provision of d rect assistance 
to producers (PROCAMPO) was introduced which 
took the place of the traditional sy¡ item of support 
prices. 
by government spending, although private-sector 
activity also helped to spur it or. The pace of 
growth began to gather quite a bit af speed in the 
second quarter owing to investments in 
petroleum and petrochemicals, transport and the 
construction of various types of facilities. 
Financial institutions, insurance *nd real estate 
expanded by 5% owing to the higher level of 
economic activity and the restructuring 
undertaken in the wake of the priví tization drive. 
Other sectors, including mining, business 
services, restaurants and hotels, and agriculture, 
recorded growth rates below the overall average 
for the economy. 
Preliminary data show that the production of 
10 basic grains rose markedl\' during the 
spring-summer growing season in 1994. Output 
amounted to nearly 20 million tors, which was 
13% more than the harvest for the ( orresponding 
growing season in 1993. The bean, sorghum, 
wheat and rice harvests led thin increase in 
production. The livestock sector exhibited quite 
divergent trends: production of b< ef cattle and 
poultry was up sharply, while the c utput of eggs 
and honey was modest and mile production 
declined by more than 1%. 
The manufacturing sector rebounded from 
1993's slight decline to record an increase of 4%; 
this figure was the net result of the differing 
growth rates recorded by its vario is industries. 
On the one hand, the sound peiformance of 
export firms led to a marked rise in the output of 
metal products and machinery, which had 
slumped in 1993. The production of motor 
vehicles also showed particularly strong growth. 
This was due first and foremost to increased 
output of vehicles for export (up 17% on 1993), 
as production for the domestic market declined. 
The basic metals industry also reported a 
substantial expansion (9%) after laving gone 
through a period of restructuring an 1 flat growth 
following the privatization of State enterprises. 
3. The main variables 
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Boosted by activity in the construction sector, 
production of non-metallic minerals rose by 4% 
with respect to the same period of 1993. Wood 
and wood products also staged a recovery 
following a succession of declines. 
The constant retrofitting made necessary by 
the liberalization of trade resulted in a further 
downturn in the textiles and clothing and paper 
and printing categories. The above set of factors 
was also responsible for the lackluster 
performance of the food, beverages and tobacco 
industries. This situation was felt most keenly by 
small- and medium-size firms, which were also 
hurt by the rise in the cost of bank credit. The 
export-oriented maquila industry (i.e., inbond 
assembly activities) continued to expand at a 
rapid pace (8%) after having recorded a 6% 
growth rate the year before. 
The financial crisis which occurred at the 
close of 1994, the steep devaluation and the 
adjustment measures adopted all combined to 
drag the economy into recession in early 
1995. Accordingly, initial estimates pointed 
to a decline in GDP of around 1% for the first 
quarter. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The Government continued to place top 
priority on its anti-inflationary policy during 
1994. Implementation of this policy continued to 
rest on the use of exchange policy as an anchor 
for price movements and on achieving a 
consensus among the various institutional sectors 
based on the PECE agreement signed in October 
1993 and ratified in March 1994. The goal for 
1994 of an inflation rate of 5% was also 
reaffirmed at that time. In order to meet that 
target, the authorities would have to maintain a 
balanced fiscal budget, restrain nominal wage 
hikes and persevere with the controlled float of 
the exchange rate within a progressively 
widening band. 
Although the inflation target was not 
achieved, the rate of inflation did continue to 
move downward throughout 1994. With the 
entry into force of NAFTA, tariffs on many 
products imported from the United States or 
Canada were either reduced or eliminated 
entirely. This helped curb the rise in prices of 
domestically- produced import substitutes, thus 
narrowing many businesses' profit margins. This 
lessened the inflationary impact of the nominal 
devaluation of the currency in the first 11 months 
of the year. 
The December-to-Decembcr variation in 
the national consumer price incex was, at 7%, 
the lowest in more than two decades but was 
still two percentage points above the 
Government's original target. The devaluation 
had a negligible effect on domestic price trends 
in 1994, since it took place just 10 days before 
the end of the year. 
As in the preceding five yenrs, in 1994 the 
prices of tradables rose at a slower rate than 
the prices of non-tradables. Health and home 
care services and educational and recreation 
services reported some of the largest 
increases. 
The producer price index (even excluding 
crude oil for export) rose by 9%, thus doubling 
its 1993 level. The main reason for this was the 
robust increase (20%) in export prices prompted 
by rising international prices for the goods which 
Mexico exports and the depreciation of the 
exchange rate. 
The open unemployment rati averaged 3.7% 
in 1994, up from the figure of 3.4% recorded in 
1993. Other unemployment indicators revealed 
some improvement. The percentage of workers 
who were either unemployed or earning less than 
the minimum wage fell from 12A% in 1993 to 
11.3% in 1994, while the percentage of workers 
either unemployed or employed only part time 
-less than 35 hours a week- descended from 23% 
in 1993 to 22.2% in 1994. 
Manufacturing continued to shed personnel, 
although at a slower rate than in 1993; these 
job reductions were seen in ill branches of 
industry. The 4.8% decrease in employment 
contrasted with the 3.6% jump in 
manufacturing output. The workforce in the 
maquila industry swelled by 8%, and as a result 
the number of jobs directly generated by this 
sector passed the 600,000 mark 
Real wages in the formal sector continued to 
regain ground in 1994. The average wages of 
workers employed in the manufacturing sector 
rose by 4% in real terms, and the figure for the 
maquila industry was quite similar. 
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c) The external sector 
The first year of Mexico's participation in 
NAFTA was notable for a marked increase in 
merchandise trade. Total trade with the United 
States expanded by 22%, while total trade with 
Canada rose by 14%. Overall, imports grew at a 
faster pace than exports, leading to a considerable 
widening of the trade deficit, which was up 38% 
on 1993. 
Trends in trade flows were similar to those of 
recent years. Exports of goods produced by the 
maquila industry rose by 20% in 1994, while 
other exports climbed by 15%; the corresponding 
figures for imports were 25% and 20%, 
respectively. The net result of the country's 
maquila operations was a surplus of US$ 5.8 
billion. 
The total value of merchandise exports 
(including the maquila industry) rose by 17% to 
US$ 60.833 billion; this achievement rested 
largely on the performance of non-petroleum 
exports, chiefly manufacturing. Sales of 
agricultural products were up by a modest 7%, 
largely as a result of higher sales of coffee, fresh 
fruits and vegetables, and pulses. Sales of other 
major products did not do so well; those of 
tomatoes, for instance, remained virtually 
unchanged, after having more than doubled in 
1993, while sales of beef cattle decreased. 
Exports of petroleum products languished, since 
the modest increase in the average price of the 
mix of crudes that Mexico exports was offset by 
a slight drop in volumes and lower sales of 
petroleum products. 
Among the country's exports of 
manufactures, industries having a high 
technological content made a particularly strong 
showing, as did, to a lesser extent, some of the 
industries producing intermediate goods and 
traditional finished consumer products. 
Specifically, sales in the metal products, 
machinery and equipment category rose by 
around US$ 7 billion, which brought them up to 
a level 25% above that of 1993. Within this 
category, the motor vehicle industry maintained 
its considerable momentum (21%), with 
particularly good sales figures for automobiles, 
trucks and engines. Impressive sales were also 
reported for information processors (up 50%) 
-thanks in large part to the maquila industry- and 
for machine parts and spare paits. Traditional 
industries which turned in outstanding results 
included the food, beverages and t jbacco and the 
textiles and clothing sectors; amor g intermediate 
goods, mention should be made of the upswing 
in sales of petrochemicals and chemicals, after a 
poor performance in 1993, and oí iron and steel 
products. 
The very rapid growth rate of imports had 
abated somewhat in 1993, bit in 1994 it 
accelerated once again, as impoits climbed to 
US$ 79.375 billion -an increase of 21%- in 
response to both the economic recovery and the 
entry into effect of NAFTA. The three major 
categories of goods expanded at s milar rates. 
Imports for the manufacturing sector were 
almost US$ 13 billion (21%) higher than in 1993, 
with 58% of the increase being concentrated in 
the metal products, machinery aid equipment 
categories. A particularly notable expansion was 
seen in purchases by the motor vehicle industry 
(22%), especially in the catégorie!! of passenger 
vehicles -which were more than double the 1993 
figure- and engines and parts, tntra-industry 
integration with Mexico's leaJing trading 
partners was also reflected in a 30% upswing in 
purchases of information-processi lg machinery 
and parts, making 1994 the third coi îsecutive year 
of rapid growth. 
During 1994 the authorities strengthened 
anti-dumping provisions in an effort to curb the 
use of unfair trading practices; accordingly, 
special countervailing quotas weie established 
for certain goods originating in Asian countries. 
Particularly strict quotas were imposed upon 
imports of footwear, clothing, tools and some 
intermediate chemical products, and these 
measures succeeded in dampening the rapid 
growth rates of these imports. 
Non-factor services (excluding the maquila 
industry) posted a deficit of some US$ 2 billion; 
this was attributable to service: » other than 
tourism, since the tourism industry marked up a 
surplus. The deficit for factor services widened 
to US$ 12.2 billion (an 11% increase over 1993), 
primarily as a result of the upswing in foreign 
debt service caused by higher intt rest rates on 
international markets and the increased 
liabilities of the private ¡ ector and 
development banks. 
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The balance-of-payments capital account 
yielded a US$ 10.3 billion surplus. This was only 
one-third the size of the surplus recorded for the 
preceding year and fell far short of the amount 
required to finance the country's hefty current 
account deficit. Portfolio investment amounted 
to US$ 7.6 billion, a figure which stands in 
striking contrast to the US$ 28 billion registered 
in 1993. Foreign direct investment, on the other 
hand, continued its burgeoning growth, reaching 
a total of nearly US$ 8 billion (an increase of 63% 
on 1993). This growth trend was maintained 
throughout every quarter of the year. 
International debt markets adopted a cautious 
attitude towards Mexican paper in 1994, thus 
compelling a number of national firms to put off 
the placement of debt instruments in those 
markets. Consequently, overseas borrowing by 
the private sector and banks increased much less 
than in 1993, whereas public-sector institutions 
and enterprises such as Banco Nacional de 
Comercio Exterior (BANCOMEXT), Nacional 
Financiera (NAFIN) and PEMIX continued to 
obtain external resources throjgh bond issues 
and other forms of borrowing. 
The decrease in net international reserves 
in 1994 was on the order of US$ 19 billion. 
In the first two months of th; year, reserves 
climbed from US$ 25 billion to an all-time 
high of US$ 29 billion. In April, after the 
assassination of the presidential candidate, 
they fell by more than US$ 10.3 billion, and 
this loss was not recouped. From April until 
late October, reserves hovered around the 
US$ 17 billion mark; their level dipped by 
US$ 3 billion between mid-Juae and mid-July, 
but then quickly rebounded. Reserve losses 
amounted to US$ 3.7 billion in November and 
some US$ 1.5 billion in this first week of 
December; they then fell below the US$ 10 
billion mark and continued to descend until 
reaching the critical levels which made it 
necessary for the Government to allow the 




The Nicaraguan economy expanded by more 
than 3% in 1994, thereby marking up its highest 
growth rate in a decade. This creditable 
performance -which was primarily the result of 
a combination of internal political events, 
consistency in the management of the country's 
economy and the availability of external 
resources- was achieved against the backdrop of 
the challenges and obstacles posed by the 
complex transition that the country had 
embarked upon in 1990 as it moved from war to 
peace, from a single-party political system to a 
parliamentary democracy, and from a planned 
economy to a market economy. 
Due to the country's dependence on inputs of 
foreign capital, these inflows continued to have 
a strong influence on the nature of the external 
sector's performance, the status of public-sector 
accounts, the exchange rate and the level of 
inflation. Larger inflows enabled the country to 
finance its deficit on current account, which 
swelled to over US$ 860 million, as well as a total 
public-sector deficit that climbed to 12% of gross 
domestic product (GDP). The nominal 
devaluation of the córdoba (10%) was smaller 
than the year before, and therefore inflation was 
also down (12%), since key prices in the 
economy remained linked to the exchange rate. 
As the year began, a number of severe 
constraints continued to make their effects felt, 
especially in three areas. First, the external debt 
burden assumed during earlier administrations 
continued to weigh heavily upon the country. 
Second, the transition involved hefty one-time 
costs, such as those entailed in the assumption of 
a high level of domestic debt in order to help 
settle disputes over the ownership of land and the 
means of production. The Government has been 
trends 
covering this debt with wha: are called 
"compensation bonds", which th<; Ministry of 
Finance issues to persons whose property was 
confiscated and cannot be returned. Third, the 
relevant actors had not yet reached an acceptable 
consensus regarding the design of a new 
economic and political institutional structure for 
the country. 
Early in the year, the Nicaraguan Parliament, 
which had been closed down, was « -opened, and 
this helped to clear the way for for;ign aid from 
the United States and facilitated negotiations 
with the International Monetarj Fund (IMF) 
concerning a structural adjustment loan. The 
enhanced structural adjustment fscility (ESAF) 
loan agreement signed in May 19i>4 brought in 
US$ 250 million from the IMF itself, as well as 
funds from other agencies. It also pived the way 
for another round of debt renegotialions with the 
Paris Club. A dispute arose, howe/er, between 
the Legislative and Executive branches over 
constitutional reforms, and the pri/atization of 
the Telecommunications and Pestai Bureau 
(TELCOR) was blocked. 
The economy showed clear signs of buoyancy 
in the first half of the year, but this trend was 
interrupted by a drought which hurt what is 
known as the early harvest and mad< ; it necessary 
to ration energy supplies, thereby severely 
dampening economic activity. This situation was 
compounded by a transport strike smd financial 
problems in the State banking system. 
Towards the end of the third quar er, however, 
the picture brightened thanks to a good late 
harvest, which was reflected in a ma ¡or upturn in 
basic grain output. In addition, higher coffee 
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Economic policy-makers had to cope with 
persistent macroeconomic imbalances in the 
external sector, in fiscal accounts, in the areas of 
saving and investment, and in the labour market. 
One of the most pressing problems of all was the 
disequilibrium of the external sector, since the 
value of imports was double that of exports and 
the interest due on the external debt exceeded the 
total value of exports. Under these 
circumstances, the economy needed a 
considerable injection of external capital in order 
to function and therefore had to go even more 
deeply into debt. The ESAF loan, and the 
economic policy commitments between the 
Government and the IMF which it entailed, thus 
exerted a decisive influence on the economic 
management of the country. 
Once financing had been obtained to cover the 
external sector's deficit for 1994-1997, economic 
policy focused more on fiscal matters than on 
monetary variables. The Government's strategy 
revolved around the need to manage income and 
expenditure in such a way as to free up funds for 
investments in production activities that would 
promote exports and job creation in the medium 
and long terms. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The Government set itself the task of raising 
the public sector's current savings rate, and it 
therefore mounted an effort to boost current 
income and hold down current expenditure. As 
in the past, the level of investment expenditure 
was contingent upon the receipt of external 
financing. 
The steps taken to increase revenues included 
a reduction in exemptions from import duties, the 
establishment of a broader tax base for the luxury 
tax and provisions regarding charges for public 
services and fines. In addition, gasoline prices 
were aligned with the currency's sliding parity, 
a strategic plan for increasing the effectiveness 
of tax collection procedures was carried forward, 
and a commission was established to combat 
smuggling. Other measures included a fiscal 
package known as Tax Reform 2000, which had 
been introduced prior to the signing of the ESAF 
ic policy 
loan agreement. Furthermore, as one 
consequence of the upswing in coffee prices, 
coffee growers became subject to income tax 
withholding provisions. In order to curb 
spending, a voluntary early retirement 
programme was set up for civil servants with a 
view to eliminating 7,000 government jobs in the 
course of 1994, civil service pay levels were 
frozen and cuts were made ir the Army's 
manning table. 
Within the public sector as a whole, various 
mechanisms were introduced (e.g., the automatic 
deduction of interest payments on Central Bank 
discounts for commercial banks) Itiat succeeded 
in reducing the Central Bank's operating deficit. 
In addition, public institutions weie restructured 
as part of a programme designed to modernize 
the State, improvements were mad; in the public 
sector's financial management, and public 
services began to be decentralized 
Despite these efforts, the Government 
proved unable to meet its fiscal targets 
because current expenditure roie more than 
current income did. The drought and the 
resulting energy crisis had a great deal to do 
with this, since they hurt tax revenues and 
saddled the National Electrical Power 
Institute with higher operating costs. 
According to the Government, another 
adverse factor was the poor resaonse to the 
labour mobility plan. The outcone of all this 
was that the central government's current 
deficit fell only marginally, remaining close to 
1% of GDP, and the current saving rate for the 
public sector as a whole dropped to less than 
3% of GDP. 
Public investment increased from 8% to 11% 
of GDP. Capital income, however, was lower, 
since the privatizations carried out by the 
National People's Corporations (COdNAP), which 
is responsible for the administration and sale 
of 351 State enterprises, did not ¡;enerate any 
significant amount of liquid assets' even though 
the process was nearing completion. This was 
because the proceeds were primarily being 
used to cover the administrative costs of CORNAP 
and to withdraw approximately 250 million 
córdobas worth of compensation bonds from the 
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Table 1 
NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic 
product 
Gross national income 





Contribution to growth 







Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 











































































































































Prices (December to December) 
Consumer prices 1347.3 33 657.3 1689.1 13 490.3 
External sector 
Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) g 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 






865.6 3.5 19.5 
External debt 
Public debt (as a percentage 
of GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of exports) 
227.1 474.1 929.5 677.5 











































































648.1 574.2 610.4 657.4 
107.4 156.0 114.4 102.2 
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Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 
Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of banking 
system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 




Real interest rates 
(end of period) 'J 
On deposits (savings accounts) ... ... ... ... ... 8.5 8.9 8.8 
On loans (short-term) ... ... ... 19.7 20.1 20.3 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign currencyk ... ... 8.5 8.9 8.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annu il growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e Ope i unemployment 
rate in Managua. This rate is expressed in córdobas per US$ 1,000 for the years up to 1987, in thousand i of córdobas per 
dollar for the years 1988-1990, and in gold córdobas per dollar for 1991 -1994, at the official exchange rate. 8 Based on the 
official exchange rate. No figure is given for 1987 due to the severe distortion of the exchange market d uring that year. 
Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. ' Interest rates are 
covered by a clause requiring the maintenance of dollar values; therefore, once the nominal interest rate has 1 «en adjusted on 
the basis of the real effective exchange rate, it is equal to the real interest rate. For these purposes, the Decc mber-December 
variation in this index should be used. J These figures represent a simple average of the floor and ceiling rates in the State 
and private banking systems. Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
NICARAGUA: MAIN QUARTERLY ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1992 1993 IS 94a 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation) 24.2 8.1 6.0 3.5 21.1 18.9 23.9 19.5 4.0 8.2 8.9 12.4 
Real exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 103.0 103.4 109.5 103.8 105.5 108.1 106.7 107.6 108.1 110.6 i 14.1 113.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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market and return them to the Ministry of 
Finance. 
As a result, the fiscal deficit grew. The general 
government's deficit went up from 7% to nearly 
10% of GDP while the public-sector deficit rose 
from less than 9% to 12%. This larger deficit was 
financed chiefly with external credit, which 
totalled 7.6% of GDP, versus 1.3% the preceding 
year. This increase in external borrowing made 
up for the downturn in external grants and 
donations, and also made it possible to reduce the 
public sector's domestic borrowing. 
A considerable portion of such borrowing 
took the form of the issuance of compensation 
bonds to former owners of confiscated property. 
These bonds were payable in 15 years and 
accrued annual interest of between 3% and 5% 
which could be compounded during the first two 
years. Approximately US$ 200 million worth of 
these bonds were issued, which was half the 
amount estimated for settlement of all cases. The 
first interest payments -totalling an estimated 
US$ 6 million- were to fall due in 1995. 
b) Exchange policy 
Foreign exchange policy focused on 
maintaining the stability of the real exchange 
rate. To this end, the authorities instituted a 
crawling peg, with daily adjustments being made 
in the nominal rate in accordance with the 
guidelines laid down after the devaluation of 
January 1993. The targeted level for the official 
exchange rate called for a nominal devaluation 
of 12% over the year. Although the devaluation 
turned out to be slightly less (10%) than that, this 
did not affect the foreign-exchange market, since 
the spread between the official and parallel rates 
was only 3% as of December. The nominal 
devaluation represented no more than a slight 
real revaluation against the dollar, since other 
key prices in the economy were indexed to that 
currency. The real effective exchange rate did, 
however, increase once again. 
c) Monetary policy 
Under this system of regulated exchange 
rates, the monetary authorities took a "hands-off ' 
approach to the increased level of liquidity in the 
economy. The expansion of international 
reserves resulting from the inf ow of external 
resources contributed to the growth of the 
monetary base. The money suoply (Ml) thus 
swelled by 21%, more than nominal GDP. Saving 
and time deposits, including deposits 
denominated in hard currencies, rose by more 
than 60%. 
The economy's liquidity position was 
reflected in the fact that commercial banks 
maintained higher cash reserves than the 
minimum required by law. However, this 
overage in cash holdings, which had stood at 
9% in 1993, fell to between 5% and 6% in 
1994. 
The rediscount rate remained linked to supply 
and demand, since in December L993 the Central 
Bank had decided to set the rate at quarterly 
intervals at 0.25% over the commercial bank 
interest rate on deposits. The rediscount rate 
exhibited a slight downward trend in 1994, 
falling somewhat less than one percentage point 
from the 11% level in effect at the beginning of 
the year. 
The larger money supply pa ved the way for 
an expansion in private-sector credit of around 
20%. In terms of the routing of credit, the 
emphasis clearly shifted from the official 
banking system to private banks. In fact, a 
programme financed by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) 
was implemented in order to switch the State 
banking sector's portfolio ove:- to the private 
banking system. Under this programme, the 
Central Bank purchased bonds (BOFOS) from 
private banks and these banks, which had 
traditionally focused on shor:-term business 
loans, were then to use the proceeds to finance 
long-term loans and the purchase of the State 
sector's portfolio. All the BOFOS for long-term 
loans were placed, but of the 140 million 
córdobas in BOFOS that were put on offer for 
portfolio purchases, only 35 million córdobas 
worth were actually traded. 
As a counterpart to this programme to assist 
the private banking system, the Government 
decided not to recapitalize thi; State banking 
sector -the Banco Nacional de Desarrollo 
(BANADES), Banco Nicaragüense (BANIQ and 
Banco Popular- which was in the midst of a 
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reorganization process. Any financing extended 
to this sector was not to exceed total loan 
recovery (i.e., zero net credit), which meant that 
any increase in the amount of credit to be granted 
would have to be backed up by an improvement 
in recovery rates. 
The year 1994 became a milestone in 
Nicaragua's economic history when the 
Nicaraguan Stock Exchange opened its doors in 
January. Trading volumes increased gradually 
during the course of the year and in the early 
months of 1995. Securities traded on the 
Exchange included the Central Bank's foreign 
currency bonds (BOMEX), the compensation 
bonds issued by the Ministry of Finance, 
tax-credit certificates and debt paper from the 
Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, Ltd., a private 
company. The main purpose of the four bond 
issues floated by the Central Bank in 1994 was 
to help develop this market; the net balance at 
year's end was around US$ 13 million. 
a) Economic activity 
Nicaragua's gross domestic product (GDP) 
rose by more than 3% in 1994; as a result, per 
capita GDP, which had been dropping sharply in 
recent years, remained more or less unchanged. 
National income grew by more than twice as 
much as GDP, thanks to the favourable trend in 
the country's real terms of trade. 
The growth of GDP was associated with a 
partial recovery of the economy's level of 
aggregate demand (up 2%) from its steep decline 
of the preceding year. Both domestic and external 
demand played a part in this upturn. The 
fastest-growing component of domestic demand 
was investment in the construction sector, 
while the increase in private consumption was 
rather small. Because of the differing 
significance of these components, however, 
their contribution to GDP growth was quite 
similar. These two trends offset both the 
decline in investment in machinery and 
equipment that followed the preceding year's 
upswing and the contraction in government 
d) Trade policy 
The country's trade liberalizai on policy was 
creating difficulties for some of he companies 
that helped to supply the domestic market, and a 
temporary selective tariff was therefore 
introduced on the understanding that it would be 
phased out later on. The liberalisation process 
proceeded, none the less, and negotiations were 
undertaken with a view to the contusion of free 
trade agreements with Mexico, «Iklombia and 
Venezuela. These talks were later suspended, 
however, because of the problems being 
experienced by Mexico and Venezuela. 
Against a background of monetary and 
exchange-rate stability, measures were adopted 
to promote exports; these included a campaign to 
step up the country's use of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative launched by the United States and the 
European Union's generalized system of 
preferences (GSP). 
consumption resulting from its efforts to limit 
public spending. 
Gross fixed investment slipped below 15% of 
GDP after having topped that level in 1993. This 
type of investment continuée to depend 
overwhelmingly on external siving for its 
financing, since national saving remained 
extremely negative. 
The higher level of aggregate demand was 
met mainly by an expansion of do nestic output 
and, to a lesser extent, by a moderate increase in 
imports. The surge in economic ao ivity was not 
evenly distributed, however; insteal, differences 
were to be observed between oie economic 
sector and another as well as amor g enterprises 
in the same sector. In all sectors of he economy, 
firms still grappling with problems associated 
with the transition existed side by side with 
companies that had already solved t Kir legal and 
financial problems and had embarked upon a 
phase of rapid expansion. 
The agricultural sector turned in an excellent 
performance overall and was thus able to move 
beyond the level of production it hid attained in 
3. The main variables 
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the early 1980s. The increase in the output of 
basic grains was particularly noteworthy, 
especially in the cases of maize (25%), rice 
(33%) and kidney beans (37%). This trend was 
as much a result of the country's return to peace 
-since the land held by former combatants began 
to be farmed again, and conflicts and the level of 
insecurity in the countryside subsided- as of the 
rains which made for a good late harvest. The 
farm sector was also helped indirectly by the 
persistence of urban unemployment, since this 
prompted a migration from the city to the 
country. 
Among the country's export crops, coffee 
output was up (28%) and the sugar-cane crop 
made solid progress (11%) as the process of 
transferring the mills over from State 
management to private enterprise proceeded, 
following two troubled years of labour disputes. 
By contrast, the banana harvest fell off sharply 
for the second year in a row and the downswing 
in cotton production worsened so much that the 
level of activity in this crop was negligible. 
Meanwhile, non-traditional export crops 
expanded at a smart pace. 
Slackening activity in the livestock industry, 
which is one of the principal economic activities 
in the country, held its growth rate to just 3%. 
This slow-down was associated with lower meat 
prices and the consequent difficulties 
encountered by the industry's heavily-indebted 
producers in covering their commitments to 
BANADES. Poultry farming, however, kept up a 
good pace of growth (16%) and pig farming, 
which, among small-scale producers, is linked to 
the basic grain harvest, made a spectacular 
recovery (41%) from a slump that had lasted 
several years. The fishing sector's output 
continued its steady climb (36% in 1994), both 
for shellfish and the fishing catch itself. 
Mining activity picked up (6%), thanks to the 
boost provided by the upturn in construction and 
to higher levels of silver and gold production. By 
contrast, manufacturing (1%) lagged behind the 
economic reactivation. The transition process 
was not yet complete in all businesses, as some 
firms still needed to formalize their adoption of 
new ownership structures and management 
practices. In addition, the operations of some 
enterprises had come to a standstill, particularly 
in the case of certain privatized firms or 
companies that were in the midst of a 
privatization process involving 1 heir purchase by 
workers. The fastest-growirg branches of 
industry were leather goods and footwear, 
household items and transport equipment, while 
the production of beverages and tobacco 
expanded in step with demand. On the other 
hand, the situation of manufaclurers of textiles 
and wearing apparel remained critical as a 
consequence, among other reasons, of steeply 
rising imports of used clothing. 
Commerce and transport renained stagnant. 
The generation of electrical power ran into 
difficulties due to the drought, which drove down 
the output of hydroelectricity sharply (21%), 
after it had soared the year befe re. This made it 
necessary to step up the use of gas-powered 
turbines to generate electricity (whose 
production costs are higher), import electrical 
power and cut back on domestic consumption. 
Energy rationing mainly affecte i residential and 
government use rates (both of which sagged by 
nearly 10%), whereas industrial use rose. 
b) Prices, wages and employaient 
Inflation in 1994 amounted to 12%, which 
was generally in line with thi; Government's 
targets and the policy of maintaining a sliding 
parity for the currency. This pol icy turned out to 
be the chief determinant of the rate of price 
increases, given the growing tendency to peg key 
prices in the economy (including gasoline prices) 
to the exchange rate. This was no t done, however, 
with wages and other types of compensation, and 
real pay rates therefore weakened for the second 
year running despite the implementation of a 
wage hike early in 1994. 
Despite the containment of real wages, the 
unevenly distributed increas; in economic 
activity did not permit any reduction to be made 
in the total under-utilization of the economically 
active population, an indicator which includes 
both unemployment and underemployment. To 
the contrary, the percentage of under-utilization 
climbed to a record high of :>4%. The open 
unemployment rate did edge downward slightly 
(although, in absolute terms, the actual number 
of unemployed persons rose), but this decrease 
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was achieved at the cost of an increase in the 
number of underemployed persons. The higher 
level of underemployment was associated with 
the upswing in activity in the farm sector, which 
boosted the number of jobs in the production of 
both export crops and basic grains. The number 
of employed persons climbed not only in the 
primary sector but also in manufacturing (4%), 
construction (where it was bolstered by 
temporary employment programmes) and 
commerce. 
c) The external sector 
The external sector of the Nicaraguan 
economy continued to register an enormous gap 
between current payments and current income. This 
shortfall was covered with inputs of foreign capital. 
The country's chronic trade deficit was eased 
by an improvement in its terms of trade, as a 
moderate rise in the unit value of imports was 
overshadowed by soaring price levels for some 
of Nicaragua's major exports, such as coffee and 
sugar. As a result, foreign exchange earnings 
from merchandise exports jumped nearly 30% in 
1994. 
Higher coffee prices and sales volumes once 
again made this product Nicaragua's number one 
export, followed by meat. The third-ranked 
category was non-traditional exports, which 
accounted for more than one third of total 
merchandise sales. The maquila (inbond 
assembly) industry expanded at a vigorous pace, 
with the Mercedes export processing zone (EPZ) 
trebling the value of its exports. 
Imports (c.i.f.) gained nearly 6% in value. 
Particularly steep increases were seen in 
purchases of raw materials and intermediate 
goods (21%) and construction materials (39%), 
which is an indication that a fuller use was being 
made of the country's installed capacity. On the 
other hand, downturns in imports of capital goods 
(-8%) and in investment in machinery and 
equipment indicated that few projects to 
modernize or expand that capacity were being 
conducted. Imports of durable consumer goods 
rose considerably, but imports of the much larger 
category of non-durables were down. 
As a result, the trade deficit narrowed by more 
than US$ 20 million, although it still outweighed 
the total value of merchandise exports. This 
improvement was more than offset, however, by 
a larger deficit in factor services, which was 
attributable to an increase in the amount of 
interest falling due on the external debt. 
Consequently, the deficit on current account 
widened to over US$ 860 million. 
A change was to be observed in the mix of 
external resources which once aga n allowed the 
country to cover its current deficit and even to 
add US$ 68 million to its international reserves, 
inasmuch as the proportion of esternal credit 
mounted due both to the receipt of fresh loans 
(the main one being the IMF loan) and to the 
accumulation of almost US$ 240 million in 
interest arrears, while the sum cf grants and 
donations shrank to slightly over 40% of such 
financing. 
The credit obtained by Nicaragua in 1994 
helped to boost its external borrowings, thereby 
adding to its future debt service obligations, 
which were already so high that the i x)untry could 
not meet them fully. Thus, the debí mounted yet 
again, climbing from US$ 11 billion in 1993 to 
US$ 11.7 billion in 1994. The inteiest payments 
falling due on that debt continued o exceed the 
value of Nicaragua's exports o:' goods and 
services, although the ratio has been declining 
since 1992. In fact, the external debt was almost 
27 times higher than those exports and over six 
times the size of the country's GDP. 
Under the terms of agreements concluded in 
1991 with the Governments of Germany and 
Italy within the framework of the Paris Club, 
US$ 308 million in debt was reregotiated in 
1994. Nicaragua was also able to secure 
forgiveness for a smaller amount of t lebt from the 
Chinese Province of Taiwan. In March 1995, 
another agreement was reached w th the Paris 
Club for the forgiveness of two thirds of the 
country's debt with the Club, which amounted to 
US$ 1.6 billion. This agreement rray pave the 
way for renegotiations with other creditors. 
Even if these arrangements were 1 inalized and 
the country's debt were cut to one third of its 
current level, its debt service oblige tions would 
still absorb the majority of its foreign-exchange 
earnings from exports. Consequently, in the 
medium term Nicaragua will have tc continue to 




1. General trends 
The Panamanian economy marked up its fifth 
consecutive year of growth in 1994 against a 
backdrop of price stability. At a little over 
4%, the economy's growth rate was lower 
than the high rates achieved in the preceding 
years, but even so it was enough to bring per 
capita GDP back up to the level it had reached 
prior to the 1988 crisis. Despite this strong 
performance, however, the open unemploy-
ment rate was verging on the disquieting level 
of 14%. 
The recovery being made by the country's 
international banking centre continued apace. 
This increased the availability of credit, which in 
turn helped to boost consumption. Although 
investment continued to expand more rapidly 
than consumption, its growth rate slowed, partly 
because of the uncertainty generated by the 
run-up to the elections held in May and the 
change of administration which took place in 
September. 
For the first time in many years, the country 
recorded a small trade deficit. Nevertheless, 
thanks to a reduction in external factor payments, 
it was able to cut the deficit on the 
balance-of-payments current account to US$ 100 
million, which was easily covert d by the net 
balance of capital movements. 
The central government's deficit grew 
slightly, but was still below 1% of GDP. Panama 
continued to service its debts witi multilateral 
and bilateral organizations after having 
regularized its payments situation in 1993, 
following an interruption lasting several years. It 
also rescheduled some of the bonds issued on its 
external debt and began to put its domestic debt 
profile in order. The renegotiation of the public 
sector's debt with private creditors remained 
pending, however. Any arrangement with the 
Paris Club would be continge it upon the 
definition of a structural reform programme, and 
such a programme was in fact in tie process of 
being approved by Congress durinj; the first half 
of 1995. 
The new administration launched a series of 
initiatives in the areas of tax reform, tariff policy, 
debt renegotiations and the management of the 
resources located in the Canal ¡tone, whose 
gradual return to the country is to be completed 
by the year 2000. 
2. Economic policy 
The central government's budget performance 
-one of the main focuses of economic policy-
was strongly influenced by the completion of 
the process undertaken in order to regularize 
Panama's payments on its domestic and 
external public debts and by the cautious 
approach it took to expenditures in view of the 
constraints affecting capital inflows and 
external finance. 
The new administration's proposals revolved 
around a redefinition of the public sector's role 
and an expansion of the effort being made to open 
up the economy to external markets. 
Accordingly, initiatives were under aken on four 
main fronts: the negotiation of terms for 
Panama's accession to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with n the new 
institutional framework provided ty the World 
Trade Organization (WTO); reforms O the system 
of tax incentives and exemptions; the 
privatization of State enterprises, including the 
Instituto Nacional de Telecomjnicaciones 
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(INTEL) and a portion of the Instituto de Recursos 
Hidráulicos y Electrificación (IRHE); and the 
institutional organization of the authority 
which is to manage the resources located in 
those areas of the Canal that have been returned 
to Panama. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The Government's fiscal policy for 1994 was 
geared to balancing the fiscal budget and moving 
forward with institutional reforms relating to the 
management of the public sector and the overall 
structure of the economy. 
One of the main reforms to be proposed was 
aimed at providing comprehensive tax incentives 
for production, a step that would entail changes 
in the policy on government subsidies and 
exemptions for a number of economic sectors. In 
1994 receipts amounting to nearly US$ 187 
million balboas, or 14% of its annual current 
income, were forgone by the central government 
as a consequence of the exemptions from import 
duties and redeemable tax credit certificates 
which it granted. Nevertheless, the 
corresponding bill was still awaiting passage by 
Congress as of the second quarter of 1995. 
Revenues were up slightly (by less than 4%). 
The increase in tax receipts (6%) was attributable 
both to the buoyancy of imports, which boosted 
the income from import duties by almost 8%, and 
to a strong domestic economy in 1994. The 
Government's non-tax revenues, which made up 
one third of total current income and were 
primarily derived from its share of the profits 
realized by State-run enterprises, failed to 
match their 1993 level, with the revenues 
provided by the State telecommunications 
company dropping by nearly 30 million 
balboas. Other non-tax income was up by 
almost 35 million balboas, however, thanks in 
part to the collection of fees for ship inspections, 
naval competency certificates and other such 
services for which charges had not previously 
been levied, as well as increased receipts from 
consular fees. 
In order to eliminate the public debt overhang 
and put its financial situation in order, the 
Government paid off the debts, in cash, that it 
owed to the Social Security Fund and the 
National Bank of Panama. The Government had 
embarked upon this process in 1992 and at 
some points along the way found it necessary 
to resort to the use of postpaymer t mechanisms 
and debt instruments to cover its outstanding 
obligations. 
The new administration strengthened the 
existing fiscal adjustment programme and 
carried forward only those projects that were 
already under way. Current savings, which 
totalled 125 million balboas for lhe year, were 
only enough to provide partial coverage for the 
execution of works in progress. Even so, the 
central government's accounts showed a deficit 
of 53 million balboas, most of which was 
financed with external resources. 
One area of policy that carried a high priority 
for the new authorities was the piivatization of 
State enterprises, a process that had been initiated 
by the preceding administration. A lew approach 
was adopted under which, in addition to putting 
established firms on the auction block, 
infrastructure projects would be opened up for 
bids at the international level, as w is done in the 
case of the construction of the north-western and 
southern sections of the Pan American highway. 
The promotion of a system of private operating 
contracts and leases allowed the administration 
to combine a number of majoi objectives, 
including those of redefining the pi blic sector as 
a regulator of private-sector development and 
restructuring public expenditure so is to meet the 
need for social spending. 
During the preceding administrai ion there had 
been a series of delays -d ie to legal 
circumstances or problems with the bidding 
process- which had caused foreigr investors to 
harbor some doubts about the process. Of a list 
of 20 firms that were up for privatization, the 
Government had been able to sell only nine, 
while another two were liquidated. In 1994 the 
State telecommunications company was 
converted into a semi-public enterprise due to a 
lack of sufficient fiscal resources ta pay for its 
modernization. Consideration was also being 
given to the partial privatization of tlie electricity 
company so that its production facilities could be 
modernized without the Government having to 
go into debt in order to finance the huge 
investments that would be required. 
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Percentages of GDP 
20.0 8.6 4.9 19.4 
22.3 18.8 7.6 17.6 
-2.3 -10.2 -2.7 1.9 
Percentages 
57.7 56.9 58.9 
11.8 16.3 16.3 16.8 
100.9 100.5 100.7 100.0 
Growth rates 
0.9 0.3 -0.2 0.8 
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67.3 59.0 53.2 53.5 
5.5 2.8 2.1 0.5 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
1 Preliminary figures. b Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact of the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's anm al growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the 
economically active population (EAP). Refers to the minimum wage in the manufacturing sector. s Reí ers to net interest 
as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. 
b) Other aspects of economic policy 
The country's international banking centre 
continued to recover from the steep downturn 
experienced in 1988, thanks to a 26% increase in 
its assets and the addition of five more banks 
holding general and international charters. This 
enabled the centre to resume its position as a 
financial intermediary between the region's 
economies and the international market. The 
national banking system, which does not include 
banks holding international charters, was also 
able to make a sizeable increase in its assets 
owing to an expansion of time deposits by foreign 
banks and individuals. 
This system-wide upswing in the level of bank 
assets opened the way for a 17% increase in credit 
to the private sector; the main beneficiaries were 
the manufacturing sector, the construction 
industry, personal consumption and especially 
commerce, which received two thirds of the total 
amount of credit extended. This sector's demand 
was generated by merchants and traders in the 
Colón Free Zone, whose level of ac tivity climbed 
considerably (11%) during the year. The annual 
interest rates on loans for commerce and industry 
averaged around 10%, which was somewhat 
lower than the rates charged on farm loans. 
Mortgage policies favoured loar applications 
from middle-income groups, while the 
Government raised the level of subsidies for 
multi-family housing units in the capital city. 
The new administration steppe 3 up the pace 
of the negotiations concerning Panama's 
accession to GATT and, to that end, began to 
consider trade liberalization measures for a 
number of sectors. This sparked a heated debate 
within the country and mobilized the various 
sectors that would be affected by a 
comprehensive trade liberalization drive. During 
these negotiations the Government kept channels 
open for consultations with representatives of 
agricultural, industrial and commercial 
associations. 
One of the country's major economic 
undertakings which has highly significant 
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implications for the future is the administration 
of those areas of the Canal Zone that have 
reverted to Panama. In 1994 the Interoceanic 
Region Authority (ARi) was created and placed 
in charge of the management and development 
of these areas. This agency then proceeded to 
move forward with a number of projects for 
a) Economic activity 
With an increase of over 4%, economic 
activity reached a record high, climbing to a point 
15% above the level recorded prior to the 1988 
crisis. This expansion enabled per capita GDP to 
regain its 1987 level. 
The economy's performance was fueled by 
an acceleration of the growth rates for both 
public and private consumption and for 
exports, which were coupled with a slow-down 
in gross capital formation. However, even 
though the 6% rise in gross fixed investment 
was far below the spectacular rates registered 
during the economic recovery of the early 1990s, 
fixed investment still increased its share of GDP 
to 30%. 
External demand strengthened markedly, 
paving the way for an increase of nearly 8% in 
export volumes; this rise was attributable to an 
upturn in re-exports, since exports of goods 
produced in Panama were down. Commerce in 
the Colón Free Zone continued to contribute to 
the economy's buoyancy as traders took 
advantage of the reactivation of South American 
markets within a more open economic 
environment. 
Production sectors making an outstanding 
showing in 1994 included the banking system, 
commerce in the Colón Free Zone, construction 
and basic services. Less striking yet still positive 
performances were turned in by almost all the 
other sectors of the economy. The sole exception 
-due to the effect of austerity measures, which 
were further reinforced towards the end of the 
year- was government services. 
The agricultural sector's rate of expansion 
was somewhat below the growth rate recorded 
for GDP as a whole. Among the country's export 
crops, the banana and coffee harvests showed an 
the development of these ureas's assets, 
including projects for the establishment of 
environmentalreserves,multisectoraleconomic 
zones, and cultural and educational centres, as 
well as other activities designed to provide 
services to meet international demand in the 
Zone. 
improvement (6% and 5%, respectively) as 
exporters strove to place these products in the 
international market. Banana producers were 
also helped by good weather conditions and the 
absence of any long-lasting labour conflicts. 
Soaring coffee prices between May and 
September spurred on the hai vesting of this 
crop, but yields were none the less limited by 
the inadequate maintenance of the country's 
coffee plantations. Efforts to open up new 
markets for Panamanian sugar failed to make 
headway, and output declined. The harvests of 
the main agricultural products sold on the 
domestic market registeied moderate 
increases. 
The slaughtering of beef attle fell by 4% 
while pork production climbed slightly and the 
poultry industry improved its performance with 
an 8% increase in its output of chicken products 
and sausages. Activity in the lishery industry, 
which has been bolstered durirg the 1990s by 
stronger domestic and external demand and the 
investments made in processing facilities, was 
buoyed by the size of the shrimp catch and by a 
spectacular 75% jump in the praduction of fish 
oil. 
An increase of almost 5% in manufacturing 
output represented a slow-down for the decade. 
Flagging demand for foodstuffs on the part of 
Central America was one of he reasons for 
the lower growth rate (2%) reported by this 
branch of industry, which is an extremely 
important one, since it provide;; more than half 
of the manufacturing sector's total output. A 
fire in the country's largest refi lery in the final 
quarter of the year reduced the output of 
petroleum products. The strong; showing made 
by the construction industry was a boon for 
producers of building materials and metal 
products, while the election campaign 
3. The main variables 
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boosted activity in the paper and printing 
industry. 
Even though it was one of the fastest-growing 
industries, construction still suffered its most 
severe slow-down thus far in the 1990s. 
Services accounted for three fourths of GDP 
and continued to act as the engine driving 
forward the Panamanian economy's growth. The 
expansion of the transport sector stemmed from 
the country's intense commercial activity, 
especially in the Colón Free Zone, which was in 
turn linked to the favourable trends observed in 
world trade. Cargo shipments through the Canal 
were up by over 8%. The only decline in activity 
to be recorded was in the trans-isthmus oil 
pipeline, but even so the decrease was smaller 
than in earlier years, when it had borne the brunt 
of the effect of competition from the Alaskan 
pipeline. The production of electricity, gas and 
water responded to the heavier demand generated 
by private consumers and, in the case of 
electricity, by the public sector as well, where 
demand was stimulated by election-related 
activities. 
Financial services, except those related to the 
ownership of residential units, did well in all 
categories. The number of tourists decreased as 
a consequence of the country's limited hotel 
capacity, but spending by tourists was up 7%. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The small increase in consumer prices -which 
rose at an annual rate of slightly over 1%- was a 
little higher than it had been the year before. 
Contributing factors in this very limited increase 
included rising oil prices and the need to import 
processed rather than crude oil because of the 
damage done to the refinery in the 
above-mentioned fire. 
Wholesale price levels, which climbed by an 
annual rate of about 2%, were particularly 
affected by the increase registered for imported 
products (5%). Midway through the year, 
imported crude oil was costing almost 16% more 
than it had in December 1993, and its price rose 
another 11% during the second six months of 
1994. Another factor was the higher price of 
imported motor vehicles, which, together with 
hydrocarbons, represent one fourth of the total 
weighting for the wholesale price index. Among 
nationally-produced goods, price hikes were 
recorded for vegetables, shellfish, sweets, some 
chemicals such as pesticides and petroleum 
products, beef and poultry. 
No changes were made in official minimum 
wages in 1994. The increase in average 
civil-service wages was estimated at almost 5% 
above the growth rate in coniumer prices, 
however, and the total payroll climbed by nearly 
2% despite a decrease in the number of civil 
servants. In Panama City's ba iking sector, 
average wages were over 3% higher in nominal 
terms. 
The employment situation worsened, 
however, with some 9,200 persons being added 
to the ranks of the unemployed. The number of 
persons who were laid off and the number of 
unemployed among new entrants into the 
labour market both rose by between 7% and 
8%, thus driving up the total unemployment 
rate to almost 14%. The deterioration in 
unemployment indexes was parti y a reflection 
of a reduced manpower absorption capacity in 
such activities as construction, manufacturing 
and tourism, which compounded the 
unemployment occasioned by the c ismantling of 
United States military bases located in the Canal 
Zone. 
c) The external sector 
Panama's current account showed a negative 
balance of US$ 100 million in 1994, The fact that 
this shortfall was less pronounced than the year 
before was attributable to the country's smaller 
deficit in factor services, since it ran up a US$ 14 
million deficit in its trade in goods and services. 
Generally speaking, the country's external 
payments situation was a fairly comfortable one, 
while the amount of funds attracted by the 
international banking centre was oi i the rise and 
the national banking system found itself seeking 
out external markets for its capital. 
The country's merchandise trale showed a 
deficit of over US$ 980 million, which slightly 
outweighed the nearly US$ 970 m ilion surplus 
yielded by its trade in real services. Commercial 
activity within the Colón Free Zone boomed, 
while both imports and exports of goods climbed 
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nearly 11% above their 1993 levels in response 
to the opening of new markets in Brazil and 
Ecuador. 
The level of merchandise imports which was 
cleared through customs was nearly four times as 
high as exports of domestically-produced 
goods.1 
In an unusual development, imports of 
petroleum products in 1994 doubled due to the 
shutdown of the country's main refinery and 
stronger domestic demand from the transport 
sector. As in the two preceding years, one of the 
sharpest increases among the country's main 
import items was in private motor vehicles. This 
trend has helped to change the Panama's import 
mix, with motor vehicles and related equipment 
coming to represent almost one fourth of the 
total. 
Imports by the Canal Commission shrank as 
facilities in the Canal Zone was gradually 
dismantled and support personnel were 
repatriated. On the other side of the coin, the 
establishment of temporary camps for Cuban 
refugees in the vicinity of the Canal, to be 
administered by United States military forces 
based in the area, boosted income. 
Exports of Panamanian products remained 
sluggish as a consequence of the difficulties 
affecting the country's main traditional export 
products, such as bananas, sugar and, to a lesser 
extent, tobacco. Even so, bananas still 
represented nearly 40% of total domestically-
produced exports, with shrimp taking second 
place. Exports of petroleum products also grew 
less than before due to the shutdown of the oil 
refinery and the curtailment of production in the 
final quarter. Non-traditional exports rose 
steeply, climbing to over 40% of the total. The 
most important and fastest-growing products in 
this category were medicines, pureed bananas, 
cowhides and shellfish preparations. 
The most notable item among the country's 
exports of real services was transport services 
routed through the Canal, which, between tolls 
and other port charges, generated more than 
US$ 500 million. Greater trading activity on the 
part of South America and the Asian countries 
1 This does not include trading activity in the country's 
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bordering the Pacific Ocean, along with the 
economic reactivation in the United States, 
resulted in a 4% increase in the net tonnage of 
freight carried through the Canal Meanwhile, net 
income from tourism was 13% higher than in 
1993. 
Net payments for factor sen ices plunged to 
just one third of their 1993 level as the increase 
in returns from Panamanian fore ign investments 
outpaced the growth of overseas interest 
payments and profit remittances. 
The surplus on capital ace aunt was large 
enough to finance the current account deficit and 
to add US$ 70 million to the country's 
international reserves. Partly because of the 
conclusion of external aid programmes and 
partly as a result of the change it administration, 
the inflow of official and multilateral funds 
slackened in 1994. Consequently, this flow 
covered only one fifth of the service payments 
falling due on the public external debt. 
The external debt owed to private creditors 
continued to mount (10%), rising to 63% of the 
total public debt, but external debt indicators 
exhibited no major changes from the year before. 
During the first half of 1994, an effort was made 
to bring the country's debt payments to official 
institutions and agencies up to date. This called 
for the rescheduling of US$ 465 million in 
overdue interest payments and, as part of this 
process, in May the country floated US$ 420 
million in new paper on the primary market. To 
assist the Government in its effort to eliminate 
arrears with international financial institutions, 
the World Bank granted it a long-term US$ 120 
million loan, only one half of which was 
disbursed. 
No major movements were observed during 
the remainder of the year, except on the part of 
the Inter-American Development Bank, which 
pledged resources and disbursed funds for 
long-term projects aimed at leforming State 
enterprises. Late in the year, the reduction of the 
country's arrears paved the way for Panama to 
obtain fresh loans and to reactivate financial 
arrangements which had been suspended. 
processing zones (EPZs). 
PARAGUAY 
1. General trends 
The Paraguayan economy's 3.5% growth rate for 
1994 was somewhat lower than it had been in 
1993 as a result of the fact that the boost given to 
the economy by the growth of private 
consumption was counteracted by the poor 
performance of Paraguay's main agricultural 
export products due to bad weather conditions 
and crop diseases. 
The country's copious inflow of external 
capital, which enabled it to cover a deficit on the 
balance-of-payments current account equivalent 
to one tenth of total GDP, held the nominal 
exchange rate virtually steady throughout most 
of the year. This bolstered efforts to combat 
inflation by holding down costs, but the 
adjustment of public utility rates early in the year 
and an upturn in the components of external 
inflation that affect the country exerted pressure 
in the opposite direction. The net result, in an 
In line with the strategy announced by the 
administration which had taken office in the 
second half of 1993, the top priority for economic 
policy-makers in 1994 was to lower inflation. A 
well-balanced management of fiscal variables 
and the setting of objectives for the growth of the 
money supply that were in keeping with a 15% 
target rate for inflation were the main tools used 
to this end; meanwhile, the country maintained 
its system of floating exchange rates, which 
allows for intervention by the Central Bank in 
currency markets. 
Towards the end of 1994 the process leading 
up to the country's official entry into the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was 
completed. Through its membership in this 
regional group, Paraguay joined Argentina, 
economy in which price formation is subject to 
widespread inertial mechanisris, was that 
inflation proved to be quite intracta ble. It was not 
until late in the year that some tieadway was 
made, when the 12-month variation in the 
consumer price index slipped to 18%, which was 
down 2% from the figure for 1993. Further 
progress was made in the first lialf of 1995, 
however, with the annualized rate 1 ailing to 14% 
in May. Meanwhile, the public sector's surplus 
climbed to the equivalent of 3% ol GDP in 1994, 
thanks to a steep rise in tax receipts and in the 
proceeds from fees charged for the use of the 
Itaipú hydroelectric complex. This situation 
made it feasible to reduce the level of both 
external and domestic debt. The contraction of 
domestic credit offset most of the effect of the 
money creation generated by the re bust increase 
in Central Bank reserves. 
Brazil and Uruguay in a limited customs union 
which entered into operation in January 1995. 
Structural reform efforts made some inroads. 
In November, Congress passed a law that 
re-wrote the Central Bank's charte- and defined 
the structure of the Superintendency of Banks, 
but the Executive branch's veto effectively 
postponed financial reforms that had been in the 
pipeline. The privatization programme moved 
forward on a somewhat limited scale with the 
sale of LAP, the State airline, who ¡e name was 
changed to Líneas Aéreas Paraguayas, SA (LAPSA). 
a) Fiscal policy 
The effort to balance the country's fiscal 
accounts, which was one of the pillars of the 
2. Economic policy 
285 
Figure 1 
PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
A n n u a l r a t e 
1 9 6 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 I 9 9 4 
T W * l v « - m o n t h V A r l A t l o n (*^>> 
1 8 8 2 1 8 8 4 1 8 
,/X.s p e r c e n t a g e s o f Q OF* 
I 8 8 0 I 8 8 2 1 8 8 4 1 8 8 6 1 8 
S o u r o e : EC2L_A.CS, o r i t h e b * * l a o f 
- O f t h « b « l » n c « o f p e y m e n U . 
t f f l c l e x l f i g u r e s . 
2 - 8 8 4 
286 
PARAGUAY 
Government's stabilization policy, was 
facilitated by the tax reforms that had been 
implemented two years earlier. In fact, after both 
taxpayers and tax collectors had been allowed 
some time to adapt to the new system, the 
improvement of administrative procedures 
actually raised the central government's tax 
receipts by nearly 50%. 
A striking increase (41%) was seen in the tax 
yield from domestic commercial activity. Within 
this category, the value-added tax (VAT) 
generated one third of the total, while excise tax 
receipts were up 31% and income tax revenues 
jumped by 71%. Receipts from taxes on foreign 
trade also rose considerably (41%) thanks to the 
boom in imports. In addition, fees paid by Brazil 
for the use of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam 
amounted to almost 3% of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and to nearly one fifth of the central 
government's total income. Consequently, even 
though expenditures climbed by 32% (a 16% 
increase in real terms), the bottom line on the 
central government's accounts switched from a 
deficit of nearly 1% of GDP to a surplus of about 
the same size. 
Inasmuch as State enterprises managed to 
increase their net operating surplus as well, the 
public sector found itself in a quite comfortable 
financial situation, and this allowed it to cut back 
on domestic borrowing and thus buttress the 
efforts of monetary policy-makers. 
b) Exchange policy 
The system of a free-floating exchange rate 
coupled with Central Bank intervention in the 
currency market remained in place. The 
abundant inflow of external resources made it 
necessary for the Central Bank to trade heavily 
in the currency market in order to ward off a sharp 
appreciation of the local currency (the guaraní); 
in fact, the Central Bank was so active in that 
market that its net purchases from the financial 
system amounted to about 2.5% of GDP. This had 
such a strong stabilizing effect on the parity of 
the United States dollar that it rose only 5% in 
1994. 
Moreover, the steep rise in the value of 
Brazil's and the European countries' currencies 
against the dollar bolstered the guarani's 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the currencies of 
Paraguay's main trading partners n real terms. 
c) Monetary policy 
In 1994 monetary policy focus îd on soaking 
up the excess liquidity generated by the strong 
build-up in international reserves. ' rhis had led to 
a sharp increase in the amount of currency 
outside banks, thus undermining the stabilization 
policy, which had been designtd to prevent 
primary money creation from moving the 
economy away from its targeted ir flation rate. 
The surplus posted by the public sector helped 
to rein in the level of liquidity by prompting the 
sector to cut back substantially on its net intake 
of credit, as was evidenced, in pi rticular, by a 
steep drop in borrowing from comr lercial banks. 
The management of the country's monetary 
affairs then focused on absorbing a cess liquidity 
through open-market operations, especially in 
the period between April and No/ember. This 
enabled the monetary authority to keep the 
monetary base under tight control, holding its 
rate of expansion to 27% for the y« ar. 
In the place of the discount vindow made 
available to the agricultural sector, which was all 
but closed down in 1994, it was ajjreed that the 
financial system would increase ils lending to 
cotton growers and that, in exchange, the reserve 
requirement would be switched from 
non-interest-bearing reserves to Tr< asury bonds. 
This step not only reduced the finar ciai system's 
costs but also narrowed the spread between 
interest rates on deposits and loans, 
Except for the first quarter, when inflation was 
higher than it was during the rest of the year, real 
interest rates on time deposits were positive, 
although they did tend to move dow nward. Even 
so, since the nominal exchange rate rose so 
slowly, local-currency deposits aïorded high 
yields in dollar terms. The reduction in the 
required level of non-interest-beaiing reserves 
from 25% to 18% and the slippage of rates on 
deposits led to a slight decrease in assets in 
nominal terms. 
The downward trend in inflation and the 
stability of the exchange rate both h;lped to spur 
the demand for money. Accordingly, the money 
supply expanded by 31% in 1994. Furthermore, 
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Table 1 
PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 




Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(guaraníes per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 








Gross debt (as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 













































































































































































































































































Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of banking 
system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
(in local currency) 
M2 
Dollar deposits 




Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign currency 
1987 1988 1989 


































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact o? the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annus I growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. Up to 19)1, these figures 
correspond to the metropolitan area; the 1994 figure refers to the entire country. e Percentages of the eco íomically active 
population (EAP). Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goo ds and services. 
eFor 1990-1992, the rates shown correspond to the month of December; the rates given for 1993 and 1994 are ¡nnual averages. 
Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
PARAGUAY: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 1993 1994a 
i ii in iv i ii in iv i il m iv 
Consumer prices 
(nation-wide) (12-
month variation, %) 12.0 14.8 16.7 17.8 18.0 18.6 16.6 20.4 22.4 20.9 20.9 18.3 
Real bank exchange, 
rate, average selling 
rate (cash transactions) 
(Index: 1990=100) 87.6 90.1 92.4 92.2 90.8 93.4 93.0 91.4 89.9 91.5 101.6 106.5 
Real interest rate 
(annualized, %) 
On deposits ... 2.7 6.3 16.7 -2.9 8.3 8.8 -1.3 -8.1 14.9 8.0 6.4 
On loans ... 11.3 ... 28.2 4.9 16.9 17.8 7.9 0.4 25.8 18.3 16.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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the spread between domestic and external 
interest rates boosted the increase in 
local-currency quasi-money, which jumped by a 
spectacular 50%. The increase in 
foreign-currency deposits was substantial (15%), 
but far lower than in the preceding years, and the 
broadly-defined money supply -which includes 
such assets- swelled by almost 30%. 
Consequently, the dollarization of the economy 
abated somewhat for the first time in many years. 
The expansion of the money supply enabled the 
banking system to increase its private-sector 
placements by 37% and thus to maintain the rapid 
growth rate registered the year before. 
d) Trade policy 
Paraguay completed the nece ssary procedures 
to join Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay as a 
member of MERCOSUR in 1994, As of 1 January 
1995, a limited customs union entered into 
operation which granted the country 399 
exceptions to the common external tariff; these 
exceptions will then be phased out over a 
10-year period. Within tie domain of 
intra-community trade, Paraguay obtained 
exemptions up to the year 2001 for a total of 
427 products. 
3. The main variables 
a) Economic activity 
The sizeable drop in the cotton harvest -the 
country's main export- and the weak 
performance turned in by the manufacturing 
sector sapped the strength of GDP, which grew by 
less than 4%; as a result, per capita GDP increased 
by less than 1%. 
The level of overall economic activity was 
hurt by the loss of momentum in 
goods-producing sectors, whose growth rate was 
only slightly more than one half (2%) of the 1993 
rate. Total services, on the other hand, expanded 
by almost 5%, with their growth being driven 
primarily by basic services (8%). 
Despite the poor performance of export crops, 
external sales -measured at constant values-
expanded by 4%. Domestic demand, buttressed 
by a plentiful supply of external finance and an 
improvement in real wages, continued to climb 
at a smart pace (5%). Both consumption and 
investment (particularly purchases of 
machinery and equipment) showed a strong 
increase. The acceleration of investment raised 
its share of GDP to approximately 23%; in all, 
37% of investment was financed with domestic 
funds and the remainder with external 
resources. Since the growth of total demand 
outpaced the increase in domestic activity, the 
physical volume of imports continued to rise 
steeply. It should be noted that a large share of 
merchandise imports are channeled into 
Paraguay's busy trade in re-exports to 
neighbouring countries. 
The 10% drop in the cotton harvest -despite 
a 60% expansion in the amount of land under 
cultivation- had a strong impact on the economy 
as a whole and had adverse social effects in rural 
areas. Bad weather conditions and an onslaught 
of pests joined forces in damaging this crop, 
which is an extremely important one for 
Paraguay. In addition, the soybean harvest 
showed almost no growth despite an increase in 
the amount of land that was planted with this 
crop. The country's other crops, together with its 
livestock, fishery and forestry industries, 
exhibited moderate increases. The 
manufacturing sector remained s luggish, as it has 
been since 1990. Consequently, the increase of 
about 4% in construction activity turned out to 
be the most important engine of growth in the 
production of goods. 
In contrast, the burgeoning growth of basic 
services continued, with the generation of 
electricity and the provision of water and 
sanitation services in the lead (13%). 
1 From 1993 on, the Central Bank of Paraguay includes an estimate of re-exports and of imports of th ; main categories of 
unregistered merchandise in its foreign trade statistics, thus invalidating any comparison between these figures and its foreign trade 
statistics for earlier years. 
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The remaining services followed the trend in 
overall economic activity quite closely. 
b) Prices and wages 
The authorities' strategy for stabilizing 
domestic prices was the cornerstone of their 
economic policy, and the main objective set forth 
by policy-makers was therefore to lower the 
annual rate of increase in consumer prices to 18% 
(it was 20% in 1993). 
In 1994, the behaviour of the 12-month 
cumulative inflation rate went through two very 
different stages. Until August, this indicator 
defied efforts to bring it down, hovering at annual 
levels of 20%-22%. In the last four months of the 
year, however, the rate followed a definite 
downward trend, falling to its lowest point for the 
year -an annual rate of 18%- by December. This 
trend was closely related to the price and rate 
hikes which were instituted for public utilities 
during the first quarter and the adjustments made 
in the minimum wage in January and July. 
Indeed, a comparison of quarterly variations in 
consumer prices for 1993 and 1994 reveals that 
the first quarter was the only one in which the 
1994 increase in consumer prices outdistanced 
the price rise recorded for the corresponding 
quarter in 1993. This indicates that, once 
corrections had been made in a number of 
public-sector prices (corrections which led to a 
one-time jump in the IPC), inflation began to fall 
into line with the course set for it by the 
administration's exchange, fiscal and monetary 
policies. 
A particularly influential factor in the 
stabilization effort was the virtual immobility of 
the exchange rate for the dollar in the last three 
quarters of 1994, during which it increased by a 
scant 1%. Imported inflation -stemming mainly 
from the implementation of the Real Plan in 
Brazil- was one of the forces exerting pressure 
in the opposite direction. 
Adjustments in the minimum wage brought 
nominal hikes of 15% in January and of 10% in 
July; this amounted to a gain of nearly 3% in real 
terms, following an uninterrupted deterioration 
in this wage level dating back to 1990. The 
general wage level for manual workers climbed 
by 1% in real terms. 
PARAGUAY 
The nation-wide unemployment rate held at 
around 9%. In Asunción, however, it slipped 
below the 5% mark, probably as a result of the 
greater buoyancy of predominantly urban service 
industries. 
c) The externa] sector 
Paraguay's trading activities include three 
distinct components. One is made up of the 
merchandise exports and imports associated with 
domestic economic activity. Another is the large 
volume of imported items which Paraguay sells 
to its two large neighbours, Argentha and Brazil. 
In view of the magnitude of this trading activity 
-for which few statistical records {re available-
since 1993 trade statistics have included an 
estimate of the flows moving in both directions. 
The third component corresponds to the 
binational hydroelectric complexes at Itaipu, on 
the Brazilian border, and at Yacyretá, on the 
Argentine frontier, which generate a 
considerable inflow of foreign exchange in the 
form of royalties. 
Paraguay's balance of payments showed a 
sizeable increase in its deficit on cuirent account; 
this gap was easily covered with lhe country's 
copious inflows of external resources, two thirds 
of which were entered under the hea ling of errors 
and omissions. This inflow was equivalent to 
15% of GOP and made a substantia 1 addition to 
the country's net international reseives, causing 
them to swell to over 4% of GDP. 
The extremely high figure fo:- errors and 
omissions raises serious questions as to that 
entry's content, with the central qtestion being 
whether it corresponds mainly tc inflows of 
private short-term capital or primarily to 
current-account transactions, which would mean 
that the trade deficit was actually considerably 
smaller. Trans-border transactions for 1994 were 
estimated to total around US$ 80) million in 
unregistered imports and re-exports in both 
directions (43% and 97% of the corresponding 
registered trade flows). The size of this figure 
suggests than an appreciable percentage of the 
errors and omissions entry represents 
unregistered trading activity. 
Registered imports climbed by or e third, with 
the increase being attributable to the steep upturn 
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in imports of capital goods and to the strength of 
domestic demand within the context of a stable 
exchange rate. Exports of Paraguayan goods also 
displayed a good deal of momentum (9%) despite 
the decline in exports of cotton and soybeans 
-two of the country's main products- since the 
decreases in these items were offset by increased 
exports of other products and higher cotton and 
soybean prices on the international market. The 
binational hydroelectric complexes were a 
significant source of foreign exchange, providing 
an inflow of US$ 500 million, which was 25% 
above the figure for the preceding year. 
Nevertheless, the current account of the balance 
of payments did show a deficit, but it was easily 
covered by the country's hefty inflow of both 
long- and short-term external resources. In the 
case of long-term assets, the upward trend in 
direct investment -which amounted to nearly 
2.5% of GDP in 1994- vas a notable 
development. Inflows of short-term capital were 
also quite heavy, as was attested to by the Central 
Bank's constant presence in the j oreign exchange 
market as it sought to stave off an unwanted 
revaluation of the guaraní. 
Registered exports exhibited a high degree of 
concentration, with a full two thirds of such sales 
going to Brazil and the Netherlands (37% and 
27%, respectively). Meanwhile, one half of 
Paraguay's imports came from MERCOSUR. 
The external public debt edge d up to US$ 1.27 
billion, the equivalent of one sixth of GDP. This 
debt is fairly evenly divided between 




Overall, 1994 marked the second year of the 
Peruvian economy's recovery -this time at a rate 
of nearly 13%- from the prolonged recession, 
political unrest and social crisis which had 
plagued the country since the mid-1980s. Even 
so, gross domestic product (GDP) was still 10% 
below its 1987 level, and the cumulative gain 
achieved over the last two years was equivalent 
to scarcely one third of the amount of per capita 
income lost during the preceding period. 
The expansion of the economy was brought 
about by an across-the-board increase in total 
demand amounting to over 10% of GDP, much of 
which was covered with external resources. 
Private consumption generated a great deal of the 
momentum behind this increase, with a 
contribution to GDP of 8%. It was followed by 
investment (with a 6% contribution), which 
skyrocketed by 36%, while exports accounted for 
another 3% of the expansion. For the second year 
in a row an increase (to a full two thirds) was 
registered in the percentage of investment that 
was financed with national savings, which rose 
by over 2 percentage points from the preceding 
year's level to nearly 17% of GDP in 1994. 
Under the stabilization programme in effect 
since mid-1990 -which has brought 
thorough-going economic reforms, including 
financial and trade liberalization, new legislation 
on foreign investment and the privatization of 
major State enterprises- inflation slowed to an 
annual rate of 15%. This was less than one half 
the 1993 level and the lowest to be recorded in 
the last 15 years. 
This achievement was made possible by a 
combination of factors, including the stability of 
the nominal exchange rate, an ample supply of 
imports (thanks to the steps taken to open up the 
economy to external markets and to Peru's low 
tariffs), a decline in agricultural prices in 
trends 
response to plentiful harvests, and greater 
confidence on the part of economic agents, which 
gave rise to a rapid remoneti/.ation of the 
economy. The performance of tht public sector 
helped to move the economy in the same 
direction, since although fiscal policy was 
expansionary, it did not impact prices due to the 
availability of external resources, a large portion 
of which took the form of proceeds from 
privatizations. In a departure from earlier years, 
the non-financial public sector'! current and 
capital expenditures both rose by inore than one 
point of GDP, but the ratio of fisci .1 expenditure 
was still a moderate 15% of GDP. 
Domestic production responded with alacrity 
to the upsurge in demand, but a considerable 
portion of consumption was none the less 
covered with imports. The deficit on the 
balance-of-payments current account widened to 
over US$ 2.7 billion, which brought it close to 
6% of GDP. Although exports, meai.ured in terms 
of value, jumped by nearly 30%, hus breaking 
free of the flat growth curve observed over the 
preceding three years, the merci tandise trade 
balance continued, as it has for the p ast five years, 
to move more deeply into the red, w ith the deficit 
doubling to over US$ 1.1 billion. Nevertheless, 
the inflow of external resources -including 
approximately US$ 5.8 billion from 
privatizations- provided so much more than was 
needed to cover the deficit on curent account 
that international reserves swelled by over 
US$ 3.1 billion (nearly 6% of GDP) . 
The upswing in the level of economic activity 
had little effect on the labour markt t. Household 
surveys conducted in Lima and data gathered on 
establishments employing moie than 100 
workers indicate that open unemployment fell by 
less than one point; employment levels in 
manufacturing and commerce were down, but 
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PERU 
this decrease was offset by a 4% rise in 
employment in the services sector. A sizeable 
portion of the slight improvement seen in the 
labour situation was attributable to an increased 
absorption of manpower by smaller business 
enterprises, which in Peru tend to be in 
low-productivity segments of the economy. 
During the first quarter of 1995 the economy 
continued to flourish, registering a growth rate of 
around 10%, while inflation continued to 
subside, with the annualized rate as of April 
standing at 11%. Mexico's economic crisis did 
As in 1993, Peru's economic policy for 1994 
sought -successfully so, as it turned out- to 
combine an economic recovery with a reduction 
in inflation. The strong upturn in the level of 
economic activity was bolstered by an 
expansionary fiscal policy, which was financed 
with the revenues supplied by a considerable 
increase in the tax burden and by the privatization 
of public assets. Another mainstay was the steep 
increase in private expenditure which took place 
against the backdrop of a steadily expanding 
supply of both domestic and external credit. An 
improvement in the supply of agricultural 
products also contributed to this trend. 
The abatement of inflation was fostered by an 
intensive remonetization of the economy as 
economic agents' favourable expectations fueled 
a substantial increase in the demand for real 
money balances. The virtual stability of the going 
rate for the dollar in a foreign exchange market 
having an ample supply of hard currency at its 
disposal -which made imported items less 
expensive- and abundant harvests -which drove 
down the farm sector's prices even in nominal 
terms- also helped to dampen inflation. 
a) Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy followed an expansionary line, 
with emphasis on investment, thus paving the 
way for an acceleration of the gradual return to 
the levels of public participation which had 
evaporated during the country's bouts with 
hyperinflation in the second half of the 1980s. 
This recovery has been based on a revival of 
not seem to have any major impact on Peru's 
external sector. Net international leserves, which 
had reached an all-time record of US$ 5.8 billion 
at the close of 1994, were drawn ilown by about 
US$ 200 million in order to defniy some of the 
costs of the armed conflict that broke out with the 
neighbouring country of Ecuador. 
President Alberto Fujimori's re-election by a 
large majority in April was well received by the 
business community and foreign investors, who 
felt that it would assure the coitinuity of the 
country's existing economic strategy. 
economic activity, progress in the stabilization of 
prices and an abundant supplj of external 
finance, combined with the preseivation -at all 
costs- of a strict financial balance in 
public-sector accounts. 
The non-financial public sec or yielded a 
primary surplus (excluding interés payments on 
the external debt), even if the proceeds from 
privatizations are not counted. The sector's 
overall financial balance also boasted a surplus, 
which amounted to 1.6% of GDP if privatizations 
are not included and to 2.5% of GEP if they are. 
This performance was made possible by a 
23% increase in tax revenues in real terms, which 
climbed from 9.3% to 10.5% of GDP, chiefly as 
a result of the boost provided by the general sales 
tax. The higher rate of tax collection was 
attributable to the economic reactivation and to 
the reform and modernization process pursued by 
the National Tax Administra ion Super-
intendency (SUNAT). This programme, which is 
being carried forward with financ; al assistance 
from IDB, focuses on streamlining the system, 
broadening the tax base and curtailing tax 
evasion. At year's end arrangements were also 
concluded with IDB for a US$ 1.5 million loan for 
the modernization of the National Customs 
Superintendency with a view to inproving the 
collection of taxes on foreign trade, 
An increase equivalent to nearly one point of 
GDP brought the central government's level of 
current expenditure to nearly 10.7% of that 
variable, while gross capital expenditure 
amounted to about 4.4%, or almost two points 
higher than in 1993. Public investment, 
2. Economic policy 
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Table 1 
PERU: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994a 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real average wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 




Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(new soles per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 








Gross debt (as a percentage of GDP) 





























































































































278.6 210.1 114.5 100.0 
Growth rates 


















































































































Capital expenditure (net) 
Financial balance 




Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of banking system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To the public sector 
To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
(in local currency) 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 
On loans 
Equivalent interest rate in 
foreign currency 
1987 1988 1989 























500.9 1 860.2 
491.5 1 805.7 
359.2 4 061.9 







































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact ol the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each agreggate's annus 1 growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e P xentages of the 
economically active population (EAP). For 1987 and 1988, the exchange rate is expressed in new soles per I tiousand dollars. 
8 Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. 
deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
h Interest rate on 
Table 2 
PERU: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 1993 li 94
a 
I II III IV i ii m rv i 1] m IV 
Gross doemstic product 
(Index: 1990=100) b 
Consumer prices 
(12-month variation, %) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 




(12-month variation, %) 
97.7 103.3 98.2 102.4 98.3 109.5 109.3 110.7 109.1 126.9 120.9 126.2 
100.8 78.4 57.7 56.7 51.3 49.9 47.0 39.5 31.5 24.1 19.3 15.3 
73.8 75.5 83.9 90.5 87.6 90.5 89.7 88.4 84.2 83.3 86.5 84.3 
-6.3 4.5 10.1 -0.6 -5.5 1.4 8.7 9.2 3.8 9.2 5.1 5.9 
48.5 57.8 71.5 45.5 37.1 39.0 44.2 44.3 36.0 38.1 28.5 28.8 
113.0 73.5 80.3 79.1 87.2 63.9 60.4 54.7 50.4 66.2 70.1 61.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
' Preliminary figures. Based on values computed at constant prices in the country; these figures have not jeen seasonally 
adjusted. c Quarterly averages. 
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buttressed by privatizations and external credit, 
was concentrated in infrastructure projects and 
social spending, especially on the construction of 
medical clinics and schools. 
b) Monetary and exchange policy 
Faced with a heavy inflow of external 
resources, in 1994 the Central Reserve Bank of 
Peru played an active role in the foreign 
exchange market -within the framework 
provided by the country's system of floating 
exchange rates- in order to prevent the nominal 
exchange rate from backsliding. Thus, following 
a slight gain in the third quarter, the price of the 
dollar declined during the final months of the 
year, falling back to virtually the same level as at 
the close of 1993. This led to a further 
deterioration -of around 5%- in the real effective 
exchange rate. 
Inasmuch as the public sector did not draw on 
Central Bank credit, since it was in a surplus 
position, the increase in the money supply 
stemmed from the sizeable build-up in 
international reserves. During the first half of the 
year, the monetary effect of this expansion in 
reserves was sterilized by deposits in the Central 
Bank made by the public sector and the Banco 
de la Nación. Consequently, the increase in 
money creation for the 12-month period ending 
in June totalled about 30%, as compared to an 
annual rate of inflation of around 24% for the 
same period. During the second half of the year, 
the momentum of domestic demand and the 
sharp slow-down in prices sparked favourable 
expectations and strengthened the public's 
preference for real money balances. At that point 
the monetary authority relaxed its policy stance, 
particularly as it related to public-sector deposits, 
which caused the money supply's rate of 
expansion to pick up speed. Hence, despite the 
steep decrease in inflation, the annual growth rate 
for the money supply hovered around 60% 
throughout most of the year, leading to an 
intensive remonetization of the economy, with 
Ml approaching the equivalent of 4% of GDP. 
This remonetization process extended to 
local-currency quasi-money, which soared by 
89% and boosted the broadly-defined money 
supply (M2) by almost 74%. Although 
foreign-currency deposits griiw less quickly 
(33%), the economy's degree of dollarization 
remained very high, with foreign-currency 
deposits making up two thirds of the financial 
system's total liquidity. 
The interest rate on local-currency loans 
moved downward throughout the year, 
descending from a nominal annual rate of 72% 
in the first quarter to 40% in the last. In real terms, 
however, it remained above ar annual level of 
28%, with the spread between it and the rate on 
deposits holding at over 20%. Dollar-
denominated interest rates fell less sharply, from 
16.4% to 15.6% between the beginning and end 
of the year, with a spread of 8% over the deposit 
rate; this differential was partly attributable to the 
policy governing minimum rese rve requirements 
for foreign-currency deposits, which accrued 
interest at IÍBOR plus commiiision. Since the 
foreign-currency rate was substantially lower 
than the local-currency one, business firms 
continued to borrow in dollars (150% of the credit 
extended by the banking; system was 
denominated in foreign currency), thereby 
assuming the attendant exchange risk. 
c) Trade policy 
Under the terms of a trade integration 
agreement signed in 1992, Venezuela and Peru 
agreed to extend their tariff preferences to 
include another 198 Venezuelan products and 
89 Peruvian ones; 60% of these trade 
preferences are reciprocal and chiefly concern 
items produced by the textile ind agricultural 
sectors. 
When the international price!; of commodities 
that are staples in the Peruvian population's diet 
dropped below their pre-established floor levels, 
the authorities proceeded to levy duties on 
imports of rice, maize, whole milk and wheat. 
d) Structural reforms 
In 1994 the country continued to pursue its 
structural reform programme, whose central 
component is the privatization of State-run 
enterprises, and in the process look in a total of 
US$ 2.1 billion. The largest-scale operation of 
this type took place in the first quarter, with the 
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sale of the Peruvian telephone company 
(COPERTEL) and the national telecommunications 
firm (ENTEL). Other major privatizations of 
companies in the fields of energy, mining and 
fisheries included the sale of Tintaya (copper 
mining), the Cajamarquilla zinc refinery, 
Edelnor and Edelsur (electrical power 
distributors) and Cementos Lima. 
In addition, in November a "citizens' equity" 
system entered into operation under which 
Peruvians were given the opportunity to acquire 
stock in State-owned firms. 
As part of the reforms being introduced in the 
financial system, in December the Banking and 
Insurance Superintendency authorized the 
operation of Small Business and Microenterprise 
Development Units (EDPYMES) in order to 
provide financing to this sector. 
a) Economic activity 
All sectors of economic activity were buoyed 
by the country's political and social stability, the 
high level of confidence among economic 
agents, the inflow of external resources and 
generally good weather conditions in 1994, but 
the sectors which took the fullest advantage of 
these favourable conditions were construction, 
fisheries, agriculture and manufacturing. Unlike 
the situation in earlier years, the reactivation of 
the manufacturing sector, whose growth rate 
approached 18%, was fueled by the processing 
of primary products; this branch of industry's 
momentum then spread to the rest of the sector, 
and its other components consequently posted 
considerable increases as well (16% for 
consumer goods, 18% for intermediate products 
and 15% for capital goods). 
The boom in construction (34%) was due to 
the ambitious road-resurfacing projects 
undertaken by the public sector with the help of 
funding from IDB, the World Bank and the 
Andean Development Corporation. The National 
Housing Fund also financed large-scale projects 
dealing with water distribution and sewerage 
networks, electrification and the construction of 
multi-family housing units. Private residential 
construction for middle- and high-income sectors 
Difficulties stemming from tiw privatization 
of the social security system madî it necessary 
for several administrative boards to merge. 
The number of persons signing up for social 
security coverage was lower than expected, 
and this has been attributed to the. fact that the 
cost to the employee is higher than it was 
under the previous system, since, in addition 
to the basic contribution (10% of the 
employee's wage), enrollees mist pay for a 
"solidarity bond" (1%) and life insurance (4%). 
Nor did the Government's delay in paying on 
claims transferred from the old system, the 
scarcity of investment instruments or the 
shortcomings of the correspond» g regulatory 
structure do anything to encourage people to 
join the new system or to further its 
development. 
also rebounded thanks to the fact that more 
financing was made available through the use of 
mortgage bonds. 
The vitality of the fishery sector (31%) was 
associated with the anchoveta catch, which was 
helped by the presence of large schools of fish 
along the coast. This, along with Norwegian, 
Danish and Chilean investments aimed at 
modernizing the fleet, upgrading ewsting plants 
and building new ones, allowed Pen to maintain 
its position as the world's leading source of 
fishmeal. Strikingly high growth ra es were also 
recorded for tinned fish (89%) and frozen fish 
(77%). 
Thanks to good weather conditio is, there was 
enough water to expand the amounl of farmland 
under cultivation and increase tlie output of 
potatoes (17%), rice (44%), sugar (.16%), coffee 
(6%) and cotton (71%) as well as of wheat, maize 
and whole milk, which enjoyed the protection 
afforded by import duties when prices on the 
international market slippec below a 
pre-determined floor price. The combination of 
these two factors led to a 13% expansion of the 
agricultural sector. 
The privatization of State-owned mining 
companies moved ahead, and some new projects 
began to yield promising results. The amount of 
iron ore mined by the Shougang-HierroPerú 
3. The main variables 
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consortium outdistanced the 1993 figure by 34%, 
while its output of gold jumped 29%. The 
maturation of large investments in gold and 
copper mines and in oil production activities are 
expected to galvanize the sector in the near future. 
In sum, with an increase of 17%, the 
production of goods was the fastest-growing 
sector. Basic services exhibited a below-average 
growth rate (7%), although electricity, gas and 
water services did climb by 12%. Transport and 
communications activity was up by a smaller 
amount (6%), while the remaining services 
(which include commerce) rose by 9%. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
The consumer price index reflected a steady 
decline throughout 1994 in the rate of price 
increases, which averaged 1.8% per month, for a 
yearly rate of slightly over 15%. The slow-down 
was steeper for tradables, as the nominal 
exchange rate held steady, and less so for 
non-tradables due to the fact that public utility 
rates were raised, especially in the cases of 
electrical power and telephone services. 
In a departure from the trend seen in earlier 
years, the labour force received substantial wage 
hikes; one contributing factor in this regard was 
surely the 30% increase made in the minimum 
living wage. A survey of establishments having 
more than nine employees in the Lima 
metropolitan area found that pay levels were up 
by 20% for white-collar workers and by 15% for 
blue-collar jobs. 
The buoyancy of the economy had no major 
impact on employment levels. A survey of 
establishments employing over 100 workers in 
the Lima metropolitan area found that 
employment in 1994 was down by 1% in 
manufacturing and by 8% in commerce, with 
these decreases being just barely offset by a 4% 
increase in the services sector. These figures 
point to strong gains in productivity in the 
modern segments of the economy together with 
a proliferation of own-account work. 
c) The external sector 
The deficit on the balance-of-payments 
current account amounted to over US$ 2.7 
billion, with a little over US$ 1.1 billion of that 
sum being accounted for by the merchandise 
trade balance. A slightly smaller sum -which 
includes the financial costs of i npaid service on 
the public debts refinanced wilh the Paris Club 
and with a private external supplier (JAPECoy-
corresponded to payments for financial services. 
The balance -roughly US$ 615 million- was 
attributable to non-financial services. 
The sizeable increase in the value of imports 
triggered by the country's faster pace of 
economic activity, a higher rate of investment 
and the stability of the United States dollar all 
played a part in widening the trade deficit by 
nearly 40%. 
The total value of merchandise imports 
bordered on US$ 5.6 billion, which was 39% 
more than the year before. The categories at the 
forefront of this expansion were consumer and 
capital goods. 
Merchandise exports mounted to the record 
level of US$ 4.5 billion -30% above the 1993 
figure. This outcome was primarily a reflection 
of the increase in traditional exports (35%) 
-especially in products from the mining (33%), 
crop-farming (214%) and fishery (30%) sectors-
although external sales of non-traditional 
products did rise by 19%. Estimates prepared by 
the Central Reserve Bank attribute the jump in 
traditional exports to a 13% increase in their 
physical volume (with fishineal making a 
particularly significant contribution in this 
respect) and a 17% rise in prices. This made for 
a 12% upturn, with the terms-of-trade index for 
goods returning to its 1991 level. Some of the 
commodities that posted the largest increases 
were coffee, copper, gold, lead and zinc. 
The capital account registered an inflow of 
almost US$ 5.9 billion; almost IIS$ 2.4 billion of 
this sum was in the form of direct investments 
made in connection with the privatization of 
ENTEL and COPERTEL and some US$ 470 million 
in portfolio investment. Capital movements 
associated with international organizations 
yielded a net inflow of about US$ 820 million, 
while another US$ 470 million came from 
unrequited transfers. The remainder -a little 
more than US$ 1.7 billion- was made up of 
short-term inflows. Thus, ono; the deficit on 
current account has been subtracted from the 
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above, the figures show that net international 
reserves climbed by slightly over US$ 3.1 billion 
in 1994. 
Arrangements were made during the year for 
US$ 1.2 billion in fresh credit, 90% of which was 
granted by international agencies for terms of 
over 12 years. On the other side of the coin, the 
country paid out nearly US$ 2 billion in 
amortization and service payments, bringing the 
external debt to US$ 23.4 billion. In the first 
quarter a bilateral debt restructuring agreement 
with the Export Development Corporation of 
Canada was approved and the Swiss 
Government's decision to forgive US$ 133 
million in debt was finalized. 
Action taken in connection with the private 
external debt included the resumption of 
negotiations with international banks in the 
third quarter, after the Peruvian Parliament 
had confirmed the legality of debts incurred 
in 1983 with Chemical Bank and American 
Express. Once the total sum of debt arrears 
had been determined (it was estimated at 
US$ 8 billion), the Government was planning 
to seek a Brady-style agreemenl in the course 
of 1995. 
Finally, regulations were established 
permitting the use of public ;xternal debt 
paper in the privatization of Stale enterprises. 
These regulations stipulated that the 
Commission for the Promotion of Private 
Investment (COPRi) would set the prices at 





1. General trends 
The uncertainty generated by the Dominican 
Republic's upcoming elections was a factor of 
overriding importance during the first eight 
months of the year; it contributed to a 
deterioration in fiscal and external accounts, 
helped to fuel expectations of a devaluation as 
well as inflationary pressures, and played a part 
in the erosion of international reserves. In 
September, after the elections, the authorities 
began to implement new fiscal, monetary and 
exchange policies which led to an improvement 
in the economic picture: aggregate demand 
contracted, the exchange rate stabilized in 
banking and non-bank markets, and international 
reserves made a partial recovery. 
Against this backdrop, the country's gross 
domestic product (GDP) did better than the year 
before, marking up a growth rate of over 4%. On 
the demand side, this expansion was associated 
with faster growth in merchandise exports and 
public expenditure. On the supply side, it was 
attributable to an upswing in the mining sector 
and an increase in the value added by 
construction and commerce. 
On the down side, inflation jumped from just 
3% in 1993 to 14% in 1994. A widening fiscal 
gap -as the central government, after having 
broken even or posting surpluses on its financial 
accounts for a number of years, ran up a deficit 
of over 1% of GDP- and an increase in the use of 
bank credit to help cover that ¡hortfall were 
important contributing factors in the ascent of 
domestic prices. In turn, the loss of confidence in 
the local currency, along with the resulting 
acceleration of the rate of devaluation, boosted 
the prices of tradable goods an i eroded the 
international reserves held by the Central Bank, 
which raised interest rates in ordiîr to soak up 
liquidity and take pressure off ihe exchange 
market. Finally, and despite higher import levels, 
the decline in the supply of agricultural produce 
on the domestic market and the relative scarcity 
of certain basic manufactures paved the way for 
a price-based adjustment in product markets. 
Amortization payments on the p ablic external 
debt exceeded incoming loan disbursements, 
thereby reinforcing the downward trend in the 
service on that debt. The progress made during 
the closing months of 1994, the country's 
structural reform plans, its incieased fiscal 
discipline, the conclusion of an agreement with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
rescheduling of its debt with the laris Club all 
appeared to herald a consolidî tion of the 
Dominican Republic's basic maoroeconomic 
balances in 1995. 
2. Economic policy 
The country had steadfastly been applying 
stabilization measures ever since 1990, but some 
signs of backsliding were seen in the early 
months of 1994. In part, expectations took a turn 
for the worse as a result of the uncertainty 
associated with the election campaign. Another 
factor was the perception that tax receipts could 
expenditure, as evidenced by tlie fact that 
between January and August the Fiscal deficit 
was twice as high as it had been dui ing the same 
months in 1993. 
Other indicators also pointed to a 
deterioration in the situation during this period: 
by August, the prime rate offered by commercial 
not keep up with the steady expansion of public banks stood at 26%, versus 19% iti December 
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1993; the exchange rate on the non-bank market 
had climbed to 13.14 pesos to the dollar, while 
the official selling rate held at 12.50 pesos to the 
dollar; and the Central Bank's gross international 
reserves were drawn down by US$ 337 million 
during the first seven months of the year. 
Meanwhile, in the external sector, cross-border 
trade slumped due to the measures adopted by the 
United Nations in relation to the defacto regime 
in Haiti. 
In September 1994, corrective steps were 
taken to restore the country's main 
macroeconomic balances. To this end, the 
Government engaged in operations on the open 
market in order to lower the economy's level of 
liquidity by issuing Central Bank pass-through 
securities at higher interest rates. Authorization 
was also granted for the exchange of export 
earnings from minor non-traditional products, 
which added to the supply of hard currency in the 
exchange market. Furthermore, steps were taken 
to enable the Central Bank to attract more foreign 
currency, and the peso was devalued to 12.87 to 
the dollar. 
In an effort to control the expansion of the 
money supply, starting in September all credits 
granted to decentralized public-sector bodies by 
the State-run Banco de Reserva first had to be 
approved by the Monetary Board. The credit 
facilities which the Central Bank had placed at 
the disposal of the public and private sectors were 
suspended as well, and any funds in excess of the 
minimum reserve requirement which 
commercial institutions had deposited with the 
Central Bank were frozen until year's end; these 
deposits accrued interest at an annual rate of 
12%. 
a) Fiscal policy 
In 1994 -an election year- the expansionary 
fiscal policy that had been implemented in 1993 
was strengthened. Thus, whereas the central 
government's income climbed by 6%, its 
expenditures were increased by over 11%. 
Consequently, the fiscal deficit grew from 0.4% 
of GDP in 1993 to more than 1% in 1994. 
Since tax receipts rose more slowly than 
nominal output, the tax burden shrank to 15% of 
GDP in 1994 (it had been 16% the year before). 
The country's high rate of tax evasion was 
apparently one of the reasons for ttiis. Revenues 
from indirect taxes rose much more sharply 
(21%) than direct tax receipts (4%). 
The tax on petroleum (which tikes the form 
of the price differential between what the State 
oil company pays for hydrocarbons on the 
external market and the higher prio Î it charges on 
the domestic market for petroleum products) and 
the sales tax applying to mam factures and 
services both yielded higher reveni es. In the first 
case, the substantial increase was made possible 
by a decline in international oil prices and by an 
increased domestic use of fuel and stronger 
demand on the part of Haiti during the first six 
months of the year. The very prominent position 
of this levy in the country's tax structure does, 
however, make the country vulnerable to 
changes in the exchange rate and ir international 
hydrocarbon prices. 
Revenues from taxes on goods and services 
swelled by 21%, but the share of total receipts 
provided by taxes on foreign trade diminished. 
One of the reasons for this was the large number 
of import exemptions which were granted. 
The 18% rise in capital expenditure -chiefly 
because of a 26% jump in fixed inv ;stment- was 
one of the main causes of the increase in 
government spending. The upturn in current 
expenditure was smaller (5%), sine; the nominal 
reduction in transfers and interest payments 
largely offset the increase in expenditures on 
remunerations (18%) and on the purchase of 
goods and services (16%). 
During the first months of tie year, the 
Government reduced its local-currency 
contributions to the Central Bank for domestic 
and external debt payments, but in S eptember the 
Dominican Oil Refinery resumed its practice of 
handing over the funds obtained from the 
above-mentioned hydrocarbons prke differential 
to the Central Bank. 
b) Monetary policy 
Up through August, monetary policy was 
geared to meeting the financial equirements 
associated with the fiscal imbalance and the 
private sector, and this had the effect of 
generating inflationary pre¡ sures and 
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Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 





























































































































Prices (December to December) 
Consumer prices 
External sector 
Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 







Gross debt (as a percentage 
of GDP) 
Net interest 
(as a percentage of exports) 
Growth rates 
22.7 55.8 34.6 79.9 7.9 5.2 2.7 
-422 -84 -300 -162 -93 -530 -241 
-189 125 5 
Percentages 
340 46 89 
14.3 
119.4 139.4 127.2 100.0 116.7 112.2 112.9 107.9 
3.85 6.11 6.34 8.29 12.61 12.79 12.68 13.16 
130.2 151.0 109.2 100.0 100.6 101.9TÍ.8T96.2 
Millions of dollars 
-281 
-389 -102 -351 -228 -229 -658 -345 -341 
1 563 1903 2 077 2 005 1 979 2 093 2 339 2 537 
1952 2 005 2 429 2 233 2 208 2 752 2 684 2 878 
275 194 298 170 434 557 330 -184 
-389 
70.0 73.8 56.8 58.4 55.0 45.4 44.9 36.9 
19.6 14.2 6.0 7.9 3.7 5.7 6.4 5.2 
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Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of 
banking system 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
(in local currency) 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Percentages of GDP 
14.6 15.5 13.5 
7.5 7.5 6.7 
7.1 8.0 6.7 
9.2 9.5 6.8 


















































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact o) the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by 
exports of goods and services. 
Table 2 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 1993 19')4a 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Consumer prices 
(12-month 
variation, %) -0.6 5.4 3.9 5.2 7.6 4.3 4.3 2.7 5.6 8.2 10.0 14.3 
Real exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 101.9 103.3 101.9 97.9 96.8 98.8 97.9 97.6 96.4 95.4 95.9 96.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. 
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undermining confidence in the Dominican peso. 
From September on, however, monetary policy 
was tightened up once again. 
For the year as a whole, the considerable 
decrease in international reserves played a 
decisive role in the reduction of the monetary 
base in nominal terms, since net domestic credit 
expanded sharply. This influenced the 
economy's other monetary aggregates. The 
money supply grew by only 2% in nominal terms, 
as sight deposits fell (-8%) and the amount of 
currency outside banks rose (11%) in response to 
the general public's preference for cash holdings, 
given the uncertainty that prevailed for most of 
the year. Hence, even though savings and term 
deposits climbed at much the same rate as 
inflation, total liquidity (M2) shrank in real 
terms. 
Under these circumstances, commercial bank 
loans rose by 15% as the net result of a 16% 
increase in lending to the private sector and a 2% 
decrease in public-sector loans. Types of loans to 
the private sector exhibiting notable increases 
included personal loans (27%), construction 
loans (18%) and trade credits (18%). 
The tight monetary policy adopted in 
September and higher inflation set the stage for 
an increase in nominal interest rates. 
Accordingly, the prime rate offered by 
commercial banks, which had been 19% in 
December 1993, rose to an annual level of 29% 
by the end of 1994. This meant that the real 
annual yields of lending rates held at around 
13%. 
c) Foreign exchange and trade policy 
The country maintained its multi-tiered 
exchange system, which includes an official 
market for public-sector operations, an open 
bank market for private-sector imports and a 
parallel market. During the first eight months of 
1994, the official exchange rate remained at 
12.50 pesos to the dollar, despite the considerable 
drop in international reserves and the differential 
between domestic and external inflation. This 
rigidity in the face of a depreciation of the 
currency on the open market (the parallel-market 
rate was moving above 13 pesos to the dollar) 
sparked expectations of a devaluation along with 
capital flight. Finally, early iii September the 
monetary authorities announced a devaluation to 
12.87 pesos to the dollar. 
In 1994 the Dominican Republic joined the 
Association of Caribbean States (ACS) and signed 
the Partnership for Development and Prosperity 
agreement reached at the Summit of the 
Americas, thereby undertaking i commitment to 
greater intraregional cooperation. The 
Government also signed the agreement under 
which the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was 
created, even though it was still renegotiating the 
classification of eight agricultural products 
(sugar, beans, garlic, onions, poultry meat, 
maize, liquid milk and powdered milk) in view 
of the damage which the elimination of 
quantitative restrictions might ilo to that sector. 
The Government was also trying to secure the 
same benefits in terms of custoins-free areas for 
the Dominican Republic as those obtained by 
Mexico from the United States under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
The new Foreign Investment Act passed in 
the Chamber of Deputies, but the Senate had 
not yet approved the bill, and the delay was 
generating a measure of uncertainty among 
investors. This legislation would eliminate 
existing restrictions applying tc the repatriation 
of profits and capital gains as well as 
streamlining filing procedures. 
As part of the Government's export 
promotion policy, work proceeded on the 
drafting of a bill on the clearance of merchandise 
exports which was aimed at defining the fiscal 
treatment to be accorded to imported inputs. The 
debate between the Government and private 
enterprise continued in 1994, with the 
Government espousing a scheme whereby 
drawbacks would be provido! once finished 
products had been exported, and the private 
business community advocating a system of 
temporary clearances for inputs which would 
guarantee the suspension of tariffs and additional 
levies. 
d) Structural reforms 
Despite the legislative steps taken to carry 
forward the structural reform process, very little 
genuine progress was made: the sale of 
308 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
semi-public companies that put a heavy burden 
on government coffers did not take place; the 
new Monetary and Financial Code, which would 
redefine the operational structure of public and 
private financial institutions, was still awaiting 
approval; authorization for the enactment of 
a) Economic activity 
The acceleration of the growth rate for GDP to 
over 4% (versus 2% in 1993) brought with it a 
further gain in per capita GDP, which thus 
continued to move closer to the level it had 
reached prior to the steep downturn experienced 
in 1990. The expansion of exports (13% in real 
terms) made a significant contribution to this 
trend. The increase in public spending (8%), both 
in investment and on consumption, was another 
important factor, whereas private consumption 
grew very little. 
The expansion of investment (expressed in 
1980 dollars) boosted this variable to nearly 24% 
of GDP in 1994. Capital formation was financed 
almost entirely with national savings, with 
external savings providing only one tenth of that 
total. 
The upswing in the mining sector, which 
nearly doubled its output, accounted for over one 
third of the total increase; with a growth rate of 
7%, construction also did its part, as did the 6% 
increase in the value added by commerce. 
Agricultural production faltered (-2%), however, 
following a year of listless growth. 
The slump in agriculture was attributable to a 
drought in the northern, south-eastern and 
south-western parts of the country as well as to 
damage done by Hurricane Gordon in 
November, the persistence of crop diseases and 
a shortage of financing. Problems arose in terms 
of the flow of credit due to difficulties with the 
Agricultural Bank of the Dominican Republic's 
capital structure and the fact that few farmers 
actually hold deeds to their land, which means 
that commercial banks will not lend to them. The 
performance of the agricultural sector was 
somewhat uneven: export agriculture expanded 
but farming activities catering to the domestic 
market weakened, as did the forestry and fishery 
regulations to give effect to the Tax Code 
promulgated in May 1992 v/as still not 
forthcoming; and Congress failed to pass the 
electrical power omnibus act which the 
Executive branch had submitted to it the year 
before. 
industries, while the livestock subs ;ctor's growth 
stalled. 
Among export crops, the production of 
tobacco, cacao and coffee was boosted by higher 
international prices; the sugar-cane harvest was 
smaller, mainly because of bad weather 
conditions. Among crops intendec for domestic 
consumption, a decrease was seer in the output 
of rice, maize, peanuts, sweet potatoes, bananas, 
potatoes and tomatoes, while the production of 
beans, peas and yucca rose. 
The sluggishness of the livestock industry was 
chiefly a result of the damage done 1 >y the drought 
to supplies of cattle feed, which tnnslated into a 
drop in the output of beef and mili. In contrast, 
the output of pork increased thanks to strong 
domestic demand and the settlement of overdue 
debts owed to producers. The poultry industry's 
results were mixed. The production of poultry 
meat expanded as a consequence of robust 
demand and the need to step up the rate of 
slaughtering in order to eliminate a glut of laying 
hens. The output of eggs was down slightly, 
however, due to low rates of return < nd marketing 
problems. 
Mining activity rebounded vigorously from 
the steep downward slide of recent years thanks 
to the sector's increased producti m of nickel, 
gold and silver. The output of niel el received a 
strong boost from a 20% jumi1 in average 
international prices and greater external demand 
for stainless steel. The upturn in gold and silver 
production stemmed from tie Rosario 
Dominicana company's resumption of 
operations in the second quarter of the year and 
climbing prices for both these n étals on the 
external market (10% and 32%, respectively). 
Manufacturing activity was up due to a 7% 
increase in production in the couitry's export 
processing zones (EPZs) and a higher output of 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco. By the end of 
3. The main variables 
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1994, a total of 480 firms in 31 EPZ industrial 
parks were providing a total of about 176,000 
jobs. On the other hand, the food industry 
recorded decreases in its output of sugar and flour 
and their derivatives. Particularly steep declines 
were observed in the production of raw and 
refined sugar and molasses owing to the use of 
outdated technology in the sugar mills overseen 
by the State Sugar Board (CEDAZU), 
shortcomings in the service activities involved in 
transporting sugar cane to processing plants, and 
a late start on the harvest. Consequently, 35,000 
tons of refined sugar had to be imported during 
the closing months of 1994. 
Construction benefited from a flurry of 
activity in public infrastructure works and 
housing projects. The most significant projects 
of this type were the expansion of the Duarte 
expressway, the construction of the Monción 
dam and of the Barahona international airport, 
the Santo Domingo-San Cristóbal highway, 
Mirador del Este park and the work involved in 
laying out 107 water supply systems in various 
areas of the country. Private construction also 
expanded owing to a more abundant flow of 
credit. 
The more ample supply of electrical power 
available for sale (3%) was made possible by a 
sharp increase (85%) in the amount of energy 
purchased from the private sector by the 
State-run Corporación Dominicana de 
Electricidad, since its own generation of 
electricity was down by 7%. Given the steep 
reduction in the output of hydroelectric plants 
due to the drought, the pace of production had to 
be stepped up in the country's thermal, diesel-oil 
and gas-powered plants. 
The level of activity in the financial sector was 
virtually identical to the rate registered for 1993. 
Communications services were expanded, 
primarily because of an improvement in 
telephone service triggered by increased 
commercial competition. Increased tourism 
boosted hotel, bar and restaurant services. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Following a three-year stretch of price 
stability, in 1994 inflation topped 14%. The 
largest increases for the year were in foodstuffs 
owing to prices hikes for a number of agricultural 
staples (e.g., rice, onions and ban anas) as a result 
of adverse weather conditions. Higher 
international coffee prices also made their effect 
felt in the domestic market. Li addition, the 
ascent of the exchange rate helped to drive up the 
prices of powdered milk and various types of 
medicines, as well as all the rest of the country's 
tradable goods. 
The nominal minimum wage in large, 
medium-sized and small private firms climbed 
by 15% in January after having remained at the 
same level throughout 1992 anil 1993, but no 
change was made in the minimum wage for the 
public sector. In April, the National Minimum 
Wage Commission raised the minimum wage for 
firms in the EPZS by 10%. 
The faster pace of growth resulted in no 
more than a small reduction in the country's 
high level of unemployment, with the rate 
dropping from 19% in 1993 to 16% in the first 
quarter of 1994. 
c) The external sector 
In the balance of payments for 1994, the 
deficit on current account widened and the 
capital account, which until 1993 had 
traditionally yielded a surplus, registered a 
deficit as well; consequently, international 
reserves shrank by over 3.5% of GDP. 
The increase in the current-account deficit 
was a reflection of the deepening shortfall in 
factor services, which in turn was; a consequence 
of the results recorded for profit remittances and 
interest payments on the external debt. 
Meanwhile, the trade balance held virtually 
steady and incoming private transfers continued 
to rise. 
The Dominican economy enjoyed a more 
favourable external environment during 1994, 
despite higher international interest rates and the 
trade embargo imposed upon the defacto regime 
in Haiti until October. The more rapid pace of 
growth in industrialized countries -especially the 
United States- and the expansion of international 
trade spurred on an increase in the volume of 
merchandise exports at the same time that the 
country's terms of trade took a turn for the better 
thanks to lower international oil prices and rising 
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prices for such commodities as sugar, nickel, 
coffee, cacao and tobacco. 
Given these circumstances, exports of goods 
and services rose in value (8%) somewhat more 
than imports (7%) did. With an increase in value 
of nearly 25% -owing to higher external sales of 
minerals, raw sugar, coffee and cacao-
merchandise exports regained some of the 
ground they had lost during the preceding four 
years. 
As total demand strengthened, the value of 
merchandise imports climbed by 8%, mainly 
because of an expansion in sales volume. 
Declining international oil prices made it 
possible to raise the level of imports. Increases 
were also seen in such items as motor vehicles, 
pharmaceuticals, and industrial machinery and 
equipment. 
Tourism services, which provide more than 
twice as much foreign exchange as merchandise 
exports do, continued to mount thanks to an 
expansion of the country's lodging facilities and 
an improved international promotional 
campaign. In fact, hotel capacity grew by nearly 
2,450 rooms, with this increase being distributed 
among 13 new hotel complexes. 
The economic recovery in the United States 
stimulated exports from the EPZs (10%), since 
around 95% of their output is destined for that 
country. Another particularly noteworthy 
development was the steady growth of inbound 
unrequited private transfers in the form of 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
remittances from family members living outside 
the country, which came to the eq livalent of two 
thirds of the Dominican Republic s merchandise 
exports. 
The uncertainty associated wit ii the elections 
and the macroeconomic disequil bria observed 
during the early months of the yeai had an impact 
on the capital account. With the exception of 
incoming foreign direct investment, most of the 
country's capital flows exhibited negative 
balances. 
On 30 August the Government signed an 
agreement with the public sector's private 
foreign bank creditors which cut the debt from 
US$ 12.5 billion to US$ 520 million -US$ 329 
million of which was automatically redeemed 
with zero-coupon bonds. The con bined total of 
external public debt and government-guaranteed 
private-sector external debt dropped by 14%, 
bringing its end-1994 level to the equivalent of 
nearly 37% of GDP, or just hall of what the 
country's debt burden had been sb years earlier. 
The expansion of the Dominican Republic's 
multilateral debt can be attributed to the increase 
in its obligations with the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), World Bank (IBRD) and 
IMF. Its bilateral debt, on the other hand, 
diminished; this was primarily a result of the 
reduction made in the country's debts with Spain 
and the United States, since th<; level of its 





1. General trends 
The Uruguayan economy's growth rate 
accelerated to 5% in 1994. Meanwhile, inflation 
continued its gradual decline (falling to an annual 
level of around 45%), the country's external 
deficit remained quite high and its fiscal deficit 
deepened. 
The momentum generated by total demand 
played a decisive role in bringing this about by 
helping to boost the growth rates for both the 
gross domestic product (GDP) and domestic prices 
above their projected levels, as well as in setting 
the stage for the upswing seen in merchandise 
imports. Specifically, the expansion of private 
expenditure (mainly consumer spending) and 
increases in the relevant components of external 
demand and inflation were pivotal factors in 
these trends. 
Exports climbed rapidly, but imports rose 
even more sharply, and the deficit on the 
balance-of-payments current account therefore 
held at about 3% of GDP. As in earlier years, the 
inflow of external capital easily covered this 
shortfall and the country continued to build up its 
international reserves. The increase in fiscal 
expenditure, much of which was due to the 
heightened demands of the social security 
system, widened the non-financial public 
sector's deficit (which was covered with external 
loans) to 2.3% of GDP. 
The administration which took office late in 
the first quarter of 1995 in the midst of a 
In the final year of its term, the administration 
which had taken office early in 1990 held to the 
principal objectives and instruments of the 
economic programme it had set in motion three 
years earlier. Lowering inflation continued to be 
tumultuous regional and worldwide economic 
environment reaffirmed the objective of 
gradually lowering inflation as well as 
emphasizing the importance of reinforcing the 
country's external linkages via the Southern 
Common Market (MERCOSUR). 
Accordingly, a high priority wis assigned to 
reducing the non-financial public sector's deficit 
through the use of an array of measures aimed at 
raising income while cutting back on current and 
investment expenditure. Mechanisms for 
providing relief from social secuity costs and 
drawbacks for exporters thus became key policy 
tools in the effort to make Uruguayan industry 
more competitive. 
In a parallel initiative, the administration 
sought to build a political consensus 
regarding the introduction of substantive 
reforms in the social security sjstem, whose 
total disbursements were equivalent to 14% of 
GDP. 
In the first quarter of 1995, the economy's 
growth slackened due to the 1'act that the 
strengthening of demand from Brc zil -an initial 
effect of the stabilization programme under way 
in that country- was far outwe ghed by the 
downswing in demand on the part of Argentina, 
whose economy was in the throes of a harsh 
domestic and external adjustment p rocess, and by 
the effects of Uruguay's internal fiscal 
adjustment effort. 
its top priority and the exchange rate continued 
to serve as the primary instrumen : of domestic 
price formation. 
The programme's targets for 1994 included 
bringing the annual rate of increase in consumer 
2. Economic policy 
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prices down to 35% (from 53% in 1993). Based 
on a projected GDP growth rate of 2%, the 
programme was also aimed at reducing the 
financial imbalance in public-sector accounts in 
order to dampen the pressure for money creation. 
The authorities also continued to pursue the 
exchange policy that had been in place since 
1991, which involved a currency band whose 
floor rate took the form of a crawling peg that 
was raised by approximately 2% per month. 
Given an external situation that appeared to 
promise a smaller trade deficit than before, the 
administration proposed to build up the country's 
international reserves by another US$ 50 million. 
Under these circumstances, the projected rate of 
monetary expansion was similar to the expected 
increase in nominal GDP. The programme also 
called for the alignment of wage trends with the 
targeted inflation rate. 
The actual behaviour of these variables 
differed significantly from the projections, 
however. In particular, public expenditure 
climbed quite rapidly, thus causing the deficit to 
be larger than expected. Nevertheless, since the 
gap was covered with external resources, it did 
not generate pressure for money creation. 
The influence exerted by the external sector, 
on the other hand, was more positive than expected, 
since the pace of the industrialized countries' 
economic reactivation picked up -although this 
also meant that interest rates on dollar-denominated 
funds rose more than had been projected. The 
start-up of the Real Plan boosted demand from 
Brazil and had considerable spillovers in terms 
of Uruguayan exports, which also benefited from 
higher prices in dollars for raw materials on the 
world market. The dollar's slide against Brazil's 
and the European Union's currencies enhanced 
Uruguay's external competitiveness, following a 
number of years during which the real effective 
exchange rate implicit in the country's foreign 
trade activity had been eroding. Ultimately, the 
country's stringent income policy was relaxed as 
the inflation rate stubbornly refused to follow its 
projected path. 
a) Fiscal policy 
The public sector's deficit doubled to 3% of 
GDP despite the fact that, in an attempt to move 
towards the re-establishment of the balance 
achieved in the early 1990s, the stabilization 
programme's objective had been to halve the 
preceding year's 1.5% deficit. 
The deficit's growth was entirely attributable 
to a higher level of spending on the part of the 
central government, whose cash shortfall (not 
counting the net transfers received from State 
enterprises) shot up from 1.3% to 3% of GDP. 
Since income continued to climb in real terms, 
most of the responsibility for this adverse trend 
must be laid at the door of the increase in 
expenditure, which amounted to nearly 23% of 
GDP (21% in 1993). 
The increase in transfers from State 
enterprises to nearly double their former level 
accounted for the bulk of the 5% expansion, in 
real terms, of inflows to the National Treasury. 
Meanwhile, the increase in tax receipts (2% in 
real terms) lagged behind GDP gnwth. Direct 
taxes held steady in real terms, as government 
revenues from income and agricultural property 
taxes sagged in nominal terms owing to the 
effect of tax provisions adopted the year 
before, while the real yield of indirect taxes 
climbed by a scant 2%. The steep rise in imports 
notwithstanding, revenues from taxis on foreign 
trade increased by only 4% in real terms. This 
was due both to the fact that avenge customs 
duties declined as the percentage of lhe country's 
imports purchased within the MERCOSUR 
customs-free area mounted and to the fact that 
the price of the dollar rose more slowly than 
domestic prices did. 
The upswing in fiscal expenditure (10% in 
real terms) was chiefly a result of the trends 
in capital outlays and in transfers 1 o the social 
security system, which jumped 16% and 26%, 
respectively. The increase in public 
investment was concentrated in the 
acquisition of machinery and equipment. The 
amount spent on remunerations also rose 
steeply (8%), but interest payments on the public 
debt, measured in Uruguayan peso: at constant 
prices, shrank (-7%) thanks to this eu rrency 's rise 
against the dollar. 
In order to prevent the growing deficit from 
putting pressure on monetary policy, the 
authorities resorted to external boi rowing. By 
this means they took in over US$ ;I00 million, 
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Table 1 
URUGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
Employment and wages 
Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100) 




Terms of trade 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal bank exchange rate 
(pesos per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
Balance of payments 
Current account 
Trade balance 







Gross debt (as a percentage of GDP) 
Net debt (as a percentage of GDP) 
Net interest 



















































































































































































































































































Table 1 (conclusion) 






Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of banking 
system 
Net international reserves 
Net domestic credit 
To the public sector 
To the private secator 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
(in local currency) 
M2 
Dollar deposits 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
On deposits 
On loans 





































































































































Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact o; ' the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annuel growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e Pi rcentages of the 
economically active population (EAP). Interest rate on deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange ate. 
Table 2 
URUGUAY: MAIN QUARTERLY ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1992 1993 1994a 
II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Gross domestic product icpi 
(Index: 1990=100) 109.5 110.6 112.1 112.7 114.3 112.0 114.2 116.3 117.1 121.1 120.4 121.5 
Consumer prices 
(domestic) (12-month 
variation, %) 78.8 69.9 63.4 58.9 54.3 56.4 53.0 52.9 47.9 42.6 41.3 44.1 
Real exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 84.5 85.8 85.0 81.0 77.4 75.5 72.8 70.9 70.7 70.6 78.6 79.0 
Real interest rate 
(annualized, %) 
On deposits -2.4 3.6 -12.2 -0.7 -9.9 -16.5 -7.6 -0.7 1.6 -5.6 -6.8 -8.6 
On loans 35.5 43.5 26.1 42.7 28.5 17.2 28.7 43.2 45.9 35.3 31.5 29.4 
Money supply (Ml )c 
(12-month 
variation, %) 82.3 110.5 91.3 54.8 67.7 47.1 48.3 61.0 46.7 47.0 45.0 37.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary figures. b On the basis of non-seasonal ly adjusted figures at constant national prices. c This differs from the 
heading "Money (Ml)" which appears in table 1 owing to a dissimilar coverage of sight deposits. 
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with 60% of that sum being obtained through the 
issuance of government securities, including 
US$ 100 million in Euronote sales. This strategy 
proved viable, thanks to the moderate level of the 
net debt burden at the start of 1994 and to the 
steps taken in previous years to improve the 
country's debt profile. 
After having posted surpluses for a number of 
years, State enterprises ran up a small deficit, 
much of which was attributable to the sizeable 
transfer payments they made to the central 
government. Quasi-fiscal expenditure edged 
downward to the equivalent of 0.7% of GDP (from 
0.8% in 1993). 
b) Exchange policy 
The upcoming elections influenced economic 
agents' expectations, prompting them to buy 
up foreign currency in the third quarter. As a 
result, the exchange rate for the dollar crept up 
to the ceiling of the currency band established 
in 1991 -which allows the currency to float 
within a 7% margin- after having hovered near 
the floor rate for several years. The pressure on 
the foreign-exchange market soon eased off, 
however, due to the effect of open-market 
operations at high interest rates, which 
tightened up the money supply; the 
enhancement of Uruguay's competitive 
position in relation to Brazil, owing to the 
effects of the Real Plan; and the fact that 
uncertainty concerning the country's future 
exchange policy was dispelled. As 1994 drew to 
a close, the rate for the dollar had fallen back to 
the floor of the band. 
Even though the price of the dollar climbed 
more slowly than domestic prices did, the real 
effective exchange rate (measured on the basis of 
a basket made up of the currencies of Uruguay's 
main trading partners) rose 10% between the end 
of 1993 and the end of 1994. The reversal of the 
ongoing downward trend exhibited by this 
indicator ever since 1990 has been attributed to 
the depreciation of the dollar against European 
currencies and to Brazil's introduction of a new 
monetary unit which quickly strengthened 
against the dollar. The net result of all this, 
however, was only a slight rise in the average 
annual rate. 
c) Monetary policy 
Within the framework of its foreign exchange 
system, Uruguay's monetary policy was 
endogenous at the boundaries of the currency 
band but became more aggressive within that 
band and, as mentioned earlier, this is what 
occurred during the third quarter of 1994. 
The administration's programme called for an 
expansion of about 40% in he amount of 
currency outside banks. One fourth of this gain 
was to come from an increase in international 
reserves; the rest -equivalent to 1.4% of GDP-
would take the form of credit for the 
non-financial public sector. The resulting 
increase in the quasi-fiscal deficit was to be offset 
by operations with the rest of the iinancial system 
and international loans. This level of money 
creation was tantamount to the imposition of an 
inflation tax equivalent to about 1.5% of GDP. 
In practice, however, the use of external 
finance to cover the fiscal shortfall had the effect 
of tightening up the flow of credit to the public 
sector. In addition, the gain of nearly US$ 230 
million in the Central Bank'; international 
reserves outstripped initial estimates. As a result, 
the increase in the money supply (43%) overshot 
the target figure by a slight amount. 
Nevertheless, unlike the situation during the 
preceding two years, in 1994 lhe build-up of 
reserves via net public debt placements exceeded 
net purchases on the foreign-exciange market. 
For virtually the entire year, the yields of the 
interest rates offered on deposit! were negative 
in real terms. Local-currency time deposits 
climbed by a scant 21%, and broad money (M2) 
therefore expanded by 33%. The coefficient for 
the broadly-defined money supply thus moved 
lower once again, falling to 8.1% of GDP. 
Meanwhile, foreign-currency time deposits 
swelled by 10% to US$ 5.76 billion. Most of this 
amount, which represented almost two fifths of 
GDP, was recycled abroad as part of the off-shore 
banking strategy adopted by the Uruguayan 
financial system after the crisis of the early 
1980s. 
Credit to the private sector was up by 40% as 
the net result of a downturn, in real terms, of 
local-currency credit and an expansion of credit 
in dollars. Once again, a highly significant aspect 
of the flow of commercial bank loans to the 
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private sector was the jump (by 43% in real 
terms) in consumer credit, which thus came to 
represent 18% of the total -double the size of its 
share just five years earlier, 
d) Trade policy 
The end of 1994 marked the completion of the 
total rollback of tariffs among the countries 
belonging to MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay), and a limited customs 
a) Economic activity 
The strengthening of private expenditure and 
the expansion of external demand, both from the 
region and elsewhere, doubled the growth rate for 
GDP to 5%, while imports mounted by a factor of 
nearly one fifth. 
With an increase of 9%, private consumption 
continued to boom, as it has been doing since 
1992, thus becoming the single most important 
factor in the country's economic activity. The 
jump in consumption, measured in 1980 dollars, 
represented over 6% of Uruguay's 1993 GDP. 
The drop in public investment was largely 
offset by the momentum of private investment, 
and consequently the rate of fixed capital 
formation only slipped to 4%. The coefficient for 
fixed investment (in 1980 dollars) remained at a 
meagre 13% of GDP. A considerable build-up of 
inventories added one percentage point to the 
coefficient for total gross investment. As in 1993, 
almost one third of this investment was financed 
by external funds, while national saving 
contributed scarcely 9% of GDP. 
The buoyancy of exports, which rose by 8% 
in volume, was another mainstay of total 
demand. The spurt in purchases by Argentina 
during the first three quarters was buttressed by 
a sizeable increase in the acquisition of 
Uruguayan products by Brazil in the second half 
of the year, following the introduction of the Real 
Plan. 
Another significant factor was the upturn in 
purchases of Uruguayan merchandise by 
European countries as their economies made a 
vigorous comeback. The increase in the value of 
union entered into operation on the first day 
of 1995. The countries have drawn up lists of 
exceptions (covering a very large number of 
products, in some cases) which are to be 
phased out over the next five years. Thus, as 
of 1 January 2001, a full-flee ged customs 
union will be in place, with no taxes on foreign 
trade among its members and eeual tariffs (at 
rates ranging from 2% to 20% ol the imported 
value) on products purchased from outside 
countries. 
exports was attributable in part to higher prices, 
particularly in the case of traditional export 
products, and in part to an expansion in the total 
level of shipments. 
GDP growth picked up speed ;n the second 
quarter, accelerating to a level 3% ibove the rate 
for the first quarter and 8% higher than the 
corresponding quarter in 1993. The upsurge in 
services was a decisive factor in this respect. The 
transport and communications sector and the 
category of commerce, restauran s and hotels 
were the most dynamic components as domestic 
consumption soared and tourists ¡ treamed into 
the country during the early part of the year. The 
statistical effect of the taxes levied on imported 
merchandise -which is included in the 
computation of total GDP at cons imer prices-
was again highly significant. The production of 
goods also rebounded, thanks in paiicular to the 
manufacturing sector's recovery (}%) from its 
steep slide of the year before (-9%). Furthermore, 
if the negative effect of the tempon ry closure of 
the country's fuel processing plan (which was 
shut down early in 1993 for remodeling) were to 
be factored out, then manufacturing activity 
would actually have risen by around 6%. This 
positive trend was, however, coupled with a 
further increase in unemployment d íe to gains in 
productivity and the increased substitution of 
imports for Uruguayan-made inputi. 
The improvement in Uruguay's competitive 
position vis-à-vis Brazil served as an incentive 
both for branches of industry that primarily cater 
to the external market and for import-substitution 
industries. Activities that did not have to deal 
with foreign competition also experienced rapid 
3. The main variables 
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growth, however. The machinery and 
engineering sector, and within that category the 
automotive industry in particular, marked up the 
highest growth rate (37%), followed by leather 
manufactures, footwear, paper, metal products 
and foodstuffs. Activity slackened, on the other 
hand, in the basic metals, glass, textiles and 
garment industries. Oil refining plunged to 
negligible levels due to the shutdown of the 
country's refinery. 
The agricultural sector expanded by over 4%. 
Bolstered by an upsurge in grain and oilseed 
harvests, crop-farming climbed by 8% (after 
having slipped back by 10% the year before), 
which brought it back up to its 1992 production 
levels. In the livestock industry, solid increases 
in cattle and dairy production outweighed the 
drop in wool output. Record levels of meat output 
were made possible by gains in productivity per 
hectare, and the size of herds was therefore 
unaffected. This expansion of supply coincided 
with considerably stronger demand from Brazil 
and the deregulation of exports of beef on the 
hoof. 
The fact that Uruguay was certified as being 
free of hoof-and-mouth disease improved the 
outlook for the cattle industry by giving it ready 
access to United States and Asian markets. The 
new international trade agreement, which rolls 
back tariffs in importing countries and reduces 
subsidies for European Union exports, will have 
much the same type of effect. 
In contrast, a slump in construction followed 
on the heels of three exceptionally good years. 
Activity in the private sector continued to rise at 
an annual rate of over 7%, but public-sector 
construction plummeted by around 8%. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
In an economic environment marked by heavy 
domestic demand, inflation continued to be 
fueled by the underlying inertial aspects of the 
country's widespread price- and wage-correction 
mechanisms, which are based on past inflation 
rather than on its projected trend. 
The rate of devaluation (27% per year) acted 
as the main brake on the prices of tradables. Its 
effect was, however, partly offset by the higher 
levels of those components of external inflation 
relevant to the country, particularly the inflation 
rates observed late in the year in Brazil, following 
the adoption of the Real Plan. The 12-month 
increase in the consumer price index declined 
steadily throughout the first three quarters, and 
in September reached its lowest point (41%) 
since 1982; its pace picked up sortiewhat in the 
last quarter, however (44% in December). 
The behaviour of wholesale prices, on the 
other hand, followed neither th.is pattern nor the 
trend observed in recent years. Since 1991, the 
movement of the wholesale price index had been 
very heavily influenced by th<; increase in the 
exchange rate, since the bulk of its components 
are tradable goods. Accordingly, its response to 
rises in the exchange rate had been much swifter. 
In fact, this was so much tie case that its 
12-month rate of increase as of the end of 1993 
was around 30%; this was just slightly higher 
than the rate of devaluation, which remained 
virtually unchanged until Auguiit. During the last 
four months of the year, however, it climbed to 
41% -thus approaching the rate registered for 
retail prices- in reaction to steeply rising prices 
for livestock products and a rapid expansion of 
external demand, which tended to push domestic 
prices üp to the higher price levels found on 
international markets. 
In keeping with firmly entrenched inertial 
guidelines, wage corrections fo lowed consumer 
price movements very closely. Consequently, the 
increase in the average real wage bordered on 
1%. In a departure from earliei years, when the 
trends in public- and private-sector wages had 
been strikingly different from one another, in 
1994 wage adjustments in the two sectors were 
similar. 
Job growth was not rapid enough to meet 
expanding demand, and unemployment therefore 
rose above 9%, which was one point higher than 
the year before and similar to he rate recorded 
at the start of the 1990s. Unemployment was the 
most severe in manufacturing, where it averaged 
nearly 10% for the year and hit a high of 12% in 
the third quarter, but it was also considerable in 
commerce (almost 9%) and construction (7%). 
These figures suggest that total wages did not 
improve by any appreciable amount despite the 
upsurge in economic activity. Nevertheless, after 
having bogged down the year before, average 
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household income -which includes other types 
of factor compensation and interest income- was 
up by more than 7% and thus exceeded its 1990 
level by a full third. If the appreciation of the 
local currency during this same period is taken 
into account, then the purchasing power of the 
average level of household income, expressed in 
dollars, turns out to have doubled in the last four 
years. 
c) The external sector 
For the second year in a row, the 
balance-of-payments current account showed a 
deficit amounting to about 3% of GDP. Once 
again, however, an abundant inflow of external 
capital easily covered this sizeable shortfall. The 
steady increase in the country's external trade in 
goods and services boosted the coefficient that 
measures how open the economy is (based on 
figures for both exports and imports of goods and 
services) to over 42% of GDP. 
The merchandise trade deficit widened to 
more than 4% of GDP. The value of exports, 
which had been at a standstill for the past five 
years, jumped by 16%, but even so was once 
again outpaced by imports (22%). The upswing 
in exports was buttressed by sales of both 
traditional products, which soared by 30%, and 
non-traditional items, which expanded 11%. The 
increase in traditional exports, which were 
boosted by stronger demand from Brazil 
-particularly for beef on the hoof at a time when 
cattle were in abundant supply- and by higher 
international prices, was more than enough to 
make up for the ground lost the year before 
(-16%). The growth of non-traditional exports 
was also helped along by an increase in purchases 
by Brazil following the implementation of the 
Real Plan, but was chiefly (two thirds of the total 
increase) a result of higher sales of motor 
vehicles to Uruguay's partners in MERCOSUR 
under the terms of bilateral agreements. The 
increase in value was attributable in equal 
proportions to higher volumes and higher prices. 
Merchandise imports continued along their 
upward path. This was particularly true of 
purchases of raw materials and intermediate 
goods, which were up by 24%. The fact that this 
increase was five times as great as the expansion 
of industrial output signals the presence of a 
larger imported component in final product 
values. Although the growth cf imports of 
consumer goods (19%), which wai; concentrated 
in non-durables in 1994, was slower than in the 
past, it also had an appreciable impact. Imports 
of capital goods edged up by only 5 % overall, but 
the rise was steeper in the case of nachinery and 
equipment. 
The country's hefty deficit in merchandise 
trade was largely counterbalanced by the surplus 
it achieved on the services axount. One 
particularly important compone: it was gross 
foreign-exchange earnings from tourism, which 
were equivalent to one third of the ] woceeds from 
total merchandise sales. Conseque itly, the trade 
balance narrowed to 1.5% of GDP. Met payments 
for factor services swelled by almost 40%, 
however, owing to increases in boh the level of 
payments falling due and average : nterest rates. 
Capital inflows amounting to 3.6% of GDP 
provided more than enough to finance the deficit 
on the balance-of-payments curren account, and 
the official banking system (which includes both 
the Central Bank and the Banco de la República 
Oriental del Uruguay) therefore continued to 
build up its reserves, adding another US$ 124 
million (the equivalent of nearly one point of 
GDP). 
The country received a copious inflow of 
long-term external capital (4.5% of GDP); this 
included a sharply higher level of direct 
investment, which accounted for one fourth of 
the total. A portion of this was composed of 
investments made by foreigner:! in lodging 
facilities located in resort areas, and another 
portion corresponded to acquisitions and capital 
investments in Uruguayan firms. Portfolio 
investment, including Euronote p acements on 
the world market, accounted for another 25% of 
the total. The other half was made up of increased 
borrowing by the public sector and by 
commercial banks. In contrast, shoit-term capital 
inflows shrank. A turnaround was seen in 1994 
in the errors and omissions entry, which 
registered a negative net result, bul much of this 
change was due to the efforts made to improve 
the measurement of some service activities. 
Thus, part of the expansion reccrded for the 
tourism industry was accountec for by the 
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statistical effect of the inclusion of new sources 
in the relevant calculations. 
Heavier external borrowing drove up the level 
of the foreign debt in both gross and net terms. 
Since the increase in exports of goods and 
services was greater, however, the net debt/GDP 
ratio slipped below 18%. The coefficient which 
measures the country's burden of debt service as 
a percentage of exports also improved, falling to 
just one fifth. 
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1. General trends 
The recession which swept over the Venezuelan 
economy in 1993 deepened in 1994. In the wake 
of the political and economic instability of the 
year before, a severe crisis erupted in the 
financial system which caused expectations to 
take a turn for the worse and generated sharp 
imbalances in exchange and money markets, GDP 
shrank by 3% and inflation heated up in the first 
half of the year, closing out 1994 with a 71% 
increase in the consumer price index (CPi) within 
an economic environment influenced by 
exchange and price controls. Although these 
controls, which were introduced late in June, 
were adopted as a temporary measure by the 
administration that had taken office in February, 
they none the less signalled a turnaround in 
economic policy five years after the initiation of 
a liberalization programme. 
This recession in the domestic economy gave 
rise to a striking improvement in tie country's 
trade balance and current account, since exports 
increased while imports declined substantially. 
An upturn in demand and in international prices 
for crude oil in the second quarter was also a 
contributing factor. On the other hand, the 
instability of the country's financial markets 
precipitated a heavy outflow of capital and the 
withdrawal of foreign (especially portfolio) 
investors. This led to a net loss of re¡:erves which 
-although it was curtailed in the second half of 
the year- took on disturbing proportions during 
the first half. 
2. Economic policy 
From the very start of 1994, the overriding 
consideration in economic policy was the need to 
deal with the critical situation existing in the 
banking system, which had been brought on by a 
series of bank failures and by circumstances 
requiring government intervention in a number 
of financial institutions. This thwarted the public 
sector's plans to find new sources of income that 
would enable it to balance its fiscal accounts. 
Meanwhile, Venezuela's monetary authorities, 
who were obliged to finance the Government's 
attempts to bail out the country's faltering banks, 
had to marshall their efforts to counteract the 
resulting excess liquidity in order to lessen its 
impact on prices and the value of the bolivar. 
Given the difficulties involved in fulfilling these 
different objectives at one and the same time, 
midway through the year the Government 
decided to impose exchange and price controls, 
thereby suspending the operation of market 
mechanisms in the most troubled seg ments of the 
market. 
In June 1994, Venezuela, Colombia and 
Mexico (known as the "Group of Three") signed 
a free trade agreement which was then ratified by 
the Venezuelan Congress in December. This 
agreement, which entered into force sn 1 January 
1995, provides for successive tariff reductions 
(10% per year) for trade amon; the three 
countries, with the exception of the agricultural 
sector (which is not covered by the agreement). 
Venezuela has participated in a customs-free 
trade area with Colombia since 199! Î. 
a) Fiscal policy 
From the first days of 1994 on, fiscal 
authorities worked to curb the fisca deficit that 
had carried over from the preceding year. The 
size of this shortfall (about 3% of the country's 
323 
Figure 1 
VENEZUELA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Annual rate 
1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 
T w a a l v a a - m o n t t - i v a r i a t i o n <***>> 
1 O S O 1 8 8 2 1 8 S 4 1 O S S 1 
A a » | 3 0 r c 0 n - t A a « » a » o f Q I D P 
1 8 S O 1 8 8 2 1 8 S < 4 1 S C 1 8 8 0 1 8 8 2 1 ! 
8 o u r o « > : E G L - A G , o n trta» b a s i s o T o T f l o l a i l f i g u r a » . 
* O f t r t«» baUai r - ica» o f o a i y n n a i T l a » . 
324 
VENEZUELA 
GDP in 1993) seriously jeopardized Venezuela's 
chances of achieving a macroeconomic 
equilibrium and, hence, of realizing its 
economy's potential. 
To this end, the Government enacted a policy 
package designed to boost its income. The 
measures making up this package included 
income tax reforms, the substitution of a luxury 
tax and a sales tax on wholesale transactions for 
the value-added tax (VAT) that had been 
introduced the year before (which had been 
applied only at the wholesale level), a new tax on 
bank debits, and legislative and institutional 
reforms aimed at reducing tax evasion and 
improving tax collection procedures. 
Thanks to these measures, the central 
government's non-oil revenues more than 
doubled to over 810 billion bolivars (versus 360 
billion in 1993). Of that amount, 262 billion was 
generated by the new tax levied on sales at the 
wholesale level and 110 billion by the new tax 
on bank debits. Income tax receipts climbed by 
around 40%, but the collection of customs duties 
rose only 20% as a consequence of a decrease in 
imports. 
The increase in the Government's oil 
revenues was considerably smaller (36%), 
mainly because of a further reduction in what is 
known as the "fiscal export value", which is a 
percentage that is added to the value of sales in 
order to calculate the tax base for the income 
taxes to be paid by the State-run oil company, 
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). This 
coefficient was lowered in accordance with a 
schedule which provided that it be set at 19% in 
1992,16% in 1993, 8% in 1994,4% in 1995 and 
that it be eliminated altogether in 1996. 
As a result, the percentage increase in the 
central government's total income was quite 
similar to the average annual rate of inflation, 
thereby outdistancing the nominal growth rate 
for GDP. In qualitative terms, a highly significant 
change in its income structure took place. For the 
first time in decades (with the exception of 1986, 
when international prices for crude oil had 
collapsed), non-oil income exceeded oil 
revenues and thus accounted for more than half 
of all current income. The share of income 
provided by oil revenues has been on the wane 
ever since 1990, when it stood at over 80%. 
For the public sector as a whole, however, oil 
revenues (the operating surplus of PDVSA before 
taxes) still made up 57% of current income, 
although this share, too, has been on the decline 
from the 77% level recorded in 1990. In 1994, 
dollar earnings from the oil company's sales 
improved substantially, although their 
contribution in terms of the local currency was 
smaller than it would otherwise have been due to 
the real appreciation of the bolivar. Total public 
income soared by nearly 80%, thereby boosting 
its share of GDP by four points to r early 30%. 
Meanwhile, expenditure skyrocketed due to 
the magnitude of the crisis that had engulfed the 
banking system in December 1993. After the 
Government had to take over th<! reins of the 
Banco Latino when it was declaed insolvent, 
other banks saw their depositors' confidence in 
them evaporate and had to seek official financial 
assistance from the Deposit Insurance and Bank 
Protection Fund (FOGADE), which look charge of 
these institutions' assets. Late in Ju îe, after it had 
become necessary to intervene in a number of 
different banks, the Government set up a 
stringent regulatory scheme to oversee 
Venezuelan financial institutions. Over the 
course of the year, FOGADE supplted 1.1 trillion 
bolivars in aid, which was equivalent to more 
than 13% of GDP. In exchange, the Fund received 
300 billion bolivars from the centra I government, 
whose capital outlays increased by ; i like amount. 
It did not prove possible to make any sizeable 
cuts in current expenditure either Almost two 
thirds of the central government's current 
disbursements went for interest payments on the 
public debt and for constitutionally-mandated 
transfers to regional and local govt rnments. The 
sum paid out in the form of inteiest payments 
doubled while transfers swelled by 80%. The 
only items of expenditure that the Government 
was able to reduce were civil-service wages, 
which fell in real terms, and investment, whose 
nominal increase of just 15% contrasted with an 
expansion of nearly 80% in the investments made 
by PDVSA in the country. Consequently, central 
government expenditures rose by ever 90%. 
Owing to the credit granted bj FOGADE, an 
even larger increase was seen in the consolidated 
public sector's spending levels, which jumped by 
a factor of 2.3 (measured in current bolivars). Its 
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Table 1 
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994a 
Growth rates 
Growth and investment 
Gross domestic product 
Per capita gross domestic product 
Gross national income 








Gross domestic investment 
Exports 
Imports 
Gross domestic investment 
National saving 
External saving 
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Activity rate 
Open unemployment rate e 
Real minimum wage 
(Index: 1990=100)f 
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(Index: 1990=100) 
Nominal exchange rate 
(bolívares per dollar) 
Real effective exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 
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Trade balance 







Gross debt (as a 
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88.0 73.8 88.4 100.0 81.4 80.0 74.6 
14.02 16.61 34.68 46.91 56.82 65.60 87.30 
























Millions of dollars 
-1 372 -5 785 2 177 8 303 1 769 -3 747 2 216 4 132 
320 -3 891 4 716 9 336 2 683 -1650 -296 5 812 
11428 11052 14 028 18 818 16 405 15 530 15 604 17 459 
11108 14 943 9 312 9 482 13 722 17 180 15 900 11647 
15 2 054 -2 045 -5 361 456 2 717 2 232 -4 916 
-1095 -3 871 95 2 826 2 258 -1032 -30 -850 
Percentages 
57.3 64.3 84.6 73.6 68.5 64.9 67.0 68.5 
13.2 14.7 16.2 4.1 3.2 9.2 8.8 8.2 
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Currency and credit 
Monetary balance of 
banking system 
Net international reserves 
Domestic credit 
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To the private sector 
Money (Ml) 
Savings and time deposits 
(in local currency) 
M2 
Real interest rates (annualized) 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. Based on 1980 dollars at constant prices. c These entries measure the impact ( if the variation in 
each aggregate on the variation in GDP. The coefficients were obtained by multiplying each aggregate's annual growth rate by 
the level of that aggregate as a percentage of GDP. Percentages of the working-age population. e Percentages of the 
economically active population (EAT). From June 1992 on, this includes special meal and transportation tllowances. g 
Refers to net interest as shown on the balance of payments, divided by exports of goods and services. Interest rate on 
deposits, deflated by the variation in the exchange rate. 
Table 2 
VENEZUELA: MAIN QUARTERLY INDICATORS 
1992 1993 1<>94" 
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV 
Consumer prices 
(12-month 
variation, %) 31.5 31.9 31.8 31.9 34.1 35.9 39.0 45.9 47.5 60.2 69.6 70.8 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
(Index: 1990=100) 91.0 88.3 86.1 90.7 90.0 88.8 87.9 85.5 83.8 97.1 101.6 88.2 




... 14.8 23.4 12.8 16.7 17.3 -19.0 -19.0 -23.3 
... 24.6 33.7 21.1 19.9 32.8 -6.4 -7.8 -8.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. 
* Preliminary figures. 
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share of GDP therefore surged from less than 29% 
in 1993 to more than 43% in 1994, saddling the 
public sector with a deficit equivalent to about 
14% of GDP. Of this sum, 9% corresponded to the 
deficit run up by FOGADE and 6.5% to the central 
government's financial shortfall; in contrast, 
PDVSA posted a surplus amounting to 0.3% of 
GDP and the rest of the public sector reported a 
1.4% surplus. 
In all, 3.6% of the central government's 
deficit was attributable to the capital endowment 
of FOGADE. Another 2%, approximately, 
stemmed from the losses incurred by the Central 
Bank of Venezuela (whose accounts are included 
in the central government's) in the course of the 
operations it had to undertake on the open market 
in order to soak up some of the liquidity 
generated by the financial assistance that was 
provided. Apart from these two items, the 
operation of the central government showed a 
deficit of less than 1% of GDP. On the other hand, 
if the Central Bank's quasi-fiscal deficit is added 
to the 13% of GDP represented by direct 
assistance (divided up between FOGADE and the 
central government), then a financial drain 
equivalent to a very large percentage of GDP 
(close to 15%) can be directly attributed to the 
banking crisis. 
b) Monetary policy 
The course of action followed by the Central 
Bank of Venezuela was strongly influenced by 
the emergency situation existing in the financial 
sector, since this is what made it necessary for 
the Central Bank to supply credit to the public 
sector so that it could assist banks in distress, 
thereby triggering the expansion of the monetary 
base and liquidity. Moreover, in order to help out 
banks faced with a liquidity crunch, a window for 
overnight funds was re-opened and reserve 
requirements were eased, with the minimum 
reserve being lowered from 15% to 12%. Given 
these circumstances, the Central Bank undertook 
weekly sales of zero-coupon bonds on the open 
market in an effort to siphon off excess liquidity. 
As a consequence of the financing provided 
to aid the country's banks, the net amount of 
credit furnished by the Central Bank to the public 
sector climbed by nearly 850 billion bolivars and 
figured as the main cause of the monetary base's 
expansion. The extension of credit was 
concentrated in the first half of the year, and 
during that period the Central Bank absorbed 
more than 315 billion bolivars (lhe equivalent of 
two fifths of the assistance provided by FOGADE 
during the same period) through its sales of 
zero-coupon bonds. 
This liquidity overage fueled the demand for 
goods and services, as well as for foreign 
currency, as the local currency s buying power 
weakened and inflationary expe< nations ran high. 
Given the nature of the exchang e policy applied 
by the Central Bank, which was based on the use 
of a crawling peg and called upon the Bank to 
meet the market's foreign-exchange 
requirements at a pre-determined exchange fate, 
the heavier demand for foreign exchange made 
it necessary to draw down the country's 
international reserves. The Central Bank was 
forced to allow the value of the bolivar to fall 
much more sharply than anticipated, and it 
therefore proceeded to set up a controlled float 
of the currency; later on, this float was 
implemented under a system of daily 
foreign-exchange auctions. 
Near the close of the second quarter, an 
additional spurt in the demand for foreign 
currency drove down the bolívar sharply and 
prompted the Government to establish a 
full-fledged system of exchango controls and to 
set the prices of certain essential goods and 
services. The rate for the dollar was raised to 170 
bolivars, which signified a 60% devaluation 
since the start of the year. Up lo that point, the 
Central Bank's efforts to shore up the currency 
had cost it more than US$ 3 bil ion. 
The rationing of foreign exchange allowed 
the Central Bank's international reserves to 
recover, but it also heightened the pressure 
generated by the domestic economy's excess 
liquidity. The Central Bank reacted to this 
situation by selling off more than 260 billion 
bolivars worth of zero-coupon bonds during the 
second half of the year. Although the banking 
system's cash holdings climbed somewhat and 
the monetary base expanded by 64% during the 
year, the money supply (Ml) more than doubled, 




Given the imbalances in the credit market 
associated with the banking crisis and the 
recession, during the second half of the year 
the higher level of liquidity sparked a steady 
decline in nominal interest rates. Rates on 
deposits, which had reached 80% early in the 
year, had fallen to 26% by November, although 
they then rebounded by a slight amount; at 
these levels, real interest rates were extremely 
negative. This trend was a contributing factor 
in the contraction of time deposits, with the 
result that total quasi-money expanded only 
a) Economic activity 
The recession deepened in 1994, following 
the slump in activity observed the year before. 
Total GDP shrank by nearly 3%; however, if the 
petroleum sector -which accounted for one 
fourth of GDP- is not included in the calculations, 
then the size of the contraction rises to about 5%. 
Per capita GDP also sank by 5%, for a cumulative 
loss of more than 7% over the last two years. 
Gross national income was almost 6% lower 
owing to both a downturn in net income from 
abroad under the heading of factor services and 
a deterioration in the terms of trade. 
Because the public sector plays such an 
important role in capital formation, the sharp 
cutback in public investment was one of the main 
factors driving down domestic demand and 
economic activity. The level of public investment 
felt the full force of the difficulties experienced 
by the public sector and of its subsequent efforts 
to reduce spending in order to pare down its huge 
fiscal deficit. Unlike what occurred in 1993, this 
time private investment also declined (by almost 
one fifth) due to the adverse expectations 
engendered by the prevailing climate of 
economic instability, the disorganization of 
financial intermediation activities occasioned by 
the banking crisis, the high interest rates in effect 
until mid-year and, possibly, the difficulties 
encountered in obtaining imported inputs and 
capital goods during the second half of 1994. 
The 25% drop in fixed investment, which was 
the second decrease in as many years, pushed the 
level of investment to a low of 16% of GDP. A 
32% in 1994as the public's prefc rence shifted 
towards more liquid types of assets. Rates on 
loans, for their part, dropped from 90% to 
54%, which also made for negative real yields 
(although they were high in Jollar terms, 
since the dollar's parity had been fixed since 
June). In an economy riIdled with 
uncertainty, the monetary authority sought to 
provide guidelines for the market by pegging 
increases in the minimum authorized level for 
interest rates to the yields of 90-day 
zero-coupon bonds. 
substantial downswing was also observed in 
inventories, equivalent to almost 8% of GDP. This 
poor showing was made in spite of a higher level 
of national saving, which climbed to 13% of GDP. 
Consumption fell much less steeply than 
investment, but the adverse impaci of its decline 
was just as great because consumpt ion represents 
such a large share of total demand. Public-sector 
consumption was down by over 4% and the 
decrease in private consumption was even 
sharper. This trend was matched by a 7% 
downturn in total supply as the cont raction of GDP 
was compounded by a 30% reduction in the 
volume of imports. 
The combined effect of this lower level of 
domestic consumption and an uptt rn in external 
demand was to boost exports by 10%. Exports of 
crude oil rose by a similar amount : n the wake of 
an upswing in output brought about by the 
development plan set in motion by PDVSA the 
year before. In fact, oil production climbed from 
less than 2.6 million barrels per day to over 2.7 
million, and the petroleum industry was therefore 
one of the few sectors to record < n increase in 
output (of nearly 6%) in 1994. 
Other production activities that did well were 
the mining of substances other thun petroleum, 
which expanded 8%, and the electri :ity and water 
sector (up 1%). All the main mining products 
boasted significant increases, especially bauxite 
(60%). The production of diamonds, gold and 
iron ore gained back some of the g'ound lost the 
year before. 
The petroleum sector's momem um spread to 
the petrochemical industry. The output of plastics 
3. The main variables 
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and olefins, in particular, increased considerably. 
This was also true of aluminium, but quite the 
opposite occurred in the case of steel and steel 
rods. A moderate increase in the production of 
tyres was also recorded. The GDP for the 
manufacturing sector as a whole slipped by 4%, 
however. 
The sector that was hurt the most by the 
economy-wide recession was construction, 
which plummeted 26%. Here, too, the main 
cause was the slackening of public-sector 
activity. Commerce was hurt as well, with the 
volume of transactions falling off by 13%. The 
automotive industry's sales plunged 40%, but the 
decrease was even greater in the case of imported 
motor vehicles. 
In agriculture, whose aggregate output also 
diminished (-3%), the results for the different 
crops were quite uneven, although many of those 
that had suffered setbacks in 1993 rebounded in 
1994. The more prominent exception was cacao, 
whose output continued to decline. 
b) Prices, wages and employment 
Prices were influenced by the large amount of 
liquidity that was injected into the banking 
system during the first half of the year, when the 
local currency was rapidly depreciating, and by 
economic agents' predominantly adverse 
expectations. The rate of price increases picked 
up speed and by the end of the year had passed 
the 70% mark, thus coming quite close to the 
record high set in 1981. 
In February 1994, the increase in the CPI for 
the Caracas metropolitan area began to follow a 
geometric progression; this set up a feedback 
loop between the CPI and economic agents' 
expectations, until late in June the Government 
decided to impose price controls on selected 
essential goods and services. This made it 
possible to slow down the CPI, although late in 
the third quarter and early in the fourth, it began 
to be evident that pressure had been building up 
due to economic agents' limited access to foreign 
exchange, which was in its turn a consequence of 
the exchange controls then in force. 
All the major product groups contributed to 
the ascent of the general index, but the largest 
increase was in the category of food, beverages 
and tobacco; this was also the only group in 
which the rate of price increases exceeded the 
index average. Generally speaking, goods 
exhibited sharper price hikes trian services did, 
and within that category, the price increases for 
durable goods were substantially above those 
registered for non-durables. In the case of 
services, prices rose more sharply in the private 
sector than in the public sector. 
Wholesale prices climbed even more steeply. 
The wholesale price index (WPi) for imported 
products (mainly manufactures) doubled during 
the year, whereas the WPI for Venezuelan-made 
goods marked up an increase of 86%. 
In order to cushion the real wages of 
low-income workers from the adverse impact of 
rising prices, the Government raised the legal 
minimum wage from 9,000 to 15,000 bolivars 
per month in urban areas and from 7,000 to 
12,500 bolivars in rural areas. These pay hikes 
boosted the purchasing power of the urban and 
rural minimum wages by nearly 6% and 4%, 
respectively. Low-paid workers also received an 
additional allowance equivalent to 40% of the 
monthly urban minimum wage. 
The slump in the production sector of the 
economy also had a negative influence on the 
labour market. Job creation fell short of the 
growth in the labour force, and unemployment 
therefore mounted from 6.6% in 1993 to 8.5% in 
the second half of 1994. This was a reflection 
both of higher unemployment among persons 
previously employed (slightly more than 7% of 
the economically active population (EAP)) and of 
an increase in the proportion or that population 
seeking work for the first time (1.3%). 
Two factors appear to have helped prevent the 
increase in open unemployment from being even 
greater. First, the crop-farming ¡sector offered an 
alternative source of jobs for some of the people 
who could not find work in urban areas, since -in 
contrast to the situation in the rest of the 
economy- a striking increase was registered in 
the number of persons employed in the primary 
sector. In the construction industry, the number 
of employed persons diminished in absolute 
terms; this was also the case in the services 
sector, with the exceptions of commerce and 
transport. The rate of joblessness among 
previously-employed persons therefore 
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increased in the secondary and tertiary sectors, 
with construction being the industry with the 
highest level of previously-employed persons 
who were out of work (around 15% of the labour 
force). 
Second, some of the people who were laid off 
appear to have moved into the informal sector of 
the economy, inasmuch as the percentage of total 
jobs accounted for by this sector, which had 
hovered around 40% since the early 1980s (30% 
in the late 1970s), climbed to about 50% in 1994. 
c) The external sector 
The situation prevailing during the last two 
years, which was marked by a deficit on current 
account and surplus positions on the capital 
account, did an about-face in 1994. The current 
account boasted a surplus of over US$ 4 billion, 
thanks to an even larger trade surplus (US$ 5.8 
billion) while the deficit in factor services stayed 
within the same range as in the two preceding 
years. This overage of current income as 
compared to current payments was countered by 
a deficit in capital transactions amounting to over 
US$ 4.9 billion. 
Consequently, the country rounded out the 
year with a loss of over US$ 800 million in 
reserves; this figure was, however, in large part 
a reflection of the exchange controls established 
midway through the year, which successfully 
reversed a free fall in the level of reserves that 
was estimated, at that point in time, at over 
US$ 3 billion. At the close of 1994, Venezuela's 
reserves amounted to some US$ 12.5 billion, 
which would be enough to finance about one 
year's worth of imports. 
The country's hefty trade surplus was 
attributable to both a strong export performance 
and a drop in imports. The export sector, in its 
turn, had responded to robust external demand 
and sluggish demand at home. The export item 
that benefited the most from this situation was 
crude oil, since increases in the volume of 
external sales (from 1.5 to 1.7 million barrels per 
day) and in the price of crude (from US$ 12.10 
to US$ 12.30 per barrel) pushed the value of 
crude oil exports 6% above their 1993 level. 
The slackening of both demand and 
consumption in the domestic economy sparked a 
33% jump in non-traditional exports which 
carried them to an all-time record level. All the 
major export products were sweot up in this 
boom, with the expansion of (nan-monetary) 
gold sales by the Central Bank of Venezuela 
being especially notable. Accordingly, 
non-traditional exports' share of otal external 
sales continued to grow -reaching 27% in 1994-
while the share accounted for by petroleum 
showed a matching decrease. Nevertheless, 
petroleum sales still generated almost three 
fourths of Venezuela's export earnings. 
Colombia was once again the country's 
largest export market, followed cosely by the 
United States. These two countries were the 
destination for over one half of Venezuela's 
external sales, which was a slightly higher 
proportion than in 1993. 
Merchandise imports weakened for the 
second year in a row, falling in value to about 
US$ 8 billion, or 30% less than in 1993 (39% 
below the 1992 level). The decrease in volume 
was even greater, however, since average price 
levels were up. This result can be ascribed to 
listless domestic demand and the difficulty of 
obtaining foreign exchange during the second 
half of the year, after exchange controls had been 
imposed. Capital goods imports (-33%), which 
were hurt by cuts in corporate investment, and 
imports of consumer goods (-31%] were hit the 
hardest. 
Capital movements reflected the instability of 
exchange and financial markets in 1994, 
especially in the first six months of the year, 
when a great deal of foreign exchange flowed out 
of the country. Overall, the main causes of the 
deterioration in Venezuela's capital account 
were a reversal in portfolio investment's 
direction of flow, a reduction in tlie amount of 
long-term credit at the disposal cf the public 
sector and the departure of short-term private 
capital. The country did, however, receive a 
positive net flow of direct investr lent (around 
US$ 140 million), which represented a 
turnaround from the year before, when the net 
flow had been negative. 
The outward flow of portfolio investments, 
which amounted to nearly -US S 1 billion, 
followed a positive inflow of over US$ 700 
million in 1993. Long-term loans r&xived by the 
331 
public sector tumbled from nearly US$ 700 
million to US$ 270 million, thus falling more 
steeply than in the private sector. The outflow of 
private short-term capital, which had amounted 
to US$ 700 million in 1993, topped US$ 1.3 
billion. On the other hand, the accumulation of 
interest arrears on the external public debt helped 
to check the deterioration of the capital account. 
Amortization payments were almost halved, 
and the servicing of the total external debt 
(predominantly public debt) therefore declined 
by about US$ 1 billion. The tightness of 
external credit also led to a reduction of 
roughly the same amount in the country's level 
of indebtedness, which thus slipped below 
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